The representation of African humanism in the narrative writings of Es'kia Mphahlele by Rafapa, Lesibana Jacobus
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE REPRESENTATION OF AFRICAN HUMANISM IN THE NARRATIVE 
WRITINGS OF ES’KIA MPHAHLELE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LESIBANA JACOBUS RAFAPA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Literature at the University of 
Stellenbosch 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Promotor: Prof. A.H. Gagiano 
December 2005 
 i
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
 
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this dissertation is my own 
original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it at any 
university for a degree. 
 
 
 
                                L.J. RAFAPA                        16 DECEMBER 2005 
               Signature: …………………..       Date: ……………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
ABSTRACT 
The introductory chapter of this thesis – in which I place Mphahlele's works within 
the Afrocentric, postcolonial theoretical context within which he wrote – consists 
of three sections that explain the three different ways in which I contextualise my 
investigation of the ways in which Mphahlele represents his concept of African 
humanism in his narrative writings. In section 1.1 I detail the historical 
background and context within which Mphahlele's philosophy of African 
humanism will be shown to have evolved, alongside my analysis of a selected 
few of his poems and all of his narrative writings, articulated in the main body of 
the thesis. I approach this introductory sketching of the historical context by 
tracing the development over time of antecedent concepts articulated by other 
writers, followed by a chronological tracing of the progressive, successive 
articulations of the idea of African humanism in Mphahlele’s own discursive 
writing . This is followed in section 1.2 by an outline of the theoretical notions or 
concepts from various sources by means of which the analysis is executed, 
some of which are Edward Said's notion of "the integrated vision", Fanon's idea 
of "national culture" and Bhabha's metonymic notion of "mimicry". Section 1.3 
dwells on a description of the conceptual approach I use throughout the thesis – 
that of viewing literature as anchored in the empirical milieu constituting the 
referential framework of its subject matter. In this section I also highlight the 
analytical method of scrutinising Mphahlele's works from the sociolinguistic point 
of view that links dialogue and the symbols yielded by fiction to the local cultural 
orientation of the people for whom artefacts were composed. The organisation of 
the later chapters of this thesis according to literary genre is also explained and 
rationalised in section 1.3. 
After looking briefly at Mphahlele’s poetry and more fully at his short stories in 
Chapter 2 in order to trace how he represents the concept of African humanism 
in a more distinct and recognisable manner in the latter compared to the former 
genre (focusing on dialogue and imagery), this study proceeds in Chapter 3 to 
demonstrate how this concept is interwoven with the fabric of Mphahlele’s 
autobiographies, Down Second Avenue and Afrika My Music, exhibiting the 
author’s concern with this concept and his expression of it in these texts, without 
his violating the conventions of autobiography by articulating it discursively. 
Further instances of the incorporation of African humanist tenets into Mphahlele’s 
literary works are explored in a consideration of his two early novels (The 
Wanderers and Chirundu) in Chapter 4. In the commentaries on the novels which 
are addressed in this chapter, the many stylistic and thematic parallels with the 
texture of writing in the texts considered earlier are discussed – in order to 
explore what appears at this point to be a more profound and extensive 
exemplification of Mphahlele’s philosophy of African humanism. Chapter 5 dwells 
on Mphahlele’s last novel to date, Father Come Home, arguing that the apparent 
simplicity of the work deceptively conceals the author’s most vivid literary 
representations of his theory of African humanism, conveyed by means of 
particularly dexterous implementations of his trademark literary devices, here 
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engaged most effectively by introducing to the reader a novel kind of character 
who embodies African humanism in a manner that is unprecedented in 
Mphahlele’s literary career.  
In Chapter 6 cumulative evidence is put together to demonstrate that Mphahlele, 
through his narrative writings, has succeeded in developing and perfecting his 
concept of African humanism, with the result that it has been shaped into a 
coherent, nuanced and lucid theory or philosophy. 
 
    OPSOMMING 
Die inleidende hoofstuk van hierdie tesis – waarin Mphahele se werke gesitueer word 
binne die Afrosentriese, postkoloniale konteks waarbinne hy geskryf het – bestaan uit 
drie gedeeltes wat die drie verskillende metodes waarvolgens ek my ondersoek na die 
manier waarop Mphahlele sy konsep van Afrika-humanisme in sy narratiewe werke 
weergee, kontekstualiseer.  In 1.1 detailleer ek die historiese agtergrond en konteks 
waarbinne Mphahlele se fiolsofie van Afrika-humanisme ontwikkel het, teenoor my 
analise van ’n paar geselekteerde gedigte van hom asook al sy narratiewe werke, wat in 
die hoof-gedeelte van die tesis geartikuleer word.  My benadering tot hierdie inleidende 
beskrywing van die historiese konteks is om die ontwikkeling, oor tyd, van voorafgaande 
konsepte (soos deur ander skrywers verwoord) na te gaan, gevolg deur ’n kronologiese 
belyning van die ontwikkellende, opeenvolgende artikulasies van die konsep van Afrika-
humanisme in Mphahlele se eie teoretiese en lewensbeskoulike werke.  Dit word 
opgevolg in 1.2 deur ’n omlyning van die teoretiese konsepte uit verskillende bronne met 
behulp waarvan die analise uitgevoer word, sommige waarvan Edward Said se idee van 
’n geintegreerde visie, Fanon se konsep van ’n nasionale kultuur en Bhabha se 
metonimiese idee van nabootsing is.  Gedeelte 1.3 konsentreer op ’n beskrywing van die 
konseptuele benadering waarvan ek dwarsdeur die tesis gebruik maak – die beskouing 
van letterkunde as geanker in die empiriese milieu, wat die verwysingsraamwerk van die 
literêre wêreld uitmaak.  In hierdie gedeelte belig ek ook die analitiese metode om 
Mphahlele se werke vanuit ’n sosiolinguistiese vertrekpunt, wat dialoog en die simbole 
wat uit fiksie voortvloei verbind met die plaaslike kulturele omgewing van diegene vir 
wie die artefakte geskep is, te skrutineer.  Die rangskikking van die latere hoofstukke van 
hierdie tesis volgens literêre genre, word ook verduidelik in 1.3.   
Na ’n kort bespreking van uitgesoekte gedigte deur Mphahlele, gevolg deur ’n volledige 
bespreking van sy kortverhale in Hoofstuk 2 – met die doel om te analiseer hoe hierdie 
skrywer (deur sy gebruik van dialoog en beeldspraak) die konsep van Afrika-humanisme 
progressief verdiep in die ‘oorgang’ van een genre na die ander – word daar in Hoofstuk 
3 gedemonstreer hoe hierdie konsep verweef is met die outobiografiese tekstuur van 
Mphahlele se eie-lewensbeskrywende werke Down Second Avenue en Afrika My Music. 
In hierdie twee werke word die skrywer se betrokkenheid met en verwoording van sy 
konsep van Afrika-humanisme uitgelig, soos hy dit uitvoer sonder om die biografiese 
konvensies te verbreek deur die idee diskursief te artikuleer.  Verder voorbeelde van die 
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beliggaming van die beginsels van Afrika-humanisme in Mphahlele se literêre werke 
word ondersoek in ’n bespreking van sy twee vroee romans The Wanderers en Chirundu 
in Hoofstuk 4.  In die kommentaar op die romans wat in hierdie hoofstuk bespreek word, 
word die vele stilistiese en tematiese paralelle met die werke wat vroeer in die tesis 
bestudeer is, bespreek – met die doel om te bepaal wat op hierdie punt na ’n diepere en 
meer wydlopende verbeelding van Mphahlele se filosofie van Afrika-humanisme lyk.  
Hoofstuk 5 konsentreer op Mphahlele se tot op hede laaste roman, Father Come Home.  
Hier word geargumenteer dat die oppervlakkige indruk van die skynbare eenvoud van die 
roman misleidend is, omdat dit die skrywer se helderste literêre voorstelling van sy teorie 
van Afika-humanisme versteek – hier oorgedra deur midde van ’n besonder vaardige 
implementering van Mphahlele se kenmerkende literêre strategiee, deur die leser voor te 
stel aan ’n nuwe tipe karakter wat die Afrika-humanisme beliggaam op ’n manier wat 
sonder presedent in Mphahlele se literêre loopbaan is.   
In Hoofstuk 6 word die opgeboude getuienis saamgestel om te bewys dat Mphahlele deur 
sy narratiewe werke daarin geslaag het om sy konsep van Afrika-humanisme te ontwikkel 
en te vervolmaak, met die gevolg dat dit gevorm is tot ’n koherente, genuanseerde en 
heldere teorie of filosofie.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v
DEDICATION 
 
 
Without the many sacrifices and immeasurable support of my lovely wife Ramokone 
Margaret , and precious children Thabo Monona Stanley, Mokgathi Katlego and Raesibe 
Mothepa Rachel Lillian, I would not have completed this work.  This dissertation is for 
you.  This is also for Dr Khomotšo Reginald Kganyago, who has affectionately accepted 
to be my younger brother.  I dedicate this study also to my elder brother Jacob Malose 
Isaiah Rafapa for his moral support throughout my learning career. 
 
How it smarts my heart to be celebrating my obtaining of the doctoral degree without the 
physical presence of the following members of my family!  It is partly as a way of 
dealing with this pain that I dedicate the success represented by completion of this thesis 
to my younger sister Gloria Rankotsana Ntshegi (died 1999); my mother Lydia Rachel 
Raesibe Rafapa (nee Leso, died 2000); my father Rev. Elias Malesela “Molemi” Rafapa 
(died 2001); my niece Vinolia Seja “Poppie” Ntshegi (died 2002); and my father-in-law 
Alfred Madimetja Thebetha (died 2003).  I know you are all alive and well in the land of 
the ancestors: so please share in this joy with me.  I dedicate this doctoral thesis to you 
all. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
My Promotor, Professor A.H. Gagiano, of the English Department at Stellenbosch 
University deserves my sincerest gratitude for her untiring guidance and support 
throughout the arduous work of writing this thesis.  Without the invaluable support of 
Mrs Mara Visser of the University of Stellenbosch Library I could not have finished my 
studies successfully as a distant student. Prof. Es’kia Mphahlele’s personal 
encouragement each time I approached him on matters related to research towards 
completion of this thesis is heartily acknowledged and thanked.  Let me acknowledge 
also the unimaginably huge support Mr Mike Stainbank of The Es’kia Institute showed 
me.  May Professor Lesiba Jo Teffo’s inspiring support as I grappled with the thesis 
proposal that gave birth to this final product be immortalised through the mystical power 
of the Sotho phrase ke a leboga, Mothokwa.  Let me take this opportunity also to thank 
Prof. C.H. Muller, formerly of the English Department at the University of the North 
(now University of Limpopo) and its former Vice Chancellor and Rector, the late Prof. 
P.C. Mokgokong.  When apartheid forces in the early 1980s wanted to nip me and other 
comrades-in-the-liberation-struggle in the bud, it is these two great men who went out of 
their way to make sure that we completed our undergraduate studies and later joined the 
adult world intellectually well-equipped.  I thank the Pan South African Language Board 
(PanSALB) and its loving leadership for their financial support that enabled me to afford 
fees towards my completion of the D. Litt. degree; colleagues Dr C.D. (Mike) Tlale, Dr 
Mariëtta Alberts, Mr Edwin Nyatlo, Mr Jefferey Mabelebele, Mr Joseph Ramokolo and 
Mr Phineas Rantlhakgwa’s brotherly encouragement is also much appreciated.  In my 
past studies during matric and postgraduate diploma (that have naturally culminated in 
this latest qualification I receive now), financial support was granted to me by the caring 
Zion Christian Church (ZCC) and its holy leadership, the committed Department of 
Education in Lebowa (now part of Limpopo), and the passionate J.L. van Schaik 
Publishers with whom I had published my debut novel.  I am at a loss for words with 
which to thank all these people. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-heading Page 
1.     Introduction  
       1.1    The Concept of African Humanism: Problems of Definition;  
Socio-Historical Background; and Evolution in Mphahlele’s 
Own Writing 
1 
       1.2        Theoretical Perspectives and Apparatus 61 
       1.3        Conceptual Approach, Analytical Method and Design 80 
2.    The Short Stories and Poetry  
       2.1        Instances of African Humanism in Mphahlele’s Poetry 85 
       2.2        The Short Stories 104 
       2.2.1     Apartheid in the Background 105 
       2.2.2     Apartheid in the Foreground 116 
       2.2.3     Mphahlele’s Use of Literal Translation 123 
       2.2.4     A More Marked Appropriation of English 127 
       2.2.5     African Cultural Traces in the Short Stories 136 
 
      2.2.6      Mphahlele’s Use of Style to Represent Personality Traits and        
                      Individual Conduct 
   
143 
       2.2.6.1   The Fabrication of Resonance 144 
       2.2.6.2   The Africanist Abrogation of Western Christianity 148 
       2.2.6.3   The Portrayal of Black Women as Stronger than Men 152 
       2.3         Closing Remarks 158 
3.    The Autobiographies  
       3.1         Opening Remarks 165 
       3.2.1      General Instances of African Humanism in the  
                     Autobiographies 
168 
 
        3.2.2     Other Representations of African Cultures 179 
        3.2.3     African Religion 183 
        3.2.4     Black Women as Strong 191 
        3.2.5     Mphahlele’s Extraordinary Description of the Setting 195 
        3.2.6     Effacement of the Apartheid Theme in the Longer  
                     Narratives 
197 
        3.2.7     Mphahlele as a Postcolonial Writer and  Theorist 199 
        3.2.8     Mphahlele’s Way of Making Meaning  205 
        3.3        Closing Remarks 214 
4.      The Novels  
        4.1        Opening Remarks 218 
        4.2        The Tyranny of Place and Time Portrayed in Bold 225 
        4.3        TheTyranny of Place and Time Portrayed in Fine Print 238 
 viii
        4.4        A Further Dimension of Mphahlele’s Narrative Writings 245 
        4.5        Familiar Stylistic Threads Continued 251 
        4.6        Closing Remarks 265 
5.     Back to Maupaneng  
        5.1        Opening Remarks 268 
        5.2        Rural Life Beyond Exile 270 
        5.3        Dimensions of Growth  
        5.3.1     Women as Pillars of Family and Nation 275 
        5.3.2     Mythmaking 279 
        5.3.3     Uniqueness of Dialogue 287 
        5.4        Closing Remarks 291 
6.   Conclusion  
        6.1        Opening Remarks 293 
        6.2        Literary Representations of African Humanism 297 
        6.3        African Humanism and Current Challenges 303 
        6.4        Closing Remarks 311 
7.  Bibliography 314 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ix
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 THE CONCEPT OF AFRICAN HUMANISM: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION; SOCIO-HISTORICAL 
BACKGROUND; AND EVOLUTION IN MPHAHLELE’S OWN WRITING 
 
Within the South African intellectual, social and political context, as well as 
internationally, a great deal of confusion has arisen around attempts to combine the 
concepts “African” and “humanism”.  It is thus necessary to look at how Mphahlele has 
resolved the intellectual or definitional dilemmas inherent in devising his concept of 
African humanism.   As the term “African humanism” combines individual terms whose 
meanings are already clouded by incoherent usage and historically acquired meanings, it 
naturally inherits the problems coming with the definition and use of the terms “African” 
and “humanism”.   As such, problems can be expected to vary from context to context.   
It is hence useful and enlightening to approach the problem of definition that Mphahlele’s 
concept of African humanism has had to face chronologically.   
 
According to Mphahlele, the roots of fundamental contemporary differences between 
Western and African humanisms are traceable “back to ancient Greece and Rome” 
(“Notes Towards” 135). In his view, thus, although the two kinds of humanisms have co-
existed since the genesis of these ideas or practices, because of the different geohistorical 
environments in which the two broad cultural clusters lived their distinction can be said 
to have started showing pronouncedly since Classical times.  A scrutiny of Mphahlele’s 
discursive writings reveals that in his view the divergences between the two types of 
humanism narrowed somewhat during Renaissance, when Western humanism “came into 
prominence in reference to the Renaissance (AD 1300-AD 1600)” (“The Fabric” 149).  
What this means is that according to Mphahlele’s thinking the distinguishing 
characteristics of the new thinking that surfaced in Europe during the historical period 
known as the Renaissance, i.e. European humanism, correlated with some core premises 
of African humanism.   In respect of European humanism, however, Mphahlele holds that 
“dissociation occurred between the Renaissance intelligence and the moral content of 
humanity [especially] in the world of science, exploration and commerce” (“Notes 
Towards” 135).   Enrichment of the African humanist existential outlook by social and 
scientific developments associated with the Renaissance resulted dialectically (according 
to the way Mphahlele delineates his concept of African humanism) in a change of 
character that was different from that of post-Renaissance European humanism.  That this 
was the case is evident in Mphahlele’s remark that in the post-Renaissance world of 
today “the black African … [still] cherishes a world view that perceives an organic 
universe [in which] a dichotomy between the realms of the intellect and spiritual 
experience would be untenable, even inconceivable” (“Notes Towards” 135).  The world-
view of African humanism, according to Mphahlele, entered the next historical period 
(known as the Enlightenment) in this shape. 
 
This study will demonstrate that since his beginnings as a theorist Mphahlele responds 
implicitly to what he perceives as skewed Western critical opinion on the nature of 
Africanness.   Such distorted or myopic European or Eurocentric views about 
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Africanness gained a huge dominance during the Enlightenment.  Africanist thinkers 
faced in later periods with this kind of lingering bias, spawned by the dominant 
theoretical climate of the Enlightenment, had to adopt Afrocentric attitudes in order to 
counteract its pernicious effects – as this dissertation will illustrate.   Without the terms 
“Afrocentric” or “Eurocentric” being used in social analysis in these early historical 
times, dominant Western discourse of these eras was undoubtedly informed by 
Eurocentrism, while that of Africanist theorists who protested against Eurocentric 
attitudes (which intensified especially during the Enlightenment) was fuelled by 
Afrocentrism.  This is because Afrocentrism refers to an attitude that directly combats 
European hegemonic discourse in order to negate its inherent Eurocentrism as a pole 
diametrically opposed to that associated with Africanists.  One of the most prominent 
Africanist theorists, Ali Mazrui, confirms the accuracy of the way I describe 
Afrocentrism above, in his explanation of what it entails: 
 Afrocentricity is … the term used [to describe] global Africa as the sum total of 
 continental Africa [as well as] the diaspora of enslavement created by the 
 dispersal of enslavement and, finally the [later] diaspora of colonialism or the 
 dispersal caused by the destabilisation and long-term consequences and 
 disruptions of the colonial era … [as well as] a dialectical method, seeking to  
 negate the … negative portrayal of the most distorted history in the world, that of 
 the African people [so that where] the thesis is euro-centricism, the antithesis is 
 afro-centricity.   (“Global Africa” 17) 
The Eurocentrism that gained huge momentum during the Enlightenment could loosely 
be referred to as a type of racism.  However, I strive throughout this thesis to maintain a 
distinction between Eurocentrism and racism – in the way Mphahlele makes the point 
never to confound the two distinct phenomena.  As this study will demonstrate, to be 
Eurocentric or Afrocentric is not necessarily to be racist, despite the fact that the two 
opposed theoretical perspectives may be evaluated as racist by those interpreting them.  
While it is true (as this study will illustrate) that racism emanated from and became rife in 
the same historical context as Eurocentrism, it is a separate issue in its own right, as is the 
case with other modes of thinking that will be discussed at the different stages through 
which Mphahlele’s definitions of his concept of African humanism has gone. 
 
What a study of this nature has to take into account is that before the concept of African 
humanism can establish itself, the humanity of African people needs to be acknowledged.  
A battle with a long, even ancient history of its own, this took a particular form because 
the conbribution of European Englightenment thinkers to European humanism involved a 
nearly uniform denigration of Africans: a questioning of their intellectual capacities and 
their status as human beings.  One Afrocentric theorist who has commented on 
Enlightenment thinking is Simon Gikandi.   He highlights the British philosopher Hume’s 
claim that the African is “incapable of artistic production and, by implication, [of 
intellectual] aesthetic judgment” (“Africa and the Idea of the Aesthetic” 5).  According to 
western thinkers like the one-time American President Jefferson, questions of morality 
and art are intimately bound together and the capacity for aesthetic judgment is seen as 
one of the crucial attributes of homo sapiens (“Africa and the Idea of the Aesthetic” 5).   
Within the context of Enlightenment thinking, the implication of Hume’s verdict is hence 
that Africans could not quite qualify as humans. It is as an individual theorising within 
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this historical trend that Lucien Levy-Bruhl sees an African as emotional and affective, 
and as incapable of thinking and reasoning (see Trinh T. Minh-ha’s article in 
McClintock, Mufti and Shohat 417).   
 
According to the African American Afrocentric writer Henry Louis Gates Jr., forerunners 
to challenge the denial of humanity to Africans include persons like Crummel whose 
activism started in 1833 or 1834 (Gates, Loose Canons 73).  The intellectual premise of 
Africanists such as Crummel can be regarded as prefiguring Pan Africanism, which is a 
refinement of the Afrocentric attitude in terms of contour and content. Hence Crummel’s 
reference not narrowly to African Americanism, but to world-wide Africanism (Loose 
Canons 74).  It is the Pan Africanist ethos that later impelled leaders like Patrice 
Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, Kenneth Kaunda and Jomo Kenyatta to view the problem 
of colonisation commonly impinging on the human dignity and freedom of Africans as 
necessitating a concerted way of thinking and resistance –  hence their championing of 
some form of Pan-Africanism in later decades. At a later stage the rise of African 
Christian intellectuals such as Bishop Crowther (since 1841) resulted in a strengthened 
Pan Africanist feeling that enabled them and their followers to transcend state boundaries 
and regard themselves as a global Africanist formation (Loose Canons 73).  
 
Notions from which Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism later drew strength are 
discernible also in the orientation of some of Crowther’s contemporaries and 
predecessors (such as Crummel).  As Mphahlele acknowledges, Bishop Crowther and his 
contemporaries “admired and adopted some aspects of Western culture for African 
advancement, but not at the expense of traditional institutions and self-determination” 
(Mphahlele, “African Identity” 46).  Here are evident the foundations of Mphahlele’s 
acknowledgement of hybridity as inevitable within the consciousness of Africans on 
account of historical-environmental contingencies, along with his insistence on the 
management of hybridity so as not to allow it to degenerate into unmediated mimicry.    
As from 1865 Africanists such as George W. Johnson (Gates, Loose Canons 74) 
enthusiastically furthered the concerted efforts of their fellow Africanists in asserting the 
humanity of Africans.  Mphahlele has recorded his awareness of early American 
Africanists such as Edward Wilmot Blyden, who was born in one of the Danish West 
Indies, but later became a citizen of both Liberia and Sierra Leone and who entered the 
American Africanist  scene in the early 1870s (Mphahlele, “African Identity” 46-50).  
Mphahlele approvingly ascribes the following standpoint to Blyden; explaining why later 
in his own formulation and practice of African humanism he makes sure to point out the 
danger of a culturally effacing agenda beneath the veil of language: 
Language would be one of the first elements of the West to use; plus the ideas that 
language carried e.g. democracy, liberty, franchise, civilization, and so on.  These 
were foreign to African thinking and he had no vocabulary for them, i.e. foreign 
as concepts to theorize about.  (“African Identity” 47) 
The citation makes clear why Mphahlele subsumed an Afrocentric stance in 
conceptualising African humanism, to correct the distorted views of the West about the 
mental abilities and social worth of Africans.   The quotation reveals Blyden as a 
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precursor of Mphahlele’s literary practice of abrogating∗ the English language.   It is 
interesting that foundations of Mphahlele’s philosophy of African humanism are 
discernible in the thinking of early Africanist thinkers such as these, in order for 
Eurocentric ideas to be recast within African modes of thinking.  That Blyden, like 
Mphahlele (and later African thinkers like Nkrumah, Kaunda and Nyerere) was 
Afrocentric in negotiating the meeting of his African consciousness with European 
thinking, is revealed by the following quote from the same essay by Mphahlele: 
Blyden lived in a century when European anthropologists were trying to prove 
that the White man was superior to the African.  He, on the other hand, knew that 
the races of the world are different, but at the same time he attacked the theory 
that White intellectual achievement was any higher in value and standard to the 
African’s culture.  Each race, he argued further, sees from its own position a 
different aspect of the Almighty God within us, and we have by virtue of this 
freedom to be ourselves and contribute our cultures to the total whole.  (“African 
Identity” 48)  
Not only do the quoted statements confirm an implied intellectual reaction among 
Africanists to the Enlightenment’s Western philosophical bias regarding the humanity of 
Africans, but they also testify to the 19th century genesis of the Afrocentric strategy of 
abrogating the English language. 
 
In his essay “African Identity – Nationalism – The African Personality – Negritude”, 
Mphahlele significantly specifies “the Berlin Convention of 1884” (“African Identity” 
46) as the formal commencement of the piecemeal colonisation of the African continent.  
This was the formal start of a major historical process that was to result in what one of 
the best known African writers, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, desribed as a both crafty and violent 
subversion of African social systems:  
Berlin in 1884 was effected through the sword and the bullet.  But the night of 
 the sword and the bullet was followed by the morning of the chalk and the 
 blackboard.  The physical violence of the battlefield was followed by the 
 psychological violence of the classroom.  (Ngugi, Decolonising 9)   
More importantly, though, this cataclysmic European gesture gave birth all over the 
African continent to the (consequent) theorising on the experience of colonisation by 
Africanist writers.  
 
The outline above of dominant Eurocentric thinking into the 1800s reveals the 
enmeshment of perceptions of Africans’ supposed inhumanity with assumptions 
concerning their purported inability to create art.  It thus makes sense that reference is 
made to the status of African art alongside repudiation of misperceptions that denied 
Africans their humanity.  The African American scholar Henry Louis Gates Jr. 
emphasises the African mask’s power to symbolise the distinctiveness of African 
lifestyles, on a Pan Africanist scale, in the following words:  
 Out of all artifacts out of Africa, it is indeed the mask that most compels.  The 
 principal artistic attraction at the 1897 Exposition in Brussels was a magnificent 
 collection of African masks and sculptures … [It] impressed French artists to such 
                                           
∗This term will be discussed in section 1.2 of this introductory chapter. 
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 an extent that the concepts of movement, rhythm, and self-contained interiority 
 that gave rise to cubism and dadaism arose from a transformation of the African 
 mask … For [in the African mask] is contained, as well as reflected, a coded, 
 secret, hermetic world, a world discovered only by the initiate.  (Gates, Figures in 
 Black  167) 
Gates highlights the need for non-Africans to be prepared to learn about Africans in order 
to appreciate the distinctiveness of Africans’ consciousness and way of life in the 
expression “a world discovered only by the initiate” (Gates, Figures in Black 167).   
 
It is significant that all of the 19th century Africanists cited above are acknowledged by 
Mphahlele as having adopted Christianity and ascended to the social status of Christian 
leadership among their African compatriots.  This fact explains why later Africanists 
including Mphahlele, are not characterised by a simplistic or reductionist rejection of 
western Christianity.  Instead, in keeping with a tradition established by the 19th century 
Christian nationalists cited above, Africanists are known for linking nationalism with the 
abrogation of western Christianity – in theory or in practice.  It is in the form of an 
affirming perpetration of this 19th century Africanist leaning that Mphahlele invariably 
alternates the definition of his theory of African humanism with descriptions of the way 
latter day African Christian leaders embraced religious nationalism as a weapon for 
liberation, epoch after epoch.    Mphahlele employs this discursive refrain to such an 
extent that his delineation of the way some Africans have abrogated western Christianity 
has attained the status of a bona fide aspect of his concept of African humanism. 
 
After the fabric of Africanist thinking took on the texture described in the preceding 
paragraphs of this chapter, the dawn of the 20th century gave birth to a robust 
championing of Pan Africanism among Africanist writers. Pan Africanism as a 
movement was formed in 1900, “when the West Indian lawyer, Henry Sylvester 
Williams, then living in England … convened the first Pan-African Congress in London” 
(Mphahlele, “Africa Day” 242-43) – although it had of course existed earlier as a 
consciousness (as implied above in  the survey of the way Africanist critical thinking 
evolved). That Pan Africanism existed in the consciousnesses of Africanists before its 
formalisation as a social programme is also borne out by Mphahlele’s explanation that: 
 Pan-Africanism is based on the belief in a bond between the Black peoples of 
 Africa and the external areas to which the slaves were sent.  It is recognition that 
 we are linked to this continent by a common ancestry and experience of 
 oppression and slavery; of racism being used by Europe as a tool of economic 
 self-enrichment.  The Pan-African movement and the idea that gave birth to it 
 came out of Black people’s desire to rediscover and regain their identity and 
 heritage, coupled with the desire to rid themselves of colonial rule.  (“Africa Day” 
               242) 
Phenomena that gave birth to a Pan Africanist consciousness mentioned by Mphahlele in 
this excerpt all occurred prior to its formal adoption as a movement, as the earlier parts of 
this work explain.   Mphahlele summarises the manifesto of Pan Africanism as: 
 The decolonization of the mind, especially where cultural directions are 
 concerned, and … renunciation of helpless, grovelling dependence on White 
 leadership and patronage … the fight against poverty, disease, and ignorance, 
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 made worse by political tyranny … collective active renunciation of [black] 
 dictators … [and facing] the realities of independence.  (“Africa Day” 243-44) 
The difference between the former and latter quotations, both detailing what Pan 
Africanism entails is that in the former its earlier manifestations as a consciousness are 
almost clinically foregrounded, while the latter characterises it qualitatively more as a 
concretised political programme.  Mphahlele not only remarks that organised Pan 
Africanism was born in 1900, but proceeds to highlight the intensity with which 
Africanists gave impetus to its solidification.  He observes that by initiating “five 
international congresses” starting in 1919, “W.E.B. Du Bois … [gave] reality to the long-
standing dream of Pan-Africanism” (“Africa Day” 243). 
 
Recognition of associations between Africanist thinking articulated in America and in 
Africa in considering the environment that offered a workable theoretical climate for 
Mphahlele is not far-fetched.    It is African Americans such as Williams and Du Bois 
who initiated perceptual formations that preceded Mphahlele’s project of formulating and 
refining his own concept of African humanism.  It is for this reason that, besides his 
tribute to 19th century American Africanist theorists, Mphahlele consistently reinforces 
the memory of America-based progenitors of concepts like African humanism – as when 
he acknowledges the decisive role of intellectuals who belonged to the African American 
movement of the 1920s known as the Harlem Renaissance (“Your History” 173).   He 
takes care to indicate indebtedness prior to commending the Pan Africanist spirit that 
became strong in South Africa in the 1930s and helped stamp out divisive tribalism.  In 
true Pan Africanist spirit, Mphahlele’s analysis of African American thought in the 
preceding decade is followed swiftly by his scrutiny of Africanists who were active in the 
1930s on the African continent. This is seen in his initial sharp criticism of negritude 
thinking, followed later by his appreciation of the fact that negritudinists later “turned 
back to home ground” (“My Destiny” 435). One of the ways the negritudinists achieved 
this was by discarding foreign linguistic formulae and inventing original ones that would 
enable them more effectively to express their Africanness.  Of course it also meant their 
turning to an African audience rather than appearing to market Africanness to Europeans.   
 
Negritude was an attempt by some Africans to resolve the challenges of cultural 
assimilation that accompanied imperialism and colonisation.  As a movement it was 
started “in Paris in the 1930s” by students from Francophone African states such as 
Léopold Senghor, Aimé Césaire and Leon Damas who “were writing poetry” and 
“showed concern that they had been uprooted from their African cultural origins”  
(“African Identity” 53).  Despite their admirable concern (acknowledged in this 
quotation), from the onset negritudinists adopted approaches that invited acerbic 
chastisement from Mphahlele.  Mphahlele is known for his outright rejection of the 
practice of negritude in its unrefined form of the 1930s when it was introduced, as when 
he censured negritudinists’ for “imposing a foreign language on the form of an African 
culture that has its own ancient language” and for “defining a culture in ideological 
terms” (African Image – Revised Edition 39).  Mphahlele differed vehemently with 
aspects of negritude that undermined what he perceived as the implied role of those 
defining Africanness in order to offset the distorted views (shown above to have been 
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inherited from the Englightenment) – of defining themselves in a manner that defies 
definiton by the coloniser. 
 
What Mphahlele mentions about the existence of negritude in the 1930s among 
Africanists associated directly with the African continent ushers in his acknowledgement 
of the simultaneous existence of negritude and Black Consciousness.   Co-existing with 
these two ideologies within Africanists in the 1930 was also Pan Africanism.  
Mphahlele’s praise of a vibrant Pan Africanism in South Africa around 1930 (in “Nigeria 
on the Eve of Independence”) reveals Pan Africanism to have been one of the currents of 
thought that influenced him in pondering the African condition.  The complexity of the 
theoretical atmosphere of the 1930s resulting from these three co-existing modes of 
thought naturally brought about problems.  One such problem is that Black 
Consciousness and Pan Africanism are sometimes confused.  It is precisely because Pan 
Africanism (the earlist manifestation of which is described earlier in this chapter) 
overlaps historically with Black Consciousness, that the two are sometimes confused.  
But from Mphahlele’s explanations it is clear that Black Consciousness mainly focuses 
on building the consciousness of the individual black, while Pan Africanism goes beyond 
this to inspire collective resistance to social, economic and political oppression, whether 
by black or white leadership.   While Pan Africanism and Black Consciousness began co-
existing visibly as from the 1930s, they emphasised different areas requiring attention in 
order for blacks to be regarded and treated as equal to people of other races.   For many 
black intellectuals like Mphahlele, the slight shades of difference were confined to 
varying emphases on whether to change both the consciousness and material plight of the 
individual or those of entire local and international communities of blacks rather than 
being irreconciliable.  It is for this reason that throughout this dissertation I refer to both 
Pan Africanist and Black Consciousness theorists.  It is from Pan Africanism/Black 
Consciousness that individual, improved concepts like Mphahlele’s African humanism 
were developed.   
 
Philosophical emphases deriving from both Pan Africanism and Black Consciousness are 
equally evident in refined, refracted forms in Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism.  
The mode of their dialectical syntheses with Mphahlele’s philosophy of African 
humanism alters from time to time as the situation demands, much as the former two 
Africanist ideologies mutate from one theoretical-critical setting to another in their own 
substantive ways.   For this reason, Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism is not the 
sum total of earlier and current theories on the condition of being black.  Mphahlele 
characterises it as a different, new entitity, leaving the other philosophies to develop 
along their own lines – beyond drawing on their raw aspects and transforming them into 
some of the novel aspects constituting his own concept of African humanism.  
 
Mphahlele has remarked that the Black Power Movement, which had its origins among 
African Americans, dominated in South Africa  in the form of Black Consciousness 
around the 1940s (“Your History” 181). This should be understood to be his concession 
that in the 1940s his theory of African humanism (which he engaged in from the South 
African terrain) was partly shaped by the way he interrogated ideas that originated in the 
Black Consciousness stable.  Mphahlele’s remark about the eminence of Black 
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Consciousness in the 1940s indicates his concession that the 1940s were a complex 
intellectual setting in which Africanist theorists like himself had to respond vigorously 
and in a circumspect manner to the thrusts of Pan Africanism, negritude and Black 
Consciousness.  The former two ideologies having coalesced and begun to acquire 
prominence during earlier decades, it follows that their continual reinvention and 
continued influence were part of the 1940 intellectual landscape.  For this reason a writer 
like Ursula Barnett remarks in one of her essays that, notwithstanding the tendency in the 
1940s by “writers in the English colonies … to reject negritude as a label … [this] was, 
however, an argument mainly of degree” (A Vision of Order 29).  This shows that 
Mphahlele’s aim of defining his concept of African humanism even in the 1940s could 
not ignore debates about the relevance and soundness of negritude.  According to Barnett, 
in the 1940s Mphahlele and the other relatively radical Africanists agreed basically with 
negritudinists’ mission of defining Africanness from an Afrocentric perspective that 
sought to quash distorted perceptions.  She rightly observes that what Mphahlele and the 
other relatively more wary Africanists rejected was the negritudinists’ laxity in 
attempting to express Africanness by using unmediated terms of western origin. 
 
Mphahlele’s 1949 polemical essay “The Unfinished Story” reveals sensitivity in 
encompassing all Africa-based people of non-European descent in his reference to the 
“Bantu”.  This is evidence of the Pan Africanist premise described earlier in this chapter.  
The terms “Pan Africanist” or “Pan Africanism” are absent from this text, similarly to the 
way reference to non-Europeans as “Africans” cannot be traced in the article.  
Considering that the origins of Pan Africanism illustrated above are in the form of a 
consciousness rather than an articulate use of the word itself, Mphahlele’s essay 
predictably embodies symptoms of the Africanist theoretical context of 1949. The 
insistence on adequate descriptions of Africans that had been fermenting since earlier 
decades among Africanists is reflected in the content of Mphahlele’s essay, stressing this 
aspect but projecting it to the need for rounded depiction of non-European characters in 
the South African English fiction of the time as written by whites. One sees this in what 
he says as a student in his UNISA newsletter article: 
So much has been written on the Bantu, but I have always felt something 
seriously wanting in such literature.  I told myself there must surely be 
much more to be said than the mere recounting of incident: about the loves 
and hates of my people; their desires; their poverty and affluence; their 
achievements and failures … (31) 
In this 1949 essay Mphahlele uses the term “Bantu” to refer to Africans who are not 
mulatto, of Indian origin or diasporic.  At this stage, he had not yet settled on articulately 
referring to his conception of African identity as African humanism.  For this reason, at 
this stage he does not yet consistently refer to the practitioners of African humanist 
lifestyles as Africans.  All the same, his implicit references to the philosophy of 
Africanism underlie this early expository piece, thus marking it as part of his beginning 
as a theorist piecing together the concept known today as African humanism. 
 
From 1953 on Mphahlele published “a series of short stories” (Woeber and Read, Eskia 
Mphahlele.  A Biography 6) in a number of journals including Standpunte (“The Woman” 
1953) and Drum (“Blind Alley” 1953), as Woeber and Read note.   The short story 
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“Blind Alley” tackles the theme of gangsterism in black townships.  It details the painful 
assault and robbery of a man whose meager wages are cruelly removed from him, 
followed by exposure of the stark poverty through which his family is going (this story is 
reproduced in The Unbroken Song 4-14).   The drama of the story implicitly contrasts the 
debauchery among the thugs with African humanist ways that are supposed to put the 
welfare of fellow humans above economic survival or place value on “the sacredness of 
life for life’s sake” (as Mphahlele puts it in “African Humanism and the Corporate 
World” 127).  Behaviour that similarly conflicts with African humanist ethos is implied 
once more in the 1954 story  “Reef Train”, in the detailed description of inhuman 
conditions under which poor township blacks are transported to and from work to benefit 
white prosperity without their (blacks’) humanity being properly appreciated (story 
published in the August, 1954 Drum 34-35).  In other words, this 1954 story stresses the 
humanity of Africans by insisting thematically that they deserve equal regard and 
treatment with other humans such as whites. 
 
One of the Africanist theorists focusing on discursively asserting the humanity of 
Africans who displays an attitude similar to Mphahlele’s (demonstrated by the 1954 short 
story described above) is G.M.M. James.  James (Stolen Legacy 1954) evokes Africans’ 
self-constituting capacity that they have manifested since prehistoric times, thus 
invalidating racially biased arguments that hegemonic dominance is necessary to assist 
‘subhuman’ Africans in order to improve their lot on humanitarian grounds.  James 
claims that Greek and Roman philosophy as well as Christianity rest on the foundations 
of African thought and practices.  As a reaction to the dominant Eurocentric theoretical 
atmosphere continuing in the 1950s, ideas of this nature featured in the writings of 
Africanists such as James and Mphahlele are a symptom of their awareness of the need to 
fight the low self-esteem hegemonic discourse threatened to perpetuate among Africans – 
by rectifying distorted perceptions of their inherent humanity.  As described above, James 
highlights the humanity of Africans in a radical way, seen in his recasting of history in a 
mould that ascribes advances in thought to the African genius.  On the other hand, 
Mphahlele’s short stories highlight the humanity of blacks in a subtler, more moderate 
manner by portraying black characters in a way that displays their completeness as 
humans.  The values informing the actions of Mphahlele’s admirable characters prove to 
be African humanist.  But their African humanism is not explicitly articulated. This 
correlates with the lack of overt assertion of the concept of African humanism in 
Mphahlele’s polemic writing produced by this stage of his career. 
 
Mphahlele’s stories published in 1955 are “The Suitcase” and “Across Down-
Stream”/”The Coffee-Cart Girl” (reproduced in The Unbroken Song 15-23 and 93-101 
respectively).   The former story maintains Mphahlele’s practice of depicting blacks as 
rounded human beings by illuminating the existential challenges against their African 
humanist sensibility posed by their degrading living conditions.  This is illustrated side by 
side with the African characters’ ability to endure degradation, even to appreciate the 
humorous or ironic aspects of life.  The action of the story entails a man who steals a 
suitcase from the bus he commutes in daily to and from work.  Upon opening the stolen 
container, the man discovers that inside are not valuables stolen from whites as he 
expected, but a dead child.   This fact lands him in prison rather than the original owner 
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he has inadvertently saved from punishment by the law.  Conflict between African 
humanist values and unAfrican values that put material well-being above human life 
ensures that Mphahlele’s implicit expressions of his own concept of African humanism is 
maintained in these writings of the mid-fifties.  The aspect of African humanism of 
viewing women as the economic pillar of society is introduced more centrally in “The 
Coffee-Cart Girl”.  The protagonist is a woman who earns a living for her family by 
selling coffee near a factory.  The effects of black deprivation ricochet onto her when 
industrial action by discontented black factory workers results in looting of the food she 
sells from her cart.   She becomes a symbol of the degradation, loss and impoverishment 
suffered by all blacks under the harshness of the inhumane apartheid system.  This story 
is the earliest among Mphahlele’s short stories in which he pits an African humanist 
consciousness conspicuously against apartheid’s lack of African humanist values. 
 
Mphahlele’s 1956 depiction of depraved conduct among blacks living in the townships 
(in “Down the Quiet Street”) extends the overt apportioning of blame to the cruelties of 
the sociopolitical system first shown in “The Coffee-Cart Girl”.   A series of Mphahlele’s 
stories, the first of which was published in Drum in 1956 portrays the impact of apartheid 
conditions on the Lesane family of Newclare township.   Stories from 1957 such as “The 
Master of Doornvlei” intensify the almost allegorical depiction of apartheid’s friction 
with an African humanist orientation.  This (1957) is the year in which black South 
African intellectuals fiercely debated apartheid and the best way of deflecting its assault 
on the survival of African identity.   Hence the foregrounding of the public conflict 
between blacks and whites under apartheid displayed in the short stories is a reflection of 
the same issues dominating black intellectual discourse in South Africa at this time.  The 
question of whether or not to include whites, coloureds and Indians among the peoples 
for whom liberation was to be fought for was central to the intellectual atmosphere of Pan 
Africanism and Black Consciousness within which Mphahlele continued to write until 
1957, when he went into exile.   This can be discerned in the way Mphahlele explains in 
his essay “What’s New in the New South Africa” how a split of the Pan Africanist 
Congress from the ANC came about in 1958.  He writes  that Robert Sobukwe and Zeph 
Mothopeng “believed that the ANC had betrayed the cause of African Nationalism by 
allowing itself to be led by the Communist Party (predominantly white) and the Congress 
of Democrats (all white)” (“What’s New” 253).  The concerns of Mphahlele’s 1958 short 
story “The Living and the Dead” as expressed by the two white characters central to the 
plot are whether or not blacks should be included in the South African parliament of the 
time.  The short story thus partly mirrors South African intellectual debate across the 
colour line in 1958 on who was to be included in state institutions – irrespective of 
whether such institutions represented black or white sentiments. 
 
Woeber and Read note that among the discursive essays Mphahlele published in 1959 are 
“The Dilemma of the African Elite” and “Negro Culture in a Multi-Racial Society” 
(Eskia Mphahlele.  A Bibliography 17).  Questions of poverty and its implications for a 
rising black elitism as well as the survival of African lifestyles in the midst of other 
cultures addressed by Mphahlele’s essays (cited above) are some of the central concerns 
treated explicitly or implicitly in his 1959 autobiography, Down Second Avenue.  In this 
book, Mphahlele contrasts robust exemplification of African humanist consciousness 
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with vividly detailed manifestations of apartheid’s dehumanising practices.   Apartheid-
induced behaviour of black policemen striving to ascend the social ladder by treating 
fellow blacks callously as illustrated in this text can be seen as Mphahlele’s satirisation of 
attempts by Africans at forming some sort of black elite.  The same goes for those 
woman characters involved in the illicit sale of types of liquor that damage the health of 
African consumers. 
 
The group of South African writers of the fifties including Mphahlele (usually referred to 
as Drum writers) generally handle the themes of the impact of apartheid on township 
blacks, who were forging their new kind of urban identity.  They also reflect and reflect 
on the rise of black elitism – themes of Mphahlele’s short stories and autobiography of 
the fifities as discussed above. According to Chapman, “Mphahlele set out with 
conviction to encourage a new level of seriousness” in the contemporary writings of 
black authors (Drum Decade 213).  The same critic observes that “[the fact that] the 
Drum writers constituted something ‘new’ has variously been recognized” (Drum Decade 
221).  Chapman further affirms this by describing the generic attributes of the Drum 
writers: “like Dhlomo [they] reveal what on the surface could be described as a petty-
bourgeois contradiction between identification with a specific local reality and the desire 
to find in art a universalising, even a transcending image of experience”  (Drum Decade 
217- 218).  By this Chapman means that the Drum writers of the fifties took over from an 
earlier school of writing to reveal in their own writing a tension between the assertion of 
their Africanness and striving to be and live like the ‘civilised’ white man.  It is important 
to establish whether and how Mphahlele affiliates with these traits of Drum writers 
outlined by Chapman.  Affiliation – in the sense in which Mphahlele approves of it – 
entails a sense of belonging to an ongoing black writing tradition as revealed in his 
description of “all the authors who wrote for Johannesburg’s Drum magazine as of 1950” 
as “Peter Abrahams’s inheritors” (“Your History” 171).  Of Peter Abrahams, Mphahlele 
says that he employed “a concrete, imagistic style that is generally American but has its 
own special African American tension and breathless urgency” (“Your History” 171).   
Such acknowledgement of past influence should not be mistaken for enslavement in 
Mphahlele to authoritarian prescriptions that would have deprived him of intellectual 
freedom.  For this reason he notes that as Drum writers “[they] evolved and developed 
individual styles independently, untrammelled by any particular canon” (“Your History” 
172).   
 
Acknowledgement of a broadly defined tradition (in the preceding paragraph) highlights 
the reality that tendencies of earlier black South African writers did have an impact on 
the directions taken by writers of the South African fifties.  An important factor that links 
earlier writers and those of the 1950s Drum era singled out by Njabulo Ndebele is 
“spectacular representation” of experience, or a “penchant for the spectacular” (“The 
Rediscovery” 39).  What differentiates the Drum writers and the earlier African writers 
similarly concerned with the impact of apartheid on their compatriots is put by Ndebele 
as follows:  “In Drum Magazine, we see a similar penchant for the spectacular, although 
the symbols are slightly different.  It is not so much the symbols of oppression that we 
see in most of the stories in Drum, but those showing the growth of sophisticated urban 
working and petty-bourgeois classes” (“The Rediscovery” 39). According to this critic, 
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“spectacular” representation of experience spills over into the Drum era, but the 
foregrounding of apartheid tapers off with the dawn of Drum writing.   
 
One of the aspects that will be probed during textual analysis of Mphahlele’s narrative 
writings is whether indeed in his works there is “nothing beyond” the depiction of despair 
among Africans in the face of apartheid, a fault of spectacular writing diagnosed in 
Ndebele’s essay (“The Rediscovery” 46).  But while this point is applied to Mphahlele 
and his contemporaries, it should be borne in mind that Ndebele has also pointed out 
some of the achievements of this group of African writers, as follows: 
 The writers of the fifties are surprisingly silent over questions of political 
 relevance in their writings.  Perhaps there was an intuitive confidence in the 
 knowledge that resistance to oppression was a complex multifaceted undertaking,  
 such that the political was understood in an inclusive, holistic sense rather than in 
 the narrow sense of party politics.  Political resistance, in other words, can also be 
 understood as total communal self-assertion … The task [of the writer] is to 
 reflect  the outward features of the popular imagination while vigorously 
 subjecting them to inner critical scrutiny.  (“Actors” 94) 
In the light of this quotation from Ndebele’s essay, this study has to probe to what extent 
and for what reasons Mphahlele’s early writing can be credited with these putative 
positive attributes of black writing in the fifties.  It will also be relevant to examine how 
some of his contemporaries fare in this regard.   It will be illustrated, for example, that the 
fiction of, Can Themba, and of a few other Drum writers, depicts township culture 
differently from the way Mphahlele does, probably due to varying intentions that are 
more or less consonant with their individual theoretical positions and personalities.  
Regarding the texture of the prose, it is true that some Drum writers did little to 
contribute to the abrogation of English.  Their abrogation of English would mean that 
they turned English against its intended effect (by colonisers) – that of inculcating a 
belief in hegemonic western cultural superiority in black South Africans.   
 
Traces of tradition weaving through the writings of Drum writers just discussed imply the 
carrying over of ideologies such as Pan Africanism from earlier decades into the fifties.  
Clearly, these critical-theoretical perspectives influenced the writing of the fifties in the 
same way they have been shown above to find reflection in African fiction of earlier 
decades.  Pan Africanism proves to be the heritage most emphatically sustained in 
Mphahlele’s expository writing of 1960.  That is why in the 1960 essay “Nigeria on the 
Eve of Independence” Mphahlele juxtaposes sociopolitical circumstances in Nigeria with 
those in South Africa in typical Pan Africanist style, transcending geopolitical 
boundaries.  Apart from maintaining the Pan Africanist outlook most Africanist writers 
were known for by 1960, this essay introduces Mphahlele’s consideration of tribalism – 
an issue that received his outspoken attention for the first time in this year. This is made 
evident in his remarks that “oppression [in South Africa] has now made tribal identities 
irrelevant and there has had to be a strong intellectual front over the past 20 years to meet 
this challenge” (“Eve of Independence” 319, emphasis added).  He confines himself to 
highlighting the need for Africans both in Nigeria and South Africa to abandon negative 
ethnic loyalties that threaten national unity.  He laments the presence of such divisions in 
the Nigeria of 1960.  He perceives the common need for a nationalist spirit between 
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Nigerians and black South Africans.   This is an indication that his use of the terms 
“black” and “non-White” in his essays tends towards the invocation of a national 
consciousness from as early as 1960.  In this essay, Mphahlele reveals his recognition of 
the need to harness localised cultural cohesion towards a proper, culturally confederal 
and broader cohesion at national level.  That is why, in mulling over prospects of stability 
in postcolonial Nigeria, he highlights local cultural tendencies that if left unchallenged 
could imperil national unity:  
 The NCNC has a looseness of structure that has something to do with what one 
 may call the republican spirit of the Easterners – the individualism and 
 independence of mind of the Ibo … The tight organization of the AG reflects the 
 profound sense of authority of the Yoruba: almost as if, without someone to pay 
 obeisance to, a man would not survive one day … The AG is now committed to a 
 lifelong battle, if need be, to form more ethnic states … Equally authoritarian is 
 the NPC.  Muslim sanctions give it a feudal look and character – and indeed it is 
 often feudal in its attitudes and in its dealings with those it rules.  (318) 
This quotation confirms the fact that, since the fifties, Africanist theorists took a 
conscious stand against ethnicity in favour of an ethnically confederal nationalism that 
they perceived as conducive to the psychological and political liberation of Africans.  
Testimony to this environment can be detected in Mphahlele’s statement that “Most of us 
who supported the ANC in the 1950s did so because its founders and their successors set 
out to unify the ethnic groups into a strong nationalist base” (“What’s New” 253).   
 
Although some well-known aspects of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism 
(demonstrated above to be resistant to tribalism and supportive of nationalism) were 
already receiving eloquent articulation in 1960, in the entire essay “Nigeria on the Eve of 
Independence” the term “African humanism” never occurs.  Neither is his reference of 
Africans commonly as “Africans” in any explicit way associated with his concept of 
African humanism in this 1960 essay.  Mphahlele refers at this time separately to blacks 
in Nigeria as Nigerians (as in the phrase “the peace-loving qualities of Nigerians”) and to 
those in South Africa as non-Whites and as blacks (as in the phrases “university college 
for non-Whites” and “Black … external students”) (“Eve of Independence” 319, 320).  
This is not to deny the fact that its presencing as a cultural consciousness informing the 
behaviour of Africans is unmistakable in Mphahlele’s writing of this period.  It remains 
to be probed whether in his later writings on nationalism he conceives of South Africa as 
a single nation of blacks and whites, or as two separate nations split along lines of 
citizens’ pigmentation. It will be relevant, too, to examine whether his conception of 
nationalism changes over time.    
 
After his earlier essays culminating in the 1960 piece discussed above, Mphahlele 
published the short stories “He and the Cat” and “Dinner at Eight” in 1961. The 
foregrounding of African humanist traits in the 1961 stories occurs in inverse proportion 
to the way the theme of apartheid is played down.   The protagonist in “He and the Cat” 
is a blind man.  This slow-paced story can be interpreted as Mphahlele’s externalisation 
of African humanist values that are embodied in the blind man – those of being at peace 
with nature and aligning oneself harmoniously with the communal ethics of fellow men.  
In “Dinner at Eight”, Mphahlele‘s writing seems oblivious of ambient apartheid, yet he 
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strongly projects the nature of African humanist conduct in the way he depicts the 
influence of communal ethos on the peace of mind of the individual in his or her daily 
interaction with others.  The thread joining the two stories together is Mphahlele’s 
highlighting of the environment as responsible for shaping the way a person thinks and 
behaves.  This should be understood to be Mphahlele’s contribution to the debate on 
essentialism that seems to have entered Africanist discussions during 1961 and gained 
momentum in 1962. 
 
It is as an index of the nature of theoretical debate among Africanists in 1962 that 
Abraham explained the distinction between African and European cultures in terms that 
depart from the usual understanding of essentialist concepts, as follows:   
in an essentialist view one holds that man’s nature cannot be changed in any 
 respect that matters; and it is precisely this which the scientific view of man 
 rejects … Cultures, I have suggested, are linked with an essentialist or a scientific 
 view of human nature.  [African] culture is, I believe, linked with an essentialist 
 view.  (Mind of Africa 23, 43) 
 
If, as African writers such as the one quoted in the preceding paragraph indicate, African 
cultures and concepts such as negritude, Black Consciousness or African humanism are 
only essentialist in a strategic sense while they are not actually essentialist (due to their 
link with nurture rather than biological endowment), then it must be because (as Abraham 
asserts) African cultures are “linked with an essentialist view” of culture (43).  This 
implies that Africans believe that the qualities of man – whether European or African – 
can only be modified or altered by environment to a certain degree.  It would then be the 
modifiable sphere of human nature that has led to environmentally bred distinctions 
between Africans as a cluster of broadly related cultures, and Europeans as another such 
cluster.  This is presumably why Mphahlele makes sure to explain the historical juncture 
at which European and African humanisms parted ways.  After such separation, historical 
events including European imperialism and colonisation (on which Mphahlele’s writings 
comment) began to be interpreted differently by the two clusters, as the cultural 
equipment by means of which they made sense of these events and processes differed.  
That is why Abraham remarks that “the same event, occurring as it were between the 
frontiers of two different cultures, should be invested with differing significance, with 
different capacities for arousing strong reaction, and with different capacities for 
determinng the direction of policies arising therefrom” (Mind of Africa 11).  In 
Mphahlele’s terms, the colonial experience for the African has given rise to the “dialogue 
of two selves”, while for the European it can be seen as having sparked off a different, 
novel sensibility.  While ideas like Mphahlele’s African humanism cannot rightly be 
described as essentialist due to their shaping by the environment, they are all the same 
defined within the broadly essentialist view of the cultures of different human groups.  
Hence the boldness of proponents of such concepts in acknowledging their essentialism 
within appropriate contexts, while vouching for their non-essentialism in other contexts.  
It is for this reason that Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism comes across as 
strategically essentialist (because of the cultures it uses as constituents being described 
within the broad essentialist view), while it is at the same time not essentialist per se. 
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The non-essentialist stance of Africanist writers around 1962 includes analyses of the role 
of history in the environment that moulds a person’s cultural consciousness and conduct.  
That is why Abraham wrote during 1962 that “interest in our own cultures [being] not 
historical or archaelogical, but directed towards the future” – it should contribute “in 
solving the question not what Africans were like, but how we can make the best of our 
present human resources, which are largely traditional” (Mind of Africa 42-43).  
Abraham’s observation is that historical cultural memory emanating from past 
experiences or contexts should inform Africans’ decisions on how their distinctive 
cultural heritage can be harnessed to make the best of the present while ensuring 
preservation of their particular African identity.  These words define African modes of 
self-expression and interrogation of the cosmos as one way of reclaiming the agency of 
Africans which was denied by colonising forces, so that they could not therefore actively 
determine their own destiny within the modern world order.  
 
It is in this spirit, continued from the Africanist theoretical context of the early sixties, 
that writers like Fanon stress the inevitability of the oppressed countering oppression with 
violent revolution because of the nature of oppression, in the following words (published 
in 1963): 
 The violence which has ruled over the ordering of the colonial world, which has 
 ceaselessy drummed the rhythm for the destruction of native social forms and 
 broken up without reserve the systems of reference of the economy, the customs 
 of dress and external life, that same violence will be claimed and taken over by 
 the native at the moment when, deciding to embody history in his own person, he 
 surges into the forbidden quarters.  (“Concerning Violence” 31) 
As Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism took shape also in this atomosphere of the 
sixties, its development and the way he clarifies it through instances in his narrative 
writings has to be considered in comparison with views on violence such as that 
expressed above by Fanon.   
 
In another 1963 essay Fanon remarked that “it is the fight for national existence which 
sets culture moving and opens to it the doors of creation” (“On National Culture” 197).  
Clearly, Fanon here sees the value of culture in as far as it is dynamic enough to carry the 
existential problems of its society.  Fanon’s writing reveals a preference for a “national 
consciousness, which is not nationalism” (“On National Culture” 199).  Such a “national 
consciousness” transcends state boundaries and takes in the whole of Africa, as he 
differentiates it from nationalism with its focus on the cystallisation of an identity relating 
to one country only, or emanating from a tribe (“On National Culture” 199).   Fanon 
remarks that such a consciousness is essential before a people may join hands with others 
with which it shares a history of devastation – with a view to contributing towards 
liberation at a global level – in the following words: “It is at the heart of national 
consciousness that international consciousness lives and grows.  And this two-fold 
emerging is ultimately the source of all culture” (“On National Culture” 199).  The Pan 
Africanist bent of this statement is Fanon’s way of tackling issues of essentialism as cited 
earlier in recognition of the non-monolithic nature of the context – which includes modes 
of thought connecting this with earlier periods such as Pan Africanism. 
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The theoretical debates forming the context within which Mphahlele wrote at this time 
(the sixties) also influenced other of the Drum writers. Bloke Modisane’s long 1963 
autobiography Blame Me on History, for instance, examines the condition of being 
distinctly African while at the same time belonging to mankind as a whole, as when he 
remarks that “in spite of everything that was doctrinated into me, in spite of my colour, I 
believed that I belonged to the enormous family of man” (Blame Me 168).  In this 
statement Modisane responds to the debate on essentialism by stressing that Africans are 
essentially human in the universal sense of distinguishing humans from other species, yet 
the environment Africans have gone through has endowed them with a distinctively 
African identity. 
 
The depiction of Africans relishing life in its fullness as if the inhibitions of apartheid did 
not exist, is a way of displaying the African humanist trait of zest for life – treating the 
present and future with unflustered hope rather than despair.  In 1964 Mphahlele 
produced the stories “Grieg on a Stolen Piano” and “In Corner B”.    In the former, he 
depicts Uncle’s culturally hybrid life more in relation to his African friends and wife than 
in terms of the harassment he receives at the hands of the few racist characters 
representing apartheid.   The latter story also offers a slice of African traditional practices 
functioning in the event of death by means of the kind of communal interdependence and 
mutual support that becomes an active spirit of cultural self-determination.  In both 
stories, the past is appropriated as a tool to conquer the present and shape the future – 
rather than a freezing prison from which no agency can be derived.   This should be seen 
as Mphahlele’s way of paying tribute to the theoretical trend in Africanist thinking that 
continued to be expressed in 1964 – that of stressing the non-essentialism of African 
identity while simultaneously highlighting the function of historical memory.   
 
During 1967 Mphahlele published “A Ballad of Oyo”, “A Point of Identity”, “Man Must 
Live”, “Mrs Plum” and “The Barber of Bariga”.  In all of these stories the locale is shown 
as exercising a determining influence on characterisation.  Without the market place – 
connected to the fertility and economically central position of African women in “A 
Ballad of Oyo” – the abusive husband’s frailty would not have been successfully 
delineated. If the township in which the coloured protagonist Almeida lived were not 
inhabited by blacks of different degrees of racial ‘purity’, the poignancy of Mphahlele’s 
depiction (in this story) of deprivation tied to racial identity by the apartheid machine 
would not have been achieved.  The characters Zungu and Karabo in “Man Must Live” 
and “Mrs Plum” are unimaginable without the railway station and urban maid’s 
backroom respectively constituting the milieu.  The womanising disposition of the barber 
(in “The Barber of Bariga”) is difficult to imagine without the barber’s shop as the 
keystone of the setting.  Mphahlele’s crafting of these 1967 stories in order to emphasise 
the role of social environment is testimony to the continuing prominence around 1967 of 
engagement with the idea of environmental moulding of character rather than attribution 
of behaviour to innate qualities among Africanist theorists.    
 
Fanon’s 1967 remark about the African intellectual who has been alienated from his or 
her own people (Black Skin, White Masks 16: “The Negro arriving in France will react 
against the myth of the R-eating man from Martinique … Furtively observing the 
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slightest reactions of others, listening to his own speech …”), is yet another 
acknowledgement of the spell the environment can have on the coduct of a person.  
Nkrumah’s 1968 comment that “positive action” is within the power of the people if they 
act at once, with resolution and in unity (Neo-Colonialism 259) reveals the premise of 
Africanist social analysis in 1968 to have been the primacy of agency in order for the 
environment to be shaped to the advantage of a people.  This is another way of 
highlighting the value of agency (among Africans), seen as embedded in their basic sense 
of interdependence demonstrated in various local forms of practices that constitute a 
broad African humanist way of life.  In line with the theoretical milieu of the time of this 
publication, Nkrumah is (at least in his text) vigilant about the need to avoid the trap of 
neo-colonialism facing newly independent African individuals and polities (Neo-
Colonialism ix, x, xi, 11, 34, 35, 246, etc.) – a practice which could result in Africans 
complacently ceasing to use agency to determine their own destinies.  
 
The need to define the characteristics of agency in keeping with the African word-view – 
such as interdependence – continues to occupy the minds of Africanist writers in 1969.  
Mbiti described the African individual’s relational attitude as follows in his 1969 
publication: “I am, because we are; and since we are therefore I am” (106).  Communal 
interdependence – that should characterize individual African practice according to Mbiti 
– is what Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism came to be associated with from 
1969 onwards.   This is proof of Mphahlele’s absorption of current trends in Africanist 
intellectual debate.   In discussing the African concept of time as “Sasa” or micro-time, 
and “Zamani” or macro-time, Mbiti demonstrates that African cultures do not classify 
reality into water-tight categories: 
Both Sasa and Zamani have quality and quantity.  People speak of them as big, 
small, little, short, long, etc., in relation to a particular event or phenomenon.  
Sasa generally binds individuals and their immediate environment together.  It is 
the period of conscious living.  On the other hand, Zamani is the period of the 
myth, giving a sense of foundation or ‘security’ to the Sasa period; and binding 
together all created things, so that all things are embraced within the Macro-Time. 
(African Religions and Philosophy 22) 
Mphahlele probably formulated this aspect of African cultures (highlighted above by 
Mbiti), that defies the view of time separating memorial and lived times, into a 
constituent of his concept of African humanism at this time – aligning it to a continuous, 
holistic view of reality.   
 
During the 1970s Mphahlele found company in his attempts to give a name to the 
distinctively African humanist identity by fellow Africanists like the Zambian Zulu (in 
the latter’s 1970 text Zambian Humanism; some major spiritual and economic 
challenges).   Zulu (6) describes “Zambian humanism” as “an act of faith, a profound 
belief in Man”.  As the South African theologian B.J.Van der Walt has observed, Zulu’s 
“Zambian humanism” sees man not only as being at the centre of society, but also as its 
growing apex (Liberating Message 244).   Such a description shows that in Zulu’s view, 
Zambian humanism did not only adequately characterise the distinctive personality of 
Africans found in Zambia, but was also a tool with which to shape their African identity 
in its passage towards the future. 
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After Zulu’s reference to his (Zulu’s) narrower notion of African identity as Zambian 
Humanism in 1970, Mphahlele started using the expression African humanism explicitly 
in referring to his own wider concept of African identity that he (Mphahlele) had been 
defining in implicit terms long before 1970.  The year 1971 is decisive in the 
development of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism, among other reasons because 
he started clarifying it more coherently for the first time by comparing and contrasting it 
systematically with European humanism. Using this new method, Mphahlele made the 
following point in his 1971 essay “The Fabric of African Culture and Religious Beliefs”: 
Areas we share with Western humanists amount to the value and love of life 
 which we cherish; openness of mind; love of self which refuses to be shackled in 
 stifling, suffocating codes of conduct laid down by some authority who 
 commands obedience; and a conscience that  emerges from one’s own character as 
 a social being responsible to the community, rather than a conscience that is built 
 on the fear of authority … (“The Fabric” 151) 
Mphahlele here expresses the belief that while deceptively seeming to share the feature of 
communal cohesion with cultural clusters whose existences is animated by African 
humanism, practitioners of European humanism are identifiable, among other kinds of 
behaviour, as being “kept together only because they share the spoils of economic 
production and industrial progress, which began as a development of individual initiative 
and free enterprise” as well as glorifying “personal wealth and advancement” to such an 
extent that “the good of the community has been sacrificed” – with this resulting in “the 
social remedies that are planned merely [ending] up being amoral” (“The Fabric” 151).   
While this description of European humanism comes across as extreme, Mphahlele 
arguably assumes a radical position deliberately in order to highlight how unchecked 
materialist individualism may lead to extremely inhumane practices such as colonialism 
and apartheid.  Mphahlele’s most serious point is his recognition of failure to regard 
human life as sacred.   Mphahlele’s seventies approach of attempting to elucidate his 
concept of African humanism by contrasting it with European humanism is evidently 
responsible for the extremism of the materialist scenario he conjures up with regard to his 
allegation regarding European humanism losing its moral criterion in judging worth.  It is 
likely that he wanted to highlight the differences between the two humanisms by 
stylistically exaggerating their distinctive features at this stage of the development of his 
theory. 
 
During 1971 Mphahlele continued to illuminate the distinctiveness of African humanist 
thought and behaviour by contrasting it with European humanism.   To this effect, he 
remarks that it “parts ways with Western humanism as [it] has developed today, which 
distrusts belief in supernatural forces” (“The Fabric” 151). Unlike Christian humanism, 
African humanism in his view does not include the view that man will be saved, as it 
does not point to alternatives such as some promised land or the prospect of hell (“The 
Fabric” 154).  In African humanism it is man’s present moral and spiritual life that 
deserves our attention and care, not the imaginary rewards and punishments of the future 
or some authority outside humanity that tries to censor and control our thoughts (“The 
Fabric” 146).  African humanism also needs to be distinguished from scientific 
humanism (“The Fabric” 151), which could be described as extremist in believing that 
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man holds his destiny in his own hands and that religious authority or conscience is 
something imposed from outside of man’s own self.  African humanism differs with 
scientific humanism in its outlook on religion (Mphahlele suggests) because (being 
originally a religious state of mind) today “African humanism still has a religious base” 
with morality remaining the primary criterion to assess the ethics of conduct (“The 
Fabric” 154-55).  In other words, while both European and African humanism frown 
upon intrusion by extraneous authority in their human affairs, such rejected authority 
includes religion in the former while in the latter it exludes it.   Mphahlele’s specification 
of the form of European humanism as scientific not only points to the fundamental 
difference between the cluster of varying African cultures and an equally broad 
coalescence of varying European cultures.  It is also a significant admission on his part 
that such peoples as are describable within the category of European humanism are not 
monolithic in outlook, as some may align with scientific humanism while others do not.   
 
In another 1971 essay Mphahlele remarked that while he was writing short stories with an 
urban setting during the period including 1971, fellow black South African fiction writers 
who “were creating out of a rural sensibility” were writing novels and poetry that 
“depicted the intrusion of Western-Christian values and custom into a non-aggressive 
pastoral humanism” (“My Experience as a Writer” 119.)   In this way, his focus in the 
1971 essay (cited in the preceding paragraph) on the consequences of the transplantation 
of western Christianity into the African setting is a response to current debate among 
fellow African writers.  His thoughts as expressed in “My Experience as a Writer” expose 
the unAfrican nature of western Christianity against the backdrop of Africans’ “pastoral 
humanism”.   In addition to paying homage to ambient philosophical debates about 
western Christianity within the Africanist context, by the subject of this essay Mphahlele 
is contributing to the then current theoretical debate about whether the environment 
(rather than biological innateness) is responsible for the shaping of specific cultural traits 
– ideas at this time still vigorously discussed by fellow Africanists.  Hence his 
metonymic representation of European humanism (from an environmental point of view), 
highlighting differences between the European social context and landscape and those of 
Africa – because of the latter’s still predominantly rural context and cognitive inclination 
(signified by the term “pastoral humanism”).  
 
The subtlety with which Mphahlele indicates the complex critical fabric of the period 
during which he wrote (1971) is another illustration of the sophistication of his 
articulation of the moorings of his concept of African humanism.  He declared in the 
1971 essay “My Experience as a Writer” (written when he had left his land of birth) that 
“a decision to forget the South African experience or to allow it to recede into the 
background would amount to a rejection of Africa as a whole” (119).  This exposes the 
inevitable inclusion of the condition of being a black South African within apartheid 
South Africa as an aspect of his undivided Pan Africanist consciousness that Mphahlele 
takes with him into exile (“My Experience as a Writer” 119).  This reaffirms Mphahlele’s 
affiliation with the core aspects of Pan Africanism that would not allow the partitioning 
of the African experiences into disparate geographic entities.  More importantly, an 
emphasis on a South African sensibility within the broader Pan Africanist otlook is a 
pointer to Mphahlele’s view of African humanism as considerate of localised differences 
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in as much as it appreciates broad similarities on another plane.  This part of the essay 
also clarifies the point that (in Mphahlele’s view) Pan Africanism more narrowly refers to 
the plight of Africans on the entire continent and in the diaspora (as felt commonly and 
needing unity of effort to uplift all Africans) – without broadening the idea as African 
humanism does to locate this within a definable, existential matrix that is culturally 
distinctive.  Such a discerning of finer detail that marks out subtle differences between 
concepts is yet another quality that begins to manifest itself in Mphahlele’s 1971 
mapping out of his concept of African humanism. 
 
In the same essay, Mphahlele makes statements on how an African humanist outlook 
accommodates religious authority. He couples this with a highlighting of Pan Africanist 
tenets, while recognising the validity of distinct, localised African behavioural patterns 
that can be dialectically aligned with aspects of his concept of African humanism. This 
should be understood as his acceptance of the broadly common conception of religious 
authority among African humanists, co-existing with acknowledged differences among 
the religions of Africans belonging to varying locales.   Here he clarifies the point that the 
authority of religion in human affairs (hinted at in preceding paragraphs) is defined 
differently in European and in African world-views.  When African humanists accept the 
authority of religion (according to Mphahlele’s explication of the concept of African 
humanism), it is a notion of religion that differs from the way it is understood within 
western Christianity.  The important point is that members of the two opposed outlooks 
do not differ superficially with regard to accepting or rejecting the authority of religion, 
but do so in a profound way, emanating from their different conceptions of religion.  
 
The markedly nuanced manner in which Mphahlele begins to define his concept of 
African humanism in 1971 is evident also in his differentiation of deceptively equivalent 
notions of African humanitarianism and African humanism.   He clarifies African 
humanism as a concept “based on communal relationships and [focusing] on the 
betterment of human existence … [with] compassion [being] one of its pillars” (“The 
Fabric” 148).  Mphahlele clearly identifies compassion as only one of the many aspects 
of “communal relationships” and not as equal in extent to culturally-defined communal 
relationships (“The Fabric” 148). In the 1971 essay “The Fabric of African Culture and 
Religious Beliefs”, direct descriptions of some phenomena as African humanist is 
coupled with direct use of the term itself, as when Mphahlele states that “African 
humanism, because it is based on communal relationships and focuses on the betterment 
of human existence, is not exclusive; it is inclusive” (148). The inclusive nature of 
African humanism is expressed alongside a direct use of the term here.  That Mphahlele’s 
formulation of the concept of African humanism appears simultaneously to be 
integrationist and essentialist could be explained by his description of African humanism 
as comprising of traditions “where ‘myth’ and reality, life and death, the natural and the 
supernatural are not separate realms” (“The Fabric” 153).   Mphahlele holds to an 
integrating notion of African humanism, by which “reason and emotion are not separate” 
(“The Fabric” 153).   To stop at describing African humanism as either an emotional or 
intellectual state would be to narrow it down to correspond with types of Pan Africanism 
or Black Consciousness.   In other words, two ideas that are separated by binary 
opposition can combine in harmony within an African humanist context – as a way of 
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accepting diversity as a manifestation of the complex, inclusive nature of Africanist 
lifestyles. 
 
Mphahlele’s major improvement of his definition of African humanism in 1971 lies in 
the circumspect manner in which he detailed its nature – matching the scrupulous way in 
which he highlights finer details and nuances in his crafting of the 1971 novel, The 
Wanderers.  His graphic description of characters like Steve Cartwright serves to alert the 
reader concerning the difference between being white and being racist.  Even more 
importantly, through the portrayal of Steve Cartwright alongside other white characters 
such as the Goshen farm owners and their labourers, Mphahlele impels his readers to 
become aware of the even subtler link of having an African humanist consciousness 
irrespective of the colour of the skin.  The massacre of freedom fighters described 
towards the end of the novel – that does not distinguish black from white in practising 
brutality – is Mphahlele’s way of emphasising the overriding power of consciousness 
defying racist categorisation.   Such handling of narrative coincides with his and his 
contemporaries’ decision, in 1971, to move away from vague or simplistic references to a 
distinctive African identity. 
 
It is significant that this novel was published at the time when Mphahlele’s expository 
writing stressed African humanism’s inclusivity and the unrelenting persistence of 
African humanist consciousness even in exile.  These are among the most evident and 
rigorously treated themes in this narrative.  References in Mphahlele’s 1971 essays to the 
non-essentialist nature of his concept of African humanism also find expression in the 
way he handles the theme of nonracialism in the characterisation of The Wanderers.  He 
portrays characters like Cartwright as Africanised in their consciousness and conduct – 
because of the environment in which they interact intimately with African humanist 
characters such as Timi and Naledi.   That is why Cartwright manages to align himself 
with the African conception of marriage in the way it is directed by the African widow he 
marries.  If Mphahlele defined Africanness in essentialist terms, a character like 
Cartwright by virtue of being white would be incapable of acquiring the Africanist 
practice of widowed marriage as Mphahlele portrays him doing. 
 
One sign that the way Mphahlele explained his concept of African humanism had 
matured considerably by 1973 is his reconsideration of ideas like negritude, this time 
critiqueing them more convincingly by contextualising them within the new theoretical 
milieu. This is seen when, after an outright, vehement renunciation of the notion of 
negritude when it took root, Mphahlele softens to identify with Senghor’s “longing to 
return to the ancient shrines – even though his lifestyle is completely European” (“Exile” 
286).  Such an appreciation of Senghor’s counterpointing of the memory of traditional 
African customs (signified by the phrase “ancient shrines”) with a culturally hybrid 
lifestyle (meant by “his lifestyle is completely European”) is an indication that he 
(Mphahlele) agrees with the idea of according status to the memory of the past in the 
present consciousness of Africans, as long as such an idea of the past is not ossified to 
reject dialectic fusion with the present.  That is why in in this 1973 essay he expresses his 
appreciation (contrasting with earlier vitriolic rejections) of negritude, “without 
necessarily supporting [it] as an aesthetic programme, as more style than theme, as 
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Senghor will have it” (“Exile” 286).  In other words, Mphahlele supports (in the 1973 
essay just cited) the manner in which negritude can evolve to abandon romanticised 
adherence to traditonal cultures without sanctioning its separation of form from content 
as far as African art is concerned.  This is because such a separation of different parts of a 
whole (Africanness) is against the holistic approach to reality that Mphahlele believes to 
be a central aspect of his concept of African humanism.  Apart from separating parts of a 
whole, negritude as “an aesthetic programme” would suggest the imposition of an 
authority to which writers would have to submit, which goes against the grain of an 
aspect of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism which identifies itself with rupture 
from any form of external determination (“Exile” 286, emphasis added).  
 
As early as 1973 Mphahlele sporadically applies a more mature, subtler way of asserting 
his theory of African humanism by presencing it without having always to refer to it 
explicitly as “African humanism”.  In the 1973 Essay “My Destiny is Tied to Africa”, 
Mphahlele uses this technique in statements like “African scholars try to avoid ‘worship’ 
because the term does not define accurately our relationship with our ancestors, nor even 
our connection with the Supreme Force” (434); and “Everyone who has ever been 
colonized has two selves and, therefore, is ambivalent” (432).  These statements reveal 
Mphahlele’s recovery from the mistake of most Africanists in the seventies of using 
unAfrican terminology in trying to describe concepts that are looked at from an 
Africanist perspective.  More importantly, there is refinement of expressive style in that 
African humanism is advocated in a subtler manner (to those who may be its detractors) 
by weaving it organically within the essay without canvassing for it by egotistically 
repeating its name.   The unobtrusive positing of African humanism in this manner also 
serves the other function of describing his concept of African humanism in a circumspect 
way.  After indicating that western Christianity conflicts with the African humanist 
conception of religion, he now continues to explain in detail what African humanist 
religion consists of (“My Destiny” 434).    
 
Sustaining the balance of boo and applause, in the same 1973 essay Mphahlele laments 
that a sentimental sense of spiritual exile or alienation informed negritude poetry – while 
admitting that the poetry was at the same time a valuable reassertion of African values 
(“Exile” 285).  Mphahlele expresses the nativism of African humanism as an inspiration 
only in order for Africans to reclaim their sense of history that should empower them to 
shape their present circumstances with a requisite feeling of adequacy.   In these citations 
Mphahlele’s description of the concept of African humanism as “an ideal” and as 
answering the need to “return to the ancient shrines” (“My Destiny” 441; “Exile” 286”) is 
an acknowledgement of the requirement for theory to consider anteriority as necessary to 
the imaginative memory, while at the same time challenging whatever claim to 
immutability it may threaten to assume.  In the seventies Mphahlele implicitly or 
explicitly desribes Africans by means of the term “African”, as when he writes in his 
1973 essay that he is “recording African thought and attitudes as the times change and 
[he] changes, too” (“My Destiny” 434). That reference to Africans by means of the term 
“African” is sometimes implicit is a sign of Mphahlele’s achieved self-assurance 
resulting in a refinement of his concept.    
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Mphahlele’s discreetness of procedure and his careful intellectual distinction of his 
position from any homogenisation of the group to whom he ascribes African humanist 
thinking and behaviour is borne out by his remark that  “African humanism is an ideal at 
one level, is non-homogenising as far as black worlds are concerned , and is non-racist” 
(“My Destiny” 441).  The new dimension he has added to his concept is the view of its 
social function as ideal.  To admit that a notion is ideal in one sense is to concede that it 
can be used as a strategy one employs to grapple with existential problems at an 
appropriate point in time.  This should explain why Mphahlele  stated in 1973 that 
“imaginative literature is … at best a compromise, something that may mature, that may 
be relevant today and irrelevant in the future, and again relevant at another time” (“Exile” 
286).     
 
Mphahlele concedes the existence of such a consciousness within postcolonial Africans 
in his 1974 remark that one “[walks] with this double personality as a [once] colonized 
man” (African Image - Revised Edition 41).  On the possibility of a mutual 
transformation of western and African ways within the psyche of an individual, 
Mphahlele has described the dual personality that he perceived in himself –  borne of the 
historical marriage of Africa and the west – as the ‘irony’ of his existence and the 
existence of Africans in general (African Image - Revised Edition 137).  Such an 
existence of ambivalent culture that is neither purely African nor European within the 
person and practice of Mphahlele as a writer has led inevitably to the imagery and 
symbolism of his poetic and narrative writings portraying a world of mixed sensibilities.  
That is why he remarks in an essay entitled “White on Black” that “the irony of the 
[cultural] ‘clash’ should be rich material enough to interest a novelist and a poet” 
(African Image - Revised Edition 137).   What Mphahlele meant in this 1974 essay is that 
it is unthinkable for a postcolonial African writer to write works whose imagery and 
symbolism do not reflect ways of thinking that have been altered by the encounter with 
the west brought about by colonisation.   As he sees it, “the irony … lies in the conflict of 
cultures that need not always clash but are supplementary” (African Image - Revised 
Edition 137).  What this means is that the distinctiveness of African culture that set it off 
from European culture should be acknowledged and respected, but the conflict (as 
contrasted with a dialectical synthesis) is ironical in that the real resolution is regard by 
either side of the other’s culture as a practice and system existing in a complementary 
relationship with his or her own.  What Mphahlele means by terms like “double 
personality as colonized man” and “dialogue of two selves” (African Image - Revised 
Edition 41, 70) relates to the postcolonialist concepts of hybridity or ambivalence as well 
as to the idea of freedom from pre-determined norms.  Because the social habits of the 
former oppressor and those of the formerly oppressed are culturally different, the 
dialectical integration of the two will invariably result in a hybrid personality.  
Mphahlele’s idea of a “dialogue of two selves” or of “dialogue between two streams of 
consciousness” (African Image - Revised Edition 70) pertains to the rigorous demand on 
the African’s part to modify the distant African past he/she cherishes with the way he/she 
implements his/her African humanist consciousness to propagate a culturally distinctive 
lifestyle in the face of contingent demands.   
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Mphahlele did not posit the necessity facing postcolonial Africans, of managing the 
double-sensibility described above, without highlighting the challenges concomitant to 
such an undertaking.  This he did by exposing the trap of hegemonising language into 
which many African writers writing in English fell, of “unwittingly imposing a foreign 
language on the form of an African culture that has its own ancient language” – 
something which unfortunately led to reductively “defining a culture in ideological 
terms” (African Image - Revised Edition 39).  This statement was not unfounded.  For 
example, some Africanists such as Julius Nyerere, were not yet sensitive in 1974 to the 
need to appropriate the English language.  They even went  as far as to censure African 
“subsistence farming”, calling for its radical replacement with western modes of 
“scientific” farming, as if in “subsistence” farming (as a traditional way of economic 
activity) there is nothing distinctively African that could be given the advantage of 
modern technology without necessarily requiring replacement by western traditions of 
individualistic farming.  Paradoxically, none of the writers of this type confronts the 
question why, in pre-colonial “subsistence farming” masses of people did not starve to 
death or suffer from malnutritional diseases while compatriots enjoyed the luxuries paid 
for by selling excess food to far-away territories.  Such contamination of terminology 
continuing up to the late seventies signifies the gradual way in which abrogation of 
English terminology progressed, with vestiges such as those cited above still remaining.   
 
Mpahlele’s 1974 concern with scrupulous employment of terminology leads him 
pointedly to clarify the stance he adopts in defining his own concept of African 
humanism vis-à-vis ambient theory of the period that concerned itself with ideas like 
racism.  That is why he explains that,  in his writings, “African [refers] to all the people 
who are culturally natives of Africa”; that he talks of coloureds “as Africans of mixed 
descent”; that “The Indians … will one day find a common destiny among Africans”; that 
“the term ‘black’ refers to all people who are not of European descent”; that “whites 
[can] earn this affiliation” as “the white man will have to choose to quit or adopt the 
majority African culture or be marooned by history”; that “Afro-Americans dance in 
performances that do not contain choreographed movements” because “they are African”; 
and also that “independent Africa” must show interest “in the Afro-American and the 
Caribbean” because they are Africans (African Image - Revised Edition 14, 35, 103, 
121).   Mphahlele’s 1974 essays explicate his subscription to non-essentialism and 
nonracialism in defining Africanness by significantly justifying his position in African 
humanist terms.  His professed African humanist criterion of allowing whites to earn 
inclusion in the appelation African (which normally disqualifies whites as a group) 
(African Image - Revised Edition 56, 58) seems to be a refusal or desertion of oppressive 
relations with other humans.  This appears to be the case because oppression, with which 
apartheid is associated, conflicts with the central tenet of African humanism, of regarding 
human life as sacred.   To accept exclusionary or oppressive practices in the name of 
African humanism would thus be self-contradictory. 
 
The specific challenge of settling on distinct terms with which to refer to Africanness still 
persisted in 1974 among some Africanists, although Mphahlele had started using the term 
“African” in a distinct manner, as well as consistently referring to his own philosophy as 
“African humanism”.  Some theoretical developments added to the existing, general 
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confusion surrounding the use or meaning of the terms “African” and “humanism”.  The 
concept of “humanism” or “botho/ubuntu” within the context of African cultures (i.e. 
black African-continental social life) was still narrowly equated by some Pan Africanist 
thinkers such as Nyerere (1974) to denotations such as Black Consciousness and Pan 
Africanism.  These terms are clearly not equivalent in nuance, profundity and scope to 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism.  Mphahlele’s idea of African humanism not 
only redefines and reconstitutes itself according to the mutations of the historical, 
political, social and economic milieu, but seeps through to pervade all spheres of life: 
education, economics, politics, etc.   The following statement testifies to this:  “Our 
humanism must try to deal with the problems of power, of national army, of education, 
the arts, land and house ownership, poverty, medical care and so on.  Our humanism must 
bring about a second productive revolution” (African Image - Revised Edition 36).  What 
Mphahlele means by this statement is that social spheres such as politics, the military, 
education, the arts and social welfare should be shaped in ways that are compatible with 
African humanist values. This quotation is also a revelation of Mphahlele’s 
understanding of African humanism as a dynamic consciousness that flexibly addresses 
contingencies in a meaningful, beneficial manner.  Here he is also positing African 
humanism as an option for resolving humanity’s existential challenges irrespective of 
whether the affected peoples are African or not.  It is for the same reason that elsewhere 
Mphahlele indicates that cultural education should be institutionalised within the 
education system – the education system that, in order to link up with other areas of life, 
should be guided by a national philosophy of education that will establish and define 
national goals (African Image - Revised Edition 21, 40).    
 
Since Mphahlele’s conception of African humanism is all-encompassing with regard to 
(different) spheres of life, it could not exclude his idea of what the post-independence 
nation-state should be.    Appropriate nationalism should ideally produce “A society in 
which you had to earn the name African and elections cut across ethnic divisions”, 
Mphahlele stated in a 1974 essay (African Image - Revised Edition 52),  “with everybody 
who owes loyalty to Africa, and who accepts the democratic rule of the African majority, 
being regarded as an African”, because actually “we are fighting against the Calvinistic 
doctrine that a certain nation was specially chosen by God to lead, guide and protect other 
nations” (54).  In keeping with his inclusion among aspects of African humanism the 
attitude of regarding human life as sacred, Mphahlele suggests that Africans should give 
“the white man the theoretical choice to stay and undergo a process of acculturization and 
civilization as aspiring Africans, and the choice to leave” (56). No brutality is suggested 
against humans who may not prefer or manage to acquire African humanist lifestyles. 
Mphahlele declares the crucial criterion in building a nationalism that conforms to 
African humanist tenets as ensuring the distinctive qualities of Africanness by allowing 
nonAfrican humanist individuals to retain their varying identity if they choose to do so – 
rather than sacrificing the unique African identity by promoting an uncritical inclusivity.  
It is for the same reason that he declares in the same essay that he supports “the 
ideological creed of the ANC as expressed in the Freedom Charter”, because “it is by no 
means a blueprint for a socialist state” (55).  He adopts this position because he views the 
European idea of socialism as extraneous to African humanist lifestyles. 
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Analyses of the fitting postcolonial forms of nationalism dominated theoretical debate 
among Africanists in 1974.  Nyerere’s detailing of his notion of the African individual, 
family and nation is a symptom this tendency.   Nyerere philosophised about what he 
called ujamaa/familyhood, in which individual and group attitudes of mutual respect, the 
obligation to work and the value of sharing constitute an African socialist order with the 
family unit as basis (Freedom and Unity 9).  The communal orchestration of economic 
activity that Nyerere illustrates displays a similar complexity to that which one discerns 
in Mphahlele’s hierarchical concept of African society, observing social hierarchy while 
at the same time  appearing externally to eschew it (Freedom and Unity 11, 33).  What 
might become excesses of hierarchical authority are kept in check by the customary 
demands that the right to personal property should not be abused as licence for 
acquisitive hoarding, as no member of society can be allowed to starve or die of exposure 
due to want of such property – according to Nyerere (Freedom and Unity 10).  Nyerere 
notes that socialism, African socialism or traditional socialism requires that men think of 
themselves as members of a society and that this is opposed to systems that operate on 
the basis of individualism (Freedom and Unity 10-11, 166).   Nyerere as an Africanist 
theorist in this context wrote that the feature of communal sharing can strengthen and 
equip African peoples in the postcolonial era.  Championing the need for self-
constitution, Nyerere indicates that there is no absolute and simple rule which can be 
easily applied everywhere and to all aspects of life in relation to equality (15).   It can be 
seen that concerns by Mphahlele’s fellow Africanists go beyond the plight of people 
during colonisation and focus on postcolonial challenges threatening to invade their 
different communities from political, economic, spiritual, psychological and other angles.   
It is concerns of this nature that have led to Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism 
invariably refining itself in consideration of how the individual, family and society exist 
in relation to one another. 
 
In his 1974 expository writing, Mphahlele displayed a bond with fellow Africanists in 
their inclusion of unique propensities governing the creation of imaginative art among 
Africans – in their comprehensive views on what constitutes Africanness.    That is why, 
within the same broad intellectual milieu of 1974, Mphahlele wrote that “No-one can 
ever think it healthy … to keep hacking at a social structure in overcharged language … 
The distance contracts and extends between the public and the individual voice” (African 
Image - Revised Edition 82).  In these statements Mphahlele maps what he perceives to 
be the position of the African writer in society or in the nation.  Clearly he expects 
creative literature to express seminal ideas that transform the plain voice of the public on 
topical matters into a potent tool with which to tackle existential challenges.  In his view 
the gap between the creative artist’s voice and public voice should not be rigid, but 
should diminish and enlarge from time to time according to altering empirical situations.  
Mphahlele also asserted in the same year that there is no simple one-to-one 
correspondence between literature and real life events (African Image - Revised Edition 
72-73).  By this he means that a writer of fiction should interpret reality rather than 
reproduce it as an unrefracted mirror image. 
 
Mphahlele’s 1976 poem “Fathers and Sons” concerns itself with the Africanist definition 
of religion that dominated Africanist theory during the 1970s.  The way Mphahlele puns 
 26
on words associated with western Christianity, such as “resurrection” “Father” and “Son” 
in this poem, reveals psychological rejection of the Eurocentric concepts which these 
terms denote as well as an insistence on their African humanist dimensions.   His other 
1976 poem, “A Prayer”, expresses the theme of religion as central to the African’s 
selfdefinition.   The poet longs to return to South Africa where his individual contribution 
can benefit a community of like-minded Africans.  In a way, this highlights the African 
humanist aspect of traditional religion which regards service to the community 
religiously and views human life as sacred.   Such a consideration of the religious aspect 
that could be indentified with Africanness seems to have been the concern also of other 
African writers in the seventies.   This orientation seems to have been a way for black 
South Africans to regain composure through sound self-deninition, after the atrocities of 
apartheid authorities had manifested themselves in a number of brutal acts including the 
June 1976 student killings.  Spiritual concerns with the plight of his fellow Africans back 
in South Africa points to Mphahlele’s valuing of an individual’s historical memory – in 
his case, the memory of South African conditions even while he is in exile.  Wishing 
history away, from the point of view of someone like Mphahlele who believes that “we 
need to keep reminding ourselves that there is a living African tradition that should 
interact with the demands of modern life … [as well as] consciously forge a 
reconciliation between our traditions and the best of Western values” (“Prodigals” 342), 
would involve a severance from South African cultural memories in the face of the 
western modes of living to which he was exposed during exile.   With regard to 
Mphahlele’s philosophy of African humanism, what he reinforces in this 1976 poem is its 
hopeful orientation towards the future, sustained by the conviction that the African 
humanist consciousness always survives foreign territorial influences. 
 
In one of his 1978 essays, “African Identity.  Nationalism – The African Personality – 
Negritude”, Mphahlele states that the “twin weapons” of “Western modernity that was 
socially engineered to uproot Blacks from their being and to assimilate them into White 
culture” were “mission education and Christian religion” (43).  This focus should explain 
why Steve Biko wrote within the same atomosphere in 1978:  “We never knew anything 
about hell – we do not believe that God can create people only to punish them eternally 
after a short period on earth” (I Write What I Like 44).   This is a revelation of Biko’s 
sensitivity to the African theoretical context of the seventies, in which matters of religion 
and African identity were vigorously interrogated.   Probably the African writers cited 
here were prompted by the realisation that the African’s self-constitution cannot succeed 
without immaculate attention to detail in their characterisation of the African identity.   
Such details touched on every sphere of life, including the impingement of modernity on 
traditional African religions.    
 
Possibly a critic like Mzamane (“Mtshali, Sepamla” 352) was indirectly referring to the 
mammoth task of defending African humanism within such complex social debates, 
including its plausible representations in literature (as Mphahlele sets out to do) when he 
significantly included Mphahlele in his essay among some Drum writers whose 
contribution should be lauded.  According to this critic’s view, the contributions of the 
Drum writers were lost, particularly as their work was banned prior to the militant, 
overtly protesting (South African) Black Consciousness writers of the 1970s, thus 
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depriving the Black Consciousness writers of an opportunity to learn from them.  
Mzamane sees familiarisation with and resultant continuation of the concerns of 
Mphahlele and some of his contemporaries of the fifties as a sine qua non in the 
perpetuation of a tradition of social relevance among all South African writers of the 
period.  
 
In the 1978 essay included in the collection Es’kia Continued, direct use of the term 
“African humanism” occurs frequently – as on page 46. Africans breaking away from 
western Christianity to form AICs (African Initiated Churches) is approved and the 
reduction in stature of African traditional leaders by Europeans to menial minions is 
identified as conflicting with African humanist consciousness (“African Identity” 51)   
even at this fairly early stage of Mphahlele’s progressive characterisation of the concept 
of African humanism.  This shows his advance from earlier highlighting distinctive 
African notions of religion as differing from the role religion plays among Europeans (as 
he did in the early seventies), to fully articulating what religious vision and practice entail 
among African humanists (in the mid-seventies), culminating in essays of the late 
seventies describing how the African humanist consciousness stimulates Africans to 
abrogate western Christianity in the breakaway denominations that they form.  Mphahlele 
clearly emphasised the religious aspect of what he understands African humanist 
lifestyles to be because of his awareness of other Africanists attempting to define the 
religious aspect of African cultures.  An example is what Biko observed about Africanist 
eschatology in his 1978 essay (quoted above). 
 
Emphasis on the distinctions of African humanism from European humanism in the 
seventies by Mphahlele and fellow African theorists using their own theoretical concepts 
(cited above) is reflected in the former’s 1979 novel Chirundu.  This is evident for 
instance in Mphahlele’s delineation of Chimba’s amoral conduct, which contrasts with 
his wife Tirenje’s moral strength.  Chimba opportunistically parades African customs on 
the pretext of desiring a healthy equilibrium between Africanness and western lifestyles.  
Ironically, his acquisitive personality is geared towards benefiting his selfish, 
individualist greed rather than uplifting the lot of the community of which he is a leader.  
The distortion or corruption of the original African humanist psyche he acquired as a boy 
parodies and betrays this culture.  Chimba’s materialist self-centredness is based on no 
identifiable African humanist moral values, despite his claim that he is acting in defence 
of African humanist customs.  The philosophical theme of nationalism shown as having 
dominated Africanist thinking in the seventies also finds exemplification in Chirundu.  
Chimba is portrayed as a political leader in a postcolonial African state in which the 
agitation pervading the affairs of the state is echoed within his family through the agency 
of his wife (Tirenje). 
 
If novelistic discourse, as Bakhtin observed in 1981, lives in fundamentally social modes 
and is in essence always developed on the boundary line between contending cultures and 
languages (“Discourse in the Novel” 50, 259), the structure of the novel cannot be the 
same across all languages and cultures except if one loses sight of the need particularly 
evident in anticolonial and postcolonial writing to abrogate. This statement cited above 
signals the shift in theoretical emphasis from about 1981 when the abrogation of 
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normative ideas began to be proposed as an effective tool with which to negate 
imperialist hegemony.   According to Mphahlele, no proper balance of the postcolonial 
African’s dual sensibility can be achieved unless western ideas – for instance concerning 
the proper form of the novel and the state, are recast in the African humanist mould.   
This point is brought out when, in a 1982 journal article, Mphahlele laments the failure of 
African figures in postcolonial societies to strike a successful dialectical balance between 
their western and African modes of consciousness, as follows:  
The idea of nationhood has been falsified by the ruling class … we realize what 
 cleavage it has brought about between an educated elite and the masses, between 
 the indigenous self and the new sensibility, in the individual that moves away
 from the collective sensibility and glorifies individualism.   
(“Towards a Humanistic Philosophy” 36; emphasis added) 
This remark shows that uncritical disowning of Africanness is as unacceptable to 
Mphahlele as the persistence of separating reality into two opposed categories of Western 
versus Africanness which leads to a perpetually binary view of reality.  In Mphahlele’s 
view, succesfully refraining from seeing reality as consisting of binary relations is proof 
of the soundness of the African humanist outlook, as such an approach is one of the 
central aspects of his concept of African humanism.  Mphahlele’s statement (above) 
which laments the “cleavage” that the neocolonial view of nationhood “has brought about 
between an educated elite and the masses” (“Towards a Humanistic Philosophy” 36) 
makes clear that the African humanist citizen as envisaged by Mphahlele in the context of 
postcolonial Africa has to live up to the perception that “I am because you are, you are 
because we are”, while at the same time taking pride in being an Africanist individual.   
The African humanist individual (as illustrated in the way Mphahlele idealises the 
decolonised citizen) is one who identifies unashamedly with the ethnic society he/she 
belongs to and thus forges a sense of history or anteriority while at the same time 
sacrificing the excesses of individualism to the collective needs of the group.  That this is 
the case is attested to by Mphahlele’s statement that “only a free mind that is sure of its 
identity, that is not ashamed of it, can, from a position of strength, go beyond mere 
survival” (“Towards a Humanistic Philosophy” 22).  Survival as distinguished from 
meaningful living has to do with failure to mediate the merging of western and African 
influences within one’s mind, thus effectively utilising an African humanist 
consciousness.  Later on in the same publication Mphahlele states:  “Indeed, white rule 
has succeeded in cultivating in us a sense of shame.  To seek our own historical identity 
looks like supporting [apartheid’s] separatist ideology” (23).   What this means is that in 
Mphahlele’s view difference is not necessarily destructive as far as sensitivity to 
communal needs is concerned – communal needs here implying a unified, nationalist 
force needed for the liberation struggle to be fought, without debilitating dissipation of 
needed efforts in ethnic strife.  In this way he clarifies his African humanist belief in 
individualism and ethnic culture as much as he believes in communalism and 
nationalism, rather than separating the smaller unit from the larger whole and putting the 
two into a binary opposition.  His concept of African humanism can hence be recognised 
as a nuanced construct.   
 
Mphahlele’s handling (in the essay cited above) of subjects such as postcolonialism, 
elitism, ethnicity, agency and nationalism is not a mere repetition of earlier discussions.  
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At this point of his gradual refining of his concept of African humanism he now focuses 
on the hazards of insidious hegemonic discourse.  His priority at this time is to direct the 
agency that Africans should reclaim after the fall of colonisation in a correctly African 
humanist direction, rather than merely highlighting agency as a means towards successful 
self-determination. 
 
The ability to abrogate entails agency.  Mphahlele’s philosophical writing in 1984  
emphasises the need for Africans to reclaim the agency formerly denied them by 
colonising forces, as when he commends the characterisation of Sol Plaatje’s Mhudi in 
the 1984 article, “Literature: A Necessity or a Public Nuisance – An African View”.    
Assumption of agency for Mphahlele thus includes abrogating the form of the novel to 
serve Africanist objectives.  He specifically appreciates the fact that the African 
characters in Mhudi “were makers of history, whereas it was generally believed that the 
European alone made history and the African merely reacted to it” (15).   Mphahlele’s 
focus on Africans’ ability to make history heralds his aesthetic belief that the practice of 
art in the African humanist framework involves uniquely African humanist devices such 
as “resonance”, “myth” and “perspective”.  With this perspective in mind, any reader of 
African literature should assume that Africans were makers of history and of art because 
they invented unprecedented methods of artistic creation.  Mphahlele’s praise of Mhudi 
(above) hence implies that Plaatje made history by inventing adaptations of the European 
novelistic form.  Mphahlele’s ability to reinvent the form of the novel in writing Father 
Come Home is evidence of his heartfelt concern with the theme of his 1984 essay (cited 
above).  By creating mythmaking characters like Mashabela in this novel and including  
numerous folktale images to form the fabric of the narrative Mphahlele wrenches the 
novel as a genre from its normative European structure and infuses it with African 
humanist aesthetics.  In the autobiography Afrika My Music it is the episodic nature of the 
plot that superimposes African aesthetics to accord with aspects of Mphahlele’s theory of 
African humanism and uphold a localisation of the European genre. 
  
In 1986 Mphahlele continues to proclaim the efficacy of abrogating hegemonic concepts 
by adapting them to African humanist matrices.  It is for this reason that he declares that 
Africn humanist practices “will absorb … new influences in ways peculiar to its own 
traditions” (“Poetry and Humanism” 10).   He maintains in the 1986 essay that European 
and African humanism as differing world-views need to have their intersections 
recognised (“Poetry and Humanism” 23).   This is a new move on his part to externalise 
the intersection of European humanism and African humanism.  Consideration of how 
the two opposed world-views interact now focuses on their outward manifestations in 
terms of issues such as global economics.  In the essay quoted above Mphahlele proposes 
a counterpointing of the two as a strategy to ensure a resolution of possible conflict that 
may result from over-emphais of either side. 
 
Mphahlele believes that all the concerns mentioned above should be the concerns of 
every African writer.  However, it is reasonable to concede (from an African humanist 
perspective) that no single writer will approach this task in the same way as another.  
This is the case because individual idiosyncracy is an accepted component of the African 
sense of community, as exemplified in traditional forms of self-eulogy that highlight how 
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proudly different one individual or clan is from another – with this healthy self-assertion 
counterbalanced with a prioritisation of communal self-pride.  At the centre of an African 
writer’s social function should be the goal of the revival, reconstitution and sustenance of 
African humanism, which is a common denominator among all African peoples the 
whole world over.  This gives a sense of concerted effort, as different African writers and 
theorists go about their enterprise in their own individual ways.  Against this background, 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o’s 1986 accentuation of the need to decolonise the mind of the 
African writer and reader, for example, should be seen as nothing other than a call for the 
writer to achieve this by aggressively analysing the consciousness of the community 
primarily as a means towards purging the African individual of the distortions effected by 
colonisation: “Writers are surgeons of the heart and souls of a community” (Decolonising 
ix).  In the same essay Ngugi affirms the interactive nature of writing within the African 
context, in his statement that “even literary creative work is not the result of an individual 
genius but the result of a collective effort” (x).  This is proof that theorising about the 
nature of African aesthetics (which naturally includes the position of the writer in 
society) continued among African writers in 1986.  While Ngugi’s 1986 publication 
focuses primarily on the soul of the community in order to reach that of the individual 
who is a building block of such a community, Mphahlele advocates a primary focus on 
shaping the consciousness of the African individual as a way of achieving the same effect 
in the wider community.  He achieves this through his projection of an African humanist 
consciousness that can direct the life of an African individual and manifest itself in the 
African personality.  That I am describing Ngugi’s approach in analysing society during 
this period accurately is revealed by his reference to the challenge of forging “a way of 
life distinguishable from other ways of life [and developing] a distinctive culture and 
history … the set of spiritual eyeglasses, through which [Africans] come to view 
themselves and their place in the universe” (Decolonising 14).    The example of Ngugi is 
proof that the African theoretical environment of the eighties was so occupied with self-
definition that even the idea of aesthetics had to be recast in Africanist fashion. 
 
Out of the same concern with self-definition, Ngugi laments the unfortunate dilemma of 
African writers having to write on African experience by using an alienating language 
such as English, Portuguese, German and French.  In the 1986 essay he puts it this way: 
“Language and literature were taking us further and further from ourselves to other 
selves, from our world to other worlds” (12).  Surely an African writer whose soul is not 
dislodged from Africa to territories of the foreign language that he or she uses should 
take care not to describe seedbeds of African indigenous knowledge systems 
disparagingly in a Eurocentric discourse in which Eurocentric prejudices are embedded.  
Exposure of such misappropriated descriptions of the self should not be confused with a 
demand for romantic lauding of everything traditionally African.  Ngugi would be the last 
person guilty of this romantic nativism, for in the same collection of essays he hastens to 
acknowledge that “African communal culture could be cruel in some of its practices” 
(65).  In this way, the concerns of Mphahlele and other Afrocentric writers about the 
pernicious cultural by-products that the use of English could have (unless it is 
appropriated effectively) are an admission on their part that their consciousness after the 
encounter of Africa with the west is hybrid.  If the Africanist component of the hybrid 
postcolonial mentality is to be effectively balanced with its westernised aspects, the use 
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of indigenous languages should be regarded as an empowerment rather than a drawback.  
This is because African cultural knowledge is best preserved in the African languages.  In 
a manner that displays attention to rigorous conceptual analysis typical of Africanists at 
this time, Ngugi stresses in his 1986 publication that “… the development of ethnic 
languages would not be inimical to national unity and consciousness” (73) 
 
Mphahlele’s 1987 expository writing shows careful attention to the issue of language use 
by African writers.  That he does this in an essay appearing only one year after one in 
which Ngugi raises the same issue indicates that this matter was one of the 
preoccupations of Africanist debate of this period.  Mphahlele uses the term “subsistence 
farming” while at the same time he explains how dynamic it has been as an economic 
practice of some African peoples, evolving into “cash-crop farming” (240).  Instead of 
adopting either the unmediated use or evasion of Eurocentric terms, his strategy is to use 
them while compensating for their inbuilt Eurocentric prejudice by explaining their 
positive connotations within the African humanism context.  This is shown by his use of 
the terms “ancestor worship” and “subsistence farming” in the 1987 essay (“Social 
Work” 240).  It remains true of Mphahlele’s writing (looked at comprehensively), 
however, that he uses his own equivalents of English words that could project concepts 
that are in conflict with what he regards as African humanist notions.  For this reason, it 
is important that any reader of Mphahlele’s narrative writings should recognise this 
stylistic feature of his work.  That Mphahlele attached immense importance to purging 
English terms of their possible Eurocentric bias is demonstrated in his concern about the 
way the term “ancestor worship” is used by western writers, expressed as follows:  “We 
do not worship the ancestors.  They are our mediators, intercessors with the Supreme 
Being” (“Social Work” 240).  What can be deduced from this remark by Mphahlele is 
that the term “ancestor worship” coined by westerners (whose consciousness differs from 
communities that practise African humanism) should not be taken literally.  By the same 
token, Mphahlele admits that there are blemishes Africans have inflicted on African 
humanism – with which they are associated – that still haunt us today, such as war, 
witchcraft, ritual murder and the killing of twins in certain African communities (“Social 
Work” 242). 
 
At this advanced stage of his theorising career Mphahlele could not stop at explaining 
terminology without delving deeper into explicating crucial socio-economic concepts, 
whose content could be confused with Eurocentric use of similar terminology.  In his 
1987 essay “Social Work and the Politics of Dispossession” he significantly explains 
that: 
 Kinship is crucial in the fabric of social relationships and organization.  It has 
 economic, political as well as social significance.  Inheritance and succession are 
 of economic importance.  This and other factors make the family an economic 
 unit … Inheritance of wealth or rank is matrilineal, i.e. son from maternal uncle, 
 rather than from his own father.  Son inherits from father or paternal uncle in 
 a patriarchal society.  Most societies are patriarchal, women serving as agents of 
 power. (“Social Work” 239)  
In cultures where there is a ruling class, nobility and peasantry/working class (as 
Mphahlele indicates above), the idea of classlessness is extraneous.  Mphahlele’s 
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reference to blurring of social and economic status among the peasantry by a sense of 
community should be understood in conjunction with his explanations elsewhere of the 
concept of African humanism as comprising the kind of communal  interdependence in 
which a rich man always shared with the poor: 
 Care is taken to balance individual rights with communal rights.  Collective 
 labour is common: cultivating someone else’s field or building his  house.  So is 
 sharing of food in times of scarcity and where one is unable to fend for the family 
 through no fault of one’s own. (“Social Work” 240) 
Commual interdependence characteristic of African humanism should be understood to 
be the external appearance of ‘equality’ that is actually underlain at the profound level by 
a valued and observed system of class in African cultures. 
 
Achebe features among Africanist writers who rejuvenated theoretical debate until the 
early, mid- and late eighties by adding their opinion on the validity of Africanness as a 
distinctive existence.   In his essay re-published in a 1988 collection, he proves to have 
synchronised his re-publication with the debate of the time, among others by means of 
reviving his earlier-published statement that “for a society to function smoothly and 
effectively its members must” assert that they “share certain basic tenets of belief and 
norms of behaviour” (Hopes 100).  In his support of purpose-directed nativism, Achebe 
declares (in the following statement from the same collection): 
 I would be quite satisfied if my novels (especially the ones I set in the past) did no 
 more than teach my readers that their past – with all its imperfections – was not 
 one long night of savagery from which the first Europeans acting on God’s behalf 
 delivered them. (30) 
Achebe’s Afrocentric passion for an affirming reconstruction of the African highlights 
his support for Africanists (including Mphahlele) invoking the past for ideological use in 
the present, as long as contingency demands this approach in present (Hopes 101).  He 
also gives his opinion on the degree to which genres imported from Europe could be 
harnessed to further the Africanist mission of self-definition that inter alia employs the 
arts. 
 
It is important to recognise that Africanist writers theorised within a global postcolonial 
context.  This is because postcolonial writing on a world scale is faced with the same 
task, although not all postcolonial theorists contribute from an Africanist angle.  To attest 
to Mphahlele’s adjustment and readjustment of his concept of African humanism in 
reaction to issues tackled by contemporary postcolonial writers, all the characteristics of 
his African humanist model confirm the postcolonial attitude summarised in 1989 by 
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin in The Empire Writes Back, as follows: “The idea of the 
center as permanent and unrefractory is endlessly deferred … There is no center of reality 
just as there is no pre-given unmediated reality” (90-91).  
 
Matters pertaining to nationalism demonstrated above as having been addressed by 
Mphahlele and his fellow African writers are a symptom of the postcolonial hue of their 
intellectual engagement.  Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin have written in The Empire 
Writes Back that nationalism has for Europeans been the force behind the colonising of 
third world countries (154), while Marxist-Leninist nationalism is preoccupied with the 
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attainment of classlessness (Empire Writes Back 156-157).  For reasons associated with 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism, this kind of nationalism, whose goal is to 
achieve classless societies, is also incompatible with African nationalism as the 
colonising kind, since African nationalism has to be informed by African values. 
 
Nationalism in the postcolonial sense is, among other considerations, “based on shared 
collective values” (Empire Writes Back 151).  As a way of combating colonisation, the 
anti-colonial movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries embraced a 
resistant nationalism (Empire Writes Back 154) which gave rise to national liberation 
movements that were later to be instrumental in dismantling colonial rule. In this kind of 
nationalism, “ideas of self-determination and freedom, of identity and unity collide with 
ideas of suppression and force, of domination and exclusion” (Empire Writes Back 151).   
The conflicting positions of African humanist resistance and the cultural menace 
presented by apartheid in South Africa are best understood in the light of the preceding 
definition of nationalism.   Unless one fails to see the driving force behind the forming of 
parties like the National Party as an expression of or aspiration towards specifically 
Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa,  the ideology of  apartheid should be interpreted 
as a localised version of colonialism in the same way as European nationalism inspired 
the colonisation of targeted countries.   For Mphahlele to have reacted against apartheid 
prescriptions in his writings qualifies him quite early in his career as a postcolonial 
theorist.  The critic Arthur Maimane’s observation in 1989 thus rings true, that 
“[Mphahlele] pioneered exile” (37); by contemplating the qualities of a future 
postcolonial citizen, Mphahlele was ahead not only of the apartheid political climate 
within which he was theorising, but was ahead also of his fellow South African and 
continental African writers.  The South African  critic Mafika Gwala’s  remark in his 
1989 essay that  the themes of the short stories in Renewal Time “remind us of the 
inherent conflict in every culture, and of the fluidity in changing situations” (“Es’kia 
Mphahlele: a divided self?” 199) also highlights the postcolonial bent of Mphahlele’s 
fiction.  When one considers the challenging nature of conditions such as those created 
by apartheid in South Africa (pointed out above by Gwala), the task African writers like 
Mphahlele faced to offset environmental drawbacks associated with apartheid will be 
fully appreciated.   
 
In 1990 Mphahlele expressed his preference for Christianity, Islam and other foreign 
religions to be reinterpreted and moulded by African religious nationalism, informed by 
African humanism (“From Dependence” 200-1).   As an aspect of a culture informed by 
an African humanist outlook, a dialectical synthesis between western Christianity and 
traditional African religions is depicted in Mphahlele’s novels and short stories. Such a 
fusion of apparently opposed consciousnesses in the religious arena, evidence of which is 
traceable in Mphahlele’s artistic work, should be understood as an externalisation of the 
reconstitution of African humanist consciousness that informs the kinds of hybridised 
traditional religions practised today by Africans.  Reshaping and redefinition, as already 
demonstrated elsewhere in this study, are in the nature of African humanism.  In the kind 
of nationalism envisaged by Mphahlele as shaped by the non-static concept of African 
humanism, individual citizens should help to bring about this kind of reconstituted 
religious consciousness.   Such a discussion of foreign religious modes is an 
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improvement from the way Mphahlele in earlier periods merely highlighted how 
intrusive these have been to traditional African religions (that inform the texture of his 
concept of African humanism).  In this 1990 essay he suggests the remedy as the 
abrogation (by Africans) of newer religions in order to strengthen a religious nationalism 
that he projects as an effective instrument with which to gain material and spiritual 
liberation. 
 
Revisiting ambient critical aspects with a fresh approach is typical of Mphahlele’s 
practice during the period including 1990.  He thus proceeds to his advanced critique of 
negritude in this period.   While in earlier decades Mphahlele had stopped at analysing 
the pros and cons of negritude, in 1990 he accepts some of its aspects and transforms 
them dialectically into some of the crucial building blocks of his concept of African 
humanism.  In his other 1990 essay (formatted as a tribute to the sculptor Gerhard 
Sekoto), Mphahlele extols negritude in the following terms: “Negritude’s intention was to 
inspire Africans to return to their roots – largely an emotional and intellectual journey” 
(“My Friend” 195).  In other words, the progressively nativist aspect of negritude 
converges with a similarly nativist departure point for African humanism.  In the 
theoretical environment of the nineties, Mphahlele’s earlier objection that negritude tried 
to “programme African art” is swept under the carpet and mentioned only obliquely.  
Another reason for this is that Mphahlele’s essays of the 1990s were written in his 
intellectually mellowed years, after the anger and bitterness characterising his apartheid 
and earlier exile years had dissipated. 
 
The article “Education as Community Development” (1990) displays consolidation of 
Mphahlele’s alert and constantly adapting intellectual interaction with changing reality,  a 
position which is saved from being amorphous by his distinctively Africanist outlook 
filtering experience and giving it his characteristic tint.  Such flexibility achieves a 
harmonisation of the consciousness of African humanism, or extended Black 
Consciousness, with a changing world.  This is indicative of Mphahlele’s philosophical 
assumption that reality itself is not fixed but has to be recreated from time to time as a 
similarly dynamic personality interacts with the external world.  Mphahlele formulates 
his ideas of Africanness not as a detached observer but as a participant-observer.  
Importantly, this also ties up with his conception of the role of the writer as a social actor 
involved with the people about whom and for whom the act of writing is performed. It is 
a further sign of alignment generally with postcolonial theory and criticism, that 
Mphahlele stated in another 1990 essay that African humanism accepts the role of 
ancestors, magic and faith even while it affirms the efficacy of reason as manifested in, 
for example, science and technology (“From Dependence” 199, 204).  The African 
world-view symbolised by the images in “ancestors, magic” and that of the West 
represented by the term “science and technology” exist in balanced complementarity in 
this statement by Mphahlele.   Such a handling of argument deepens the reader’s 
understanding of what Mphahlele has been referring to as a synthesis of European and 
African consciousnesses within the psyche of the postcolonial African.  
 
The deepened sophistication of definition that Mphahlele displays in 1990 continues in 
1991 in his affirmation of Africans’ capacity to prove their humanity by ably creating 
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imaginative artefacts.  He outlines a conception of art as broad enough to encapsulate 
various media like painting, sculpting, oral storytelling, music and dance as understood 
differently in African humanism from the way it is in non-African communities.  That is 
why Mphahlele’s comments on sculpture (in the following quotation) bring in references 
to music, dance, and storytelling in a particular manner.  Not only do they reveal his 
wide-ranging conception of art, but they also assert subtly that from the point of view of 
African humanism life is seen as an interconnected whole rather than as constisting of 
compartmentalised spheres.  The same quotation demonstrates that, specifically for 
Africans, any art form is understood in terms of man’s centrality to nature, inflected in a 
uniquely African humanist way.  This has already been shown to be an aspect of 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism.  Such  cosmological centrality of man  is 
evident in Mphahlele’s 1991 description of a collection of Southern African art as “Hard 
concrete materials” that “have been reshaped by skilled caring hands of disparate origins 
which nevertheless collectively tell Africa’s story, and produce music of their own” 
(“Brenthurst Collection” 273, emphasis added).  The expression “reshaped by skilled 
caring hands” once more reinforces the humanist position that recongnises individuals’ 
and communities’ ability to shape reality to their own spiritual satisfaction.    By 
describing such skilful hands as having “disparate origins which nevertheless collectively 
tell Africa’s story”, the writer is acknowledging the heterogeneity of African cultures 
which nevertheless coalesce in a broad sense to reveal a distinctively African existential 
perspective.   
 
In the 1991 essay (quoted above), thoughts on Pan Africanism and the relationship 
between art and political activism are revived in a methodologically refined way to 
invoke the density of the context within which the essay was devised.  The essay reveals 
Mphahlele’s approval of Pan Africanism as one of the alternative ways in which an 
African humanist consciousness and way of life have been expressed by different 
thinkers over the ages (as the phrase “tell Africa’s story” signifies) (“Brenthurst 
Collection” 273).  This is done without direct use of the term “Pan Africanism”, as a 
stylistic indication that the idea is neither the central focus of the essay nor a new addition 
to the Africanist intellectual context.  Mphahlele displays similar discursive dexterity (in 
a different essay of the same year) in his reaffirmation of the value of rigorous 
intellectual analysis versus spontaneous ideological activism.   In the 1991 essay “The 
Art of the Writer and his Function”, he remarks that “while an artist should not dismiss 
ideology, he should also avoid choking on it … [because] an ideology can either enrich a 
work of art or undermine it” (“The Art of” 400).  Other African theorists of this period 
were also expressing their opinion on this issue.  One example is Njabulo Ndebele, who 
pronounced in his 1991 collection of essays that a careful distinction needed to be made 
between paraded intellectualism and the positive attribute of applying intellectual rigour 
in social analysis. Njabulo Ndebele discourages sloganeering or “superficial thinking”, 
which he castigates as “acting as a façade for what might appear to be an empty desperate 
intellectual centre lacking in firmly established traditions of intellectual rigour” (“Turkish 
Tales” 25).    In the same breath, in the essay titled “The Rediscovery of the Ordinary”, 
Ndebele cautions against the self-defeating attempt to contribute to nation-building by 
favouring spectacular representation.  His reference to “the immense challenging 
responsibility to create a new society” (“The Rediscovery” 57, emphasis added) reveals 
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his call for serious intellectual analysis rather than facile sloganeering.  He exemplifies 
the type of engagement he canvasses for by a remark in which he cautions that all that is 
destructive should not be attributed to the oppressor European while all that is benevolent 
is associated with the oppressed African.  
 
In 1992 Mphahlele continued with analyses of currents of thought that had been 
manifested in earlier decades in ways that elucidate aspects of his African humanism 
more effectively than had been possible earlier.  In re-critiquing the ideology of Black 
Consciousness, Mphahlele explains that in his view African humanist sensibility conflicts 
with the intellectualism of Black Consciousness, the same reason why he also rejects “the 
humanism of Europe” which he perceives as having become “an intensely intellectual 
adventure” (“Notes Towards” 135).  The tendency of European humanism towards 
intellectualism, as this quotation observes, means to him that it has veered away from the 
concrete terrain that remains the abode of African humanism.  However, the 
intellectualism associated with members of European cultures differs in content with that 
practised by the followers of Black Consciousness.  The tendency of the former to 
intellectualise contrasts with the Africanist outlook of embodying philosophy 
communally by living it in simple, practical ways.    
 
In the 1992 essay analysed above, Mphahlele uses the terms “African” and “humanism” 
quite frequently, both in isolation and in combination – as their use in the title suggests.  
The essays touch on various aspects of the concept including the religious, cosmological 
and cultural, evident in expressions such as “African thought and belief” (136); “social 
concept”, “The Supreme Being is a poetic conception” (all 137); and “at peace with the 
ancestors and other humans” (138).   Weaving his reviewed explication into the 
complexities of Africanist thinking patterns pervading the years including 1992, 
Mphahlele describes the unique features of his concept of African humanism in an 
effectively comparative manner marking mellower, less strident style of argumentation 
that he displayed in this period.   For example, he remarks that African humanism “could 
never be a godless way of life” and that “we cannot separate African humanism from 
African thought and belief, including religion” (“Notes Towards” 136).  The divergences 
mentioned above between African and European humanisms manifest themselves in the 
differing forms of collective behaviour of those we can perceive as influenced by African 
humanist consciousness and those influenced by European humanist consciousness, he 
suggests.  On the one hand, Mphahlele believes, African humanists display a morality 
that has survived in the communal African consciousness till now in conduct such as 
assuming the living presence “of the Supreme Being … as an all-pervading vital force in 
the mountains, rivers, valleys, and the plant and animal kingdoms” (“Notes Towards” 
137).  Mphahlele holds that “at the level at which [they] feel powerless because a violent 
rupture is threatening in [their] relationships or has occurred [those practising African 
humanism call] others in the extended and immediate family [to] talk and try to mend 
things” (“Notes Towards” 138); maintaining that “your character is determined or shaped 
by being morally upright and being at peace with the ancestors and other humans” (Notes 
Towards” 138).  African humanists, he believes, display a “total reliance on individual 
and collective resilience”, depending on the complex pattern of social relationships that 
enable life to survive as a collective or communal force (Notes Towards” 138).  
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Mphahlele sees it as a  consciousness that is manifested in conduct informed by a sense 
of the interconnectedness of human, animal, plant, and inanimate environments and the 
cosmos, with human life at the centre, envisaging human life “merging with the 
environment even while deriving nourishment from it” (“Notes Towards” 137).   
 
One of the strongest pillars on which such humanism rests is the complex pattern of 
social relationships (“Notes Towards” 138).   This particular tenet of African humanism 
tends in its cosmological view towards emphasis on unity rather than diversity, synthesis 
rather than analysis.  Simply put, African humanism recogonises diversity as natural and 
thus deserving of pious awe.  This explains why this existential perspective sees harmony 
in difference, hence its insistence on its own distinctive nature.  So that difference is to be 
hallowed, as it relates to the interconnection of varying components of reality by the Vital 
Force.  From difference then, African humanists derive nourishment by way of spiritual 
growth, i.e. recognition of a higher, spiritual kind of harmony that demands more than 
just carnal or material filiation.  That is why Mphahlele emphasises that reality for the 
African consists of the interconnectedness of human, animal, plant and inanimate 
environments and the cosmos, with human life at the centre, envisaging human life 
“merging with the environment even while deriving nourishment from it” (“Notes 
Towards” 137, emphasis added ).   In contrast with religions brought to the African 
continent from elsewhere (such as Islam and western Christianity), African humanism is 
not a proselytising faith (“Notes Towards” 139).  This would contradict its mystical 
respect for difference or diversity.  It has never sought to colonise anybody, a trait that 
has been common to Christianity and Islam (“Notes Towards” 139).  Of course 
colonising anyone implies imposed removal of difference by denial of the value of 
“difference” or otherness of the colonised.  In “Landmarks of Literary History: A Black 
Perspective”, Mphahlele explains the distinctive quality of African humanist religious 
practice as manifesting itself among postcolonial Africans in forms such as the “Ethiopic-
Zionist” Christianity.  He appreciates the self-constituting function of such hybridised 
forms of western Christianity (championed by religious leaders such as Isaiah Shembe) as 
being inspired by religious nationalism (“Landmarks” 46).  
 
There are African critics who continued in 1992 with the debate on how the mission of 
the writer artist relates with that of the political activist.  Keorapetse Kgositsile as one of 
them interestingly made pronouncements differing from Mphahlele’s stance on this 
matter.  He writes (in “Culture as a Site of the Struggle”) of South African literary figures 
like Alex la Guma, Wally Serote, Mandla Langa, Ronnie Kasrils, Barry Feinberg and 
himself as “cadres of the Movement who are writers – as distinct from writers who 
happen to be in the Movement” (50).  Kgositsile stresses that in his view “there is a 
serious distinction” in respect of these two categories of social activists (50).  Both 
categories are commonly acknowledged in this quotation as writers, but Kgositsile sees 
political activism as the more important role compared to that of being a writer.  That is 
why, for Kgositsile, Sol Plaatje remains the major role model specifically for primarily 
being “an outstanding figure in the top leadership of the ANC” while his being a “leading 
artist and cultural worker with a keen sense of social responsibility” is seen as an 
occupation of secondary importance (48).  Despite the disagreement explained above and 
the contrast between Mphahlele’s and Kgositsile’s perspectives, they share (for opposed 
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reasons) a common appreciation of the complex relationship between being an 
intellectual artist and being a political activist.   
 
That Kgositsile and Mphahlele share this view is clear when one considers Kgositsile’s 
observation on the need for the intellectual excercise of producing literature “never to be 
allowed to degenerate into being no more than a mirror reflection of life” (“Site of 
Struggle” 49).   Kgositsile’s argument, however, seems to disparage the intellectual 
engagement required in writing a poem – for he equates it with an excuse for direct 
political action.   This is evident in his urging supposedly truant political activists to 
consult a “military instructor” about fighting for liberation without dilly-dallying (“Site 
of Struggle” 49) rather than writing a politically inclined peom.  For theorists like 
Mphahlele, the theorist or “interpreter”, counter-“spontaneity” position of the African or 
postcolonial writer should be given priority if the liberation atmosphere is not to remain 
stagnant or to degenerate.  There is no doubt about Kgositsile’s writing being 
postcolonial in orientation.  That is why he writes in a tone similar to Mphahlele’s and 
those of other African postcolonial writers, as when he asserts that:  “When you write you 
oppose, propose or affirm certain values and thereby you define yourself and your 
national, group or class values, essential interests and allegiance … the writer must be 
informed; the writer must be knowledgeable” (“Site of Struggle” 48).  For Kgositsile, the 
knowledge a writer needs in order to be relevant or to have impact is about his or her 
“national, group or class values” (“Site of Struggle” 48).  Mphahlele has been shown to 
be referring to such communally shared values as an aspect of his concept of African 
humanism in the sense that such values are a constituent of African peoples’ cultures.  
Kgositsile accedes to such a role of African cultures (without necessarily using 
Mphahlele’s terminology or concept) in the following words:  “The very existence of the 
SACP and COSATU is an act of culture; it is an opposition to the existence of the racist, 
exploitative culture which we have known and continue to suffer and resist.  Their very 
existence proposes an alternative culture” (“Site of Struggle” 48).   
 
The important point to recognise is that African writers cited so far as having developed 
in ways parallel to Mphahlele in his undertaking of delineating the crux of African 
identity and personality, tackle what are fundamentally the same concerns as Mphahlele 
does.  The commonalities that stimulated these processes of intellectual development can 
best be summed up in Mphahlele’s explanation that “a discussion of African humanism is 
a question of culture, of anthropology, by which I mean simply what we do, how and 
why” (“Notes Towards” 136).  All of these Africanist writers (broadly speaking) describe 
the African conception of the individual more or less as Mphahlele does. That is why 
Mphahlele confesses to his enlistment into African humanist thinking of the Igbo and 
Hindu concepts of ‘chi’ and ‘dharma’ respectively.  These terms point to acceptance of 
an individualism that has self-respect and an ability to be accommodative as hallmarks of 
African humanism in Mphahlele’s conception of this cultural practice (“Notes Towards” 
140). 
 
Because of the difficulty of achieving a cogent and useful definition of the concept of 
African humanism within the complex context of postcolonial debates on matters his 
concept has to address, Mphahlele’s life-long concern with the idea of African humanism 
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(as expressed in his own work), and his criticism of its inadequate representation by some 
African writers in their writing, provide ideal material for study in an attempt to clarify 
this idea.  Mphahlele hints at the invaluable contributions of fellow African theorists who 
grappled with commonplace intellectual enquiry of the times during which he wrote.  
That is why he clarifies what African humanism entails by naming and defining it in a 
way that is consonant with his discernment of a myriad of terms being used to refer to it, 
including those occurring in the popular oral and literary media of radio, television, 
magazines and newspapers.  For him these contemporary ideas circulating in the public 
domain refer to aspects of African humanism – without equating or being identical to it.  
It is for this reason that in a 1993 essay, Mphahlele notes the relevance of the newspaper 
editor Aggrey Klaaste’s concept of “nation building” to his own notion of what 
constitutes an African humanist consciousness and way of life, as follows: 
Aggrey Klaaste … himself conceived of ‘nation building’ a few years ago as a 
 rallying cry for reconstruction for unity and self-reliance and self-help.  Through 
 and around the Sowetan, he called for people with vision to devise programmes 
 for social change.  African Humanism – Botho (Sesotho) and Ubuntu (Nguni) lies 
 at the base of the concept.  (“In Search of” 220) 
The words “self-reliance” and “self-help” foreground Mphahlele’s recognition of the 
African humanist proclivity towards self-constituting acts rather than compromising 
reliance on (material or intellectual) handouts from those who are responsible for one’s 
wretchedness.  The African humanist basis of such acts is pointed out directly when 
Mphahlele states that “African Humanism … lies at the base of” Klaaste’s concept of 
‘nation building’”.  Urging Africans to engage in “nation building” activities like this is 
typical of the postcolonialist move away from embracing prescriptions by the “centre”.   
The “centre”, according to postcolonial writers like Edward Said in Culture and 
Imperialism (1993), denotes dominant norms imposed on the disadvantaged peoples of 
the southern and eastern hemispheres of the world by privileged peoples occupying its 
northern and western hemispheres.  By resisting harassment by the “centre”, the 
oppressed peoples of the world will achieve postcolonial hybridity on their own terms 
rather than as colonised people.   On the scale bigger than the individual plane, this 
reveals the postcolonial insistence (as articulated by theorists such as Edward Said) on a 
contrapuntal relationship between Africa and the West rather than a Manichean one in 
which the oppressor fabricates culture in exclusion of the oppressed and vice versa.   
 
From what Mphahlele says in this excerpt, it is clear that Klaaste’s concept of “nation 
building” is narrower than Mphahlele’s notion of African humanism.  That it is narrower 
is revealed by its focus on “reconstruction for unity and self-reliance and self-help” 
which results in the “devis[ing] of programmes for social change.”  Absent from it is the 
broad scope of African humanism as Mphahlele conceives of it, that includes emphasis 
also on spiritual rather than material resources.  The kind of unity and self-reliance 
contained in “nation building” incline more towards coming together as a group of blacks 
for collective economic power that may release them from material dependence to 
achieve material self-reliance and “self-help.”  For Mphahlele to say that African 
humanism “lies at the base of” the concept of “nation building” means that the former is 
more profound and underlying, and thus more fundamentally effective.   For this reason, 
writers like Klaaste make the meaning of African humanism more lucid by explaining 
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what its constituents mean, without necessarily using the broader term “African 
humanism” itself – as Mphahlele expresses the more adequate notion of the often loosely 
used term “botho/ubuntu” in English, consistently throughout his later expository writing.  
Concerns of African writers such as Mphahlele and Klaaste include putting the African in 
the centre of history rather than on its fringes. 
 
The decision to put the African in the centre and interpret experiences from that localised 
perspective is an incarnation of Afrocentrism, as Mashegoane testified in an essay 
published a year later in 1994 (“Historical Anteriority Twisted” 79). European 
nationalism, which spawned colonisation and its South African variant known as 
apartheid, cannot be reconciled with any nationalism that is integral to African cultures 
within the context of Mphahlele’s explication of the concept of African humanism.   
Mphahlele has stated that African humanist approach in interacting with other peoples is 
not that of colonisation, in the same way as its religion does not proselytise (“Notes 
Towards” 139).  For this reason, the kind of nationalism espoused by practitioners of 
African humanism is not attained through colonisation.  Similarly, egalitarianism or 
classnessness as a feature of nationalist polity is not congruous with the concept of 
African humanism, as shown in Mphahlele’s statement that: 
In traditional times, African communities were loosely divided into the ruling 
 family, with the nobility close to it, and the common citizenry.  What social 
 differences there might be in modern terms were blurred by the sense of 
 community and moral interdependence that pervaded society … Still, one’s age 
 group was more important in the ordering of social relationships than the family’s 
 economic means.  (“In Search of” 210) 
Mphahlele details the structure of the populace traditionally constituting African societies 
in the spirit of insisting that African humanist communities in the postcolonial era should 
critically revive such practices as part of their self-constitution.  Devices with which the 
Africanist creative writer can effect a creative perpetuation of such a traditional 
nationalism or social structuring (according to Mphahlele in one of his 1993 essays) are 
perspective, resonance and myth (“Educating the Imagination” 184), discussed in full in 
the next section of this chapter of the study.   
 
Because of a concern with the nature of nationalism that postcolonial Africans should 
appropriate for themselves – characterising Africanist debate in years including 1993 –  
Okolo (1993) outlines the subservience of the single African individual to social roles 
and communal needs (African Philosophy 28).  This accords with Mphahlele’s emphasis 
in a 1993 discursive piece of the point that the individual finds fulfilment in what he or 
she does for the community and “[becomes] an elder in the ruler’s court according to age 
and the esteem [he or she enjoys] among [his or her] own kin and clan” (“In Search of” 
210, emphasis added).  This means that achievement is the objective criterion that 
determines one’s proper position on the social ladder, thus ensuring that hierarchy is 
maintained fairly and with equal respect for human dignity or for the sacredness of 
human life. The novel fibre re-envigorating the somewhat hackneyed theme of social 
roles and communal interdependence in Mphahlele’s description of his concept of 
African humanism is the idea of social hierarchy that is seen as having a role in modern 
African existence.  This notion of hierarchical promotion of the African individual within 
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African communities “according to age and the esteem [he or she] enjoys among [his or 
her] own kin and clan” emphasises experience in referring to those who have served the 
community for a long time (as the word “age” implies), as well as fulfilment of one’s 
social role according to the expectations of the community.  The individual serving the 
community over time and according to social roles determined by the community earns 
status within the community, as this quotation indicates.  But it is important to note that 
the community served in this manner “[feels] increased by [such an individual’s] elevated 
status” (“In Search of” 210).  As such, the African individual and the African community 
benefit mutually from such proper interaction. This mutual benefit between the African 
individual and community highlighted by Mphahlele includes female individuals.  As this 
study will continually demonstrate, Mphahlele bases his observations in a patriarchal 
society, and not a paternalistic one.  References to a patriarchal society, consistently with 
the way Afrocentrists have avowedly had either to discard or modify Eurocentric 
terminology, are not used by Africanist writers (such as Mphahlele) to suggest 
disapproval associated with an embedded masculinist bent in a society, but simply means 
that in its hierarchical social organisation it places men, husbands, uncles or grandfathers 
(rather than women, wives, aunts or grandmothers) in topmost positions.  These 
culturally sanctioned positions should not be regarded censoriously because they are held 
vicariously on behalf of all the strata of society as well as on behalf of ancestors who, 
before their depature into the spirit world, valued this very kind of social patterning.  The 
same is the case with African societies that are historically matriarchal.  A censorious 
tone could not suit any Africanist writer describing such a society as its difference from a 
patriarchal one is merely a matter of tradition having placed females (rather than males) 
in symbolically superior social-hierarchical positions.  For Africanist theorists a word like 
“egalitarian” or “classless” would not mean what it means in European, Marxist thinking, 
because the notion of class in the African world-view does not ipso facto imply 
exploitation and status-related conflict. It is for this reason that, if at any stage Mphahlele 
portrays the paternalism of a character or group of characters, it is done to expose the 
errant behaviour of such a character or characters.   
 
Another significant tenet of African humanism spelled out by Mphahlele in 1994 is that it 
is “a simple faith free of the tyranny of theology and intellectual argument” (“Educating 
the Imagination” 180).  In a way, this statement cautions against the latent danger in 
intellectualising about rather than practically living out a view of life based in African 
humanist consciousness – in addition to referring to religion or theology more directly as 
a segment within various African cultures.  African humanism, according to Mphahlele, 
is based on practice rather than conscious theory.  The African humanist consciousness 
within Africans is thus an unconscious driving force behind African humanist conduct.  
Among the pragmatic things the article highlights is the fact that the African humanist 
concept of community provides a sound basis for team learning in the workplace, to keep 
in check the Eurocentric tendency towards placing detrimental emphasis on individual 
excellence only (“Humanism and Corporate World” 130-131).  While teamwork is a 
value that is not alien to people who fall outside the category of Africans, the major point 
is that in contexts other than those constituted by African cultures it could be 
implemented as a means of pursuing individualistic interests rather than communal ones.   
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Mphahlele highlights this position as relevant to the corporate world of today – for 
instance – in the following words: 
(1) Managerial reality is socially and culturally determined.  The community 
 concept provides a sound basis for team learning to  counter the Eurocentric habit 
 of mind that is hung up on the demand of individual excellence.  This spawns 
 reckless individualism in South African corporations.  (2) A community concept 
 of management can help develop a greater sense of oneness in the corporation.  
 This will counter the older view that sees only an adversarial relationship 
 between managers and the managed in preference to consensus.  (“Humanism and 
 Corporate World” 131-132)   
From the quotation above it can be seen that Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism 
is resilient at both individual and community levels.  This enables it to pervade, for 
example, the modern day workplace and keep in check the Eurocentric tendency to 
promote detrimental emphasis on individual needs and excellence only, by using the 
concept of community as a sound basis for team learning and fulfilment in the group as a 
whole (“Humanism and Corporate World” 130-131).   
 
Mphahlele’s attempt to crystallise the concept of “African humanism” led him in 1994 to 
guide the audience of one of his many addresses on his vision of society towards a lucid 
understanding of the concept, in the following words: 
Let us, for the sake of convenience, consider African Humanism on two planes: 
 (a) as a state of mind, a consciousness, a way of perceiving; and (b) as a social 
 order, a possible option for a way of life based on (a), and a pursposeful act of 
 knowing and of behaving in a human context.  These are really two aspects of an 
 indivisible concept of thought and belief.  (“Humanism and Corporate World” 
 128) 
 
The broader, more carefully circumscribed nature of African humanism compared to that 
which Mphahlele ascribes to underdeveloped concepts like Black Consciousness is 
evident in his describing African humanism in 1994 also as “a social order, a possible 
option for a way of life” (“Humanism and Corporate World” 128).  In juxtaposing what 
Mphahlele conceptualises as African humanism with his understanding of Black 
Consciousness one can recognise the embroilment of his concept in debates constituting 
the intellectual milieu of that period.  Mphahlele’s mention of Black Consciousness at 
one stage of its history freezing into a political matrix (elsewhere in the essay quoted 
from above) is significant (“Humanism and Corporate World” 129).  It betrays 
Mphahlele’s guarding against African humanism diluting into a (merely) political 
programme while at the same time repulsing tendencies among his peers to try and 
impoverish the intellectual terrain by equating or confusing it with political activism.  
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism is put across as able to survive the encounter 
with western modes of living.  Mphahlele describes African humanism as capable of 
functioning within and contributing to modern institutions such as the corporate word 
(described above) and of sifting through surrounding ideas in order to plumb qualities it 
can incorporate into its make-up – to highlight the  adaptability and elasticity of the 
concept that has enabled it to survive across shifting, contingent conditions across 
history.  
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While ideologies described earlier as Black Consciousness and negritude prioritised a 
psychological strenghthening of demeaned blacks to see themselves as worthy humans, 
Afrocentrism describes conscious awareness of the dangers of Eurocentric distortion of 
knowledge about Africans as well as efforts to rectify the distortions.  In a 1994 article 
entitled “Historical anteriority twisted, broken and denied: a general vindification for an 
Afrocentric method in the studies of Africa”, Mashegoane stresses that Africans need to 
discard jaundiced Eurocentric approaches and attitudes and approach reality on their own 
terms:  “within an Afrocentric … context [we combat] prejudices, stereotypes, myth and 
untruth … putting into perspective knowledge about Africa” (79).   As explained earlier 
in this section, Afrocentrism as an analytical perspective cuts across Africanist theorists 
of all ages and nuclear persuasions.  It is clear from Mphahlele’s essays including those 
from 1994 that he and the other African writers discussed alongside him are linked by a 
shared Afrocentrism.  Each interrogates existential challenges with an Afrocentric 
attitude, yet carries out the theorising assignment with his or her own points of view, 
orientations and priorities of purpose in mind. There are bound to be theoretical 
atmospheric factors that led to African writers like Mashegoane in 1994 to outline the 
important role played by Afrocentric points of departure in grappling with issues of the 
time.  One likelihood could be the writer’s awareness of a Eurocentric colouring in some 
of the publications of the time which did not settle well with him because of his 
Afrocentric preferences. 
 
 It is significant that the South African theologian B. J. van der Walt’s perspective in 
handling the topics dealt with in his 1994 book The Liberating Message is crassly 
Eurocentric. Symptoms of Van der Walt’s Eurocentric psyche include a misinterpretation 
of African humanism’s communal aspect (236-237).   His seeing what Mphahlele 
chooses to call African humanism as mere humanitarianism is inadequate in that it 
generalises only one aspect of caring for and loving fellow humans as if it is all that 
African humanism is about.  Van der Walt’s attempt to interpret these notions in line with 
the way Africanist writers implement them in their theories is evidently unsuccessful. 
Failure to see community from the same Afrocentric perspective as Mphahlele, for 
instance, leads Van der Walt to conclude wrongly that the sense of community prevalent 
among African societies gives rise to “a hunger for power” (Liberating Message 236).  In 
this way, the ‘tyranny’ of “one societal relationship (e.g. family, tribe or state) over all 
the others” invariably leads (he claims) to the idea of the state being inseparable from 
excesses such as absolute control of economic resources or an oligarchy of political 
power (Liberating Message 236-37).   In African communalism, however (as Mphahlele 
and other African humanists indicate), any social unit emanating from what Van der Walt 
describes as “societal relationship” (237) will be regulated by the cultural constraint of 
having eventually to direct all benefits to the entire community.    Mphahlele’s sense of 
African humanism is also harmonious with the non-chauvinistic aspect of a 
patriarchal/matriarchal hierarchy within African customs, in its non-sexism.  It is for this 
reason that Mphahlele’s fiction reveals African communal condemnation of male 
characters who misuse their hierarchically superior positions within society to abuse 
women, as conflicting with African humanist values. 
 
 44
 Unlike writers such as Mphahlele who view the advent of postcolonialism mainly as 
capacitating formerly oppressed Africans to define themselves more soundly, Van der 
Walt sees the introduction of Christianity as well as of a western education and western 
political and economic institutions as having led to an “identity crisis” (9-10).  What Van 
der Walt (as an example of a Eurocentric theorist) stops short of understanding is that this 
humanism has germinated from the traditional African concept of botho (in the Sesotho 
languages) or ubuntu (in the Nguni languages).   The concept of botho is rooted in 
African tradition and is broader than humanitarianism.  In Van der Walt’s view, African 
theorists such as Mphahlele endowed the word “humanism” with a new content, 
“conveying thereby simply that he believes in the values and potential of man” (242, 
emphasis added).  Already dimensions of “values” and “potential” of man adds to what 
the term “humanitarianism” entails in its sense of merely being compassionate.  As such, 
the word “simply” is misplaced, since it inaccurately means that “values” and “potential 
of man” are as narrow in range of meaning as compassion (suggested by the choice of the 
term “humanitarianism”) (Liberating Message 242).  Van der Walt’s own explanation of 
what he means by African humanist world-views believing “in the values and potential of 
man” (242) is that according to Africanists, African society reinforces human beings’ 
belief in themselves without denying their dependence upon God (242, 243).  Rather than 
the humanism of Africanists’ analysis of society straddling two seemingly unliked and 
conflicting religious perceptions (as Van der Walt describes it above), the role of 
ancestors serves to harmonise this way of religious worship. Ancestors having once lived 
on earth, they are an extension of centralising man in the African’s cosmology as much as 
they bridge the gap between the material and the spiritual.  The reality is that in African 
religions ancestors are revered and continually communed with, while worship or prayer 
is culturally only the due of the Supreme Being.  Africans recognise the manifestation of 
God in natural phenomena (as indicated by Mphahlele’s description of African humanism  
cited elsewhere in this study), yet this should not be confused with the western idea of 
‘nature worship’, as if Africans do not acknowledge a distinction between these 
phenomena and the Supreme Being itself.   The exercise of juxtaposing any contrasting 
entities yields a deeper etching of their differences.  The way contributions of Africanist 
writers such as Mashegoane and Eurocentric ones such as Van der Walt in 1994 
highlighted divergences between Afrocentric and Eurocentric approaches to theory 
served, inter alia, to clarify both Afrocentrism and Eurocentrism.  They also delimited 
the true nature of theories conceived from Afrocentric vantage points (such as 
Mphahlele’s philosophy of African humanism) in high relief.  For this reason, 
Mphahlele’s concept gained a more thorough coherence from the atmosphere of 1994 in 
which writers from opposed poles wrote concurrently in Afrocentric and Eurocentric 
ways. 
 
The tendency of Africanist writers of the preceding decade to characterise Africanness 
more pertinently in comparison or contrast with European hegemonic dispositions flows 
into the 1995 intellectual atmosphere.  But in essays such as “For the Sowetan: We’re 
Being Had!” (1995), Mphahlele almost always invokes African humanism without using 
the term, as in the statement: 
 I’m constrained to ask:  What are we Blacks doing to jack ourselves up in our 
 own esteem, as we, rather than Whites, perceive ourselves?  What are we doing to  
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 assert our own intellectual and moral being, so that it becomes less and less 
 possible for the cultural establishment to assign us to the easy twilight zone of 
 marginalized people?  (351) 
A similar confidence in the capacity of an African humanist psyche and way of life to 
mediate the complexity of all spheres of modern life is displayed by Mazrui in his 1995 
book Cultural Forces in World Politics. He confirms that economically the Northern and 
Western hemispheres have always since colonisation been and will continue calling the 
shots (after uhuru in African states), unless an efficient Africanist intervention takes 
place.   
 
Mphahlele similarly stresses the need for African agency as a means towards self-
determination.  That is why among the things that he finds impressive about black literary 
art is a quality he identifies as African authenticity in contemporary music (as he states in 
a 1995 Drum Magazine article):  “There are skilful, soulful musicians who are adapting 
indigenous idioms to modern jazz, such as Malombo Jazz and a few other groups. We 
must commend these artists…” (“From My Notebook” 144).  It is for pragmatic agency 
(as opposed to ineffective intellectualising agency) that Mphahlele feels these Africanist 
artists should be lauded. Lamenting the contemporary inclination of Black Consciousness 
proponents to evade pressing sociopolitical issues of the day by receding into impotent 
intellectualism, Mphahlele wrote in an essay originally presented in 1995 that: 
 The present lull in the Black Consciousness exhortations towards self-reliance and 
 the affirmation of a black selfhood may suggest to some that all of us have settled 
 for political and economic advancement without any heed of the intellectual and 
 spiritual alternatives we can evolve.  But movements driven by a passionate 
 intensity have a way of coming and going in cycles, as long as the historical 
 conditions make it necessary.  (“The Burden of History” 81) 
What this means is that emphasis on “self-reliance and the affirmation of a black 
selfhood” that is not accompanied by a richer spiritual scaffold (“The Burden of History” 
81) has come about because the intensity of as broad a mentality as that of (original) Pan 
Africanism is waning. The same Black Consciousness/Pan Africanist consciousness is 
still the impetus of Mphahlele’s denunciations of impotent sophism rather than a more 
adequate form of agency that encompasses praxis.  He is able to transcend the myopia of 
his fellow Africans limited to these cruder definitions of Africanness, due to the benefit 
of his more sophisticated and nuanced use of Black Consciousness/Pan Africanism in the 
form of African humanism.  This is attested to by Mphahlele’s remark (below) about the 
relative scope and depth of Pan Africanism and Black Consciousness on the one hand, 
and on the other hand African humanism: 
 Black Consciousness, before it became institutionalized into a political camp, 
 helped students, artists, writers and social activists to appreciate at least the 
 dynamics of African Humanism.  Black Consciousness endures, albeit in a 
 truncated or dislocated form.  (“Humanism and Corporate World” 129, emphasis 
 added) 
One of the benefits of exploring the Black Conscious/Pan Africanist milieu of 
Mphahlele’s development of his own concept of African humanism is the unearthing of 
the roots of some of the stances for which African humanism is of present known.   
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Reconsidering the state of artistic production among Africans in 1995, Mphahlele 
manipulates deceptively pedestrian topics to excavate more profound, underlying 
distinctive features of his philosophy of African humanism. One way he does this is by 
highlighting a uniquely African attitude, which defers to communal needs in practising 
art, including ritual performance. Not all Africans may be artists, but they will at least 
have this particular sense of the function of art.  There are those, Mphahlele states in his 
1995 speech, who will emerge better than others as “artist[s] because [they] have the 
talent for it, the sensitivity to sustain it, revitalize it” (“Opening of Community Arts 
Come Together” 268).  The remark reveals that Mphahlele’s African humanism does not 
conform to positivism as secular (European) humanism does, in that it accepts 
conceptualisation of human action in intellectual or spiritual terms (signified by “talent”), 
as well as discipline of the body and its senses to give out their best in order to 
foreground human achievement across cultural clusters (represented by the terms 
“sensitivity”, “sustain it” and “revitalize it”).  For Africans, there is a religious duty to 
create art – an attitude that has to a certain extent been eroded by the colonial and 
imperial experience, hence Mphahlele’s declaration that: 
We had greater appeal as artists when our creations were ritualistic, inspired by 
 the gods and ancestral spirits as intercessors between us and the Supreme Being.  
 To see, for instance, a West African wooden and bronze mask is to come face to 
 face with an overpowering mystery that nails you to the spot where you’re 
 standing.  (“Opening of Community Arts Come Together” 269) 
What becomes immediately evident from this citation is the spiritual imperative towards 
creating works of art found commonly among Africans of varying cultures that are linked 
by an overriding African way of thinking and perceiving.  It is natural that on the 
intellectual plane thinkers like Mphahlele, faced with the challenges of mapping societal 
progression from colonialism to postcolonialism, had to expand their understanding of 
concepts such as African humanism by reviewing what they had said earlier concerning 
certain features of African identity. 
 
In this period, Mphahlele’s handling of the theme of tribalism is revealed by the 
statement that “signs that tribalism is with us … [do] not augur well for nation building” 
(“Towards a Definition” 251).  He continues in this year to denounce forces that militate 
against traditionally-founded communal cohesion in an unobtrusive, discursive style by 
which he foregrounds an overt topic while masking a deepening illumination of his 
concept of African humanism underneath such a relatively more superficial topic.  That is 
why the quotation above from “Opening of Community Arts Come Together” conceals a 
concern with the need for creating works of art (found commonly among Africans of 
varying cultures) beneath a seemingly commonplace description of the mask as an art 
form.  It is important that Mpahlele asserts the relevance of dinstinctively African ways 
of life (as he does in this article) in the postcolonial period around 1995, when feminism 
started to emerge more strongly as one perspective that could not be ignored within the 
intellectual critical debate of Africanists. 
 
Mpahlele cannot validly be expected to express his views on issues from the same 
position as feminists, because a case can be made for defining feminism as a Western 
theoretical tool.  Such an apparent contrast of two seemingly opposed world-views 
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should not be misconstrued as an indication that African humanism as a way of life is 
unconcerned with the genuine issues addressed by Western theory.  What I am saying is 
simply that African humanism does not refract reality through such foreign perceptual 
tools or media.  That is why Mphahlele stated in 1996 that he rejected negritude as a 
literary theory because he saw negritudinists like Senghor as attempting to fight western 
assimilation on the westener’s terms (“The Function” 422).  One of the reasons 
Mphahlele advances for adopting this position of eschewing terminology typical to 
Western concepts is that “Because art is a way of perceiving, literary demands must 
needs vary from country to country – one social situation to another” (The Function” 
422).  This aspect of Mphahlele’s expository writing, especially as expressed in his later 
essays such as that of  1996 (quoted above) is necessary to note in order not to misjudge 
the surface-level difference of terminology as symptomatic of an underlying neglect of 
crucial ideas merely because they are expressed in Eurocentric terminology.  It does, 
however, signal that African humanism and European ways of looking at reality co-exist 
within any modern-day African as two unidentical world-views.    
 
Although the preoccupations of feminist postcolonial thinkers may appear to be 
discordant with Mphahlele’s African humanist engagement with postcolonial reality, the 
truth is that he shares their concerns.   For example, Mphahlele’s attitude towards women 
cannot be said to go along with the thinking of sexist or chauvinistic thinkers described 
by the feminist theorist Minh-ha as assuming that “women’s enemy is the intellect, that 
their apprehension of life can only wind and unwind around a cooking pot, a baby’s 
diaper, or matters of the heart” (“Not You/Like You” 1997).  But Mphahlele’s fight for 
the recognition of women’s rights is not expressed in terms that feminists normally use.  
Mphahlele’s censure of practices that violate the sacredness and dignity of women (as a 
valued part of humankind) coincides with postcolonial views on the same issue expressed 
by feminists.  This is more straightforwardly discernible when his expository writing is 
scrutinised by using theoretical devices attributable to feminists who also published in 
1997, such as Gayatri Spivak.  When this is done in the next sections of this chapter, it 
should serve to clarify Mphahlele’s convergence with the views of feminists, although he 
does not normally use such unAfrican terms as “feminism”, “egalitarianism”or 
“Marxism” in referring to the phenomena which the European words denote.  He uses his 
own African equivalents of such terms – without making them into labels.  
 
The critic Thomas Pavel’s 1997 examination of literary genres helps to explain why the 
literary works of a writer like Mphahlele display permeation by his and his fellow 
Africans’ biographical material.  Pavel remarked that:  
Literary fictions … differ from history (but not from myth)  insofar as they 
 emphasize the problematic nature of the links between observable (imitable) 
 action and the invisible norms and values that inform it … like many myths, 
 fiction lingers on exemplary conformity and nonconformity to norms…   
 (“Fiction and Imitation” 532).   
In the same article Pavel asserts that literary fiction typically represents human beings in 
their relationship with norms and values, which norms and values cannot be reduced to a 
set of observable facts or copied directly, but can only be highlighted indirectly through 
examples of human action (521).   It comes as no surprise therefore that what Mphahlele 
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sees as the effect of literature on his reader is the same benefit he himself gets from his 
practice of creative writing.  He has declared that the target audience of his fiction 
consists of his fellow Africans (rather than foreigners), whose conduct is stimulated by 
the African humanist consciousness that he, too, confesses to be his world-view.   This 
could also explain why Mphahlele frequently chooses autobiography as the way to 
express himself in literature. This genre empowers him to perform the function of 
literature most effectively, enriching a people’s experience by transforming mundane 
experience into a self-constituting existential tool – according to Pavel’s explanation 
(above) of the problematics inherent in fiction writing and social analysis.  
 
The need for conscious and active efforts that mediate assimilation and transform it into 
hegemonic discourse that does not deny Africans their true identity continues to be the 
concern of African theorists during 1997.  Kwame Gyekye stresses the need to adapt 
what has been inherited from the dialectical marriage of tradition and colonisation in 
order successfully to manage modern day  society that he describes as having the pattern 
of large, complex, heterogeneous day to day living (Tradition and Modernity x).   His 
sensitiviy towards the dangers that neocolonialism might pose against African 
nationalism in the postcolonial period impels him to assert that:  “what may be true is that 
in many instances the different cultural forms or practices can be said to be essentially 
variations on the same theme [as] a number of scholars recognize the existence of 
common features or commonalities among the cultures of Africa” (Tradition and 
Modernity xii).  He identifies the problematic relation between ethnicity and nationalism 
as the bane of nation-building and projects as a solution the elimination of 
“communocultural conflicts” and the transfer of ethnic or local loyalties to the new 
central government (Tradition and Modernity viii).  While the questions of ethnicity and 
tribalism had already entered the Africanist debate by 1997, Gyekye’s that is an 
indication that their current handling had advanced beyond considering African 
nationalism and was focused more on neocolonialism – probably a bigger and more 
urgent menace to the survival of Africanism at this later time.   It is in recognition of this 
need to tackle issues in keeping with changing challenges that Mphahlele’s essays of the 
nineties develop the concept of African humanism with notable sensitivity to the 
theoretical context in which complexity of current daily spheres had to be addressed with 
commensurately complex theories (in the way Gyekye proposes above).  There is no 
doubt that African theorists of the period including 1997 acknowledged the complexity of 
modern life that any philosophy on the condition of being African in the modern context 
had to address.    When Teffo wrote in 1997 about the dynamic religious pluralism 
characterising the African’s life at the time, he was highlighting the same complexity of 
modern day living which increased the challenges facing African theorists.  Teffo (1997) 
illustrated that for the African of the northern part of South Africa, for example, 
communion with ancestors, offerings to traditional deitities like Kgobe, and original ideas 
of being spiritually elevated co-exist in a dialectical relationship with Christian ideas 
informed by western thinking. 
 
With the scrupulous approach Mphahlele acquired during this period (described above), 
the African humanist alignment with postcolonial attitudes of demanding self-definition 
rather than definition by the “centre” becomes evident in his writing, as well as 
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banishment in day to day living of objective self-absencing.  In “Knowledge, Its Nature 
and Role in the Process of Change” (1997), African humanism informs the whole paper, 
yet it is referred to in an applied way rather than starkly – including the point that African 
and European humanism parted ways in an earlier period (167).  Expressions that – 
without direct use of the word “African humanism” – yet assert the concept as an idea are 
a significant symptom of Mphahlele’s discursive style evident from the late nineties 
onward.    The postcolonial writer Bart Moore-Gilbert’s essays of 1997 dwelling 
primarily on instances of “absence” in the life of the “other” (Postcolonial Theory 114 – 
115), can be seen as a theoretical formulation of observations and vantage points similar 
to those of Mphahlele and other African postcolonial writers of this period.  The critic 
Gaurav Desai referred in 1998 to “the choice between an area studies focus such as 
African studies or Asian studies and a spatiotemporal one such as postcolonial studies” 
increasingly becoming a “redundant one” (“Postcolonial Criticism in an African(ist) 
Frame” 217).  This is acknowledgement on her part that issues handled in this period by 
African intellectuals were as demanding as those challenging the attention of globally 
acknowledged postcolonialists to such an extent that the distintion between Africanist 
and postcolonial writing was blurred. 
 
In a 1998 essay Mphahlele demonstrates his alignment with the way Black 
Consciousness thinking turns historical memory effectively into a self-defining tool.  
Typical to his polemical maturity of this period, Mphahlele in the 1998 essay uses his 
sustained critique of Black Consciousness as a lever towards spelling out yet another 
significant feature of his concept of African humanism: “a heightened consciousness of 
history … [as] a concrete experience” which Black Consciousness and African humanism 
commonly “seek to comprehend … as cause, effect, aftermath and sets of resonance” 
(“Your History” 158).  Mphahlele’s mention of “resonance” is an indication that he does 
not incorporate threads of the intellectual debates of his time without dialectically 
adapting them to the plane of his concept of African humanism.  This is made clear by 
the fact that the notion of “resonance” is not an integral part of Black Consciousness 
theory, yet he describes one of the aspects of this discursive formation by using a term 
that is inherent in his own philosophy of African humanism. After broadly pointing in 
preceing decades to the need among Africans to theorise towards a crystallised idea of 
their own brand of postcolonial nationalism, in the 1998 essay he spells out the 
distinctive features of the kind of African nationalism he envisages as a future part of 
African humanist lifestyles that would successfully preserve the identity of Africans.   
Remarks such as the following testify that is is a nationalism shorn of its European, 
capitalist or Marxist-Leninist hue, whose distinctness needs to be recognised:   
Black nationalism, otherwise called African nationalism, or Black 
 Consciousness, are not dead issues in South Africa … riddled though they are 
 with massive ambivalence among us … [and complicated by] concepts such as 
 ‘reconciliation’, ‘forgiveness’, ‘non-racialism’ and ‘socialism’, which are being 
 bandied about … [and serve as] comforting terms that postpone indefinitely issues 
 concerned with identity – being African beyond geographic location, 
 reconciliation between nationalism, socialism and non-racialism, integration and 
 so on”.  (“Your History” 175-176) 
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To refer as in this quotation to “concepts such as ‘reconciliation’, ‘forgiveness’, ‘non-
racialism’ and ‘socialism’” as “comforting terms” within the context of the struggle of 
South African blacks to free themselves from colonial oppression is to allude 
suspiciously to subtle operations of the goals of a nationalism that is European and could 
neo-colonially thwart the intentions of African nationalism to achieve liberation from 
colonialism (“Your History” 176).  That this is so is confirmed when Mphahlele mentions 
what he regards as genuine intermediate goals of African nationalism intending victory in 
the struggle for liberation as “issues concerned with identity – being African beyond 
geographic location, reconciliation between nationalism, socialism and non-racialism, 
integration and so on” (“Your History” 176).  For Mphahlele to pronounce as urgent the 
need to reconcile nationalism, socialism and nonracialism is an indication that these have 
been the focus of theoretical analysis among African nationalist intellectuals and that 
failure to refine and harmonise them could hamper the cause of full liberation. 
 
The many-sided nature of Mphahlele’s concern with issues drawing the attention of 
postcolonial theorists on a world scale includes his constant description of the way self-
constitution can be achieved – using the postcolonial lives of people he desribes as 
belonging to the African humanist category as his vantage point.     Perhaps as a reminder 
that African theories of all varieties throughout the stages of history enter contemporary 
debates with an Afrocentric theoretical attitude, in an interview with Samin (published in 
Research in African Literatures) Mphahlele emphasises that the discourse of African 
humanism is “opposed to European influence” (182).  In keeping with his sanguine sense 
of the future of those he describes as belonging to cultures that broadly constitute peoples 
practising African humanist lifestyles, Mphahlele proceeds to pinpoint that his African 
brand of humanism responds to and is threatened by modernism, but that some aspects of 
it stubbornly survive and seem unlikely ever to be eroded (Research in African 
Literatures 186). In responding to the theoretical environment of 1998, Mphahle 
advanced his more recent evaluation of negritude.  That negritude was still topical in 
1998 is discernible in other intellectual contributions of the same year such as expository 
essays by Ashcroft et al.   These writers concern themselves with negritude in their 1998 
text, although they state that it was a dominant ideology just before and after the Second 
World War (Key Concepts 161).   
 
Mphahlele’s sensitivity concerning ignorance of the complex ways in which intellectual 
writing and political activism relate is revealed in the following words: 
The general correspondences suggested here between the two black worlds [of 
America and South Africa] revolve around black consciousness (lower case ‘c’).  
We in South Africa lost our ability to deal with our reality beyond  white avagery, 
protest and the mounting institutional violence that resulted … Understandably, 
preoccupations with mass rallies and guerilla activism sapped our energies and 
left us little which could elevate our arts above the ‘freedom agenda’, a 
programme that would seek to send our bleeding words into the battlefield several 
times over.  (“Your History” 176) 
Mphahlele’s emphasis in this quotation on the “c” in “black consciousness” being in 
lower case testifies to what he set out to define as African humanism having been 
(through the history of black thought the world over) free of political narrowing and 
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oversimplification.  More importantly, Mphahlele’s brand of humanism is tied to his 
claiming a distinctive identity that includes Africans on the continent and in the diaspora, 
differing from “other cultural clusters” and counteracting westernisation in a way that 
enables this philosophy nevertheless efficiently and creatively to cope with the ever-
changing challenges of modernity (“Notes Towards” 135).   
 
Mphahlele’s accent on history as “a concrete experience” (“Your History” 158) 
highlights one other area in which African humanism differs from Black Consciousness.  
The latter is generally criticized for emphasising mainly the psychological state of 
Africanness as opposed to the former’s commensurate inclination to tackle matters of 
praxis.   In the religious sphere Mphahlele reiterated his conviction in another 1998 essay 
about the bent of African philosophical views towards practicality rather than abstract 
contemplation, describing the modern African humanist as practising “a duality of belief: 
the Christian and hard-core traditional that resists exorcism” (“Colonial Conquest” 255).  
Improved analyses of the apparently perennial idea of Black Consciousness as well as of 
the exact nature of abrogated western Christianity in later years including 1998 – 
highlighting “concrete experience” as a keystone to what he sees as a sound theory 
circumscribing the identity of Africans – show that Mphahlele was continuing to grapple 
with the challenge of achieving a better grasp of negritude. Because history as a source of 
nativist memory is considered a motivating factor in negritude (as explained when this 
theory was discussed earlier in this chapter),  African humanism and negritude commonly 
conform to nativism, but to differing extents and for different reasons.  This is in addition 
to other subtle affinities between the two that have been made evident in earlier 
paragraphs of this section.  For the reason that African and global postcolonial theorists 
were commonly faced with the task of interrogating the complex context of the late 
nineties to the advantage of humankind, both Mphahlele (“Your History” 167) and 
Ashcroft et al. (Key Concepts 161) in their 1998 essays pay homage to the positive 
contributions of negritude – in a manner confirming how each sees their relation to views 
of others regarding the common task of describing what challenges society is facing and 
what it should do about them.  
 
Gikandi (1999) records Mphahlele’s appropriation of the aesthetic in such a way that it 
no longer perpetuates hegemonic discourse.  By doing this (as Gikandi observes), 
Mphahlele re-aligns the aesthetic towards relevance in as far as current existential 
African realities are concerned, for example the role of art in replacing traces and 
symbols of colonial influence in the cultures of Africans.  On this issue, Gikandi remarks 
that Mphahlele uniquely enunciates and practices an affirmation that the relationship 
between art and the politics of everyday life is a complex one (Africa and the Idea of the 
Aesthetic 3).  Hence Gikandi’s observation on Mphahlele’s aesthetics: that Mphahlele 
holds a work of art to be “implicitly bound up with political practices but … not … 
reduc[able] to them” (3). 
 
Positive results of such a seizure of agency are highlighted by Gikandi’s observation (in 
1999) that Mphahlele’s idiosyncratic handling of the politics of the aesthetic led to 
American and European views of the aesthetic being compelled to acknowledge the 
soundness of African thought and practice in a progressively more objective manner, as 
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race-related thought evolved from the Enlightenment to the present (3). Gikandi 
illustrates that Mphahlele’s handling of the politics of the aesthetic differs from that of 
Europe not only due to his private idiosyncracies, but more importantly also due to his 
acceptance and transcendence of the Afrocentric trend of his times. If active 
Africanisation of aesthetics is accepted as a cultural act and as learned (according to 
Mphahlele), such learning could not exclude learning from contemporary Afrocentric 
writers like Ngugi and Achebe.  That he sees this as a cultural and thus dynamic act that 
escapes entrapment in the static traditional past reveals his able circumvention of 
problems that the narrower Afrocentric interpretation of reality might otherwise invite.  
The non-homogenising nature of Mphahlele’s construct has already been shown by his 
use of the term “African” to group together a wide spectrum of African cultures in the 
same cluster, or (in Ruth Obee’s 1999 formulation) his illustration of African humanism 
as “[an] ethos that binds African cultures regardless of locale or ethnicity” (“The 
Unbroken Song” 189).   The terms “Pan African” and “Black Consciousness” are thus 
used interchangeably by Mphahlele and other African thinkers such as Gikandi.  While 
they focus more on strengthening black brotherhood and sisterhood across the African 
continent up to the realm of the African American and other diasporic dispersions, 
Afrocentrism clarifies itself as concerned more with correcting conceptual and theoretical 
misperceptions of Africanness by hegemonic discourse.  However, there are differences 
in the degree to which hard-core Afrocentrists on the one hand and on the other the 
accommodative ones such as Gikandi and Mphahlele with his broader concept of African 
humanism embrace Pan Africanism or Black Consciousness.  
 
 In the expository writing of the 1990s, assertion of African humanism as a distinctive 
consciousness that deserves recognition in its own right is most intense.  Interestingly, 
however, there is an intensification discernible from the 1980s onwards in the frequency 
with which the term “African humanism” occurs in Mphahlele’s essays.  The essays 
“Notes Towards an Introduction to African Humanism: A Personal Inquiry” (1992), 
“African Humanism and the Corporate World” (1994), and “Your History Demands Your 
Heartbeat: Historical Survey of the Encounter Between Africans and African Americans” 
(1998) assert both the distinct and immanent nature of African humanism among those 
the environment has shaped to possess this consciousness and way of life, while 
exhibiting the highest frequency in direct use of the term “African humanism”.   
 
But beyond the 1990s, Mphahlele’s modus operandi in referring at one time explicitly 
and at another implicitly to aspects of African humanism tilts more towards subtler 
assertions of African humanism instead of more overt articulation.  This he achieves by 
either invoking its informing presence in what is depicted or analysed, or by hinting at its 
imposing presence in applied terms.  It comes as no surprise, considering the progressive 
shift of tone, when Mphahlele declares in the year 2000 that “African literature of French 
expression has not always lived at the philosophical level” (“A Dreamer” 264).  By this 
Mphahlele means that negritude has been broad enough to impact on all aspects of the 
African’s life to such an extent that it led to works of art that articulated counterdiscourse 
and exercised the agency to project their own praxis and world-view.   This resembles an 
aspect of Mphahlele’s thinking which the critic Reingard Nethersole emphasised in 2000:  
“cultural memory for Mphahlele”, she says, is in him “a clarion call for self-affirmation 
 53
… [that aids] the recognition of a plurality of cultures of equal worth, something which 
cultural as opposed to economic globalisation seeks to foster in the idea of multi-
culturism” (“Places of the Past” 509, 513).  What this critic means is that Mphahlele 
perceives recognition of the distinctive qualities of any cultural cluster (such as the 
identity he calls African humanism) as a sine qua non for reaching a strong multicultural 
globalism.  This does not differ from Mphahlele’s sense of an organic harmony within 
African societies.  His demonstrated view is that the stronger the individual building 
blocks of the overarching social structure, the more perfect will be the bigger formation. 
 
Indeed, the substantive form in which Africans can contribute to global solidarity on 
various contemporary fronts is the general concern of African theorists of this period.  
Ekwe-Ekwe (writing in his 2001 book African Literature in Defence of History) 
comments on Africa’s participation in multinational formations such as the 
Commonwealth.  He defines Africans in non-essentialist terms that emphasise moulding 
by the environment.  That is why he envisages participation of Africans in global 
formations against the backdrop of their having been united within the historical context 
of colonisation, enslavement and displacement as well as pillage and plunder of their 
continent by a common, cataclysmic, historical phenomenon which he has called “the 
African holocaust” – greater in size than the Jewish holocaust, yet deliberately obliterated 
in the chronicling of the history of mankind (African Literature 134).  Ekwe-Ekwe firmly 
discourages the submerging of African interests, with countries historically known to 
have been involved in colonialism and imperialism continuing to deny the dignity of 
Africans through economic domination.  He prefers the involvement of Africans in 
contesting of conditions which multinational hegemonic formations lay down for Africa 
– with the façade of sympathy for Africans while in fact perpetuating exploitation by 
means of neocolonialism.    In this 2001 book, Ekwe-Ekwe argues for the preservation of 
Africans’ distinctive world-view by insisting that as they join the global society, Africans 
must remain themselves culturally.  He asserts that “the full operation of the ethos and 
institutions of dual-sex complementarity has always defined the central tenets of African 
social existence” (136).    Mphahlele has been shown (earlier on in this chapter of the 
study) to regard the notion of women as revered and valued pillars of the family unit as 
one of the core aspects of his concept of African humanism.  Ekwe-Ekwe’s observation 
of the “treasured position of the family in African community affairs” (136) focuses on 
the notion of family as much as Mphahlele has been shown to do, albeit in his own way 
(as shown).  
 
Ignorance of the distinctive vantage point of African humanist existence may lead to 
inadvertent self-contradictions by some well-meaning Afrocentric writers in their 
attempts to analyse Afrocentric fiction, including that of Mphahlele, by using, for 
example, feminist criticism.  An example is Maqagi (2001).   Maqagi accurately observes 
that the women portrayed by Mphahlele in Down Second Avenue and “Mrs Plum” display 
an agency which enables them dynamically to articulate their own mode of presence 
within urban African communities in transition (215). Maqagi premises such an 
observation on the assumption that African traditional society is inherently paternalistic. 
That this is Maqagi’s assumption is indicated by her declarations such as “the inadequacy 
of past patriarchal significations” (206); “past patriarchal maxims which become 
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‘disjunct and displaced’” (207); and “transform the culturally sanctioned [chauvinistic] 
power relations” (208).    
  
Maqagi’s description of the agency of the female characters as a self-defining reaction to 
the “inadequacy of past patriarchal significations” can be reconciled with Mphahlele’s 
statement in the above quotation that describes women in patriarchal societies as “agents 
of power” or culturally-held preservers of communal self-sufficiency.  But such a 
reconciliation of Mphahlele and Magaqi’s view of women is possible only when it is 
borne in mind that the latter’s use of the idea of a patriarchal society is conventional – 
hence, at odds with Mphahlele’s pruning of the term of reprehensible male chauvinism.  
Maqagi’s reference to “past patriarchal maxims” as becoming “disjunct” and “displaced” 
alongside the female character’s self-assertive subjectivity predicates the positive agency 
of the character against a suppossedly flawed traditional African mindset.  Although 
paternalism is not among the evils Mphahlele lists as marring African humanism, Maqagi 
equates the patriarchy of some African societies with oppression of women, as the above 
quote illustrates.   A close scrutiny of Maqagi’s essay also reveals that she homogenises 
traditional African cultures as having invariably been patriarchal, thus extending the 
unfortunate denigration of traditional African cultures to indict the entire African world. 
Mphahlele’s female characters’ appropriate agency can alternatively be seen as a 
transformation of society by way of African humanism expanding towards a greater 
welcoming of individuality, perhaps as a way of appropriating to its own advantage the 
inevitably hybrid life in the urban settings of Pretoria and Johannesburg.  Individuality 
that contributes to the welfare of community has never been taboo in African humanist 
societies as conceptualised by Mphahlele. Maqagi’s feminist analysis of the behaviour of 
the character Karabo in “Mrs Plum” (discussed above) should be understood as 
concurring with Mphahlele that women are powerful members of African communities, 
without concentrating overly on the differing angles from which Mphahlele and she 
appreciate the central role of women in such a society. 
 
It is interesting how African theoretical developments in 2002 make references to the 
way Africans have abrogated western Christianity.   This is an aspect of African cultural 
clusters which drew Mphahlele’s attention since earlier decades to such an extent that he 
described the precise way in which it merges with other features of his concept of African 
humanism.  According to extreme Afrocentrists discussing African religious practices in 
2002, Christianity, like humanity as a whole, originated in Africa long before the birth of 
Jesus.  Hence statements like this one made in 2002 in Dumisane Hlophe’s newspaper 
article:  “The truth is that Africa gave the world religion.  The truth is that Africa gave the 
world Christianity itself.  The truth is that Christianity in Africa is not an imported 
religion, but has its roots in this African motherland” (9).  Such writers and their disciples 
up to this day maintain that Christianity in its unadulterated form has always formed the 
crux of religious variants in the unified diversity of African cultures.  Mphahlele, without 
being outspoken about it, does not seem to see the need to comment on his concept of 
African humanism as it survived during the  periods covered by the theses of the 
extremist Afrocentric writers such as the ones cited above. 
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That the documentation of Africanist modes of adapting western Christianity constituted 
part of the 2002 Africanist debate is revealed by the statement in 2002  in a City Press 
newspaper article, “Moria: a journey of hope, salvation”.   In this article, a young black 
journalist by the name of Lucas Ledwaba details why he comes to the philosophical 
conclusion  that the Easter pilgrimage to the ZCC headquarters of Moria “is a journey of 
prayer, of praise and healing” (17).   Ledwaba’s article is a crucial index of discussions of 
African religious practice around 2002.  In “The ZCC – where Africa meets God” 
Ledwaba relates that according to the Zion Christian Church or ZCC, the waters of 
Kwenane river are understood to be sacred; prayer sessions are interpreted into seven 
major African languages including Herero and Shona; the church recognises the African 
cultural beliefs of ancestor worship and the church supports peace in the land.  Ledwaba 
confirms the Africanness of these denominational modifications of western Christianity 
when he writes that “the ZCC founder Engenas Lekganyane was one of the first Africans 
to break away from the mainstream ecumenical movement in the late 1800s and early 
1900s” (17).  It should be borne in mind that by 2002 Mphahlele had acknowledged the 
positive role of an appropriation of religious worship that is consistent with the character 
of his concept of African humanism, as practised by African Initiated Churches such as 
Lekganyane’s ZCC, in the following words: 
 Barring the psychological aberration that sometimes reveals itself in the Zionist 
 and messianic sects, I have a sneaking admiration for the latter.  They have tried 
 to carve a corner for themselves where they could indepently create a simple kind 
 of worship, free of the tyranny of theology and other intellectual trappings. 
 (“From Dependence” 201).   
What coincides with Mphahlele’s statement that African Initiated Churches like the ZCC 
have their origins in an African religious nationalism bound (by implication) to be 
informed by dialectical mixes of western Christianity and traditional African religions is 
illustrated in the same article when Ledwaba proceeds to state that “the rest of the night 
on Good Friday and Saturday is spent singing while congregations from different areas 
and districts take turns performing heroics with the famous mokhukhu dance” (17).   Such 
dancing, as both art and prayer (which in Mphahlele’s view of African humanism are 
inseparable), can only be interpreted as the uniquely Africanist tendency (associated with 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism) of practising a celebration of life.  It will be 
interesting to screen Mphahlele’s narrative writings for representations of such a religious 
nationalism as the study sketches above, and to investigate whether they represent the 
consciousness Mphahlele associates with an African humanist agency – of abrogating 
social norms propagated by the “centre”, as well as accommodating an appropriate 
ambivalence. 
 
Among the most recent Africanist writings Mphahlele responds to is a newspaper article 
by Mazrui (2002).  In the article “Global Africa requires our focus”, Mazrui calls for a 
shift from Afrocentrism to Multiculturalism.  He does this without denying the need for 
and importance of an Afrocentric attitude among African intellectuals.  That Mazrui is 
among the Africanists sharing a common understanding of and belief in Afrocentrism 
with Mphahlele, is indicated in statements such as the following: “What negritude is to 
the black poet, afro-centricity is to the black scholar.  They are a celebration of 
africanity” (“Global Africa” 17).  To Mazrui, negritude and Afrocentrism are, generally, 
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both broad and effective enough to be equated with what Mphahlele has conceptualised 
as African humanism.   Mphahlele is known for being wary of equating the content and 
scope of negritude and African humanism in the way Mazrui implicitly does with his 
statement above.  Moreover, Mazrui (unlike Mphahlele) separates the creative writer and 
theorist’s roles in shaping society.   
 
Mazrui confirms (above) that his vision of Afrocentricity takes into account the 
geographical distribution of Africans beyond the continent of Africa, without explicitly 
recognising the non-racist aspect as Mphahlele does.  The similarity between Mazrui and 
Mphahlele’s conceptions of the geographical parameters of peoples who are included in 
the notion of “Africans” is made clear in Mphahlele’s description of Africans as various 
societies (signified by the term “cultural clusters”) occupying space on the African 
continent and beyond, in the following words: “we are that part of Africa … that displays 
features suggesting a unity of its cultures [which] confers upon us the right to claim an 
identity that distinguishes us and the African diaspora from other cultural clusters” 
(“Notes towards” 135).  Mphahlele’s outright characterisation of African humanism as 
nonracist is brought out in his remark that the African humanist “stands right at the 
crossroads of African Humanism and Western culture, but is fully in charge of the 
synthesis” (“Notes towards” 141). 
 
It should thus be worthwhile (in order for this study to clarify Mphahlele’s concept of 
African humanism by means of juxtaposing him with other African theorists) to trace the 
representations of African humanism in his narrative writings in a way that probes the 
extent to which he departs from solutions such as Multiculturalism – suggested by 
Mazrui as being the proper goal in the further evolution of Pan Africanist thinking.   
Mazrui describes Multiculturalism as “pluralistic, seeking to represent diverse cultures: 
latino (including chicano of course), Asian, African, native American and women [sic], 
so multiculturalism is pluralistic in that sense” (“Global Africa” 17).  In the 2004 article, 
Mazrui goes on to urge Africans and other subalterns to form an affiliative front in their 
struggle for self-definition, one that encompasses other marginalised peoples of the 
world, including women of all cultures (“Global Africa” 17).   
 
After clarifying what he means by “Multiculturalism”, Mazrui hastens to promote it as a 
better solution to the challenges faced by the African of today than Afrocentrism, in the 
following words: “Emphasising afro-centricism [sic] alone cannot challenge western 
cultural hegemony.  It must be tackled by an alliance of all other cultures threatened by 
Western hegemony” (“Global Africa” 17).  Mazrui here summarily regards women of all 
cultures as one cluster of peoples discriminated against on the basis of sex, similarly to 
the way some feminists see women as one social group that is marginalised by sexist 
practices irrespective of variations between cultures, thus needing to form solidarity with 
whoever is combating any kind of hegemonic subversion.  It does seem to be 
Mphahlele’s view that the adoption of African humanism would change social behaviour 
among Africans to ensure women being treated with the dignity they deserve.  Any 
multiculturism that blurs distinctive African identity in order to lump women or other 
sections of society together in a transcultural category of a section of the globally 
oppressed is not commensurate with Mphahlele’s view that distinctive identities such as 
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African humanism should not be immolated at the altar of globalisation.  The nuanced 
manner in which Mphahlele defines his concept of African humanism will be shown (as 
in the present comparison with Mazrui) as ipso facto justifying his criticism of other 
theorists’ views on Africanness, Afrocentrism and other related ideas.   There is no doubt 
that (in the same way as Mazrui is shown to do with his concept of Multiculturalism) 
Mphahlele’s African humanism is concerned not only with what happens at the present, 
but with its adaptation to future demands as well.   
 
As a way of clarifying the concept more intensively, it will be probed how compatible 
Mphahlele’s African humanism is in its current shape, with the proposed shift from 
polarised Afrocentrism as put forward (above) by Mazrui.  Mazrui’s and Mphahlele’s 
notions of Afrocentrism can be seen as largely similar – although the Afrocentrism 
accepted by Mphahlele is more conservative with regard to the appropriateness of 
abandoning it as a strategy bound up with historical circumstances, while Mazrui’s is 
more radical in advocating such a shift as a means of countering a distortion of African 
identity by dominant discourse. It is also possible that the textual analysis of Mphahlele’s 
narrative writings may reveal an affinity with evolutionary views expressed by some 
African writers – views discordant with that of Mazrui on Afrocentrism which accord 
better with the relatively more cautious yet self-confident bent of Mphahlele’s position.  
An example from the popular press expressing views similar to Mphahlele’s on 
multiculturism, published in City Press, is an opinion piece on whether Africans should 
discard distinctly African cultural practices or should cling to them as they evolve amidst 
current existential challenges, by the journalist Khathu Mamaila.  Mamaila’s 2004 City 
Press article (“Gacaca: where grass is green and justice is seen to be done”) explains that 
the modes of consciousness and motives underlying the genocide in Rwanda have led the 
Africans inhabiting that part of the continent to realise that the current form of the 
(colonial) legal system cannot cope with an atrocity such as occurred in Rwanda (19).  
This has led Rwandese Africans to rethink the direction their ‘modernisation’ should take 
in relation to African humanist consciousness.   
 
They resuscitated long-lost traditional custom called “Gacaca” in order to deal with the 
crisis – while multiculturally-inclined western legal methods have failed under these 
circumstances, as Mamaila reports (19).  “Gacaca” is described by Mamaila as a pre-
colonial cultural practice of the Rwandans in which participants gathered under a tree in 
their village to resolve disputes between members of the community.   Due to the written 
form of evidence in the revived and evolved form of Gacaca, the judge in this practice is 
now required to be a person with secondary education, Mamaila notes (19).  This is in 
addition to the pre-colonial criteria by which judges are appointed by the community and 
should display leadership qualities.  “Lawyers are not allowed to represent suspects”, 
who have to defend themselves and are allowed to call witnesses to testify in support of 
their version of the story (19).  The hybrid nature of the practice of Gacaca in which a 
traditionally constituted structure takes advantage of literacy and qualifications obtained 
through western modes of educational practice is in tune with Mphahlele’s view of 
African humanism as an accommodative consciousness and practice.  That this is the case 
is thrown in sharp relief by Mamaila’s lauding of this adapted traditional practice in 
modern Rwanda as not only successful in resolving the social crisis of a genocide, but 
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also (as by implication constrasting properly and improperly managed hybridity) of the 
continuing need for African humanist vision.   Mamaila depicts the practice as 
succeeding in resolving problems where a western institution not carefully balanced by 
hybridisation fusing it with Africanism has proven ineffectual.  Mamaila’s conclusion is 
in support of the appreciative or conservative Afrocentrism writings such as Mphahlele’s 
posit as an appropriate tool with which Africans can defy cultural extinction.  
 
What this means is that internationalism/global solidarity should not come before the 
consolidation of a national consciousness.  This near-quote is meant to invoke Fanon 
conceiving of Afrocentrism as an indispensable building block or stage on the journey 
towards globalisation.  According to views such as these by Mamaila, efforts by writers 
like Mphahlele to define and assert a distinctively African way of thinking and living are 
worthwhile in their own right and should not be characterised as ignoring the global 
terrain. 
 
An essay of Mphahlele’s that appeared in 2004 seems to be a more soundly etched 
recapitulation of certain aspects of his concept of African humanism.  In “Different 
Times Demand, and Bring, Different Answers: Random Thoughts on Intellectuals”, 
Mphahlele addresses confederality with African and world intellectuals differently from 
fellow African writers such as Ekwe-Ekwe, by highlighting global approaches while 
affirming the inclusivity of his concept of African humanism (340).  He confirms in the 
same essay that he is first a philosopher informed by the distinctive African humanist 
way of interrogating reality before he is a fiction writer (339), much as he confirms the 
non-elitism of African humanism (344).  He re-affirms the adaptablity of his philosophy 
of African humanism in the following words: “Indeed different times will always 
demand, and bring, different answers: a chastening lesson to those who continually strive 
to live outside of history, heedless of the human drama” (“Different Times” 345).  
Questions worth addressing include considerations whether or not African humanism is 
at present ready (as it reshapes itself according to contingent demands) to converge with 
the future envisaged by the “Multiculturalism” referred to by Mazrui above, and whether 
it will ever be necessary to abandon its strictly Afrocentric perspective (borne out by 
Mphahlele’s words “in its own right” in the quotation above), or whether it will 
eventually coincide in outlook with what Mazrui defines as “Multiculturalism”.    
 
Gaylard’s 2004 essay contributes to the clarification of ideas that I demonstrate in this 
study to be closely linked with Mphahlele’s philosophy of African humanism, as when he 
states that ubuntu (in Nguni languages like isiZulu and isiXhosa) or botho (in Sesotho, 
Setswana or Sesotho sa Leboa) “is used to characterise the norms and values which 
suppossedly inhere in traditional African society” (“Welcome” 76).   From Mphahlele’s 
characterisation of the concept of African humanism quoted so far, it is clear that norms 
and values within the framework of traditional African cultures are building blocks of the 
concept of “African humanism”.  For this reason, writers like Gaylard make the meaning 
of African humanism more lucid by explaining what its constituents mean, without 
necessarily using the broader term “African humanism” itself – as Mphahlele has decided 
to define the more adequate notion of the often loosely used term “botho/ubuntu” in 
English consistently throughout his later expository writing.  However, it is a feature of 
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Mphahlele’s post-nineties essays (as this 2004 one) to make no direct reference to 
“African humanism” or forthright characterisation of what it is, despite an assertion of its 
aspects permeating the text underneath the surface of such expository essays.   
 
The crux of what Mphahlele designates by his concept of African humanism has now 
been outlined as its development since 1949 (when he published “The Unfinished Story”) 
up to the present has been traced.  Such cumulative clarification of what Mphahlele’s 
philosophy of African humanism entails recognised the context of the range of 
‘problems’ or challenges its definition faced.  The approach adopted was that of probing 
how Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism became more lucid and nuanced as it was 
tested historically by Mphahlele himself against the shifting settings and positions of 
fellow theorists.  What links African writers cited in this section to Mphahlele is a 
common concern with what distinguishes Africans from other human groupings.  This is 
irrespective of whether or not these African writers discern the veiled contradiction in 
adhering to western terms and concepts while attempting to characterise African 
experience – which may defy such foreign tools of definition.  In my view, analysing 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism within the theoretical context within which it 
was conceived, asserted and defended is particularly suited to examining the validity of 
his concept of African humanism as a substantive theory, because Mphahlele sees this 
construct as a tool with which African humanist cultural clusters are equipped to resolve 
existential challenges in their day to day living.   
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1.2  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND APPARATUS 
 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism was since its inception (when he wrote his 
earliest theoretical expressions of his idea) developed within a context where other 
writers were expressing and had addressed related, contemporary issues – to some of 
which he responded explicitly or implicitly in his own writings.  For this reason, I do not 
only use Mphahlele’s own theoretical terms in my analyses of his literary works in 
tracing the development of his representations of his concept of African humanism, but 
also employ concepts invented and perspectives adopted by other theorists, who 
interpreted reality within the same historical context.  
 
The theoretical apparatus in respect of which Mphahlele’s fictional articulation of his 
concept of African humanism will be analysed in this thesis includes the overarching 
concept of “postcolonial writing”. According to Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 
postcolonial writing is the collective noun used to refer to whatever national literatures 
have emerged in their present form out of the experience of colonisation and have 
asserted themselves by “foregrounding the tension with the imperial power, and by 
emphasising their difference from the assumptions of the imperial centre” (Empire Writes 
Back 2).  The three writers go on to explain that “implications for theory in postcolonial 
writing are that theories of style and genre, assumptions about the universal features of 
language, epistemologies and value systems are all radically questioned by the practices 
of post-colonial writing” (11).  Some of the salient effects of postcolonialism have been 
the emergence of noticeable indigenous theories which emerged as a result of the demise 
of imperialism from a new (“post-colonial”) view of all experience as “uncentred, 
pluralistic, and multifarious” (Empire Writes Back 12).  As Mphahlele wrote all his 
fiction before the advent of a democratic order in South Africa, he was impelled to 
struggle intellectually with matters of psychological, material and spiritual freedom that 
came to expression internationally under the literary and theoretical rubric of 
postcolonialism. 
 
Notions of culture expressed by various theorists are used in this thesis as primary tools 
by means of which to trace Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism in his literary 
compositions.  This is so because culture, seen  as repeated patterns of social conduct, is 
central to Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism, which he has described (in terms 
that invoke culture) as a consciousness and way of life (Mphahlele, “Humanism and 
Corporate World” 128).  When two or more cultures meet, the interaction among the 
differing social groups naturally leads to those cultures being re-shaped in certain 
directions that favour certain groups and disadvantages others because of the balance or 
imbalance in power between or among them. Concepts used in such discussions 
inevitably include dominant attitudes or dominant discourses that have their origin in the 
aftermath of the historical phenomena of imperialism and colonisation.    Ashcroft, 
Griffiths and Tiffin note that “discourse” is a term traceable to the philosopher Foucault, 
used in postolonial criticism to refer to “a system of statements within which the world 
can be known” or “the complex of signs and practices which organizes social existence 
and social reproduction” (Ashcroft, Griffiths an Tiffin, Key Concepts 70, 71).  So great is 
the impact of discourse that “it is through discourse itself that the world is brought into 
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being” (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, Key Concepts 71).  It is in this Foucauldian sense 
that I use the term “discourse” throughout my dissertation.  But it is to hegemonic 
“discourse” that I most frequently revert.   The term “hegemony” was invented and 
asserted “in the 1930s by Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci” (Ashcroft, Griffiths and 
Tiffin, Key Concepts 116) and refers to a process whereby  
Domination is … exerted not by force, nor even necessarily by active persuasion, 
 but by a more subtle and inclusive power over the economy, and over state 
 apparatuses such as education and the media, by which the ruling class’s interest 
 is presented as the common interest and thus comes to be taken for granted.  (Key 
 Concepts 116) 
Hegemonic discourse thus means domination of discourse by subtle means that give the 
false impression of the dominant way of thinking as taking care of the interests of the 
oppressed while actually not caring for them to the same extent that it looks after the 
interests of those in the ranks of the ones in control (or who have the monopoly of 
power).  It is to hegemonic discourse Mphahlele reacts in positing his concept of African 
humanism. 
 
It is the hybridity of the colonised that may render them vulnerable to manipulations of 
hegemonic discourse.  The concept of hybridity is attributed, among others, to the theorist 
Homi K. Bhabha and refers to “colonizer/colonized relations [that] stress their 
interdependence and the mutual construction of their subjectivities” (Ashcroft, Griffiths 
and Tiffin, Key Concepts 118).   Subjectivity means “peoples’ perceptions of their 
identities and their capacities to resist the conditions of their domination, their 
‘subjection’” (Aschcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, Key Concepts 219).  I refer throughout this 
study to ‘management of hybridity’, by which I mean the way  postcolonial Africans – in 
pursuit of whose empowerment Mphahlele devised his concept of African humanism – 
succeed or fail (exercising their inevitably hybrid postcolonial psyche) to attain 
subjectivity.  It is in this potentially empowering sense of hybridity ascribed to Bhabha 
(and developed later by writers such as Young) that I use the terms “hybridity” and 
‘managing hybridity’ in this thesis.  I understand manifestations of hybridity, inter alia, 
as “assertions of national culture and of pre-colonial traditions [that] have played an 
important role in creating anti-colonial discourse” (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, Key 
Conncepts 121).  The affirming effects of hybridity result in a situation in which 
the hybrid nature of post-colonial culture assert[s] a different model for resistance, 
locating this in the subversive counter-discursive practices implicit in the 
colonial ambivalence itself and so undermining the very basis on which 
imperialist and colonialist discourse raises its claims of superiority.  (Key 
Concepts 119) 
Counterdiscursive practices are actions that constitute a “symbolic resistance” to the 
threats of dominant discourse (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, Key Concepts 56).  
Ambivalence (referred to in the quotation above) is behaviour resulting from the 
colonised’s hybridisation by virtue of their combining indigenous cultural values with 
those imbibed from the cultures of colonisers.   Ambivalence implies mimicry.  Mimicry 
refers to the “threatening” nature of ambivalence acquired by the colonised after 
decolonisation, in that it threatens hegemony or colonial dominance by its “never being 
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very far from mockery” of the culture of the coloniser (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, Key 
Concepts 139). 
 
One of the many ways in which anticolonial discourse was reinforced was by means of 
abrogation. In abrogating some cultural implements of the coloniser, the colonised 
“subvert[s] and adapt[s] dominant languages and signifying practices”, in the process of 
which he or she “reverses the orientation for power in the relationship” governing the co-
existence of the two groups of people (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, Key Concepts 57, 
229).  But in postcolonial theory it is significantly acknowledged that those whose 
cultural embodiments are abrogated counterdiscursively by the colonised also gain in 
such reclamations of subjectivity by those they colonised.  They benefit because their 
affected cultural instruments are also broadened in their content after they have 
appropriated some cultural wealth from colonised cultures.  A careful reading of what 
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin explain (in Key Concepts 57, 229) as the double-edged 
impact of hybridisation reveals that both the coloniser and colonised gain through 
ambivalence resulting from their cultural interaction – on the part of the coloniser by 
means of appropriation and for the colonised by means of abrogation.  Because of the 
abundance of concepts defining differences and modes of interaction emanating from 
different cultural perspectives, describing these necessitates the use of the overarching 
ideas of Eurocentrism and Afrocentrism.  Eurocentrism and Afrocentrism are terms used 
in postcolonial theory to describe approaches that emanate from particular cultural 
vantage points in the interpretation of reality.  Eurocentrism is the “conscious or 
unconscious process by which Europe and European cultural assumptions are constructed 
as, or assumed to be, the normal, the natural or the universal” (Ashcroft, Griffiths and 
Tiffin, Key Concepts 90-91).  With Eurocentrism referring to the attitude of looking at 
life from the angle of European cultures and tastes and Afrocentrism being its obverse, 
Afrocentrism means (as explained elsewhere in this study) contemplating reality from an 
Africanist cultural point of view. 
 
I use terms and perspectives by means of which the theorist Frantz Fanon expressed 
himself on issues of culture and the effects of cultural interaction, including the cultural 
intercourse of the broad cultural group known as the coloniser and another broad cultural 
group known as the colonised. Fanon focuses on the cultural perspective in detailing the 
weapons with which the oppressed can overcome their oppression.   In The Wretched of 
the Earth (1963) Fanon highlights the centrality of culture and cultural expression in the 
emotional and physical redemption of the colonised, in the following words:  “… this 
passionate search for a national culture which existed before the colonial era finds its 
legitimate reason in the anxiety shared by native intellectuals to shrink away from that 
Western culture in which they all risk being swamped” (Fanon, “On National Culture” 
169).  This, as Fanon observes, results (on the literary scene) in “the poets of Negro-ism 
[opposing] the idea of an old Europe to a young Africa” (171).   
 
Mphahlele recognises culture as central to the self-emancipation of oppressed Africans. 
Differences between Fanon and Mphahlele’s view of culture as an aspect of their 
respective theories do not negate the fact that both these writers see culture as a 
constituent and focus of their theories for analysing society.  For Mphahlele to have 
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proposed African humanism as an appropriate weapon against apartheid’s physical and 
spiritual degradation of South Africans indicates that he does not believe (like Fanon) 
that “in the colonial situation, culture … falls away and dies” (“On National Culture” 
197).   While Fanon admits only rather grudgingly that culture may transform dormant or 
passive customs and traditions to grapple actively with the present circumstances of 
society, Mphahlele’s conception of culture in its adaptive fluidity perceives it as central 
to the survival and the recovery of Africans from colonial loss.   He does not concur with 
a view like Fanon’s that “you do not show proof of your nation from its culture but … in 
the fight which the people wage against the forces of occupation” (“On National Culture” 
179, 180).   Unlike Mphahlele, who emphasises cultural consciousness as one of the 
central ingredients of African humanism and as an efficacious weapon against some 
effects of apartheid dehumanisation, Fanon sees only armed struggle as primarily 
necessary to counter the destructive blows of colonisation – rather than cultural 
consciousness, despite the beneficial restoration of historical pride and the restoration of 
hope among the oppressed that a national culture can provide in the face of despair 
(Fanon, “On National Culture” 169, 179).  A people’s distinctive culture, as Fanon sees 
it, gives clear meaning to social phenomena.  He detests facile analyses of social 
phenomena that may result in situations where “The art of politics is simply transformed 
into the art of war; the political militant is the rebel.  To fight the war and to take part in 
politics: the two things become one and the same” (“Spontaneity” 105).    Fanon’s 
emphasis on the detailed, circumscribed distinctiveness of a people’s culture points to his 
preference for thoroughness in social analysis as opposed to glossing over aspects of 
society hurriedly in order to arrive at ill-conceived proposals for its emancipation.   It is 
such simplistic observations of society that may regrettably lead to the confounding of as 
distinctly different an activity as “fight[ing] the war” with “tak[ing] part in politics” 
(“Spontaneity” 105).  It is such a blurring of distincitions in the analysis of culture in all 
its dynamism that Fanon abhors. 
 
Fellow Africanist theorists share Fanon’s perception of the need to counter the harm of 
simplifying complex phenomena by means of lax analysis – as they set out to engage in 
their own definitions of Africanness by considering its subtler features.  Fanon remains 
more useful than most of the theorists I discuss below as far as my need for terminology 
that primarily asserts the cultural perspective in the social analysis practised by its 
inventors is concerned.  He consistently emphasies comprehensive culture rather than 
particular details as the actual point of departure.   Focussing on the epistemological 
aspect of the cultural perspective rather than on the main theme itself, Edward Said 
laments simplistic responses to phenomena within the framework of imperialism and 
colonialism as follows: “people’s analytical powers are dulled and anaesthetized.  And 
the result is that you get an immediate acceptance of what is easy.  You forget about all 
the complexities and difficulties” (Said, “Rendezvous” 191).   Similar concerns emerge 
when in “Spontaneity: Its Strength and Weaknesses” Fanon pinpoints the drawbacks in 
the spontaneous intellectual state of the oppressed masses in the following words:  
“Tactics are mistaken for strategy” (“Spontaneity” 105).  Mphahlele’s clarification of 
what his concept of African humanism entails includes using a perspective such as this 
one of Said’s – of contrasting intellectually engaged social analyses with superficially 
thought-out strategies.  As this view can be effectively used to examine Mphahlele’s 
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well-documented insistence on the need to strive towards discerning shades of difference 
between various concepts or between aspects within the same concept, Said is one of the 
theorists whose approaches to social analysis are adopted in this study in tracing the 
tenets of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism.    
 
One of the benefits of thorough interrogation of social conditions is the ability to detect 
cultural bias underlying concepts that may superficially appear to be culturally neutral.  
Edward Said has argued in Orientalism (1978) that all western systems of cultural 
description are deeply contaminated with “the politics, the considerations, the positions 
and the strategies of power” (see Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory 34).   This point of 
view of being constantly conscious of imperial and colonial motives in western discourse 
finds its antithesis in consciously ensuring that Afrocentric discourse should be infused 
with Africanist assertions.  That is why I make use of the essays of the Africanist theorist 
Wole Soyinka.   He significantly articulates views in his discursive writings from the 
point of view of assuming that African art is necessarily intertwined with the distinctive 
African philosophical outlook.    Soyinka in his 1976 text demonstrates how African 
literature is invariably embedded in African myth and ritual as well as metonymically 
representing modes of thinking that are uniquely in African myth and ritual (Myth, 
Literature and the African World 127).    Soyinka’s terminology of “African myth”, 
“ritual” and “[metonymic] represent[ation]” reveals a perspective that is applicable to the 
analysis of Mphahlele’s literary works.  This is so because Mphahlele’s concept of 
African humanism not only regards African cultures as its core component, but proceeds 
to represent African cultures metonymically through the dialogue of his characters and 
the imagery he employs to form the texture of his fictional compositions – as the next 
chapters of this thesis will show. 
 
Consistent with scrupulous attention to finer differences in literary and social analysis is 
the nuanced use of terminology in order to identify culture-specific African societal 
features – terms that are otherwise used to transmit Eurocentric conceptions of social 
phenomena.  The Zambian social commentator Timothy Kandeke illustrates in his 1977 
essay that while in African societies on the one hand “individuality was not allowed to 
violate or militate against the accepted [African] customs … [on the other hand the 
individual] worked for the good of society generally … [because] the task for Zambian 
Humanism is to make the Zambian not only a good HUMANIST but also a GOOD 
HUMANITARIAN” (Kandeke, Fundamentals of Zambian Humanism 62). If humanism 
and humanitarianism were identical in meaning, Kandeke would not mention 
humanitarianism as just one of the many constituents of African (or Zambian) humanism.   
The distinction between the meanings of words like “human”, “humanist” and 
“humanitarian” is the resonant theme in dispelling misconceptions that interpreters from 
unAfricanist or non-postcolonial perspectives would transmit in attempting to examine 
whether any other alternative forms of humanism other than European do exist.  I use this 
perspective in explicit or implied ways throughout this study in the course of 
demonstrating how Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism is as much human, 
humanist and humanitarian as it is not European. 
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It is not only terms that inevitably require domestication within the cultural milieu in 
which they occur.   In terms of Said’s “travelling theory”, the failure of critics outside 
Afrocentrism to comprehend the aesthetics in African works (like those of Mphahlele) 
can be equated to judging works outside one’s cultural framework as misappropriations 
or “misreadings” when they are actually “part of a historical transfer of ideas and theories 
from one setting to another” (“Travelling Theory” 205).  This will be better appreciated 
when one remembers that the novel/autobiography in its normative form originated in the 
west.  Because its original manifestations occur outside African cultures, the novel’s 
transplantation from western cultures to African cultures can be seen either as a 
“misreading” of its European cultural-aesthetic imperatives, or as illustrating the practice 
of “abrogation” to tally with African cultural values – depending on the perspective from 
which one looks at the “travelling” process.   For Said, the solution of the problem of “the 
hegemony of European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European 
superiority over Oriental backwardness” (“Orientalism” 73) – such as a facile dismissal 
of the culturally transformed form of the novel/autobiography exemplified in such a text 
as Mphahlele’s The Wanderers – lies in the critic or reader’s preparedness to 
distinguish theory from critical consciousness by saying that the latter is a sort of 
 spatial sense, a sort of measuring faculty for locating or situating theory, and this 
 means that theory has to be grasped in the place and the time out of which it 
 emerges as part of that time, working in and for it. (“Travelling Theory” 210-11)  
A reader of Mphahlele’s fiction should be sensitive to the way western genres or forms 
are bound to be adapted to local African cultures within which they are crafted – as self-
defining cultural endeavours.  Mphahlele’s practice of transforming non-African 
conceptions of art forms like the novel or autobiography to respond meaningfully to the 
condition of being black under apartheid South Africa and in exile as in The Wanderers, 
can best be explained in terms of Said’s concept of “critical consciousness”. This 
concept, as Said sees it, accommodates local historico-cultural exigencies, whereas mere 
“theory” pertaining to the employment of particular genres may (or intends to) resist 
forms of local adaptation.  On a broader scale, using Said’s terms best explains how 
Mphahlele (in keeping with his theory of African humanism) transforms Eurocentric 
meaning to enable non-African terminology to convey Africanist concepts. 
 
Such an appropriation of the aesthetic is neccessary when one considers what writers like 
Ashcroft et al. stated in 1998 (in Key Concepts 84–85): that the expectations of the 
coloniser towards literature on Africa written by Africans are those of a continuation of 
the function of the western writer writing on Africa (who has been described as no more 
than an ethnographer doing field work, followed by reportage on Africa) (Key Concepts 
84-85).  One more aspect of Mphahlele’s theoretical position (related to his appropriation 
of the aesthetic) is his intention of mentoring younger Africanist practitioners in the art of 
creative writing with the intention of making them recognise the true place of the writer 
in society – as distinct from that of a political activist.   Separation of political statements 
from rigorous intellectual analyses is parallel to distinguishing theory from “critical 
consciousness”, with “critical consciousness” better suited to equip the social analyst in 
resolving existential challenges. 
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Mphahlele’s way of mapping out his concept of African humanism, including general 
abrogation of Eurocentric ideas (described above), qualifies his theoretical enterprise as a 
“beginning”.   According to Said, a “beginning” is a wide-ranging, lasting, purpose-
directed undertaking that repeats what it is built on even while demarcating a clear break 
with its origins.  Seen from the perspective of Said as represented by the description 
above, Mphahlele’s sustained, enduring and progressive clarification of his concept of 
African humanism qualifies to be a beginning in that it is a “process that has duration and 
meaning” (quoted from Said’s 1975 essay “Beginning Ideas” 5).  Mphahlele’s approach 
in characterising and refining his concept of African humanism in an accommodative 
way that yet does not blur its contours displays “strength” that (according to Said in 
another 1975 essay), is a function of “wider incorporation” (“Beginning with a Text” 
193).  The latter feature reinforces the former, lending an overall force and elegance to 
the philosophy of African humanism. Regarding this specific aspect of African humanism 
– as expansive in its demarcation – it is thus important, in the study of Mphahlele’s texts, 
to explore how peoples scattered over such a huge terrain, with varying histories of 
emancipation, can be convincingly demonstrated to share a common “African humanist” 
culture (in Mphahlele’s thought and perception).  The obverse could be that this feature 
does not mark the theory of African humanism as distinctive within Africanist and 
postcolonial theory in general – thus not making the grade when one considers it as a 
“beginning” in terms of Said’s theory of “beginnings”.   
 
Mphahlele’s literary writings will be scrutinised for illustration of his endorsement of the 
normative conception of literary genres as amenable to cultural adaptation, for the reason 
that literature reacts to the physical and intellectual-cultural context within and on which 
it is written.  Said’s theoretical concepts are indispensable in explaining this feature of 
Mphahlele’s writing because he (Said) displays this contextual perspective in his theory.   
That is why he rejects a “religious criticism” that detaches itself from rational realities 
and escapes to emotionally conceived connotations of concepts like communist, Arab and 
European.  Instead, Said accepts “secular criticism”, which rigorously analyses society 
and events in such a way that they are not romanticised or homogenised, but are based in 
their concrete context – that is in its turn profoundly interrogated (“Introduction: Secular 
Criticism” 4, 28).    
 
Tied to Said’s idea of “religious criticism” is the risk theorists may easily run into, of 
homogenising the oppressor or the oppressed (including Africans).  As an antidote to 
potentially homogenising praxis, Said has commented on the need for the literary critic to 
be secular (as opposed to metaphysical or religious) in the following words: 
 Texts are a system of forces intitutionalized by the reigning culture at some 
 human cost to its various components.  For texts after all are not an ideal cosmos 
 of ideally equal monuments …The critic’s attitude to some extent is sensitive [to 
 this fact but] it should in addition and more often be frankly inventive … which  
 means finding and exposing things that otherwise lie hidden beneath piety, 
 heedlessness, or routine.  Most of all, criticism is worldly and in the world so long 
 as it opposes monocentrism, a concept I understand as working in conjunction 
 with ethnocentrism, which licenses a culture to cloak itself in the particular 
 authority of certain values over others.  (“The World” 53) 
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Monocentrism in the sense in which Said uses it here refers to a self-centred imposition 
of authoritarian orthodoxy which negates any dissenting point of view.  Such a 
monocentrism manifests itself (for example) in bigoted religious orientation by which a 
religion (such as western Christianity) is imposed on Africans, as if they are on their own 
devoid of religious consciousness.  Those imposing religion like this would expect the 
subjugated to embrace it without resistance for the reason that it is seen by the “centre” as 
a normative religion – thereby leading to the expectation that the subaltern should 
capitulate to its unquestioned authority.   It is known that African humanism (according 
to Mphahlele) rejects any kind of authority imposed from outside; so that religious 
practice is something that is negotiated and agreed upon by consensus on matters of 
cosmology, sociology and eschatology in African communities.  In terms of Mphahlele’s 
theory of African humanism, expectations of the European (stemming from 
monocentrism) would call for the Africans to constitute themselves in a manner that 
rejects biased views of African culture and religion. The correlation between Mphahlele 
and Said in their opposition to “monocentrism” is elucidated throughout this study by 
illustrations of Mphahlele’s non-essentialist, non-ethnocentric and non-racialist 
perspective in exemplifications of what his concept of African humanism entails.  
Mphahlele’s theory of African humanism spans a broad and chequered cultural and geo-
political space for the reason that it arises from his opposition to homogenisation.  He 
acknowledges that the various cultural, geographical and political territories inhabited by 
practitioners of African humanist lifestyles contribute to their localised differences.  This 
is one way in which he displays a clear stance in relation to the idea of homogenisation.  
Mphahlele is known for his vigilance against homogenisation and its corollary hazards 
such as essentialism, enthnocentrism and racism. 
 
Perspectives such as those revealed in Said’s theory by means of ideas that he either 
supports or opposes embedded in concepts such as “travelling theory”, “religious 
criticism”, “secular criticism” and “monocentrism” – are those in terms of which I 
investigate the representation of Mphahlele’s philosophy of African humanism in his 
narrative writings.  Moreover, Said’s perspective of considering a worthwhile intellectual 
enterprise as a “beginning” will be used to test whether Mphahlele can be judged to have 
been a “beginner” in defining his concept of African humanism.  Mphahlele’s way of 
taking into consideration observations of fellow theorists with an astute selectiveness and 
adaptive reinvention of his core concept may be considered within the theory of 
beginnings in general, and specifically as it is interpreted by Said in such a publication as 
his Beginnings: Intention & Method (1975). Indeed, the radically discontinuous way in 
which Mphahlele characterises the concept of African humanism (differently from other 
writers) marks his project as a beginning.  On the strength of the inclusiveness of 
Mphahlele’s approach – in isolating a beginning in the form of theorising rigorously on 
the concept of African humanism – I here cite Said’s remark that “Structure develops 
from mere specificity to impressive, over-mastering scope and generality … [with] 
another meaning for strength [being] wider incorporation …” (“Beginning with a Text” 
193).   Said explains that the concept of beginning  
is associated … with an idea of precedence and/or priority … In short, the 
 designation of a beginning generally involves also the designation of a consequent 
 intention …We might not actually say as much every time, but … [it remains true 
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 that] the beginning is the first point (in time, space, or action) of an 
 accomplishment or process that has duration and meaning.  The beginning, then, 
 is the first step in the intentional production of meaning.  (“Beginning Ideas” 4-5)  
The protracted, purpose-directed and nuanced manner in which Mphahlele has defined 
his philosophy of African humanism qualifies him as an originator of an unprecedented, 
enduring idea.   
 
Said has remarked on the link between the traditional past and his concept of “repetition” 
in the following words: 
 Take history as a reported dramatic sequence of dialectical stages, enacted and 
 fabricated by an inconsistent but persitent humanity … and you will equally avoid 
 the despair of seeing history as gratuitious occurrence as well as the boredom of 
 seeing history as realizing a foreordained blueprint … Indeed [this dialectical 
 repetition of history or past memory] connects reason with raw experience.  (“On 
 Repetition” 113) 
What Said is articulating in this quotation is the notion that recollection of communal or 
personal memory of the cultural past is acceptable in fiction writing or in the formulation 
of any theory or concept as “beginning”, as long as such valuing of memory is recognised 
as being a “compromise” between the past and the present – because it has to be used to 
interrogate issues of the immediate present with imaginative inventiveness.   The result 
will be distinctive cultural features that are dynamic and thus continue to benefit the 
people identified by these features throughout various historical periods.   Said’s notion 
of “repetition” is applicable to my study of Mphahlele’s literary texts in that the latter 
views the place of Africans’ past in the present as relevant only in as far as it is harnessed 
to recur or maintain itself in a transformed form that represents a rupture with what 
would be its anachronistic form (of the past). 
 
Theorists such as Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin have addressed the issue of whether the 
strong sense of distinctive cultural identity (forged in such ways as are described in the 
preceding paragraph) should be accommodative or exlusivist, in relation to other cultural 
indentities.  By doing this they introduced considerations of cultural identity vis-à-vis 
essentialism.  Essentialism “is the assumption that groups, categories or classes of objects 
have one or several defining features exclusive to all members of that category” 
(Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, Key Concepts 77). Significantly, Ashcroft, Griffiths and 
Tiffin note that the term “essentialism” is used in postcolonial “analyses of culture” as “a 
(generally implicit) assumption that individuals share an essential cultural identity” (Key 
Concepts 77). Within the framework of postcolonial theory, Mphahlele and other 
postcolonial writers (who include Afrocentric theorists) advocate a countering of socio-
cultural erosion and political threats with functional, as opposed to absolute, essentialism.  
As Aschcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin note, postcolonial theorists like Spivak hold, in their 
acceptance of “a strategic essentialism”, that: 
 In different periods the employment of essentialist ideas may be a  necessary part 
 of the process by which the colonized achieve a renewed sense of the value and 
 dignity of their pre-colonial cultures,  and through which the newly emergent post-
 colonial nation asserts itself. (Key Concepts 79-80) 
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These remarks by Aschcroft et al. also reveal a concern with the notion of difference in 
relation to essentialism.   It makes sense that as essentialism implies difference by 
highlighting distinctive features that distinguish one social entity from others, theorists 
should apply their minds on whether difference contributes positively or not to social 
interaction. 
 
Spivak advocates strategic essentialism by highlighting the need for a “monumentalized 
national-cultural history of origin combined with ideas of a miraculated resistant 
hybridity” (“Teaching for the Times” 471) in the struggle of the oppressed sections of 
society for self-definition.  The connotations of idealism inherent in the words 
“monumentalized” and “miraculated” point to the need for idealistic or strategic 
essentialism that is supported by the oppressed who should (according to this theorist) 
define and re-constitute their past in order to reclaim “[their] disavowed articulation 
within the history of the present of [their] chosen new nation-state” (“Teaching for the 
Times” 471).  Emphasis (in the latter part of the quotation) on integrating such an 
essentialist self-definition regarding the past history of the oppressed with contingent 
challenges that accompany unfolding history, is proof that the kind of self-definition 
implied in meanings of the terms “monumentalized national-cultural history” and 
“miraculated resistant hybridity” is tied to the environment, and not to biological filiation.   
To try and coalesce the defining features of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism 
by using Spivak’s idea of “a miraculated resistant hybridity” should facilitate a detection 
of the former concept’s profound qualities.  Since Mphahlele uses the theme of Africans 
failing to attain an adequately balanced hybridity beyond colonisation in most of his short 
stories, autobiographies and novels, a concept like Spivak’s that characterises a specific 
way of managing hybridity properly is helpful as an instrument with which to analyse his 
(Mphahlele’s) work.  Mphahlele’s consistent consideration of how hybridity can be 
managed properly by the colonised beyond colonisation has resulted in successful 
portrayal of some of his most memorable characters failing in this regard – such as 
Chimba Chirundu (in the novel Chirundu).  Analysing these works of fiction by using 
ideas like Spivak’s tallies with Mphahlele’s own emphasis on the problematics of 
managing hybridity.  Spivak’s highlighting of the link between symbolic personification 
of the core lifestyles of society and hybridity combine theoretical positions on 
essentialism, culture and hybridity in as interesting a manner as Mphahlele does when he 
describes his concept of African humanism in relation to these ideas. 
 
Due to his circumspect analysis of difference, Mphahlele is nuanced enough in his notion 
of African humanism not to hurl himself into the snare of some Africanists who, in 
attempting a self-definition, have fallen into the quagmire of absolute essentialism.  He is 
no less conscious of the dangers of essentialism that acquire the guise of loyalty to 
geographical habitat, than fellow African theorist Achille Mbembe is when the latter 
impugns such romanticisation of essentialism: “Racial and territorial authenticity are 
conflated, and Africa becomes the land of black people” (256).  This leads to a deplorable 
situation in which “imaginations of the self and the world remain trapped within a 
conception of identity as geography – in other words of time as space” (271).  At worst 
essentialism, according to Mbembe, may lead to a canonising of difference and an 
elimination of plurality and ambivalence of custom (African Modes of Self-Writing 247).   
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Mbembe is no less conscious of the dangers of essentialism that acquire the guise of 
loyalty to geographical habitat, than he cautions against a homogenising brand of 
essentialism in which “Racial and territorial authenticity are conflated, and Africa 
becomes the land of black people” (256).  
 
The social theorist Conversi views cultural cohesion as a healthy display of the objective 
symbols of a social group, as opposed to subjective ethnicity with its potentially perilous 
self-defining approach.  Indeed, ethnic identity can be used negatively to foster absolute 
essentialist sentiments.  Conversi (2002) observes that (absolute) essentialism is often 
identifiable by the sustained and totalising description of entire groups in “a hypostatising 
manner” as cohesive entities that appear to be trapped in their historical legacy 
(“Resisting Primordialism” 271).  Conversi goes on to link essentialism with historical 
and cultural determinism (272-273).  To him, the problem arises when the distinction 
between subjective ethnicity and objective culture is blurred, which could lead to 
unfortunate essentialising of the (imaginary) enemy and could end in blanket attribution 
of individual misdeeds to whole groups (274).  Historical determinism also leads 
dangerously to absolute essentialism due to its view that “the past has got a hold on the 
present, and that we cannot escape its grasp”, as Conversi goes on to remark (275).   The 
interesting point Conversi makes is that, despite the potential dangers of essentialist 
orientation (as he points out in the quotation above), it should not be denied that cultural 
groups or any groups joined by common anteriority and goals “share some myths of 
common descent to maintain social cohesion” (271).   
 
If Mphahlele were not wary of such an invidious manifestation of essentialism (as noted 
by Mbembe), his concept of African humanism would not have been formulated in such a 
way that it cuts across racial and geographical demarcations.  His modification of 
essentialist approaches to social analysis, in the form of a strategic, mediated 
essentialism, reveals his awareness of the potential dangers of essentialism as observed 
by Conversi and Mbembe (above).  It is within the complex of theoretical perspectives 
and apparatus sketched above that Mphahlele reviewed and redefined his theory of 
African humanism until it attained a state of coherence, recognised today by those 
interested in his career as a theorist.  Whether implicitly or explicitly, I analyse 
Mphahlele’s works from the theoretical perspective of his accepting strategic (as opposed 
to absolute) essentialism – in the way the concepts of Mbembe and Conversi (above) 
contrast the two kinds of essentialism. 
 
The issue of the extent to which distinctive features of people practising an African 
humanist lifestyle (including the memory or maintenance of traditional customs) can be 
used positively for their spiritual strengthening was addressed by a number of other 
African writers.  Specifically in the case of Mphahlele (as section 1.1 of this study has 
partly demonstrated and section 1.3 will explain fully), he clearly asserts a strategically or 
usefully essentialist rallying point for fellow Africans in the face of alienation that 
requires their concerted resistance as a group. The term “alienation” is used in this 
context to mean estrangement that is larger than a forging of disharmony between the 
individual and the environment that he or she needs to exist in harmony with in order to 
interrogate and use it to his or her maximum benefit.  Within the context of discussing 
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Mphahlele’s literary works, I use the term “alienation” to refer to a more intense form of 
estrangement that renders a people’s cultural identity ineffectual in its supposed role of 
giving meaning to reality through the distinctive cultural bias of such a people.  In other 
words, Mphahlele finds it necessary for Africans to rationalise their existence as a 
distinctively identifiable and culturally capable cluster in order gainfully to counter 
threatening attitudes by other identifiable groups that seek to distort the Africans’ identity 
as incapacitating – as far as judging it capable of making meaning out of reality is 
concerned.  Eurocentric attitudes have driven Europeans to view only European cultures 
as capacitating the people practising them to forge a meaningful existence which is in 
harmony with the environment (as opposed to being alienated from it).  It is for this 
reason that Achebe, for instance, justifies Africans’ use of strategic essentialism on the 
basis that “equality is the one thing which Europeans are conspicuously incapable of 
extending to others, especially Africans” (Hopes 15).  Achebe defends the right of 
Africans to use cultural memory to as extreme an extent as they may deem fit when he 
states that “for a society to function smoothly and effectively its members must share 
certain basic tenets of belief and norms of behaviour” (Hopes 100).  To counterbalance 
any potential recklessness that may arise from cultural chauvinism, Chinua Achebe 
cautions against the concomitant snare of absolute essentialism in the following words:   
[It is wrong to hold  the] belief that some people who live across our frontiers or 
speak a different language from ourselves are the cause of all the trouble in the 
world, or that our own particular group or class or caste has a right to certain 
things denied to others …  (Hopes 101) 
 
Achebe states Africans’ need of theories adopting a strategic essentialism in one of his 
Hopes and Impediments essays when he writes that “theories are no more than fictions 
which help us to make sense of experience and which are subject to disconfirmation 
when their explanations are no longer adequate” (Hopes 98).  To testify to the wariness of 
several Africanist writers (including Mphahlele) of absolute essentialism, Achebe himself 
has warned in the same text (quoted above) that “all white people cannot be exactly of 
one mind or equally guilty of the fault of too much transmission and too little reception” 
(Hopes 16).   This point is similar to his caution against proponents of the distinctness of 
Africans – as a  confederal cluster of peoples – falling into the trap of seeing the 
differences betweeen the West and Africa as absolute, rather than as merely relative 
(Hopes  40).  It is therefore appropriate to demonstrate (as above) that Mphahlele 
conceptualises African humanism as flexible as far as people of other group identities are 
concerned, and in so far as reorganising itself from time to time and from one complex of 
circumstances to another is concerned.  Social analytical criteria such as strategic 
essentialism are some of those I use in this thesis to illustrate ways in which Mphahlele 
resolves the complicated nature of what the individual terms “African” and “humanism” 
entail as substantive notions, before they are even considered in combination with each 
other.  Considerations of whether social behaviour is the result of biological endowment 
or nurturing by the empirical world are fundamental to the idea of strategic essentialism.  
Looking at society from this perspective, Achebe (Hopes 30) and others see concepts 
such as African humanism as products of nurture rather than nature – an idea expressed 
by Achebe in the following quotation: 
 72
 You have all heard of the ‘African Personality’; of African  democracy, of the 
 African way to socialism, of negritude, and so on.   They are all props we have 
 fashioned at different times to help us get on our feet again.  Once we are up we 
 shan’t need any of them any  more. But for the moment it is in the nature of 
 things that we may need to counter racism with what Jean-Paul Sartre has called 
 an anti-racist racism, to announce not just that we are as good as the next man 
 but that we are much better. (Hopes 30) 
Achebe thus sees difference as positive, even empowering. 
 
The cultural peculiarity of Africans stressed by Achebe in the citations (above) extends in 
his view to the unique relationship between an African writer and the society about and 
for which he or she writes.  The entanglement of personal living, fiction writing, 
autobiographical writing and philosophical writing should be acknowledged as a 
distinctive feature of the relationship between literature and society in Africa because of 
the place of the writer in African society that differs from the way European writers have 
generally been observed to relate to their readers and societies.  Implying the individualist 
practice of personal lifestyle as well as creative and other writing that typifies the West, 
Achebe confirmed this distinction in 1988 when he stated that an “adversary relationship 
[between the writer and his community is] generally assumed and promoted in the west” 
(Hopes 40).  By this Achebe means that, among others, the level of living and thinking of 
the western writer and philosopher is normally expected to be at variance with that of the 
society he writes for and lives in without society being expected to label him as elitist.  
This may lead to the life of the writer and his/her community never merging or even to 
the two competing in terms of the values the writer asserts and practises, as a result of 
individualism being the norm in western societies.  The writer as a philosopher can in this 
way also be separated from the writer as a creative writer of fiction.  On the contrary, 
“the non-Westerner does not as a rule have those obligations because in his traditional 
scheme and hierarchy the human hero does not loom so large” (Hopes 38).    The 
relational mode of the African writer thus blurs the dividing line between fiction and 
philosophical writing.  This leads to there being no clear partition separating postcolonial 
theory focusing on literature and postcolonial theory focusing on social issues. 
 
In an attempt to illustrate that difference may be seen as legitimate rather than hostile 
self-assertion, the feminist postcolonial theorist Trinh T. Minh-ha supports “strategic 
essentialism” (from the point of view of difference) as follows:  “Difference, in other 
words, does not necessarily give rise to separatism” (“Not You/Like You” 416).   In this 
quotation Minh-ha clarifies that the essentialist descriptions of the debased self (which 
she calls “closures”) are ever-changing, react to present challenges within the lived 
environment and do not conform to pre-cast ideas whether emanating from the oppressive 
“centre” or from an enslaving traditional past (as the words “unfinished”, “contingent” 
and “arbitrary” respectively signify).  The opening part of the quotation expresses Minh-
ha’s perspective of interrogating social conditions from a position that uses the idea of 
strategic essentialism.  She regards strategic essentialism as a crucial tool in the self-
description of the oppressed whose past and present identities have been disfigured by the 
oppressor.  Mphahlele’s definition of the consciousness and way of life of Africans as an 
alternative to the “otherness” that the “centre” assigns to them, by reclaiming instead a 
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self-affirming and self-constituting position, is postcolonial in terminology and attitude.  
His theory and practice concur with what a postcolonial theorist like Minh-ha sees as 
requisite for the claiming of subjective position by the subaltern in which “Otherness 
becomes empowerment, critical difference, when it is not given but re-created” (417).  
Minh-ha’s approach values a stance on essentialism closely resembling Spivak’s views 
on appropriation of experience to the advantage of both the abrogating oppressed and the 
imposing oppressor.   
 
It is appropriate to sum up Mphahlele’s postcolonial mission of defining the distinctive 
identity of African humanists as constituting an analysis of Minha’s conception of 
“difference”.  The view of collective cultural identity as mutable and diffuse has been 
vindicated by Minh-ha, as when she writes that  
a particular virtue of literature … is instruction in otherness: vivid, compelling 
 evidence of differences in cultures, mores, assumptions, values … [it makes] 
 otherness palpable and … comprehensible without reducing it to an inferior 
 version of the same, as a universalizing humanism threatens to do. (“Not 
 You/Like You” 472) 
The African humanist point of view enables Mphahlele to justify a strategic essentialism 
similarly to the way postcolonial writers like Minh-ha do. In “Woman, Native, Other”, 
Minh-ha highlights the usefulness of strategic essentialism that is meant to assert the 
agency of the oppressed by means of a self-constitution, which defines the oppressed as 
embodying a constantly changing consciousness rather than seeing their culture as an 
anachronistic relic trapped in an enslaving past, in the statement that: 
 if it is a point of redeparture for those of us whose ethnicity and gender were 
 historically debased, then identity remains necessary as a political/personal 
 strategy of survival and resistance … Here the notion of displacement is also a 
 place of identity: there is no real me to return to, no whole self that synthesizes 
 the woman, the woman of colour and the writer; there are instead, diverse 
 recognitions of self through difference, and unfinished, contingent, arbitrary 
 closures that make possible both politics and identity.  (72-73) 
 
Trinh T. Minh-ha’s major contribution to social analysis (taking difference among 
varying social groups and the role of the environment in shaping the identity of a social 
group as points of departure) is with regard to recalling Eurocentric stereotypes in order 
to explode them with her own statements, relating to the capacity of a person’s agency to 
turn the “centre’s” absencing into a self-constituted presencing of the “other”.  It is in this 
spirit that Minh-ha analyses Levy-Bruhl’s statements implying that ‘an African’ is 
emotional and affective, and that ‘he’ is incapable of thinking and reasoning (in Minh-
ha’s article – 417).  This, as Minh-ha accurately interprets it, is in keeping with the 
Eurocentric attitude maintained over centuries that “Primitive man [merely] feels and 
participates” (417).  Although written in more technical terminology associated with 
postcolonial theory than is the case with African theorists, Minh-ha’s contribution is 
indeed continuation of the approach of discrediting normative descriptions of the 
subaltern by those in the “centre”.  The important point not to be missed is that 
Mphahlele’s dissatisfaction with such Eurocentric views is not motivated by their being 
articulated by people of a different race from his – in keeping with the non-essentialist, 
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nonracial orientation of postcolonial and Africanist theory.  Instead, Mphahlele disagrees 
with the romanticised or distorted nature of such views which tend not to look at the 
subject of scrutiny in a rounded manner, but rather in a manner that is more or less 
reductionist.  
 
Terms such as the “centre”, “otherness”, “absencing”, “agency”, and “strategic 
essentialism” are generally used in postcolonial theory and have been clearly defined, for 
example in Aschcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin’s Key Concepts in Post-Colonial Studies.   
These terms and others operate in proximity with and constitute perspectives that I adopt 
throughout this thesis in my critical analysis of Mphahlele’s texts – in order to follow the 
development of both the polemical articulation and fictional representation of 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism because Mphahlele is appropriately seen as a 
postcolonial writer.  This includes my assessment of the theoretical coherence of 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism and whether he uses the idea of essentialism 
in the way it is applied by commentators such as Achebe and Minh-ha (described above) 
in their consideration of what it is to be dinstinctively African.  This view of the writer 
from an Africanist perspective has been demonstrated in this study to have influenced the 
way Mphahlele perceives his role as a writer.  As I analyse Mphahlele’s narratives to 
identify ways in which he reflects the African humanist world-view, I assess his 
relationship with his writing and audience by bearing statements by Achebe (above) in 
mind.   Mphahlele is shown throughout this dissertation to align himself with the scenario 
described by critics such as Achebe (above) as the uniquely African relationship between 
the author, his or her creation and the material conditions from which he or she draws 
inspiration.  
 
Sociolinguistic concepts proposed by theorists like Matsumoto (1988) and Fraser (1990) 
are used in this thesis to analyse Mphahlele’s dialogue and imagery, because they 
effectively explain how communication of ideas or messages should be carried out.  
According to Frazer, “face” is the idea used to describe the speaker’s psychological 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction after he or she has taken care to be polite in communing or 
communicating with others (Frazer, “Perspectives on Politeness” 229).  Matsumoto 
points out the nature of “politeness” that considers the appropriateness of speech forms or 
modes of communication, as determined differently from one culture to another 
(Matsumoto, “Re-examination of Face” 405).  What is “positive face” (or the effect of 
communication whereby the speaker’s message or communication is acceptable to at 
least some others) in one cultural setting can effectively become “negative face” (or an 
impediment of the speaker’s desire that his or her words should communicate whatever 
he or she wants to express) in a different cultural environment.  What this means is that 
for a communicant from a largely individualistic society like that of the West, to speak in 
an acceptable manner among a group of Africans may lead to what he or she perceives as 
impingement on his or her freedom to express an individual opinion.  This is because 
acceptability of dialogue in African cultures is measured against its alignment with the 
opinion of the entire community on a specific issue.  In terms of the hierarchic structure 
of African society (demonstrated in section 1.1 of this thesis as an aspect of Mphahlele’s 
philosophy of African humanism), whether the speaker has proven himself or herself an 
outstanding hunter, warrior or traditional healer would determine the extent to which his 
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or her individual communication can be sanctioned as sagacious/prophetic and thus as 
tantamount to the communal voice in its authority or acceptability.  But for the 
nonAfrican interlocutor these criteria may be interpreted, not as contributing positively to 
acceptability by the listeners, since the criteria may instead be evaluated as interfering 
with the individual’s freedom. Mphahlele’s Africanist position as a writer makes some 
views on the relationship between culture and communication more relevant to an 
analysis of his literature than others.   
 
Several of the ideas of the South African theorist and writer Njabulo Ndebele are used in 
this thesis specifically because they help conceptualise how communication is to be 
executed.  In Ndebele’s theory, “pamphleteering” is a writing style that obliterates real 
meaning – that is, knowledge that needs to be searched for rather than making itself 
immediately clear.  Because of his formulation and application of the idea of 
“pamphleteering”, Ndebele’s essays constantly reveal his dislike of stories which 
simplify reality at the expense of analytical scrupulousness – as when he protests against 
the kind of writing that would get “out of us more indignation, and less understanding” 
(“Against Pamphleteering the Future” 137).  The act of pamphleteering is viewed by 
Ndebele as regrettably leading to spectacular representation. Ndebele summarises what 
he means by the “spectacular” in the following words: 
 The spectacular documents; it indicts implicitly; it is demonstrative, 
 preferring exteriority to interiority; it keeps the larger issues of society in our 
 minds, obliterating the details; it provokes identification through recognition and 
 feeling rather than through observation and analytical thought; it calls for 
 emotion rather than conviction; it establishes a vast sense of presence without 
 offering intimate knowledge; in confirms without necessarily offering a challenge.  
 It is the literature of the powerless identifying the key factor responsible for their 
 powerlessness.  Nothing beyond this can be expected of it.  (“The Rediscovery” 
 46) 
The words just quoted characterise spectacular representation as a mode of writing which 
appeals to emotion rather than reason, reacts to the comprehensive picture without 
analysing its constituents, expresses despair rather than hope or resilience (as the phrase 
“literature of the powerless identifying the key factor responsible for their powerlessness” 
indicates) (“The Rediscovery” 46).  Ndebele, for instance, urges a return in South African 
black English literature to the richness and depth of localised cultural existence and a 
shift away from reflections of experience preoccupied and regulated by the larger-than-
life race problem:  
…for the human tragedy to be confronted, together with the immense challenging 
 responsibility to create a new society, demands an uncompromisingly tough-
 minded creative will to build a new civilization … no civilization worth the name 
 will emerge without the payment of disciplined and rigorous attention to detail.  
 (“The Rediscovery” 57) 
 
On the literary scene Ndebele cautions the African writer-critic facing the turbulent 
apartheid era against sacrificing sound critical practice at the time it is most needed – to 
counter a threatening disorientation regarding the direction of the liberation struggle.  In 
the essay titled “The Rediscovery of the Ordinary”, Ndebele puts in relief the crassness of 
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spectacular representation of the life of Africans under apartheid, which, inter alia, 
“keeps the larger issues of society in our minds, obliterating the details” (“The 
Rediscovery” 46).  In the essay quoted above, Ndebele denounces the depiction in protest 
literature of political oppression and brutality as an implacable motif.  Ndebele urges a 
return (in South African black literature written in English) to “an uncompromisingly 
toughminded creative will to build a new civilisation… [which will not] emerge whithout 
the payment of disciplined and rigorous attention to detail” (“The Rediscovery” 56-57).  
In this way, Ndebele posits a move away from the “spectacular” as an antidote to 
reflections of experience preoccupied with and regulated by the larger-than-life race 
problem (associated with protest literature) – to a literature that recreates the richness, 
complexity and depth of localised cultural existence.   
 
Ndebele pinpoints spectacular representation of reality as a major weakness permeating 
the black intellectual circles during the struggle for self-determination.  According to 
him, this weakness leads to confusion of expository language with creative language: 
“[protest literature] reinforces the expository intention without establishing its own 
evaluative literary grounds” (46).  Ndebele’s aim in inventing and employing these terms 
is that of highlighting the primacy of distinguishing concepts clearly so that the role of 
the social analyst may serve its proper purpose of interpreting social phenomena 
accurately in order for him or her to arrive at the most efficacious remedies for identified 
social ills.  I analyse Mphahlele’s works by using ideas expressed in these terms (devised 
by Ndebele) because Mphahlele approaches the exemplification of his own concept (of 
African humanism) in his narrative writings in a manner that seeks to analyse society to 
the maximum, using the most rigorous analytical method that would not stand in the way 
of a thorough grasp of the nature of his theory – which he advances as his own remedy 
for what he perceives as psychological and material frailties of African communities.  
Mphahlele’s emphasis on the need to recognise the unpredictable nature of societal needs 
(that constantly demand versatile adjustment of the social function) is proof of his 
sensitivity to the flexible relation between public and individual voices.  It is yet another 
way of advocating proper attention to shades of difference in analysing society.    
 
Ndebele’s theory seems to be the most suitable in respect of which to analyse or assess 
Mphahlele’s commitment to the theoretical position he (Mphahlele) professes.  I judge 
Mphahlele’s handling of literature and refinement of his concept of African humanism 
against Ndebele’s ideas that take the issues of essentialism and difference (discussed 
above) further – those of “the spectacular”, “protest literature”, “rediscovery of the 
ordinary” which are central to Ndebele’s theory.   These concepts are particularly helpful 
in enabling me to anchor my critical analysis of Mphahlele’s narratives in the concrete, 
specifically South African human condition rather than ending my critiques in abstract 
and broad foundations like the ideas of essentialism and the placing of Mphahlele’s 
works on the global postcolonial terrain.  It is helpful (in my analysis of Mphahlele’s 
narratives) to converge from contextualising it in a very broad framework to discussing it 
in relation to theoretical apparatus closer to Mphahlele’s particular characteristics as an 
individual writer.   
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Apart from my adoption of Ndebele’s concepts (outlined above), Homi Babha’s concept 
of a “metonymic gap” is another tool enabling me to explain the way Mphahlele narrows 
down postcolonial concepts to suit his specific South African locale.  Homi Bhabha 
advances the idea of analysing society from the point of view of difference by use of this 
concept of a “metonymic gap”.   The concept as Bhabha defines it entails that effacement 
of the colonised individual’s personal or private subjectivity in postcolonial social life is 
equivalent to the epic effacement of the individual’s cultural representations 
(Postcolonial Theory 114).   Using a theoretical framework that includes Bhabha’s ideas 
(in examining the representation of African humanism in Mphahlele’s narrative writings) 
is relevant in that Mphahlele employs each and every literary formula he has devised 
specifically to suggest the presence of African humanist lifestyles in his narratives as a 
symbolic representation of the cultures of Africans on which he writes. With each 
carrying this out in his own unique way, Mphahlele and Bhabha commonly highlight the 
implications of a “metonymic gap” in the way the coloniser and colonised interact, which 
include its manifestation in the kind of transformed behaviour referred to as mimicry. 
Bhabha’s thoughts on the effects of paranoia inflicted by mimicry on those from the 
“centre” and on the need for what I refer to as “strategic essentialism” will prove handy 
in fully exposing the conflict between African humanist consciousness embodied in the 
actions of characters like Moruti “KK” and Karabo (in “Mrs Plum”) on the one hand, and 
on the other hand European lifestyles like those of Kate and Mrs Plum.  In discussing the 
ideas of a “metonymic gap” and of strategic essentialism, Bhabha takes the analysis of 
sociocultural difference a step further by moving beyond its analysis and focusing on its 
consequences – exemplified in the idea of mimicry.  Mphahlele seems (from his reactions 
to the idea of multiculturalism described in section 1.1 of this thesis) to identify with the 
approach of satirising mimicry or poor management of hybridity in his postulation of the 
concept of African humanism, because he advocates the conservation of the identity of 
individual cultural clusters rather than bending or blurring it into a type of global 
multiculturalism.  
 
I also use some of Mphahlele’s own theoretical terms to discuss his literary works.  
Mphahlele considers “perspective” as one important constituent of the difference between 
people of broadly differing cultural orientations.  In terms of Mphahlele’s notion of 
perspective, details of a locally set literary composition are expected to include the 
characters’ distinctive cultural symbols for the readers’ benefit.  The cumulative effect of 
such details or images that invoke Africanness should be the reader’s recognition of his 
or her own existential challenges, tied to his or her unique cultural identity.   The work of 
art containing “perspective” should utilise this feature to enable such a reader to resolve 
everyday problems, using his or her cultural resourcefulness that lies at the core of his or 
her African humanist consciousness.  So, to Mphahlele, the competent writer today in a 
context like his own will be the one who artistically represents African humanism in 
his/her work.  It is evident also that written literature for the African should necessarily 
revive the dynamics of orature, if “resonance” is to be attained.  In the way Mphahlele 
employs it, the term “resonance” refers to repetition in literature of “certain things that 
must never change ... [like the] metaphor [that] keeps re-echoing what [you] said before 
… like a prophecy that sets up vibrations in one response mechanism … [because of] the 
things that keep vibrating when you’ve left the novel behind” (“African Literature” 275, 
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276).  Traditional literary forms such as folktales (and narrative devices associated with 
them) are among the items which “must never change” (African Literature” 276) if the 
resonating music of African humanism is to result in what Mphahlele calls the “unbroken 
song”.  
 
The traditional oral artist whose social function is implied in the proper use of devices 
outlined above is in Mphahlele’s view a precursor of the modern African artist, because 
the resonances of his or her art must “[set] up vibrations in [the] response mechanism” 
(“African Literature” 276) of the modern African writer. This legacy from earlier oral 
artists can be assumed as being transmitted with ease through Mphahlele’s writing 
through the successful fabrication of perspective, using resonances that capture the daily 
rhythm of African lives.  From such observations it follows that African writing as 
Mphahlele conceives of it cannot be divorced from social function.  Indeed, there is a 
recognisable and culturally-informed general tendency among African(ist) writers to 
tackle concerns of the community, deploying individual strategies displaying their own 
varying priorities.  The distinctively African relationship between the individual and the 
community ensures that the aims of fiction production by African writers invariably 
include the spiritual and material advancement of the community. 
 
Because of the multidimensional entanglement of the writer and his community 
Mphahlele (like his fellow African writers) aims to interrogate the postcolonial 
experience integratively without dividing literature from social issues.  The school of 
postcolonialist African writers such as Mphahlele is best accommodated in Bart Moore-
Gilbert’s description of a body of theory that began to be built up during the colonial era 
and was further consolidated after the colonised had reached political freedom, known 
presently as postcolonial modes of cultural analysis (Postcolonial Theory 5).  Reference 
to the interrogation of postcolonial experience as “cultural analysis” circumvents the 
problem of compartmentalising experience, which would conflict with what Mphahlele 
describes as the African humanist view of reality as integrated experience.  This is so 
because the word “cultural” avoids a splintering of experience into the literary, 
philosophical or autobiographical, by transforming the meaning of “analysis” into a 
unified, nuanced interpretation of social life.   
 
The concepts described above constitute the core of my theoretical apparatus in analysing 
Mphahlele’s literary works.  Together they form the theoretical framework by means of 
which I trace the nature of Mphahlele’s philosophy of African humanism, as well as the 
manner of its literary representations. 
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1.3 CONCEPTUAL APPROACH, ANALYTICAL METHOD AND DESIGN  
 
As illustrated in section 1.1 of this chapter, the concept of African humanism and related 
notions have been part of Africanist discourse for a long time before Mphahlele began 
refining and articulating the idea.  The term “representation” in the sense in which it is 
used in the title of this thesis refers to the way Mphahlele reflects or exemplifies the 
concept of African humanism in his imaginative writing, rather than to his direct 
elaboration of it as he does when explaining the concept in discursive essays.  There are, 
however, few African writers or theorists in whose work it forms as central a focus as it 
does for Mphahlele.    It must nevertheless be acknowledged that it is in his later years 
only, and then with explicit reference to the term only in his public speeches and 
discursive essays (rather than his narrative writing or poetry), that Mphahlele expressly 
discusses and promotes his concept of African humanism.  The point of departure here is 
the notion that works of literature like Mphahlele’s, in the vividness with which they 
depict the texture of everyday life (in ways that are accessible through a process of 
textual scrutiny and analysis), both conceptualise and embody sociological, philosophical 
and political concepts such as (in his case) “African humanism”.  
 
I shall be analysing Mphahlele’s fiction using the approach advocated by Said in his use 
of the term “secular criticism”, because I share Said’s belief that fictional texts are based 
in social conditions forming the context in which the issues the texts tackle originate.  By 
doing this, Mphahlele consistently attributes imaginative, self-defining action to the 
deeds of humans rather than to a reified idea or to some metaphysical power.   Edward 
Said wrote in 1983 in support of the secular appproach to literature – by which he means 
“criticism [or writing that] deals with local and worldly situations” (“Secular Criticism” 
26).  Secular criticism differs from “textuality” in the sense in which Said uses the latter 
term (“textuality”) to refer to the hermetic treatment of a literary text as if its content have 
no relation to issues in the real world of experience.  Said laments the fact that “literary 
theory has for the most part isolated textuality from the circumstances, the events, the 
physical senses that made it possible and rendered it intelligible as the result of human 
work” (“Secular Criticism” 4).  By using the term to highlight the central position of 
human beings (as this quotation shows), Said reveals his humanist approach to theory.   
As explained in section 1.1 of this study, it is the view of humanists universally to credit 
humans with all action that makes meaning out of contingent conditions.    An exclusive 
focus on the “textuality” of the text (as understood by Said) deviates from the 
centralisation of human action in interpreting phenomena in much the same way as 
religious criticism “reveals itself as neither fully human nor fully apprehensible in human 
terms” (“Religious Criticism” 291).  A theorist purporting to be secular may ironically 
degenerate into a religious critic if he or she falls victim to the “dramatic increase in the 
number of appeals to the extrahuman, the vague abstraction, the divine, the esoteric and 
secret” (“Religious Criticism” 291).   My critical approach in examining Mphahlele’s 
narrative writings for representations of his concept of African humanism “deals with 
local and worldly situations”, in Said’s terms (“Secular Criticism” 26).  The dialogue of 
characters and imagery are the primary focus of this study for the reason that dialogue 
links the action within fictional works with the bigger world in relation to which it 
(dialogue) makes sense.  In Mphahlele’s narrative writings, imagery derives meaning 
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from the concrete world consisting of African lifestyles and interpreted in African 
humanist terms that place carnal human beings at the centre of reality.  In this way, my 
criticism of Mphahlele’s works is not based on meaning based on some metaphysical or 
abstract entity; it is secular. 
    
My analysis will examine the ways in which dialogue and imagery in Mphahlele’s 
narrative texts exhibit aspects of an ethos (or practice) and a world-view (or philosophy) 
which are identifiably both African and humanist in orientation.   Dialogue and imagery 
as building blocks of the ‘hermetic’ text assist in linking the text with the sociological 
conditions within which context it is written, as well as the theoretical context to which it 
implicitly responds.  It is in the nature of dialogue (in the way Mphahlele uses it in his 
literary work) to bridge the gap between a text’s internal organisation and its alignment 
with the larger reality forming the empirical order in which contents of the text is based.  
It is possible for Mphahlele’s dialogue to achieve this because the ideas expressed in it 
add to the text itself, making sense within the smaller world of its plot, while at the same 
time escaping enthralment to hermetic signification by meaning what it means in 
accordance with the cultural biases these ideas acquire from the world outside the text – 
which include the ideological atmosphere that gave birth to the idea, the distinctly 
African cultural vantage point of the ideas, the multicultural theoretical matrix of the 
ideas, and so forth.  
 
In theoretical or methodological terms, the analysis of dialogue in the chosen texts rests 
on the notion that to speak is to perform speech acts (Hymes 1972; Schmidt and Richards 
1980).  The performance of speech acts, as Candlin noted in 1978 (as quoted by Schmidt 
& Richards), depends on “culturally-specific appropriateness criteria” (“Speech Acts and 
Second Language Learning” 141).  This entails, as Matsumoto has established, that that 
which is sociolinguistically appropriate is established as such in terms of a specific 
culture (“Reexamination of the Universality of Face” 403).   In addition to revealing 
individual character, therefore, dialogue necessarily reveals societal character.   Such an 
interpretation of dialogue in relation to cultural norms that underlie it is appropriate in 
analysing Mphahlele’s writings – in which expressions have a double layer of universal 
and of culture-specific meanings in simultaneously referring to universal identities of 
entities while also evoking culture-specific connotative meanings.  My study will test 
whether the determinant of what is socioculturally appropriate in the dialogue contained 
in Mphahlele’s prose writing is an African humanist modus vivendi.  
 
The conceptual approach I adopt (outlined above)  in examining  the form and content of 
Mphahlele’s narrative writing explained in preceding paragraphs should justify why one 
of the features of my approach is to articulate, through close literary analysis, the issue to 
which Mphahlele was implicitly responding in his texts: whether it would be possible to 
indicate that Africans qualify as a distinct cultural entity equal to other such entitities in 
their human attributes within a philosophical, theological and sociopolitical context 
which sought to deny this.  Because the implied contention of Mphahlele’s reflection of 
African humanist consciousness and temperament explained in preceding sections of this 
thesis is anchored in questions of sociological bearing, I found a sociolinguistic approach 
most suitable in that it links text ans social context more directly than other methods 
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would.  Some approaches may regard the form of the text and specific ways in which 
diction is deployed in attaining the writer’s intended message and effect meaningful 
within the insular world of the text.  These approaches would not unlock the wealth of 
sociolinguistic meaning with which Mphahlele’s narratives are imbued. 
    
The way Mphahlele constructs and uses imagery in his poetry and narrative writings is 
closely linked to his use of dialogue.   While the referential meaning of an image can 
safely be said to be the same across sociological contexts, the same cannot be said of its 
connotative meaning.   Analogically, while the image of a snake referentially designates 
the same creature to an African living in South Africa (say) and a Chinese in any part of 
China, for the African the image evokes a spontaneous feeling of fear and connotations of 
death that might result from a venomous bite.   For the Chinese, living within a culture 
that sanctions the slaughtering and cooking of snakes for a meal, what the image 
immediately unlocks are appetising ideas of a delicious dish. For people in those parts of 
the world where a snake is treated mystically as a god, the image would instill immediate 
awe, prompting introspection with a moral focus.   
 
The metonymic ability of both dialogue and imagery to reflect in a text the culture and 
consciousness of the people about whom and for whom it is written makes a focus on 
these two vehicles of meaning most suitable in analysing the fiction of a writer such as 
Mphahlele.  This is so because Mphahlele adopts a literary approach that could be 
described as assuming a “secular” interpretation of literature (as his approach to writing 
was described in earlier sections of this dissertation).    That is why he has, for example, 
indicated that in his view education cannot but “fit into the cultural, political and 
economic goals of the community” (“Education as Community Development” 14).  The 
secular world in which his texts are anchored is one conceived from African humanist 
perspective.  Despite his intimate linking of text and the secular world, Mphahlele’s 
concept of African humanism has a strong religious dimension.  This leads to the 
coexistence in Mphahlele’s literary practice of secular and religious approaches.  He 
writes according to what may be called secular inclinations of criticism, while succeeding 
in precluding an escapist use of religious authority that simplistically ignores the 
empirical conditions of human action. 
 
The investigation in Chapter 2 of this study attempts to illustrate extensive evidence of 
African humanist consciousness and conduct in Mphahlele’s early stories.  I shall trace 
Mphahlele’s representations of his concept of African humanism in these stories in 
relation to his views on the role of autobiographical information in fiction as well as on 
the relationship of an African writer with his audience (indicated in section 1.1).  It is to 
be expected that as soon as articulation of an idea evolves, the contours of that idea ipso 
facto refine themselves, thus making the articulator’s own conscious understanding of the 
concept clearer.  It is for this reason that in Mphahlele’s (selected) poems and entire 
corpus of short stories (discussed in Chapter 2), I shall test whether the representation of 
the concept of African humanism advances from the earlier stories to the later stories and 
poetry. (Mphahlele wrote poetry later in his career in between writing maturer stories, 
autobiographies and novels – “My Experience as a Writer” 119).   The second chapter 
starts by examining a select number of Mphahlele’s poems and concludes with a 
 82
consideration of all his short stories.  The rationale was to show that Mphahlele’s 
representations of the concept of African humanism are not confined to his prose.  But as 
the thrust of this study hinges on the narrative writings, it is the latter category of 
Mphahlele’s writings which received fuller attention in the main body of the work.  The 
selection of the poems was guided by how they appeared to represent African humanist 
tenets more prominently than the rest of Mphahlele’s poetry. 
 
In Chapter 3 I sketch the representation of African humanism in Mphahlele’s 
autobiographies.   In keeping with Mphahlele’s theoretical position of abrogating the 
normative structure of autobiography (detailed in section 1.2 of this study), I shall 
investigate how differently African humanist conduct is exemplified here from the way it 
is traceable in genres considered earlier.  The aim of this chapter is to show that 
Mphahlele is in his autobiographies able to delineate on a bigger canvas and in more 
graphic detail the African humanist reaction to the alienating and self-alienating effects of 
apartheid – forming the contents of Down Second Avenue and Afrika My Music.   This is 
because autobiography can more directly draw on everyday experiences of those Africans 
Mphahlele portrays as African humanist in consciousness and conduct.  Based on what 
Mphahlele has said about the need to redefine genre, it is arguably appropriate to trace 
evidence of the technique by means of which Mphahlele conjoins the pain of the conflict 
rankling in his mind as writer-protagonist (because he shares the experiences of his 
characters and target audience) with the portrayal of the impact of the alienation caused 
by apartheid on Africans in his autobiographies.   
 
In attempting to probe whether and how conceptualisation, articulation and representation 
of African humanism becomes more coherent and lucid through the stages of 
Mphahlele’s career and in probing how successfully African humanism is represented in 
the novels discussed in Chapter 4, I search for further  crystallisation of this concept.   
Chapter 5 is analysed in order to search for progressively more radical abrogation of the 
novel form in ways that one would have thought incompatible with modern forms of 
African literature in postcolonial times, in which the oral form has been overtaken by the 
written medium and traditional life dislocated by modern ways. This is predicated on 
Mphahlele’s well-known announcement (in a number of published interviews) that he 
designed Father Come Home to explore the possibilities of  using a rural setting in 
asserting and portraying more coherent African humanist ways of thinking and living.  In 
Chapter 6 (as the conclusion) I try to consolidate evidence of Mphahlele’s ways of 
representing his philosophy of African humanism.  The intention is to enable the reader 
to have a comprehensive map of how the many detailed demonstrations in the body of the 
dissertation spanning Chapters 2 to 5 justify the conclusions of the study.   
 
One of the intentions of this study is to show how Mphahlele’s repeats some of his 
unique literary devices in representing his concept of African humanism throughout the 
different texts under consideration.  For this reason the body of the work is divided into 
subheadings.  Each subheading is designed to highlight to the reader that a specific 
feature of the devices Mphahlele implements to demonstrate the presence of African 
humanist consciousness and lifestyles in his fictional creations is repeated in the different 
genres he employs. It will be demonstrated that the way Mphahlele’s distinctive stylistic 
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devices – signifying his weaving of various aspects of his concept of African humanism 
into the fabric of his texts – recur in his different texts is not plain repetition.  As the 
study will elucidate, each stylistic implement or fictional feature unique to Mphahlele’s 
writing that embodies or illustrates his philosophy of African humanism recurs in various 
contexts to render its use more sophisticated or nuanced.   To hint at this effect achieved 
by Mphahlele’s repeated use of the devices and literary formulae he invented for himself 
in order to articulate African humanism vividly and powerfully, I take pains to ensure 
that (delineations of) this aspect of Mphahlele’s style is accommodated by repeating 
some of the words used in previous subheadings, while no subheading as a whole is 
merely a repetition of anything earlier in the thesis.   
 
The present chapter is organised differently from Chapters 2 to 5.   While the first chapter 
(as shown above) links the development of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism 
with the historical periods during which it was refined, in the next four chapters its 
development is linked to different genres.  This is because certain constraints associated 
with generic requirements give latitude to specific modes of representation, while being 
limiting to others.  It thus seemed appropriate in writing the succeeding chapters to focus 
on the way various fictional representations of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism 
merge with structural demands of the various genres.  For the same reason of reliance on 
the characteristics of each genre in order to probe how Mphahlele’s representation of 
African humanism varies, the subject of each chapter is a single genre rather than 
different genres published in a specific period.  Mphahlele’s literary orientations that may 
have a link with the historical period in which a work was published are addressed within 
each chapter, without determining the sequence of the different chapters themselves.   
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2. THE SHORT STORIES AND POETRY 
 
2.1     INSTANCES OF AFRICAN HUMANISM IN MPHAHLELE’S POETRY 
 
An understanding of Mphahlele’s presentation of African humanist ideas in his fiction 
necessitates study of the way he (differently and similarly) articulates these ideas or 
features of social analysis in his poems.  It is my conviction that an illustration of 
continuities and discontinuities in the way Mphahlele exemplifies his concept of African 
humanism in his poetry and in his prose fiction ultimately serves better to clarify the 
concept of African humanism itself; and this is partly the goal of this study.  The goal of 
this thesis is also partly to demonstrate both how Mphahlele’s philosophy of African 
humanism coalesces in his formative years as a theorist and writer, and how he develops 
it in expository and fictional writing in his maturing years.   Despite my implicit 
argument that evidence of this is found most abundantly and perfectly in dialogue that is 
looked at sociolinguistically, it is a defensible assumption that dialogue in literature is 
manifest in many other genres in subtler ways like monologues and clipped dialogues 
attributed to the persona in poetry.    Even more significantly, for an autobiographical 
writer like Mphahlele, a more profound kind of dialogue obtains between him and his 
subject matter and between him and the theory of African humanism that he continually 
interrogates in order to extract from such interrogation a progressively more lucid and 
more nuanced, coherent and comprehensive understanding of this concept.  Vehicles of 
the latter sort of dialogue are (as I argue in this study) imagery.  For the reason that 
imagery straddles both prose and poetry, I had to acknowledge that leaving out 
Mphahlele’s poetry would create an unfortunate hiatus in a comprehensive consideration 
of the evolution of his concept of African humanism.  This should not be misconstrued as 
a shrinking back from the hypothesis that the concept of African humanism is best 
represented in Mphahlele’s narrative writings when one uses the entry points I have 
decided on – those of dialogue and imagery.  An acknowledgement of this is the fact that 
only a few of Mphahlele’s poems are analysed while the entire body of his short stories, 
novels and autobiographies is scrutinised exhaustively. 
 
A reading of Mphahlele’s published poetry collected in The Unbroken Song (1981), 
starting from the poem of 1960 named “Exile in Nigeria” right through to “Fathers and 
Sons” of March 1977, testifies to a continued concern with a distinct black identity 
globally.  Writing in itself being an intellectual activity, Mphahlele the intellectual should 
be understood to operate at two levels in the writing of this poetry.  The first level is that 
of depicting social experience.  Clearly a line like “now my enemies are out of sight” 
portrays the experience of anyone (not necessarily an intellectual) who sighs with relief at 
the physical disappearance of apartheid South Africa which he or she has fled.  The 
second level is that of articulating a sensible theory about such common experience of 
exile.  Mphahlele’s way of fulfilling this intellectual task at the second level of his 
composition is that of positing the theory of African humanism.   Ndebele aims to 
distinguish these two levels that (according to him) should characterise any attempt at 
social analysis such as the writing of fiction about society in a statement like the 
following: 
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 In other words, in any society, there are actors and interpreters; there is popular 
 culture on the one hand, and on the other, the formal culture which attempts to 
 explain and to give ideological credence to popular  culture at the highest 
 conceptual level.  (“Actors” 82-83) 
In this sense, a description of fleeing apartheid and entering exile can pass for popular 
culture in that a person undergoing this enterprise need not necessarily theorise about 
being African and going into exile.  But to go further and theorise about the condition is 
to be an interpreter in Ndebele’s terms. 
 
Edward Said points out this need to participate in an experience by theorising about it, 
when he writes of the Israel-Palestine situation in the following words: 
 I think it’s one of the consequences of 1948 … that we can begin to talk about 
 Palestine and Israeli history together.  Separate histories that can be seen as 
 intertwined and counterpointed with each other. Without that the Other is always 
 going to be dehumanized, demonized, invisible.  We must find a way.  That’s 
 where the role of the mind, the role of the intellectual, the moral consciousness is 
 crucial.  (“One-State” 22, emphasis added) 
Here the social experience in which ordinary Palestinians are oppressed not only finds 
representation but also benefits from a workable, well-thought-out theory, which a writer 
like Abraham would call “participation in the theory [of a culture], as distinct from the 
practice” (Mind of Africa 12) – which is parallel to Ndebele’s distinction between being 
an interpreter and being an actor in the experiences of society. 
 
As for Fanon, on this very concern by Ndebele and Said as demonstrated in the 
quotations above, he formulates his viewpoint in the following words: 
 That spectacular volunteer movement which meant to lead the colonized people to 
 supreme sovereignty … all [its actions] now are seen in the light of experience to 
 be symptoms of a very great weakness.  While the native thought that he could 
 pass without transition from the status of a colonized person to that of a self-
 governing citizen of an independent nation, he made no real progress along the 
  road to knowledge.  His consciousness remained rudimentary.  (“Spontaneity” 
 110, emphasis added) 
Fanon is clearly exhibiting a similar concern which Ndebele formulates (according to the 
quotation above) as the need to consciously inculcate a distinction between the  lived 
culture of the “actors” and formal culture that  “interpreters” have to distill  from the 
culture of the masses. 
 
It should be seen as Mphahlele’s way of addressing such concerns as those of Ndebele, 
Said and Fanon highlighted above that in his poetry he interprets the lived cultures of 
blacks exiled from apartheid South Africa as well as of those still trapped physically in 
the South African situation.  To address this challenge to interpret the actions of his 
fellow black South Africans in the face of apartheid, Mphahlele has conceptualised the 
theory of African humanism.  It is for this reason that the resilient crystallisation of 
African consciousness is expressed directly in Mphahlele’s poetry set in South Africa as 
an antidote against “the tyranny of time” within the context of apartheid South Africa.  
The same consciousness acts as a survival kit against “the tryranny of place” when the 
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black South African is in exile where he or she has fled apartheid.  Yet the dream to 
escape “the tyranny of time” completely is dashed as the memory of apartheid South 
Africa continues to cling to the consciousness of the exile.  This haunting obsession with 
the brutality of apartheid is expressed by these lines from “Exile in Nigeria”:  “now my 
enemies are out of sight;/only distant sound of long-tongued hounds/I hear/across the 
Congo and Zambesi and Limpopo --” (Unbroken Song 264).  We know from biographical 
information as contained, inter alia, in Woeber and Read’s Es’kia Mphahlele. A 
Bibliography that Mphahlele has had to endure the flustering tribulations associated with 
“the tyranny of place” as he exiled himself to Nigeria, Paris, Kenya, Denver, Zambia, 
Denver again, then Pennsylvania, up to his permanent return to South Africa in 1977 after 
the brief visit in 1976 (the order of places of exile given here as in various publications 
including the chronicle in Woeber and Read, 1989) (A Bibliography 5-8).  Desperation 
with “the tyranny of place” that one grapples with in exile conditions is expressed in such 
lines as   “new dawn tells me/that void can never last” (Unbroken Song 270).  Here the 
“new dawn” which symbolises excitement that should accompany Mphahlele’s novel 
experience of exile in America gives way to a sense of alienation upon his realising that 
the estrangement of apartheid that he has run away from pursues him in America in a way 
that does not fundamentally differ from conditions back home. 
 
In his essay written in the year 2000, “Africa in Exile”, Mphahlele reconfirms the 
ubiquity in exile of the situation he has called “the tyranny of place” (125).  This is when 
“the local setting can make impossible demands on one’s commitment” (“Africa in 
Exile” 125). There is, in the above statement by Mphahlele, an undertone of resenting the 
failure by host countries to acknowledge in a non-totalising manner that they know the 
exiles only skewly, in even homogenising terms (that blur differences among cultural 
groups coming from different parts of Africa), due to the monocentric nature of reality 
that is defined from the point of view of host countries as the “centre”.  This unfortunate 
presumptuousness about exiles in their host countries results in the agony of “always 
[being] humbly aware that [one knows] volumes more about [oneself] – the limits of 
what [one] can achieve and what is within [one’s] capacity” (“Africa in Exile” 125) than 
those of the host country can.  Ndebele has remarked about the danger of the centre 
imposing its interpretation of social experience on the other as “[committing] the fallacy 
of universalising [the Centre’s] interests” (“Actors” 77). 
 
Mphahlele remarks in the poem quoted above that “new dawn” tells him that “void can 
never last” (Unbroken Song 270).  The pun on “dawn” means that, due to the condition of 
exile it is dawning on Mphahlele that the void formerly associated with the tyranny of 
time in apartheid South Africa cannot remain for any length of time as it is bound to be  
filled by  the equally unpalatable tyranny of  place which exile is all about.  The void 
proves to be only a temporary reprieve from the pain of oppression by the colonising side 
of society.  It is probably with this ‘void’ in mind that Mphahlele acceded in a 1971 
interview with Lindfors to “both situations [of apartheid South Africa and exile bearing] 
crippling factors, but those in exile [being] still less excruciating than those inside the 
country” (“Es’kia Mphahlele” 171).  From this statement it can be safely deduced that for 
Mphahlele moving out of apartheid South Africa into exile is marked by shortlived 
atonement which is only substituted with the “spiritual, mental ghetto” of exile (“Es’kia 
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Mphahlele” 171). Mphahlele’s documented vocation of turning the bitter memory of 
apartheid that dogs him in exile into a tool with which to make meaning of the challenges 
of exiled life is akin to Said’s theoretical position regarding beginning, difference and 
discontinuity, as exposed in the following words: 
 … knowledge is conceived of, first of all, as radical discontinuity – not that the  
relationships between finite instances of knowledge are necessarily nondialectical, but 
rather that the unit of knowledge is an articulation, or an  instance, of difference from 
another unit… [and] underlying all this discontinuity is a supposition that rational 
knowledge is possible, regardless of how very complex – and even unattractive – the 
conditions of its production and  acquisition.  (“Abecedarium” 283) 
The similarity between Mphahlele’s and Said’s positions on beginning, difference and 
discontinuity becomes clearer as soon as Mphahlele’s enterprise to define his concept of 
African humanism is seen as a beginning.  This is the case because Mphahlele’s 
distinctive intellectual contribution in creating his own definitions of ideas such as 
Africanism, humanism, liberalism, racism and essentialism are in “radical discontinuity” 
(in Said’s terms) with what obtained before (“Abecedarium” 283).   The status of 
Mphahlele’s theory of African humanism as “radical discontinuity” is attained as he 
endows these ideas with his own mantle, which differs from the way other theorists have 
conceived of them.  That the ideas are inflected within the framework of his concept of 
African humanism should isolate this concept as a beginning even more graphically. 
 
As critics like Thuynsma have indicated, Mphahlele “[explores] the meaning of raw 
experience in fiction” (“Whirlwind” 236).   In other words, Mphahlele’s quest in personal 
life is the same as that expressed in his writings.  In the 1971 interview with Lindfors 
(published in 2002) Mphahlele himself testifies to this in the remark that “one could say 
something is more autobiography than fiction and something is more fiction than 
autobiograpy, but the two are never completely separate” (“Es’kia Mphahlele” 169).  As 
such, the quest of Mphahlele the observer-participant having been a self-defining one in 
order to establish the meaning of being African in the historico-cultural framework of 
colonisation and exile, this quest is explored in the poems. This point is what Ruth Obee 
is talking about in remarking of “[Mphahlele’s] African humanist aesthetic and its 
expression in art [beginning] by finding its inspiration in the community while at the 
same time serving that community … [as] can be seen … in [his] poetry” (“The 
Unbroken Song” 195).  The link between Mphahlele the person-in-the world and 
Mphahlele the writer and critic as observed by Thuynsma in the quotation above serves to 
explain why this study places the study of Mphahlele’s poetry, short stories, novels and 
autobiographies within the broader context of Said’s theory.  One of the reasons for such 
an approach is that Mphahlele’s relation with his work fits into Said’s model of what he 
theorises as the relationship of the writer’s life to his literary output, as when he observes 
that “there is a real, unavoidable coincidence between an author’s egocentricity and the 
kind of eccentricity found exclusively in his text” (“Beginning with” 228).  The constant 
that carries Mphahlele through variants that are successive historical shifts (from real-life 
alienation from his abusive father,  to psychological exile within the alienating apartheid 
atomosphere of the South Africa in which he grew up, to egregious exile in African states 
and America) is an identity he terms African humanism.  In other words, the meanings of 
the poems are couched within an African humanist perspective.  Eccentric as the content 
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and style of these poems are due to their being informed by an African humanist 
consciousness, they are no less “egocentric” (in Said’s terms) in that they reveal 
Mphahlele’s personal intention of designating his African humanist interpretation of 
experience.  It should be realised that (personal) intention is as crucial to the beginning of 
any intellectual assignment as (subjectivised) authority, according to Said’s general 
theory on beginnings.  That is why Said has written that “the beginning … is the first step 
in the intentional production of meaning”; that “authority is… [either] a property of 
discourse and not of writing … or authority is an analytic concept and not an actual, 
available object … [but in either case] authority is nomadic” (“Beginning Ideas” 5, 23; 
emphasis added).  Authority in the sense in which Said describes it in this quotation is 
invariably the subjective property of the writer or theorist as a constituent of the 
soundness of beginning.  As such, authority in the instance of Mphahlele’s ‘beginning’ 
the concept of African humanism embodies the strongly discontinuous mode of his 
conceptualisation as infused with the existential challenges he combats in real life as 
subject, a struggle which ends up reflected in his writings. 
 
While experiences represented in this way in the poetry are instances of social practice, 
Mphahlele’s interpretation of these examples of social practice from the perspective of 
African humanism should be understood to be his devotion (as an “interpreter” in 
Ndebele’s terms) to the task of conceptualising the experiences within an African 
humanist discourse.  His conceptualisation of African humanism is what Ndebele sees as 
the interpreter’s “task of designing theory out of social practice” (“Actors” 83).  Edward 
Said has remarked about such a need for writers – whom he associates with “[the] era of 
liberationist anti-imperialist resistance” (“Yeats and” 76) – to theorise about cultural 
traits of their peoples which affirm their existence, defying any predicating on colonialist 
hegemonic discourse, in the following words: 
 It has been the substantial achievement of all of the intellectuals … by their 
 historical, interpretive, and analytic efforts to have identified the culture of 
 resistance as a cultural enterprise possessing a long tradition of integrity and 
 power in its own right, one not simply grasped as a belated reactive response to 
 Western imperialism.  (“Yeats and” 73) 
The conception expressed in this quotation is also found in  “Freedom from Domination 
in the Future” where Said  advocates the perception of “the intellectual as first distilling 
then articulating the predicaments that disfigure modernity”  (403).  This affirms the very 
conception of the role of the writer/critic/theorist as not just an actor but also and more 
importantly as an interpreter (to use Ndebele’s terms).  These close views of the social 
position of the writer-critic held by Said and Ndebele are similar to Mphahlele’s own on 
the same issue, as analysis of his works will show. 
 
This conception of the writer as an “interpreter” as well as oneness of Mphahlele’s quest 
in personal life and that of his writings as I indicate above by citing Thuynsma, 
circumscribe and permeate all of Mphahlele’s poetry.  That this is the case has to do with 
Mphahlele’s practical delineation of his concept of African humanism and the 
composition of this concept of African cultures – neither of which separates the craft of 
the writer/storyteller from his personal life and the way he or she shares communal life 
with fellow humans. In this way he broadly shares his orientations with other African 
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writers, illustrated in a theorist like Soyinka’s perception that “African writing is … 
rooted in the concept of literature as part of the normal social activity of man” (Myth, 
Literature and the African World 67).  Mphahlele’s poetry (which characteristically 
merges his personal experience and the life of fellow Africans with whom he shares 
existential challenges) can be put into the two categories of those that oppose apartheid 
more openly and those that do so in a subtle manner. The merging of his interpretive 
roles as a living African and and as a writer is a feature of Mphahlele’s poetry 
irrespective of whether it is the category of Mphahlele’s poetry that foregrounds 
apartheid or refers to those of his poems that put it in the background.  In “Dedication to 
Voices in the Whirlwind” (Unbroken Song 302), Mphahlele merges his hope for 
Africans’ victorious survival of apartheid’s cultural and spiritual onslaught on them with 
the typically Africanist viewing of the writer’s work as a group activity among 
compatriots joined together by a communalist ethos:  “FOR DENNIS BRUTUS:/ You 
stopped a fascist bullet./ FOR KGOSITSILE:/  Your ‘borrowed fears’/ are also mine--/ 
and so your questionings”.  The solidarity expressed above with Brutus and Kgositsile is 
followed (in the next lines) by a celebration of Gwendolyn Brooks’s “incisive image” 
that is credited with the incantatory mystical  power of the word in its portrayed feat of 
overcoming self-consuming and self-defeating emotions induced by the colonising 
experience.   Reference to Kgositsile’s challenges in the quoted poem as “borrowed” and 
“also mine” is an allusion respectively to the alienating nature of exile conditions and to 
the fact that Mphahlele shares such unsatisfactory conditions with fellow exiles from 
South Africa.   The unfortunate conditions in which Mphahlele and exiled compatriots 
like Kgositsile find themselves are the result of host countries contributing to the 
“tyranny of place” which the victims find themselves facing.  Mphahlele continues the 
poem with lines that exhort his younger sons Chabi and Puso to learn to emulate the 
aforementioned heroes and better learn sooner (rather than later) to withstand the 
annihilating nature of either exile or  apartheid experience (depending on whether they 
stay behind in exile for ever or return to home soil one day). 
 
The theme of African humanist resilience in the face of colonial adversity is taken up 
again in “Vignettes” (290).  Here Mphahlele enumerates the collective culture of 
Africans as one aspect of African humanism with which to shape reality to one’s comfort 
(as the words “beauty” and “order” indicate).  The three-score geese that Mphahlele sees 
while jogging one morning in Wayne, greater Philadelphia, profoundly attract his 
attention due to their “breasting the wind”.  In this poem of 1976 Mphahlele in his 
characteristic thematisation of the sustaining black myth of steadfast, selfconstituting 
struggle, joins the action of the geese that he depicts here to the historically distant words 
of the African-American activist W E B du Bois, who referred in October 1926 to 
Africans all over the world as those who “have all the years been breasting hills and 
winds/the size of a whole black universe” (300).  The observation that the “whole black 
universe” has been negotiating existential obstacles successfully “all these years” (as 
indicated by the image in “breasting hills”) should properly be understood to be referring 
to Mphahlele himself as one of the “whole black universe” – and not only to the blacks 
he is writing about.  Mphahle’s achievement in “breasting hills” is consonant with the 
task to “begin” as characterised by Said when he writes that “underlying all [the 
discontinuity in beginnings] is a supposition that rational knowledge is possible, 
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regardless of how very complex – and even unattractive – the conditions of its production 
and acquisition”  (“Abecedarium” 283).  The conditions under which Mphahlele has been 
“breasting hills” by way of positing the concept of African humanism to sustain himself 
and others in a similar situation spiritually are symptomatic of the “supposition that 
rational knowledge is possible” in the way Said explicates aspects of “beginning” 
(“Abecedarium” 283). 
 
In America particularly, Mphahlele indicates, blacks have been “breasting hills” 
victoriously on the path to self-emancipation.  The reader is then transported to apartheid 
South Africa by the lines “as if ahead/were bearers of a coffin/or they were pickets/bent 
on raising hell for/ bureaucrats/… a purpose much bigger/than the crumbs of bread/these 
numskulls/come and throw to them/over the fence” (291).    When apartheid agents in 
this connecting image are depicted as coming out in tanks to blow the geese to pieces, 
this is counterpoised against the agency of the geese that are “bent on raising hell 
for/bureaucrats” (Unbroken Song 291).  Fanon’s theory on violence interprets action such 
as this as testimony that “the agents of [oppression] speak the language of pure force” 
(“Concerning Violence” 29).  Contrary to the critic Percy More’s general description of 
Mphahlele’s African humanist stance as “[excluding] violence” (“Hegel, the Black 
Atlantic and Mphahlele” 13), at least in the poem “Vignettes” (quoted above), the 
described Africans actively protesting against apartheid brutality are violently “bent on 
raising hell for/bureaucrats” (Unbroken Song 291).  In fact, Mphahlele’s African 
humanism does not exclude justifiable violence as a means towards self-realisation.  That 
is why he is known to object inter alia to “the theology of the Christian world [for being] 
against any kind of political overthrow … [and for being] the gospel of … nonviolence” 
as his interview with Lindfors records (“Es’kia Mphahlele” 169).  Statements such as this 
are significant not only as factors within Mphahlele’s African humanism as a theoretical 
matrix.   They are useful, too, in as far as they map the overlap between the concept of 
African humanism and Mphahlele’s postcolonialist views on the relationship between the 
oppressor and the oppressed.  Theorising more broadly on the interaction between the 
oppressor and the oppressed in the colonial environment, Fanon makes a remark that is 
pertinent to the clash between the oppressed and the oppressor in the poem quoted above, 
in the following manner: 
 The violence of the colonial regime and the counter-violence of the native balance 
 each other and respond to each other in an extraordinary reciprocal homogeneity.  
 This reign of violence will be the more terrible in proportion to the size of the 
 implantation from the mother country.  (“Concerning Violence” 69) 
That Mphahlele imagines the necessarily violent nature of the liberation struggle along 
Fanonian lines is indicated when apartheid agents in the connecting image of blacks 
“breasting hills” against apartheid back home on South African soil are depicted as 
coming out in tanks to blow the geese to pieces and the oppressed blacks react with 
counter-violence by “raising hell for/bureaucrats” (Unbroken Song 291). 
 
Consistently with Mphahlele’s position that Africans as the oppressed of the world suffer 
the same humiliation whether by apartheid on home soil or by exile on foreign soil, it 
does not matter whether in “Vignettes” the Africans rise up against apartheid or 
American oppression.  This is why “Vignettes” bridges time and defies geographical 
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distance by conjoining images that signify the alienation of African humanist 
consciousness on American soil with those of alienation that springs from apartheid’s 
master-slave attitudes. 
 
In this way the sustained image of blacks “breasting hills” weaves through stanzas 
depicting black survival situations that are distant in place and time.  This happens till the 
motif leads us to specific images of black intellectuals keeping their wise distance in 
white-dominated institutions, to exiled blacks bravely preserving their identity in 
alienating exile scenes, until we arrive back home in Johannesburg where black survivors 
in an apartheid context are impelled to resort to unorthodox methods including that of 
practising crime with the motive of  ‘normalising’ society from the perspective of a 
“centre” that is Africanist (“for ta-night is ta-night Missus Rosenbaum, ta-night your 
jewels are mine”).  Significantly, such a placeless and timeless survival of blacks globally 
is depicted as heroic, in true Black Consciousness spirit.  For this reason one must agree 
with Ruth Obee’s observation that Mphahlele’s poems including “Fathers and Sons” 
“memorably [serve] to exemplify Mphahlele’s Black Consciousness thought and his 
African humanist stance” (“The Unbroken Song” 199). 
 
This sustained image of “breasting hills” significantly traverses time and place.  This is in 
keeping with the notion of unbroken cultural identity interrupted now and again by time-
bound reshapings of outward behaviourial patterns that remain informed by the timeless 
myth of a self-respecting people as conceived of by Mphahlele (for example in the essay 
“Renewal Time”, in the introduction of the collection of stories Renewal Time viii -  xii) 
and by other postcolonial writers such as Acharya Vinoba Bhave, Kahlil Gibran and 
Rabindranath Tagore who are quoted in “Renewal Time.”  What qualifies these writers as 
postcolonial is not necessarily the time during which they wrote but the self-constituting 
aspect of their writing. 
 
Despite Mphahlele’s well-known denouncement of overt anti-apartheid creative writing, 
poems like “Death” (274 – 277) do not seem to fall outside the category of protest 
literature.    The opening lines of the poem announce with deep indignation that the social 
and economic conditions in apartheid South Africa probably led to the poet’s mother and 
brother dying at the early ages of 45 and 42 respectively.   Even the grandmother’s death 
at 80 is no consolation, as (no differently from the poet’s mother) “she also washed her 
years away/and saw them flow/into the drain/with the white man’s scum” (276).  The 
poem is inspired by the assassination in 1967 of apartheid prime minister Hendrik 
Verwoerd while the poet was in exile in Colorado, hence the refrain constituting the gory 
images of a Verwoerd “butchered”,  “like a buffalo”, and falling “like a colossus”.  
Tsafendas (the court messenger who stabbed Verwoerd to death) is described as having 
sunk the knife into the tyrant’s neck “while the honourable men/who rode his tanks of 
fire/looked on”.   Tsafendas is stylistically elevated by Mphahlele, in the above quotation, 
to the level of the politically astute assassins (the Roman who stabbed Caesar to death 
was no spineless villain but one of the intellectuals who plotted Caesar’s murder within a 
political context that demanded immense understanding of social issues).  The 
intertextuality is testified to by references to Verwoerd in terms that Shakespeare used to 
describe Caesar’s successful assassination through the mouths of his characters; words 
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such as “like a collosus.”  There is also significance in Mphahlele’s employment of the 
term “honourable men” in that it invokes Mark Antony’s famous satirical speech in 
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, which epithet served in Shakespeare ironically to connect 
(in the atmosphere of Caesar’s murder) both the victim Caesar and conspirators including 
Brutus ( revealed by Caesar’s imprecation “et tu Brute”).  Mphahlele’s intention of using 
such heightened expression, as well as his likening of Tsafendas to treacherous Brutus, is 
that of making the reader aware that people who may (from some perspectives) be seen 
as ‘ill-behaved’ or ‘lowly’ such as the writer’s mother, brother and grandmother, should 
be valued equally with social giants like members of the Afrikaner  intelligentsia.  
Tsafendas and the poet’s next of kin are levelled up as mischievous although they belong 
to opposite sides of the colour line – which is again a subtle assertion that people are 
equal irrespective of their pigmentation.   
 
Mphahlele is suggesting by these parallelisms that failure to recognise the African 
humanist value which holds human life sacred irrespective of social status leads to self-
destruction (as Verwoerd and the regime he represents symbolise).  In this way the fall of 
Verwoerd by Tsafendas’s knife predicts the self-destructive fall of the apartheid 
government through the self-assertive efforts of ‘villainous’ blacks.  At a more profound 
level this ironically shows that even whites may be or feel ‘oppressed’ by a white 
government, leading to the violence of the oppressor being met with the counter-violence 
of the oppressed. This poetic moral of Mphahlele’s is especially true when appreciated 
within the framework of the Africanist modus vivendi that holds human life as sacred 
regardless of social rank.  The punctuation of the dirge on departed family members with 
a refrain that creates a sustained image of Verwoerd’s death should also be understood as 
announcing yet another different kind of equality – this time the fact that both 
Mphahlele’s relatives and Verwoerd have equally been killed by the apartheid system.  In 
thus asserting equality in its varied manifestations Mphahlele succeeds in illustrating a 
judgement informed by a consciousness he has chosen to call African humanism whose 
central precept is regard for human life as sacred and inviolable.  In symbolic terms, the 
verbally and intellectually complex manner in which Mphahlele considers ideas of 
equality, the riff-raff, oppressor and the oppressed, is indicative of the intricacy of his 
concept of African humanism as well as its capacity to contain life in its entire 
multifariousness.  Mphahlele, confirming such a description of African humanism as 
equal to life’s challenges of whatever immensity and uncanniness, has stated that: 
Now I am older, I can contain that [protesting] sense of urgency, that anger and 
 bitterness and deal with them [in such a way that] I am now conscious of the 
 moral deprivations on both sides of the colour line and across the ethnic 
 boundaries defining those of us who are not white. (“Versus the Political 
 Morality” 375) 
 
All the same, the immoderate tone of the poem as described in the preceding paragraph is 
in the mould of overt protest literature, albeit not without justification.   The starkness 
with which the ravages of apartheid are debunked is commensurate with the profound 
and passionate sense of moral indignation against apartheid and specifically Verwoerd as 
its “architect” which sweeps through the poem.  Despite this, it still strikes one that the 
juxtaposition of the earlier deaths of the poet’s kinsfolk with the death of the apartheid 
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leader evokes a feeling of morbid gratification – morbid because it is unAfrican to rejoice 
in a death or disrespect the sacredness of life.  With the non-racial attitude inherent in 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism in mind, the unsympathetic painting of 
Verwoerd’s death remains in contravention of the principle of regarding human life with 
awe.  This is one poem in which the “bitterness” Mphahlele (like so many black South 
Africans) had to struggle with, makes itself clearly felt.  Mphahlele does not always allow 
this to happen in his creative writing, probably due to his view that the function of the 
writer should not descend to that of the activist bent on instigating political action.  At the 
same time it is important to remember that Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism is 
functional as opposed to absolute.  In keeping with this view of African humanism, a 
poem such as this one could be a statement by Mphahlele that at one time it would have 
been appropriate overtly to protest while this does not imply that protest poetry has been 
appropriate at all times irrespective of the contemporary setting.  One other possible 
explanation could be that the poem was written during the formative years of 
Mphahlele’s aesthetic theory, before, by his own admission, it became his chosen 
philosophy of life.   He once wrote: “before I left South Africa in September 1957 I was 
not consciously burrowing into my racial community [because] anger propelled one. 
Writing was a way of dealing with one’s anger” (“Versus the Political Morality” 374-5).   
Such a statement by Mphahlele immediately nullifies the possibility that overt protest in 
“Death” could have been caused by the inchoate nature of his African humanist 
consciousness and practice at the time he wrote it.  It is known that “Death” was written 
after Mphahlele had already departed South Africa as a bitter, angry young man and had 
already had the advantage of intellectual maturity resulting from his sojourn in some 
African states and France, and that the poem was actually written during his mature years 
as an exile working within academia in America.  What remains the probable cause of 
such acrid protest in the poem against apartheid is Mphahlele’s position regarding protest 
literature.  In his expository writing Mphahlele does acknowledge the validity of protest 
literature provided that such a protest is done with the purpose of asserting the persistent 
presence among the oppressed of perspective and resonances, as he writes in the 
following quotation: 
I am never allowed to forget the high-voltage fences, so I have to create my own 
 myth about survival, about the collective memory that orchestrates the human 
 drama here.  This is not a fantasy because ghetto life, urban and rural, does 
 move as if it were independent of the fences, of the booby traps, of the brooding 
 fate.  The myth I endeavour to establish is that this part of our South African 
 humanity will yet outlast at least some of the malicious gods, even when these 
 have been replaced by another pantheon. (“Versus the Political Morality” 374)   
And in “Death” Mphahlele leads by example.  The technique used in “Death” elegantly 
employing the ‘resonated’ refrain borne of the images of violence and counter-violence 
from a perspective that is evidently partisan while subtly unifying reality on both sides of 
the colour line – these exemplify what Mphahlele is known to have professed: that to 
craft literature in the protest mould should not be mistaken for an excuse to lack technical 
profundity and vigour.  In “Death” Mphahlele achieves literary sublimity through his deft 
use of intertextuality as demonstrated by ironies reached by effectively juxtaposing the 
images of Verwoerd’s death with those of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar.  On the matter of 
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not using protest literature as a subterfuge for lack of artistry Mphahlele wrote in a 1983 
essay that: 
 The subversion of the political morality is not necessarily a literary 
 confrontation, in which [subversion of political morality] the imagination, 
 prophecy, revelation and impact of message explicitly tries to diminish the 
 workings of such morality in the hope of laughing or cursing it out of town. 
 (“Versus the Political Morality” 375) 
What Mphahlele advocates in this quotation is tied to his stance that the reader should not 
be simplistically confronted by direct messages about how he or she should resolve day 
to day challenges, but should instead be stimulated by literature that implements 
culturally appealing resonances to arrive at African humanist solution to or 
circumvention of existential challenges. 
 
African humanist resonance is evoked when the poem conjures up images associated with 
African oral tales – images of giants dying as they have lived and of the frog in a well 
that bursts attempting to inflate its body to the size of a drinking cow.  When the gory 
image of the dying Verwoerd is introduced in the poem, the refrain of “giants” and 
“frogs” reminiscent of folktales ceases to weave through the poem.  The place of earlier 
exemplifications of orature is taken by the image of a gory lifeless Verwoerd in a manner 
that sensuously links Verwoerd with the mythical creatures.  In this way the images of the 
giants dying as they have lived and the frog with the oversize ego are sustained through 
the shift to images of Verwoerd’s corpse by means of a simile.  The simile is one in 
which a character flaw epitomised by Verwoerd’s corpse is likened to the flawed traits of 
the mythical characters of the earlier lines – folktales usually end when cannibals are 
supplanted by means of boomerang results sparked by their earlier selfish acts; the fate of 
the megalomaniac frog in a known African fable is that it bursts into smithereens before 
it can reach the size of the cow that was drinking in the well from which it was sighted by 
the frog. The intended effect on the reader is thus that of repulsion rather than humanist 
commiseration. While images derived from the oral tradition introduce an African 
humanist perspective to the poem, the emotive effect is that of gloating about the death of 
the detestable ‘giant’ and/or ‘frog’ instead of an exhortation to self-constituting action.   
This contrasts with the way another Drum writer, Bloke Modisane (who shared the same 
culture and environment with Mphahlele), rationalises in traditional cultural terms why 
he restrained himself from avenging his father’s murder in Sophiatown in the following 
words: 
 In the communal culture of my ancestors which still governs our lives, we all 
 share the same blood, and the taking of it, even in the execution of justice, is 
 condemned as an uncivilised ritual…Moshoeshoe, the paramount chief of 
 Basutoland, instead of raining his vengeance on the  derelict army which had 
 eaten his father, sent down from his mountain fortress a herd of cattle to the 
 cannibal army with the message that he could not desecrate the graves of his 
 father.  (Blame Me 54) 
 
While apartheid references in the poetry quoted earlier are not as conspicuous as in 
“Death”, the consistent contextualisation of the the poetry’s content within ‘resonances’ 
of traditional cultures that produce an African perspective remains constant.  The effect is 
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consistently the highlighting of victorious selfconstitution, as seen in the poem “Death” 
when the powerful figure of mighty Verwoerd is supplanted by the actions of ordinary 
men and women who (like the geese in “Vignettes”) “breast hills”.    Such victorious self-
definition is foregrounded despite Mphahlele’s graphic portrayal of the immanence of 
apartheid in the lives of Africans.  As the poem “Death” testifies through its use of the 
images of giants and frogs, the starkness of apartheid is depicted side by side with the 
weaving of mythical resonances into the fabric of the poem.  This consistent production 
of a distinctly African humanist perspective through poems that do not depict the 
apartheid experience in unrelenting, lingering fashion is an intensification in practice of 
the idea of Africanist survival that Mphahlele refers to as an “unbroken song”.  The irony 
of overt protest literature is the fact that while purporting to reveal how weak apartheid is, 
what it actually achieves is an elevation of apartheid as defining the life of a black man or 
woman to such an extent that it gives the impression that black life is constituted by 
apartheid. Mphahlele’s continued creation of perspective by means of myth consistently 
serves to debunk apartheid as ephemeral, in contrast with the heroic endurance of the life 
of blacks in South Africa that is ascribed to their varied lifestyles collectively defined as 
African humanist. 
 
The way Mphahlele has created the poem “Death” is congruous with the point he has 
expressed in The African Image - Revised Edition (revised, 1974) and elsewhere, that he 
disapproves of a writer hoping to survive on anger for the reason that such an approach 
inevitably detracts from the profundity of a work of art.   According to Mphahlele a work 
of art is adequately intellectual if it does not just criticise apartheid in a racist manner but 
considers social directions such as “multiracialism [rising] to non-racialism, which goes 
concurrently with the intercultural enterprise, before the latter totally refines and 
supercedes it” (“The Burden of History” 82). What he means is that it is proper within the 
interaction of various races if blacks and whites bring on board their distinctive identities, 
but such racial self-confidence should not lead to racist bias towards differing groups.  
This position characterises Mphahlele as non-partisan in that he is against even blacks 
equating whiteness with evil without isolating apartheid as the specific feature they revolt 
against.   This is what he means by non-racialism “totally [refining and superceding] 
multiracialism” (“The Burden of History” 82).  It is probably the non-partisan poise in 
Mphahlele’s poems including “Death” which prompted the writer Ruth Obee to describe 
Mphahlele as “inclusive in spirit” (“The Unbrokeng Song” 199).  She links this to the 
“dialogue of two selves” within Mphahlele, which (as this study indicates in numerous 
places) simply means the mutually abrogating African and western consciousnesses that 
are the legacy of one’s historical anteriority having straddled cultures of both worlds 
(“Conclusion” 224).  As Obee rightly observes, “African humanism serves not only as an 
effective and illuminating thematic counterpoint to themes of alienation… but it also 
serves an an affirmation and bridging point, a meeting place between Africa and the 
West” (“Conclusion” 224).  For Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism to “serve as 
an affirmation and bridging point” between the identities of blacks on the one hand and 
whites on the other implies that it advocates an accommodative, impartial view of the 
other by each side of the colour line – similarly to the way “Death” seeks to highlight the 
equality of black and and white plights in the way it puts oppressed blacks and whites 
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who are unhappy with the apartheid government of which Verwoerd is a symbol in the 
same position to mete out counter-violence to the violence of the state. 
 
The features of the poem “Death” having been explained to employ consistent African 
humanist devices in a dexterously meaningful manner, it is worthwhile to examine how 
this technique continues to be used in other poems. One such noteworthy feature 
exhibited by Mphahlele’s poetry and short stories is the representation of one aspect of 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism which he has described as “religious 
nationalism”, “Zionist-Ethiopian” or “messianic sects” (“Your History” 158, 163; 
“Prodigals” 336).  This phenomenon refers to the way Africans reconstruct western 
Christianity to reconcile it with African humanism.  In “Exile in Nigeria” for instance, 
Mphahlele cautions that his exile is a temporary sojourn, a mere stop at the roadhouse for 
a beer, as he is going to “tunnel through/back again” (269).   Brooding in this poem on 
how his home continent was plundered by the coloniser, he muses:  “Over centuries/they 
scrambled/for my mother/…sold her shrines/planted/brass and wooden crosses/…gaming 
for the land/while hungry eyes transfixed on a miracle/high on Calvary” (270).   This 
powerfully signifies that the poet sees foolishness in Africans who simplistically believe 
in the coloniser’s faith (western Christianity). 
 
Western Christianity is again satirised in “Fathers and Sons”.  Here the poet negates the 
precepts of Western Christianity by anchoring his interpretation of the youth uprising in 
Soweto in 1976 within the matrix of the cultures of Africa that believe in reincarnation.  
The poet maneuvres the reader to conceive of the youths’ revolution as a mystical 
reincarnation of their fathers earlier persecuted and killed by the apartheid system.  In a 
mocking tone the writer indicates through the voice of the speaker that his waking from 
the dead is not like that of the biblical Lazarus.  Lazarus’s death and resurrection (as 
Mphahlele portrays these) were comfortable, unearned and followed by an inactive, 
dishonourable waiting on “the edge of the cliff/for a second going” (310).   After stating 
that he comes with fury braving another dawn of police killings, the speaker shows that 
the teachings of the bible and the brutality of the coloniser are intertwined, in these terms:  
“Tell me not of second comings/or love of your god:/I cannot feel it/never have in all my 
terror-sticken years” (310).  The poet’s voice seems to warn his people not to embrace 
western Christianity uncritically and attempts to alert the reader to the truth that this 
brand of faith is but one of the many stratagems by the coloniser to secure hegemony and 
subjugation.  Mphahlele’s direct rebuff of western Christianity is well documented 
throughout his expository writing as well.  This can be seen inter alia when he remarks in 
the 1971 interview with Lindfors about it in terms that are amenable to the 
counterhegemonic theory on beginnings as expatiated by writers such as Edward Said – 
that “It instills a sense of authority to the extreme extent that you do nothing about it” 
(“Es’kia Mpahlele” 169). 
 
In the latter lines of the poem the poet advances the poem’s argument from a mere 
negation of the Christian religion that he dismisses as devoid of the African humanist 
values which he mentions in an essay as “[being] not a proselytising way of life” and as 
“[having] never sought to colonize anybody” (“Notes Towards” 139).  Typically of a 
subjective self-definition that Mphahlele has shown to be an aspect of African humanist 
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consciousness, the poet this time symbolically conjures up the existence of an Africanist 
religion as a result of which the rebellious youth refuse to accept the western Christianity 
that is paraded to them as a justification of the order they are actively contesting.  This 
the poet achieves by sustaining the image of soil through descriptions of three different 
scenes that have links with his life as a young boy of 15 in rural Maupaneng, in Soweto 
(which symbolises the state’s extravagant display of military power against the subaltern) 
and in Marabastad where he was first exposed to urban ghetto life. It could be said that 
the connective symbol of soil is an allegorical signification of African religion, an aspect 
of which is a ritualistically perfected attachment to home soil that includes nature as a 
whole.  A mention in the poem of police also evokes an idea of prison where people are 
kept after being arrested.  Use of words such as “police” and “Soweto” in the same poem 
is no more than an indication by Mphahlele that by engaging state power on the soil of 
Soweto (which could be seen as a huge prison in itself due to a permanent presence of 
police patrols and raids), the boy knows the experience of prison though he has never 
been to prison.  The poem depicts the recalcitrant boy as repeatedly making references to 
his father who is not shown as being physically present on the scene as he is probably 
dead.   This indicates that the boy’s fighting of the system together with his mates is a 
continuation of the fights of their fathers and forefathers, a re-incarnation of them in a 
way.   
 
This is a significant representation of traditional religion.  It is a symptom of the boy’s 
outlook and that of the African people he symbolises being African humanist in the way 
Mphahlele understands the concept.  The implied reference in the poem to the land  as an 
invigorating point of contact with the ancestors supports Mbiti’s observation that the 
ontology of Africans is such that “space and time are closely linked … [because] what 
matters most to the [African] people is what is geographically near” (African Religions 
and Philosophy 26).   Mbiti gives as a reason for this view the fact that “The land 
provides them with the roots of existence, as well as binding them mystically to their 
departed” (26).  As the departed or ancestors can only be connected with in this way (on 
home soil in which they are buried), Mphahlele links the devastating impact of the assault 
by apartheid agents to the youths’ mystical attachment to the land which is not foreign, 
but previously occupied by the ancestors before they could join the spirit world. The 
lexicon of the poem consists of language signs that collectively represent an assertion of a 
religion alternative to that paraded by the state which the youth are fighting (words such 
as “soil” and “god”).  This is in keeping with the sarcasm towards western Christianity 
elicited by a comparison of the resurrection of the youths’ ancestors with that of the 
biblical Lazarus in “Fathers and Sons”. 
 
This positing of an alternative Africanist religion against any form of foreign religion 
including western Christianity features consistently in the short stories and novels of 
Mphahlele.  That this should be a consistent stylistic feature supports what Mphahlele has 
written about Christianity in his non-fictional texts, as when he remarks in his interview 
with Lindfors: 
 The theology of the Christian world is against any kind of political overthrow or 
 political agitation.  It is the gospel of kindness, of humility, of nonviolence.  It 
 instills a sense of authority to the extreme extent that you do nothing about it.  
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 LeRoi Jones would argue that Islam is the other preference.  I don’t see that there 
 is any choice between the two.  When we have pushed all these foreign relations 
 into the background or flushed them out of our minds, do you know what we are 
 left with?  We are left with ourselves to depend on – no props, no visions of the 
 world to come, no guardian angels – only our naked selves with our ancestors to 
 think of.  Who are our ancestors?  They are those who fell by the white man’s 
 gun.  Those are the ones we think of, and those are our moral props if we need 
 any at all.  When we have eventually divested ourselves completely of the 
 Christian myth we will know we have won a battle.  (“Es’kia Mphahlele” 169) 
The linking of ancestors in their current spiritual existence with their past empirical 
existence as victims of the coloniser’s brutality bears striking relevance for the 
juxtaposition in the poem “Death” above of Lazarus as a Christian ancestor with his 
foreign brand of resurrection, the socioculturally inflected resurrection of Africans as 
embodied by the rebellious youth of Soweto, and the violence of the apartheid state that 
seeks to blot Africans out of existence. 
  
Evidence of Mphahlele’s informed stand against western Christianity is not confined to 
examples we have just quoted.  Mphahlele demonstrates throughout the kind of religious 
selfdefinition that challenges what prove to be colonialist religions (exemplified in the 
above poems by the variety of western Christianity evident within apartheid discourse) as 
testimony of African humanist engagement.  This, as an analysis of the poems above 
demonstrates, is tied to a spiritual reconnection with the ancestors.    It is carried forward 
in other poems such as “A Prayer”.  In “A Prayer”, the poem that recalls the tempest of 
thoughts in the poet’s head as he stood in a Soweto open area during his temporary return 
to South Africa in 1976 — one reason advanced by the speaker to explain his resolution 
to terminate his exile for ever is that he is responding to a beckoning by the ancestors:  “I 
have returned /to this killing ground/because I heard my ancestors calling” (305).   In a 
later stanza Soweto is referred to as follows: “here on the killing ground/here where the 
ancestors forever/keep their vigil” (307).    
 
The poet informs his poems with the ethos and vision he has called African humanism, 
brought to the surface by means of such words as “vigil” in “A Prayer” when he 
describes the visit to Soweto, inter alia, by reference to the African custom of attending a 
wake when death has occurred (307).  For a reader unaware of this allusion, reference to 
the magnitude of the 1976 Soweto massacre will slip past unnoticed.  For ancestors 
forever to keep vigil means that there is continuous dying, something frightfully unusual 
as death, under normal circumstances, is known to visit the living – not stay forever.    
For the ancestors, and not humans, to keep vigil is a powerful hyperbole that implies a 
crisis approaching annihilation of the present  generation, as the spirits of the ancestors 
would descend to attend a wake only under extreme conditions where all their 
descendants have been wiped out. 
 
Another reference to the role of the ancestors is found in “Death II” where the poet fears 
that he may die in exile before artistically telling the story (to later black generations) of 
the brutality of the agents of apartheid during their reign.   Mphahlele expresses the desire 
to recount the past of the blacks under apartheid in South Africa to younger generations 
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in terms that equate the cultural tradition of oral storytelling to a frenzied invocation of 
the ancestors:  “so you want to howl/howl/howl into the night/from hill to hill/where 
ancestors commune/for all who care to hear their beat” (284).  This pious view of the 
cultural role of the oral storyteller testifies to Mphahlele’s aesthetic view that art is a 
compulsive cultural act, a ritual with cultural-religious significance.  The line “for all who 
care to hear their beat” is a reaffirmation of the non-homogenising definition of the 
concept of African humanism.  The agonised “howling” is meant for the audience of only 
those (both black and white) whose consciousness is sufficiently African humanist to 
respond empathetically due to identification with the cause of the howling and in a 
commensurate manner. The repetitive reference to the near-religious act of teaching the 
young about their past as “[howling] into the night” is indicative of an awareness on the 
part of the storytelling African sage that people on the other side of the social chasm 
would in their naivety misread the serious act as some sort of unwarranted noise-making 
or even outright insanity (284). 
 
The diction achieves more than an exposition of the piety involved in oral storytelling, 
though.  The term “ancestors commune” expresses Mphahlele’s validation of the belief of 
Africans in their communal existence, which would be the behaviour also of ancestors 
leading a communal existence in the afterlife.  The ancestors in African culture perform 
the duty of linking the living and those who have died, as well as linking the past to the 
present, and Mphahlele recognises both roles here.    The term “hear their beat” refers to 
the fact that those with the correct cultural code would, even while the speaker is crying 
the teachings on hilltops, decode the mystical presence of their African ancestors’ past 
tribulations in the very voice of the crier over and above understanding the plain message 
of the traditionally oral teachings. Such a dramatic representation of the resonances of the 
words of the ‘howler’ is important to give meaning to a belief in an enduring or timeless 
life – a belief that is needed in the face of the brutalised existence of blacks during 
periods such as the apartheid era in South Africa.  This aspect of Mphahlele’s aesthetic is 
demonstrated continually in the short stories and novels. 
 
Another way in which Mphahlele contributes to the understanding of African Humanism 
in the life depicted in his poetry is by means of images deriving from Northern Sotho 
proverbs.  In “Death II”, a poem in which the poet expresses the fear of dying in exile 
(Africans ideally always return home to die, they do not just die anywhere), the poet 
likens the stifling sensation of living in exile to something dripping from the heart 
without finding any external outlet or course:  “something trickles from/the ego 
center/sinister/like water/dripping/from a pipe within a wall,/out of reach” (285-86).     In 
the footnote to the poem Mphahlele admits that the image of blood dropping from the 
heart is a literal translation of the Northern Sotho idiomatic expression “pelo e rotha madi 
(the heart drips blood)” (289).  The expression refers to being profoundly angry or sad.  If 
the reader remains unaware of the Northern Sotho derivation of the expression from 
which the image comes, the fact that exile makes the poet angry or sad could be 
underinterpreted or completely misconstrued.  
 
It will not be enough for the non-African English-speaking reader to read the footnote by 
Mphahlele, unfortunately.   It is because the footnote does not bother to explain the 
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application of another Northern Sotho expression, “go tetela madi teng” (to smother the 
victim in such a way that it bleeds internally).  It is an idiomatic expression used by the 
Northern Sotho people to highlight the probably fatal nature of any internal injury or 
assault (bleeding externally is culturally associated with a good chance of surviving the 
injury, among the number of ethnic groups collectively called the Northern Sotho).  An 
appreciation of this implied metaphor in the lines “like water/dripping/from a pipe within 
a wall,/out of reach” equips the reader to correctly conceive of the impact of exile on the 
soul of the exiled as carrying the potential to injure terminally without prospects of 
recovery. 
 
In “A Prayer”, Mphahlele again laments the exiled condition of “sowing seed/on 
borrowed land” (304).   This links with the poet stating in a later stanza that what helps 
him survive in exile is fellowship with like-minded compatriots back home in South 
Africa, faith in future freedom, and hope that he will return.  It is part of the thinking 
pattern of Africans that whenever one moves house, one should plant seeds for good 
harvest in case one returns to the ruins at a later time.  This kind of thinking is 
immortalised in the Northern Sotho proverb, “Maropeng ge re tloga re hlaba dithaka, ra 
re re boa ra ja maraka” (Upon moving house we plant melon pips so that when we return 
one day we may feast on a dish of melons).  The antithesis of this is what Mphahlele 
means in the lines “sowing seed/on borrowed land”, indicating that exile is in 
contradiction of African thinking.  It is seen as painfully futile to work hard at any 
occupation while in exile, for as long as you are in a foreign land and benefiting people 
other than yourself or your own people, you or your people cannot fully or actually 
benefit by your labour.  Knowledge of the Northern Sotho proverb obviously facilitates a 
more complete understanding of this image.  Tied to the longing expressed in “A Prayer” 
to return home (where one can “sow seed” on home soil from which one may later reap) 
is fear for old age in a foreign country “where the young grind the aged under with 
steamrollers, here where to be forty is an affront to youth” (“Portrait” 235). Mphahlele’s 
fear of losing the energy to be of any use to his people – who, because of respect shown 
traditionally for old age would welcome him – by the time he returns from exile is 
expressed in the essay “Portrait of a Man in a Glasshouse”: 
 Not yet time for [me] to fart like a horse and dangle on an elongated burp without 
 care who’s around.  Nor time yet for [me] to gargle with words and syllables and 
 sighs and saliva and spit them out together.  Nor yet time to flip over on [my] side 
 before [I carry my partner] to the hilltop, flip over and wheeze in long 
 irresponsible bars, the heart panting like it’s just turned back on the edge of a 
 precipice …  (“Portrait” 235) 
There is no doubt that the images of doting old age and senility this passage bristles with 
highlight Mphahlele’s fear of old age catching up with him while he is still in exile.  The 
poetic quality of this excerpts (though formatted as prose) apparently hints at the 
intensely pensive state in which the writer ponders over the question of aging on strange 
shores. 
 
It has already been mentioned in the preceding parts of this study that Mphahlele’s 
poems, like his prose, are true to his African humanist conviction that man is at the centre 
of creation.  Creation to the African humanist is an unbroken unity that includes the 
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Supreme Being, the ancestors, man, inorganic and organic nature (“Notes Towards” 137).   
Because man in this sense of being at the centre of reality (“Notes Towards” 137) is free 
to give meaning to reality, nature to the African cannot take any fixed form or shape 
except as subjectively conceived (as such) by man at the centre.  In this way the form or 
shape of things usually describable in objective terms can differ on various occasions 
depending on the mood of the specific person from whose subjectively defined centre the 
particular shape is perceived.  That is why in one poem, “Homeward Bound”, the first 
stanza describing the mountains near Denver in Colorado contrasts stylistically with the 
way Maupaneng mountains are intimately described as “… forms beyond/… of ever-
changing tints” (280).  While the Denver mountains are described as evoking feelings of 
a static and intimidating unfamiliarity, the Maupaneng mountains are described in terms 
of salutary familiarity and pliability of association.  With the Africanist Mphahlele as the 
‘centre’ the mountains in Denver evoke in him an eerie mysteriousness that represents his 
views of American life as impenetrable and unintelligible.  On the other hand, the images 
describing the Maupaneng mountains as unfixed in form and as intelligibly familiar and 
transmutable, represent the same Mphahle at the centre of and shaping reality with his 
Africanist consciousness, yet in a way that reveals the way he interprets the culturally 
defined cognition of worlds symbolised by the two contrasted mountains as dissimilar.  
Hence Mphahlele’s nostalgic recreation (in the imagination) of the home mountains as 
“those shimmering faraway bodies/… they can look the way I want them” (280-81).  It is 
with the same technique that Mphahlele muses in “Vignettes” about the vivid way in 
which the beautiful image of the communing geese haunts him.  This time the beauty of 
the geese is not interpreted like the Colorado mountains in terms of the European 
consciousness that views nature objectively without it being shaped a priori  by man who 
(according to the concept of African humanism) is at the centre of reality.   That is why 
the perception of the geese leaves Mphahlele’s soul in delighted appreciation due to his 
having assigned the geese his own Africanist shaping and connotations.   
 
Such differing interrogations of phenomena that are commonly perceived physically on 
European soil should be an indication of the impulses vaccillating between African and 
western ways of sensing impressions.  Flitting abruptly like this between interpreting 
reality as an African and as one with westernised sensibility is symptomatic of the 
virulent alienation that accompanies physical sensations in exile.  Such fluctuations in 
negotiating the pain of exile points to the severity of such pain, for the harassed state of 
mind when emotions are being tossed backward and forward can be no mitigation or 
atonement of pain in any status quo.  Beauty with an African dimension is enacted in the 
following lines: “beauty/will not last for its own sake./ Beauty only means the/parts are 
put together right/to shape the order that you want” (292-93).  Man is at the center of 
reality in the Africanist sense, in these poems, and in this way man shapes the reality 
according to Africanist conceptions of cosmology. 
 
The symptomatic use of mythical tales in Mphahlele’s poetry as shown above as well as 
the other African humanist trait in the poetry that sees reality as having no shape until 
man has subjectively given it shape (in keeping with African humanist conceptions of 
cosmology), achieve a vivid illustration and consolidation of the idea of African 
humanism.  The mythical element obtains in the lighthearted poem “Somewhere” to 
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perfect its optimistic perspective:  “a man made a song/out of the wailing of a dove/a 
song that moved all animals/to rise and kill the serpent/who ate the bird’s young ones”.  
High-spirited lines towards the close of the poem stress that though “somewhere a mother 
sobs”, it is important for the world to bear in mind that “somewhere, too, a woman gives 
the world an artist” who will transform the universe and make it a happier one for his 
people. 
 
It now remains to examine whether the devices that are as African humanist as they are 
personal as far as Mphahlele the theorist and artist is concerned are as evident in the short 
stories as is the case with his poetry.   
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2.2 THE SHORT STORIES 
 
Mphahlele’s short stories can be grouped for convenience to indicate some common traits 
found in each category. 
 
The five stories published under the title Man Must Live and Other Stories deserve 
separate treatment as they share some characteristics not manifested in other stories.  Of 
these early stories Mphahlele has said in the interview with Lindfors that he “was 
interested in people, in their own ghetto life and their own little dramas and tragedies, 
which would not necessarily have to do with the racial issue” (“Es’kia Mphahlele” 167).   
From subsequent collections of stories two other types of story can be distinguished: 
those exploiting everyday life chiefly to demonstrate the virtues, follies and frailties of 
blacks, and those inclining more to the protest mode of laying emphasis principally on 
apartheid to such an extent that apartheid is portrayed almost as the overriding 
protagonist in the stories.  The binding thread of the two types of Mphahlele’s stories that 
he wrote during the latter part of his writing career is the ubiquity of the crass apartheid 
context, with the difference that sets apart the two sub-types being that of degree of 
intensity only.  Such common ground consisting of the apartheid milieu and atmosphere 
is what Mphahlele is confessing in the remark that “in them [he] put the ghetto people 
aside, by themselves, acting out their dramas but at the same time implying the political 
pressure over them” (“Es’kia Mphahlele” 167). 
 
The chief aim (as in our probing of selected poems in the preceding section) is, however, 
to glean whatever traces can be identified in these tales of a consciousness or cultural 
essence Mphahlele has called African humanism.  Ogude, Raditlhalo, Ramakuela, 
Ramogale and Thuynsma say of the short stories “Man Must Live”, “The Living and the 
Dead”, “The Leaves were Falling” and “Tomorrow You Shall Reap” that they 
“demonstrate … aspects of the moral dilemma that the black-white encounter entails” 
(Es’kia 462).  Actually, all of Mphahlele’s writing is invested with the “moral dilemma” 
mentioned above.  Mphahlele’s definition of African humanism as being the spiritual 
resource on which Africans can fall back is a way of responding to this moral dilemma.  
That is why it is possible here to  classify all Mphahlele’s narrative writings including the 
short stories according to whether or not in specific literary pieces African humanist 
social behaviour takes the foreground or whether it is the “black-white encounter” or 
apartheid that assumes prominence.  Such thematic and stylistic variation will be exposed 
as being tied not only to Mphahlele’s trademark formulation and assertion of African 
humanism as his way of negotiating the “moral dilemma” pointed out in the above 
citation (from the four critics in their editorial note to the essay collection Es’kia), but 
also as his discontinuous method – as  a “beginner” of the concept of African humanism 
within the broad social and intellectual framework he shared with other African writers of 
the fifties.  As the authority on Drum writing Bruno van Dyk has remarked, these writers 
“were all members of the displaced intelligentsia, and as such bring to their work the 
tensions that are inherent in such a designation” (“Writing in Drum” 3). 
 
The critic Bruno van Dyk unpacks the cause of the “moral dilemma” that characterised 
Drum writers such as Mphahlele in the following words: 
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 Most were products of liberal institutions like St Peter’s Secondary School 
 (Rosettenville), Adams College and Fort Hare.  All were thoroughly urbanised 
 and … while they were supremely scornful of apartheid regulations, debunking 
 strictly African styles of life, they were simultaneously attracted to and repulsed 
 by European culture and black nationalism alike.  (“Writing in Drum” 3) 
While the ambivalences and contradictions identified in this quotation have generally 
characterised the consciousness of the Drum writers, it is the intellectual reaction to them 
(which will be demonstrated in the analysis of Mphahlele’s short stories and other 
narrative writings) which constitutes Mphahlele’s rupture and beginning authority, to 
borrow terminology from Said’s theory on beginnings.  His instrument for achieving such 
a distinction from his contemporaries as a theorist has been the authoritatively inflected 
definition of his concept of African humanism, as scrutiny of both his writings 
foregrounding apartheid and those relegating it to the background will testify. 
   
2.2.1 APARTHEID IN THE BACKGROUND  
 
Despite the shortcomings Mphahlele mentions on many occasions including in the 
interview with Samin (190), which relate to use of diction in his first collection of short 
stories – published in 1946 under the title Man Must Live and Other Stories — the title 
story is a tale in which the early germs of his characteristic representation of African 
humanism are found.  I agree with Samin that these first-ever published short stories by 
Mphahlele already point to major aspects of his future writing. 
 
In the title story “Man Must Live”, for example, Khalima Zungu’s mimicry of white 
people’s manners and his failure to synthesise western and African culture in a sound 
equilibrium is foregrounded alongside the unfolding depiction of his temperament.  
Colonisation or apartheid is only accorded secondary blame for some of the motives for 
Khalima Zungu’s conduct.  Such tactful downplaying of the apartheid ambience within 
which Zungu’s existential strife unfolds foreshadows what Mphahlele states on his 
literary treatment of the apartheid theme, when he writes that he is situated “Between the 
outright protest of Richard Rive and James Matthews at the one end and the romantic 
escapism of Can Themba at the other [which] is a category in which rejection, revulsion 
and protest meet acceptance and conciliation” (quoted in A Vision of Order 171).  
Understanding Mphahlele’s own description of this “acceptance” as a deliberate shift of 
focus away from the disturbing immanence of apartheid to the independent spiritual 
resourcefulness of harrowed Africans, Ursula Barnett explains that “this is not acceptance 
of township conditions or of life in South Africa; [it is] rather acceptance of the fact that 
human values of love, trust, and loyalty can continue even under impossible living 
conditions” (180).  That this strand constantly pervades Mphahlele’s later writing is 
exemplified by the vivacity of the Africans depicted attending a wake just before the 
funeral of Talita’s husband in the much later short story “In Corner B”, in which 
Mphahlele comments in his authorial voice that the spirit dominant among the mourners 
is a symptom of their surrender to or acceptance of life and death that proceeds from their 
deep-seated “long and huge irony of endurance” (In Corner B 38).  By “irony of 
endurance” Mphahlele is alerting the reader to the African humanist aspect of hopeful 
survival in the face of menacing surroundings (rather than a despondent self-
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surrendering).  This success of Mphahlele’s earliest narratives in broaching a wholesome 
approach to living and writing has led critics like Ursula Barnett to observe that despite 
Mphahlele’s nonchalant assessment of such earlier works of his own, “in its portrayal of 
the life and struggle of the black man to survive in his society, [Man Must Live and Other 
Stories] broke new ground for the South African reader” (A Vision of Order 172).  It is 
the implicit African humanist consciousness within the characters in the stories collected 
in Man Must Live and Other Stories which serves as survival kit facilitating the 
successful “portrayal of the life and struggle of the black man” – with its depiction of 
oppressed people nevertheless managing to live life to the full proving to be the most 
outstanding aspect of the earlier stories. 
 
Congruously with Mphahlele’s approach described above, the voice of Khalima Zungu in 
Man Must Live rises to individual prominence while the collective voice of  the 
commuters recedes into a mere background communal voice.  Expressions such as 
“Masses of people”, “the stampeding herd”, “like sheep”, “group of listeners” and  
“among themselves” pervade the short story to create images of community in describing 
the mass of black commuters that Zungu is assigned by white bosses to channel (like 
livestock on a farm) through the right platforms.  These groups constitute the audience of 
the remarks (by single commuters) about Zungu’s behaviour.    When Zungu overhears 
commuters commenting “Isn’t he fine in that uniform” (23) or murmuring complaints 
among themselves that he is “driving them like oxen” (26), the dialogue expresses a 
societal voice that is a metonymic expression of communal African culture, as informed 
by a consciousness Mphahlele calls African humanism.  It is against the grain of African 
humanism to espouse a culture symbolised by the wearing of a uniform or by ordering 
people around in a detached manner.  What an audience woven together through African 
humanist mores would expect is the interactive mode of involving people by negotiating 
some of their concerns in a two-way dialogue rather than by uttering unilateral 
commands. It is for this reason that Mphahlele has stated that “we are traditionally great 
talkers, find comfort in talking to other people, and also want others to know that they 
can unburden themselves by talking to us” (“Notes Towards” 138). 
 
By contrast, the mimicry of colonialist conceptions of proper conduct underlying the 
protagonist’s conduct is revealed in descriptions like “fine in that uniform”, “cringed 
before his employer and the European workers” and “had been told at school about hell”.   
That the terms above signify conduct conflicting with tenets of African humanism is 
shown up by Mphahlele when he writes elsewhere that “wrongdoing is not conceived, as 
in the West, in theological terms, as the abstraction called sin” (“Notes Towards” 138). 
Mphahlele’s attribution of Khalima Zungu’s errant consciousness (contrasting with what 
the character has learnt at school – where curriculum content was defined by the 
coloniser in the era of apartheid) points to the particular type of hybrid consciousness in 
him, manifesting itself in the improper way he relates to the commuters as an effect of 
mental colonisation.  That Zungu had learnt in school about “hell” is a further revelation 
of the ambivalent consciousness galvanizing the protagonist Zungu into action in this 
story, in which his behaviour conflicts with expected African humanist conduct.  On this 
point Mphahlele has stated that in the lifestyle of African humanists the idea of sin that 
will be punished in hell after one has died is ridiculous: 
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 For the human being to survive this world, and upon death rejoin his ancestors, he 
 endeavours to maintain harmony with all the forces  that he perceives – 
 physically, emotionally and intellectually.  Which means that one has perpetually 
 to attempt to maintain a natural order in which there is a balance with a variety of 
 forces – placating some and beseeching others.  A sense of wrongdoing can be 
 atoned for by speaking to the person wronged through an intermediary.  One 
 doesn’t take the easy way of seeking absolution from the Supreme Being. 
 (“Notes Towards” 138) 
 
It is for these reasons that a community member with a Black Consciousness attitude 
would not display such a shamefully obsequious attitude towards whites.  After the 
widow that Zungu has married deserts him, and he is trapped in a house set on fire by 
himself, he runs out of the house only after the colonially-induced memory of hell visits 
his dazed mind.  This exaggerates the point that the protagonist sees life through the eyes 
of the white man and that without images derived from colonising western Christianity 
his own African conscience is dead.   The neighbour who comes to rescue him comically 
wraps him in a sack (a symbol of the cruel, consumerist culture of the West that in his 
happier days he foolishly embraced), and like a western economic commodity he is rolled 
on the ground to have the blaze doused.   This rolling may also be explained as 
reminiscent of how Zungu has always been tossed around by the westernisation that the 
sack he is wrapped in symbolises; also, his literally placing himself in fire in this incident 
(figuratively) symbolises the fact that by his conduct throughout the short story he has 
harmed his own well-being like someone destroying his own life on a bonfire. 
Significantly, when he is re-initiated by fire back to Black Consciousness/Pan 
Africanism/African humanism (as the story unfolds), only his affected behaviour dies and 
he himself survives as a down-to-earth, communal member of Shantytown.  
 
One afternoon Zungu is required by duty to inform a woman that the Cape Town train is 
leaving at “ten-ten” in the night.  Betraying his desire to be like the white man, Zungu 
relishes swinging his left arm gracefully, wondering if he has “put enough music in that 
“ten-ten” (24).  The image of a black colonial policeman or soldier that is detestable 
within the Black Consciousness perspective is desirable to the mimic man, thus 
indicating his colonised condition.  In “Signs Taken for Wonders. Questions of 
ambivalence and authority under a tree outside Delhi, May 1817”, Bhabha explains 
psychological conditions of the kind shown by Zungu’s behaviour in this scene as having 
resulted from “a discrimination between the mother culture and its bastards, the self and 
its doubles, where the trace of what is disavowed is not repressed but repeated as 
something different – a mutation, a hybrid” (111).  The interesting point is that hard as he 
may try, Zungu’s psychological composition is such that he can never perform what he 
imitates in the same way the Europeans he is emulating do.  This state is throughout 
made evident in Zungu’s dialogue, constantly expressing his crass hankering after 
European manners and possessions. 
 
Significantly, Zungu is not completely consumed by the aspiration to mimic Western 
ways, as we see him express disdain for blacks who “wield rackets at balls” or jerk their 
bodies in “funny movements in dance halls to weird noises” (29).   This tells us that 
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Zungu’s “disavowed” (in Bhabha’s terms) African consciousness continues to surface, 
although it does so in an altered form because of his admiration of the ways of the white 
man.  The same is true for the white man:  Zungu’s resultant hybrid behaviour represents 
some sort of lampoon of the real manners of Europeans. When he romantically sees his 
luck with the gorgeous and wealthy Mrs Masite who is still trapped in a frivolous 
lifestyle that humorously parodies his (imperfect) mimicry of western manners, Zungu 
attributes the apparent congeniality of their views on love and marriage to the 
transcendental power of the “magic carpet”.   The metaphor combines the western idea of 
romance (as symbolised by the probably exotic “carpet”) and the African one of the 
Supreme Being (symbolised by qualifying the carpet as a magic one).  In a monologue to 
help himself muster sufficient courage to face up to the challenging task of proposing 
love to the widow, Zungu justifies the erotic aspect of such a move by convincing himself 
that enjoying sex with the woman would show homage to his ancestors (29).  This idea of 
celebrating life for what it is has been mentioned by Mphahlele as an aspect of African 
humanism (Es’kia 138) ; among Africans a man who dies a virgin has his anus and 
genitals burned with a red hot amber to signify that the ancestral spirits are unhappy with 
such a lifeless existence.  A celebration of life and the orientation to “love life for its own 
sake” (“Notes Towards” 138) implies that a man, among other aspects of the definition of 
manhood, is not a real man if he does not live up to the expectations of  playing the 
lovemaking role skilfully during sexual intercourse.  Such an aspect of manliness is 
confirmed in another Drum writer Can Themba’s short story “The Suit” (The World of 
Can Themba), when the cuckolded character Philemon praises his ancestral spirits in a 
monologue in which the sources of his thankfulness include “the goodness of life”, “the 
pure beauty of his wife” and “the [erotic] strength surging through his willing body” (82).   
To love life for its own sake or to celebrate life in this sense is to perform to the full the 
acts of fathering or mothering of children as culture demands. Ngugi was confirming 
Africanist traditions and institutions such as this when he indicated that black writers 
should not perpetuate European cultures by writing in languages belonging to a system of 
signification that is embedded within the European cultures.  He mentions that among 
other things an Africanist writer must do in order to act in contestation of the kind of 
“Afro-European” writer (whom he challenges in quotations above) is to preserve and 
propagate the “African tradition of poetic self-praise or praise of others” (Decolonising 
78). It is known that apart from men being expected to perform well during sexual 
intercourse and sire children to expand the clan, every adult man or woman within 
African societies is expected (as Ngugi indicates) to know the praise poems associated 
with himself or herself as an individual and with the clan he or she belongs to, as well as 
the praise poems of those he or she interacts with on a daily basis. 
 
The effective delineation of Zungu will be understood best by a reader who is aware of 
the aspects of African traditions that are explained above.  Mphahlele subtly portrays 
Zungu as a personality that oscillates between an uncritical embrace of colonial values 
(signified in this part of the short story by the word “carpet”) and Africanist conceptions 
of manhood (illustrated by Zungu’s belief that a copulation on the carpet that is driven by 
an adequately concupiscent manhood to achieve exceptional coitus would please the 
ancestors, symbolised in the part of the short story by the word “magical”).  Such a 
creation of Zungu as a character torn between two opposed world-views points to the 
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recognition by Mphahlele as a resistant writer of ambivalence and alterity induced by 
colonisation being inevitable constituents of the psychic orientation he calls African 
humanism. Despite the colonised state of Zungu’s psyche as demonstrated in, for 
instance, his failure to commune with the commuters, Mphahlele intimates a realisation 
on Zungu’s part of his culturally-defined role to perform well in sexual intercourse as his 
authorial way of revealing the persistence of vestiges of an African humanist 
consciousness in Zungu, albeit in a diminished form, because of colonial influence.  
Mphahlele writes about the accommodation of alterity in his concept of African 
humanism when he states that “we define and redefine” it (“Notes Towards” 139).  More 
importantly, the short story should be fully understood as Mphahlele’s affirmation of the 
point about African humanism that he has repeated most consistently– that it survives the 
formidable barrage of practices and traditions that are part of a foreign consciousness that 
seeks to eliminate it. 
 
The anonymous remark that emerges from the community, that Zungu looks fine in the 
police uniform (meaning that he and the system symbolised by the uniform are 
inextricably connected), reveals the reprehensible role of black policemen like him who 
are out of step with the oppressed or resistant culture of their society.  Mphahlele not 
being a man to conform to a totalising outlook whether from the side of the “centre” or 
the “periphery”, he counterpoises the figure of Zungu in this early story with a different 
kind of policeman in “Down the Quiet Street” (In Corner B).  In “Down the Quiet 
Street”, people comment that Constable Tefo is fine, except for his uniform.   Tefo is a 
black constable whose daily tasks involve his being stationed in the black township of 
Newclare.  High on the list of crimes Tefo is required to quell is illicit sale of liquor.  Yet 
as a result of some of the apartheid legislation of the time, most black families can only 
earn a living by means of this illicit trade.  Mphahlele’s sustained image in “Down the 
Quiet Street” (In Corner B) of Tefo always sitting on the stoep of the Indian’s shop 
overlooking the main street of the township and drinking liquor is significant.  For 
Mphahlele to depict Tefo’s usual place of relaxation as overlooking Nadia Street is an 
indication of the black policeman’s commitment to understanding the daily life of the 
inhabitants, for Nadia Street is the confluence of all social activities in the black location.  
The result that Tefo’s committed scrutiny of Newclare life yields is an understanding 
which leads him not to see the illegal activities of the township residents as crime, due to 
the paradoxical nature of lawfulness and morality under apartheid in which (as Mphahlele 
has remarked) “Deception is the fundamental virtue in [the] asymmetrical power tussle 
between black and white” (Exiles 149).  The economic tactics with which characters like 
Manyeu beat the life threats posed by apartheid appear to be justified, instead of being 
condemned unconditionally as criminal.  This matches the point Mphahlele makes in his 
statement that for “an African in South Africa, the law sooner or later turns you into a liar 
and criminal” (Exiles 110). 
 
It is in the light of this information about Newclare and its people that the contrast of the 
characters of Zungu in “Man Must Live” (Man Must Live) and Tefo in “Down the Quiet 
Street” (In Corner B) will be fully grasped.  Far from being aloof from the community 
like Zungu, Tefo is at one with the people as is shown by his intimate conversations with 
Sung Li’s wife each time he gulps a drink on the stoep of the shop overlooking Nadia 
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Street, and also with another patron of the Indian’s shop called “Seleke’s cousin”.  Keledi 
is a female character in the story who always has the opportunity, like the shopkeeper 
Sung Li’s wife and Seleke’s cousin, to talk to Tefo each time he is in the township.  
Keledi’s position sets her up as a rival to another female character by the name of 
Manyeu because Tefo eyes Manyeu as a possible future lover and wife.  The fact that the 
widow Manyeu survives by trading illicitly in liquor lends credence to Keledi’s critical 
judgement of a possible love affair between a policeman and a ‘criminal’.  Despite 
Keledi’s apparently garrulous declarations of a brewing love affair between Tefo and 
Manyeu (initially the inhabitants do not believe Keledi), which she depicts as scandalous 
when she gossips with other women of the location, and despite Tefo’s awareness of this  
dim view of Manyeu’s character in the eyes of most Newclare inhabitants, he eventually 
marries her (Manyeu is widowed and thus ‘available’).  The marriage serves the 
important purpose of binding Tefo communally to the people of Newclare.  The portrayal 
of a policeman who relates harmoniously with the township residents because of a 
profound understanding of the real cause of their apparent criminality is found also in 
Can Themba’s short story, “Ten-to-Ten” (The World of Can Themba).  The policeman 
named Ten-to-Ten leads colleagues like Constables Masemola and Ramokgopa, and 
together they routinely patrol the streets of Marabastad, supposedly to enforce the 
apartheid laws of the time, yet after the curfew of ten minutes to ten o’clock every night 
(as they patrol) all Ten-to-Ten does is to clear the township of criminals (69, 73).  When 
Ten-to-Ten walks down Second Avenue and other streets of  Marabastad he does not 
break into houses to arrest the men and women for trading in illicit liquor despite being 
aware that upon his appearance the residents only switch off the lights and sit “in the dark 
with their calabashes and tins trying to find their blind mouths” (68).  This shows that 
Mphahlele’s narrative writings and those of some Drum writers of the 1950s depict the 
Africans’ attempts to cope with apartheid in somewhat similar ways. 
 
The marriage (in Mphahlele’s “Down the Quiet Street”) of a law-enforcing policeman 
with a ‘criminal’ like Manyeu signifies a sympathetic solidarity of the black policeman, 
not only with Manyeu’s plight as a widowed woman who as a single parent needs to fend 
for herself but also with the lot of the whole disadvantaged community of Newclare.    
Tefo’s acceptance of Manyeu as a lover and wife accords with his acceptance of the 
Newclare residents, warts and all.  His sensitivity to the political plight of the Newclare 
residents, revealed by his defiance of expectations in marrying the widow, has been 
foreshadowed by his many confabulations with Seleke’s cousin.  This is so because 
Seleke’s cousin belongs to a political organisation that represents the aspirations of the 
Newclare residents to be lifted out of the morass that is their life in the township.  By 
keeping alive the political consciousness of the residents through characters such as 
Seleke’s cousin, Mphahlele subtly justifies the illicit sale of liquor as a reaction to the 
economic repression they face because of the racist apartheid policies of the time.  
Mphahlele downplays the superficially criminal aspect of the lifestyle of the people of the 
ghetto as the expression of an African humanist virtue: to possess the ingenuity to beat 
the system that oppressively circumscribes their lives at the same time as it wants to 
efface their distinctness as a group held together by identifiable, profound commonalities. 
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The garrulous Keledi should be understood as being a typical township woman living life 
to the full according to the Africanist dictates of the traditions of her people – the 
sounding board for the Newclare communal voice.  She furthermore serves as a vehicle 
to allow the community to share the news orally, for privacy (or non-sharing) could 
easily drive one to the unAfrican state of isolated individualism instead of communal 
living – as Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism requires.  Such effective use of 
characterisation in the short story cannot be dissociated from Mphahlele’s assertion of the 
presence of cultural connectedness of any group of communities sharing broadly some 
common behavioural patterns due to their shared history, the discontinuities between 
their customs and the “centre”, and common futures that result from the nature of their 
shared past and present.  This kind of essentialism which I have already interpreted as 
non-absolute or as moderate should be understood to function primarily among the 
peoples sharing these circumstances.   It should also be understood collectively as the 
people’s mutually accepted values looked at as a social creation rather than as a sum total 
of innate qualities.  If it is an innate quality of these cultural groups, this is the case only 
in relation to their cultural cohesiveness, in being at the centre of and binding together 
their common traditions, customs and practices seen to include the individual people 
whom the common traits describe.  Such an interpretation of Mphahlele’s strategic 
essentialism (which he shares with other Africanist thinkers and writers, some of whom I 
have already cited in this study) explains itself without contradiction when the author 
concedes the flexibility of this philosophy or orientation, that allows it to change with the 
times or even be discarded when it ceases to be relevant.  Such a strategic essentialism 
may be outdated in the unknown future in which “multiracialism” gives way to “non-
racialism” as Mphahlele’s preferred goal of self-definition (“The Burden of History” 92).   
 
As such, Mphahlele’s strategic essentialism in its present phase is in harmony with what 
some linguists see as the nature of linguistic behaviour.  A writer like Matsumoto, in 
explaining that what are positive face wants for one cultural group may be negative face 
wants for another, has stated that “superficial similarity can result from different 
underlying principles” (404).  In relation to the character Keledi in “Down the Quiet 
Street” (In Corner B), the idea of “face” is perfectly applicable.   While the description of 
Keledi as a busybody from whom the township gossip is always available may appear not 
to distinguish Keledi from any gossipmonger in whatever kind of community, such  
perceived similarity is deceptive in that it results “from different underlying principles” 
according to the theory of politeness as explained by linguists such as Fraser (1990) and 
Matsumoto (1988).   “Face” is connected to the speaker’s requirements of politeness or 
desirability in relation to recipients of the speaker’s messages or communication (Fraser 
1990, Matsumoto 1988).   This results in “positive face” and “negative face”, according 
to two different ways in which considerations of politeness in an expression benefit the 
speaker (Fraser 1990, Matsumoto 1988).   “Negative face” or “negative politeness” 
(which is sometimes called “loss of face”) can be explained as a thwarting of the desire of 
every linguistically competent adult member that his or her freedom of action should be 
unhindered and his or her attention should be unimpeded; while “positive” face or 
“positive politeness” (which is sometimes called “gain of face”) is the desire that the 
speaker’s messages or communication should be acceptable to at least some others 
(“Perspectives on Politeness” 229).  In challenging the view by some linguists like Brown 
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and Levinson that the idea of “face” or politeness is universal across all cultural groups, 
Matsumoto writes that 
What is of paramount concern to a Japanese is not his/her acceptance by those 
 others.  Loss of face is associated with the perception by others that one has not 
 comprehended and acknowledged the structure and hierarchy of the group.  The 
 Japanese concepts of face, then, are qualitatively different from those defined as 
 universals by Brown and Levinson.  (“Reexamination of Face” 405) 
The fact that the busybody character Keledi in “Down the Quiet Street” (In Corner B) is 
talkative is acceptable within the ethos of the Newclare residents in that such behaviour 
conforms to “positive politeness”/”positive face” in terms of Newclare’s collective 
cultures which (in Mphahlele’s terms) are imbued with the consciousness of African 
humanism.  According to such a communally inclined African humanist consciousness, 
which commonly with Japanese consciousness yet in ways unique to itself conflicts with 
that of the West where individualism is the outstanding value, being the centre of the 
village or township gossip like Keledi in “Down the Quiet Street” constitutes positive 
politeness or positive face.  This positive politeness is associated with approval of the 
gossip by its recipients in society as shown by affirmation criteria shaped by the 
communal voice, the terms of which the community is able to identify in the gossip one 
utters.  The criterion for acceptance differs from that of the West in that it is not 
customarily the acceptance of individualistic messages for which expressions must strive 
– while at the same time ensuring that the application of politeness strategies does not 
adversely affect the individuality of the speaker’s own opinions being communicated.  
While for peoples belonging to a cultural cluster other than African (such as the 
Japanese) the strategy for positive politeness would be to put a message across in such a 
way that it shows recognition of the customarily rigid hierarchical organisation of society 
(“Reexamination of Face” 405), for the African humanist character Keledi the correct 
strategy is to put the message across in such a way that it is shifted in attribution from her 
to the community as a whole.  That she succeeds in this is the vindication she earns at the 
end of “Down the Quiet Street” (In Corner B), when what initially might have come 
across to the Newclare residents as ridiculous gossip motivated by personal jealousy is 
proven to have been a well founded rumour.  Imagining what the township ‘gossips’ 
would chatter about after Tefo’s initially unbelievable marriage with Manyeu enables one 
to realise that what the principal village gossip has been saying all along is a communal 
voice, as opposed to an individual one.  It can thus be seen that both “Man Must Live” 
(Man Must Live) and “Down the Quiet Street” (In Corner B) demonstrate the survival of 
an African humanist consciousness in ghetto life as exemplified by a conception of the 
purpose of living as a “celebration of life” (in Mphahlele’s terms), as well as his 
highlighting of the communalism of public talk (as a scrutiny of dialogue in his poetry 
and stories reveals).  One way in which the public voice in evidently private utterances is 
proffered is by Mphahlele’s creation of resonances of oral literature, as has been 
demonstrated to be the case in the poem “Death”. 
 
Survival of an African humanist consciousness among Africans who live in urban 
townships is not evident in stories by some of the other Drum writers of the 1950s such 
as Can Themba.  Perhaps this is what prompted Aggrey Klaaste to remark that “On closer 
study … Can’s writing shows a lack of depth” (“The Tyranny of Time and Place” 104).  
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In Can Themba’s short story “Passionate Stranger” (The World of Can Themba), for 
example, the context of the love affair between Reggie and Ellen is shallow in terms of 
those traditional practices that Mphahlele has identified as components of the African 
humanist consciousness, despite the rural setting in Chebeng village – where one would 
expect to find such customs surviving more strongly than they do in the urban 
environment.  In the story, arrangements for lobola with Reggie’s love rival Dikgang’s 
parents involve the local chief’s councillors without the writer mentioning that Dikgang 
is the son of the chief, which unfortunately distorts his depiction of the institution of 
marriage among Africans (according to which, when a marriage takes place between two 
families it directly involves the traditional ruler at the family level only if such a ruler is a 
parent of one of the fiancees and not by virtue of the families being such a ruler’s 
subjects) (45).   In a manner that is alien to traditional practices, Ellen’s unmarried 
brother and the visiting boy Reggie are described by Can Themba as part of the 
customary lobola negotiations, in which Ellen’s brother Osbourne even confronts his 
father and the elders and ‘advises’ them that “we should display our wares before these 
gentlemen commit themselves to a purchase” (45).  Casting of the paying of lobola in 
such a commercial light as the purchasing of “wares” as well as the involvement of a 
visiting boy and a young son in customary lobola negotiations is not genuine or accurate.  
Specifically on the tradition of magadi or lobola Mphahlele has written in contradiction 
of the light in which it is cast by Can Themba’s “Passionate Stranger”, in the following 
words:  “The bride wealth, the [rural African] people reasoned, was not a selling price.  It 
was a bond made holy by ancient custom and therefore valued by the ancestors.  To scorn 
the idea was to rebuke the ancestors” (Father Come Home 31). 
 
People of a settlement like Chebeng (where the marriage negotiations are taking place 
according to Can Themba’s “Passionate Stranger”), a village in rural Northern Transvaal 
(now the central region of the Limpopo Province), would be unable to view the 
institution of lobola in a commercial light as the elderly negotiators do upon Osbourne’s 
confronting them.  That it is a boy misleading the older tribesmen to veer towards a 
consumerist valuing of magadi/lobola should clearly be understood to contain Can 
Themba’s elitist message that the younger generations of Africans should modernise 
African lifestyle by abandoning traditional values, which is diametrically opposed to 
Mphahlele’s position that African traditions will adapt to modernity yet retain their 
dignified cultural essence.  The “unreal reality” (see below) that is tied to the culturally 
rootless “projected urban world” of the Drum writers sets those like Themba apart from 
Mphahlele despite his commonly belonging with them to the Drum era, for the reason 
that Mphahlele’s life and writings exemplify African humanism as an antidote of what 
Gready perceptively describes as “the destruction of the community” (“Sophiatown 
Writers of the Fifties” 145, 157).  Considering the 1950s, it is such a destruction of the 
Africans’ cultural cohesion and preservation that, true to Gready’s words (157), “prove[s] 
to be the ultimate real reality”.  For writers like Themba to have “cocked a snook at racial 
classifications of Africans”, as Chapman explains in “Identity and the Apartheid State” 
(238) is not wrong.  But to have simplistically commended the proper attitude of rejecting 
racial segregation in the same way as a confused denial that “Africans [are] essentially 
tribal people from distant reserves” (as Chapman indicates in “Identity and the Apartheid 
State” 238) is a symptom of superficiality that cannot be consistent with any adequately 
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analytical writing.  Without any suggestion of cultural backwardness, Africans are better 
off with pride in, rather than denial of, their originally not being urban – in as far as 
urbanisation at this point symbolises colonisation.  It is when self-definition is preceded 
by such a concession that Africans will appropriate industrialisation and urbanisation on 
their own terms shorn of the sometimes overly modernist mimicry upheld in the lives and 
writings of some of Mphahlele’s contemporaries like Themba. 
 
The daughter (Ellen) at the centre of matrimonial negotiation in Can Themba’s 
“Passionate Stranger” goes on to wrench the story further away from African cultures 
when Can Themba describes her as saying during the lobola negotiations that “she knows 
[that according to custom] the woman should be silent and suffer her elders and betters to 
determine her fate” (46).  Such dialogue clashes with the sacredness of both the woman’s 
place in society and the practice of lobola as explained by writers like Kaunda and 
Mphahlele cited above.  It can thus be seen that whatever symptoms of an Africanist 
consciousness may seem to obtain in a work like this by the Drum writer Can Themba  
represent the outlook of individual characters and  (unlike in Mphahlele’s works) are not 
rooted within any sound cultural framework that constitutes a distinctive Africanist 
consciousness.  Ogude, Raditlhalo, Ramakuela, Ramogale and Thuynsma are pinpointing 
deficiencies in the representation of Africanist social practice like these found in the 
works of writers like Can Themba in the example above, when they react in comparative 
terms to Mphahlele’s attention in fiction to traditional features in the following words: 
“Writings by black South African writers have addressed the dynamics of the present, but 
… have little time to employ indigenous cultural elements beyond diction and idiom” 
(460). 
 
A thorough recreation and knowledge of culture (which is a constituent of African 
humanism) is crucial to Mphahlele’s aim to make his readers acquire a clearer 
understanding of the concept of African humanism, as he states in the following words: 
 We are talking about culture as a concept that defines what we as humans do 
 and make to cope with the material realities of life.  On the  other hand, it also 
 defines the body of knowledge, ideas, morals, beliefs, religion, the arts and 
 language that make up the sum total of our being.  (“Social Work” 238) 
The above quotation explains that it is not enough to do as Can Themba does and pay 
attention to the culture of Africans only in so far as it defines what Africans “do and 
make to cope with the material realities of life” (“Social Work” 238).  The 
representations of culture in any work of art should go further than such a description of 
what the people do at the superficial level to cope with the exigencies of everyday living.  
Such representations of culture should anchor the superficial manifestations of cultural 
activity within the more profound (accurate) definition of culture as a definition of “the 
body of knowledge, ideas, morals, beliefs, religion, the arts and language that make up 
the sum total of our being” (“Social Work” 238).  A distorted representation of African 
cultures as in the short stories of Can Themba cited above will fail to increase his readers’ 
self-knowledge as embedded within the latter definition of what the culture of a people is. 
  
The representation of culture as the consciousness of a people (the point of view 
demonstrated by the quotation in the preceding paragraph) continues to be demonstrated 
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in Mphahlele’s short stories by the portrayal of characters like Tau Rathebe. The 
Rhodesian man Mfukeri in “The Master of Doornvlei” (In Corner B) is as grovelling in 
front of his employers as Zungu in “Man Must Live” (Man Must Live and Other Stories).  
He helps the Afrikaner farmer to make sure that the farm workers comply with the 
dehumanising conditions of farm work.  He is the antithesis of Tau Rathebe, who 
organizes the labourers into a bargaining group (which is consistent with the African 
humanist aspect of communalism or deciding together on issues rather than acting in 
individualist isolation).  When the farmer comes to realize that blacks are “no children” 
(101), Mfukeri does not need to realise anything new as he has always been aware of the 
reality and has deliberately been telling the white boss a lie.   That is why, when the 
farmer orders him to shoot his black bull after it has defeated the white man’s stallion in a 
fight, his true self jumps up and he walks away in protest.  Without overemphasizing the 
apartheid context, the story illustrates that blacks are equal to any race and should be 
recognised for being as fully human as anyone else. 
 
The content and texture of the fictional pieces explored above display the features that are 
illustrated, because of what Thuynsma has called Mphahlele’s exploration of  “the 
meaning of raw experience in fiction” (236) . Through the psychological filter that shapes 
life for Mphahlele in order for him to experience it from the point of view of  the 
‘working essence’ he calls African humanism, raw experience for him is his and his 
people’s collective existence according to the African humanist “state of mind” and “way 
of life”. What Mphahlele is exploring in fiction, therefore (by Thuynsma’s logic) is the 
meaning of the concept he calls African humanism.  The representative poems and short 
stories above are thus written in an inflected manner, true to the exploratory nature of 
Mphahlele’s representation of African humanism in order for him and his readers to 
deduce meanings out of represented reality in an imaginative way or to utilise portrayed 
reality to grow in reasoning capacity into achieving a richer understanding of their 
everyday living. The poems and short stories that are analysed above testify to 
representations of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism in works that are among the 
earliest in his body of narrative writings. 
 
In Mphahlele’s short stories analysed above, the demonstration of the evils of apartheid is 
effected subtly, with instances of African humanism in the short stories assuming 
prominence and receiving primary focus.  The counterpointing of apartheid’s alienation 
with the sanguine and reassuring presence of African humanism that inhering in the 
oppressed Africans is what lends rootedness to Mphahlele’s fiction.  In his 1991 survey 
of Drum writings, Aggrey Klaaste may be implicitly referring to such a redeeming 
presence of African humanism both in Mphahlele’s personal life and in the fabric of his 
narrative writings when he observes that “Es’kia Mphahlele … seems to have had his feet 
firmly planted on the ground” (104).  By way of contrast, Can Themba has written short 
stories that (like those of Mphahlele considered above) focus primarily on the way 
Africans live their lives in the townships during apartheid without overtly centralising 
apartheid itself.  In “Mob Passion” (The World of Can Themba), for instance, a young 
Xhosa man (Linga) and a young Mosotho woman Mapula’s love affair suffers as a result 
of faction fighting between the Basotho and the amaXhosa of Newclare and this leads to 
a tragic end in which the Basotho (led by Mapula’s uncle) kill Linga after which (and in a 
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fit of rage) Mapula also kills her uncle Alpheus (19).  Although apartheid is truly the root 
cause of such mindless faction fighting (117), the short story highlights the mindlessness 
of the fights and not the underlying cause rationalised within the two groups’ cultural 
consciousness conflicting with enforced apartheid.  For writers like Mphahlele, this 
contextual aspect would have proven too crucial to ignore.  This may be among Aggrey 
Klaaste’s reasons for describing Can Themba’s stories (as indicated earlier on) as 
“[showing] a lack of depth” (104). 
 
Continuation of such a treatment of theme by Can Themba is found in “Forbidden Love” 
and “The Urchin”.  In the former short story the black man Michael Chabakeng of 
Sophiatown and the coloured woman Dora Randolph of Noordgesig fall in love and this 
leads to a serious assault on Michael by a gang organised by Dora’s brother Davie, who 
sets the assailants on Michael by shouting, “Hey, boys, this is Dora’s kaffir!” (29). This 
assault happens because Davie and his family are jeered at by fellow Coloureds for 
letting a black man fall in love with their daughter.  In apartheid South Africa (as 
Dorothy Driver has remarked), prescribed black/white social relations were of the nature 
that “marriages and other sexual liaisons across the colour bar [were not] officially 
approved” (“Women and Nature” 461).  Of course the legislation led to a superiority 
complex among some Coloureds which would have turned into a scandal any affair with 
‘inferior’ blacks.  It is precisely this attitude of some Coloured persons in apartheid South 
Africa which the other Drum writer Todd Matshikiza recalls in his autobiography 
Chocolates for My Wife when he writes that “an educated native was tolerated into” the 
Coloured Bar in Queenstown “by the coloured community who considered themselves 
white” (37).  The latter story exposes the foolishness of gangsterism that plays itself out 
in Sophiatown in a gratuitous clash (leading to shops closing down, traffic diverting and 
people locking themselves up in fear) between a gang led by the rogue Macala and 
another gang called the Berliners, in which “knives were brandished and plunged, big-
buckled belts were swung in whistling arcs, arms were flailed in the centre of the 
imbroglio with desperate savagery” (105).  As illustrated by analyses of stories like these 
by Can Themba and Todd Matshikiza, Mphahlele is not the only Drum writer who 
protested against apartheid in a subdued voice in several of his earlier short stories. 
 
2.2.2 APARTHEID IN THE FOREGROUND 
 
With the publication (while in Nigeria) of The Living and the Dead and Other Stories in 
1961, and In Corner B while working in East Africa in 1967, the apartheid texture of day 
to day living in South Africa gets progressively stronger representation in Mphahlele’s 
work, having been present, but in weaker relief, in Man Must Live and Other Stories 
(1946).   
 
Differently from the earliest shorter narratives, the short story “In Corner B” from the 
1967 collection, for example, foregrounds apartheid’s corrosive effect on African 
cultures, with the frailties of black characters depicted as largely justifiable responses to 
this context. The story opens with a focus on the brutality of the boys who have stabbed 
Talita’s husband to death.  Instead of the writer manipulating the storyline to expose this 
criminal offence as most execrable, something different happens.   
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Contrary to what one might expect, events unfold in such a way that communal feeling is 
expressed during the wake by the audience sighing “Ja” in a chorus, affirming their 
agreement with one of the mourners.  This immediately polarises responses to the 
untimely death of Talita’s husband into two camps, which are communal opinion (which 
in Greek tragedy is usually represented by the chorus) at one end and the individual voice 
of the single person who comments loudly at the other end.  Yet Mphahlele’s 
identification of the loud commentator as just one of the mourners without mentioning 
his name is significant in that it merges his voice into that of the ‘chorus’, while at the 
same time Mphahlele sets him apart as an individual because this kind of open 
commentary comes from his side as an initiator of the speech act.  Such a raised voice 
may appear like individualism in the orthodox sense (in which it is found in societies 
such as those of the West), while in reality this is a kind of communal individualism as 
identified in the African humanist sense. This is the case because the chorus’s assenting 
response credits the Africanist individual initiator of the comment as having surveyed 
communal opinion first before taking the initiative to voice it.  To speak in terms of 
positive and negative politeness as characterised in Linguistic Pragmatics by writers such 
as Matsumoto (1988) and Fraser (1990), the way Mphahlele describes the actions of the 
individual speaker indicates that the culturally-specific strategies to achieve “positive 
politeness”/”positive face” or desirability with the recipients of the message on the part of 
the loud commentators are shown to have been the appropriate ones.  Yet in societies 
other than those leading an African humanist existence, the individuality of the unnamed 
commentator could be a kind of individuality in which one speaks to express personal 
opinion without bothering first to determine what communal opinion on the matter is.  
The same positive politeness that searches for the communal voice in order to be 
desirable will (in the latter type of society) become negative politeness in which the 
individual wants his or her message to pass as desirable while actually seeking to ensure 
that no conflicting voice on the same issue emanates from the group that are recipients of 
the message.  In societies informed by an African humanist consciousness “positive 
politeness” or “positive face” is on the other hand achieved by means of calibrating one’s 
communication to be in tune with the communal opinion of the society during a particular 
speech act.  In the setting of the story, the apparently individual speech act comments on 
a case of death that has just occurred and shocked the community.  Though initially it 
seems to be the individual exclaimer expressing this particular evaluation of the 
conditions surrounding the death, it should be understood to be society in communal 
opinion that is stopping short of blaming the death on the black thugs who were the 
perpetrators, and as simply saying philosophically:  “Ja madoda … death is a strange 
thing … We were so close.  And now he’s late, just like that” (In Corner B 123).   To say 
death is a strange thing is to accept this specific death as an occurence whose cause 
should be blamed on something bigger than the group of miscreants whom Mphahlele 
does not hesitate to foreground in the early parts of the short story as having stabbed 
Talita’s husband to death. 
 
Earlier on, people attending the wake see a corpulent black constable dragging the 
murder suspects towards Talita, probably to extract some expression of contrition from 
them.  Both the crowd and the widow simply look at the theatrics of the constable with 
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indifference.  The constable’s boisterous chastisement of the youths meets with 
exasperation, epitomised by the elderly woman accusing the policeman of undermining 
the sacredness of the gathering.  When the elderly woman chases the policeman with a 
stick to the van waiting at the gate outside, the white policeman finds much amusement in 
this solemn act and suppresses a laugh.  This strikes the reader as conveying the message 
that, should a black person fail to secure humane warmth from amidst his own people, he 
should never expect to find it among the whites –  no matter to what extent he might be 
complying with the hegemonic demands of domination by means of conduct described as 
‘conscientious’, ‘obedient’, ‘upright’, etc.  Soon after the van has left, Talita 
(representing popular opinion, true to Mphahlele’s humanist purpose) is depicted as 
wondering:  “Were the boys merely the arms of some monster sitting in the dark 
somewhere…” (120).   Such a comment by the newly bereaved widow Talita sustains the 
shift Mphahlele achieves in this short story, of moving the accusation away from the 
black thugs who have murdered the husband to blame the system of apartheid.  It is the 
same shift of blame that has been initiated by the unnamed loud exclaimer earlier on 
when he referred to death as “a strange thing” in South Africa.  The play on the word 
“strange” debunks the murder that has been committed by familiar compatriots (because 
they are supposedly imbued with the same African humanist make-up as the mourners 
and victims) as actually having been caused by a political order in which the strange 
consciousness manifested by apartheid is at work.  It is with a similar effect that, while 
the mourners busy themselves outside the house, making sure the funeral proceeds 
smoothly, one mourner responds to reported hitches in the smooth running of the funeral 
without attributing the resultant agitation to the murderers, whose misdeed is at the heart 
of all the trouble.  What happens is that we hear one mourner blaming some of the 
reported hitches on the apartheid administration by exclaiming:  “Pass pass be damned, 
cannot a man go to his grave in peace without dragging his chains after him!” (121).   
This is yet another comment confirming the communality of Talita’s earlier reference to 
the grievous incident that has befallen her family as ensuing from machinations of  the 
“arms of some monster sitting in the dark somewhere” (120). 
 
The African humanist sensibility in terms of which the mourners are portrayed together is 
evinced in such examples as the narrative voice in “In Corner B” showing that other 
cultural practices may be broken or bent, but not communal support during a funeral.  
This is due to the cultural aura that death is accorded in the statement “You are a person 
because of other human beings, you are told” (109).   These words are uttered as an 
explanation of the reason why no-one wants to be absent from the funeral within the 
African community of which Talita and her family are a part. Communal support is also 
illustrated in the practice of a relative collecting money donated by mourners to meet 
catering costs (113); and in the emphasis given to the arrival of the grandmother of the 
deceased to join the vigil.  Further points confirming that Mphahlele is here depicting an 
African humanist ethos in practice are the comment that relatives who had not seen one 
another for a long time were there and that family bonds were in place again; and the 
cultural practice of the elderly ladies washing the corpse after it has arrived from the 
morgue (121).  
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All these social images – even the nature of the expressions of societal dialogue rather 
than the message of individuals; the social roles; the importance of the role of relations; 
communal sharing of grief, joy and responsibility – all these are facets of the sensibility 
called African humanism, but demonstrated in action rather than discursively described 
and analysed.  According to critics like Ursula Barnett, writers within the Drum 
generation (unlike earlier black writing which addressed itself to whites), “Instinctively 
… knew that to tell it as it was, was not enough [because] the reader had to be given 
some hope, and since hope lay only in change, the writer, in his stories, had to grapple 
with the forces of oppression” (A Vision of Order 181).  This observation by Ursula 
Barnett perhaps explains why black writers prior to Drum, including Mphahlele (in Man 
Must Live and Other Stories), write in a conciliatory tone that exposes the evils of 
apartheid mildly so that the white authorities are propitiated into hearkening, rather than 
being antagonised.  If “the reader had to be given some hope” (A Vision of Order 181), 
being overtly offensive to oppressive white authorities of the time could galvanise the 
state into a massive clampdown on the less powerful blacks.   Such crushing action by 
government would result in despair intensifying among the blacks – thus achieving the 
opposite of strengthening hope among the oppressed blacks that the writers saw as a 
priority. From stories contained in the collection The Living and the Dead and Other 
Stories onwards, Mphahlele understandably protests more stridently against apartheid in 
the manner demonstrated in this subsection of the study, while mediating the vulgar 
emotional appeal of protest literature with the intellectually stimulating and more 
balanced assertion of African humanism, by representing it in his works of art as the 
appropriate tool to empower the independent, subjective existence of Africans.  By this 
strategy, a balance is maintained between the intensity with which apartheid is 
condemned and the complex circumscription of what African humanism entails.  More 
importantly, the profundity with which the concept of African humanism is expatiated 
insists upon an unflagging hopefulness among the blacks facing desperate conditions.  
Mphahlele’s growth as writer in the depth and scope of his representation of African 
humanism in his later stories which protest more openly against apartheid can thus be 
recognized as a development of his understanding of this notion. 
 
Proper behaviour, exemplified by the activities cited above, is contrasted effectively with 
decadent behaviour by some blacks attending the wake.  The sacrilegious man who 
moves from one death gathering to another pretending to be the appointed relative for 
collecting monetary donations, is uncovered and he is prevented from stealing money 
intended for a communal purpose (112).  The impiety of this deed is as immoral as the act 
of feigning a funeral procession in order to transport liquor in a coffin, as is shown in the 
precursor of Mphahlele’s “Lesane” stories, “Down the Quiet Street”.  Similar desecration 
of the communal ethos occurs when township ‘witch doctors’ take people for a ride by 
pretending to be in touch with the mysteries of the spiritual world (as in “A Point of 
Identity” 153).  In all the short stories with black characters engaging in such despicable 
acts, the narrator’s tone and the context he supplies indicate that he wants the deeper 
cause to be recognised: the disruptive reality imposed on Africans by the apartheid state.  
Even the base act of the two lovers who farcically roll down in coitus next to a fowl-run 
could, considering the atmosphere of the story, be blamed on their having drunk the white 
man’s liquor!  What saves such stories from being the kind of vulgar or obvious protest 
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literature Mphahlele himself denounces, is the writer’s ability to make heroes out of 
ordinary men and women and endowing everyday events, which in the hands of the 
average writer would deflate to banality, with rich texture.   
 
“Grieg on a Stolen Piano”, republished also in Renewal Time (1988), continues (like the 
other stories mentioned above) to exemplify how Africans after colonisation “grappled 
with the processes of assimilation, rejection and synthesis of Western culture and the 
African personality” (“Thoughts on” 2002).  Whenever he is depressed by the 
inhumaneness of the widowed woman he has married after being widowed himself, the 
behaviour of Uncle (in “Grieg on a Stolen Piano”) depicts the “two streams of 
consciousness” he straddles, as illustrated in the following description:   
He went back to his whisky … played excerpts from Grieg’s piano concerto or a 
 Chopin nocturne, or his own arrangements of Mohapeloa’s Chuchu-makhala (The 
 Train) or Leba (The Dove) and others, vocalizing passages the while with his 
 deep voice.  He loved to evoke from his instrument the sound of the train’s siren 
 Oi-oi-i-i while he puffed Chuchu, chuchu. (Renewal Time 124) 
Uncle’s drinking of whisky rather than traditional beer such as sorghum, and his playing 
of the concerto and nocturne composed by the Europeans Grieg and Chopin respectively, 
are indicative of the hybridity that informs his behaviour.  By mentioning that Uncle 
played these Western compositions while vocalising the stanzas with his “deep” voice 
Mphahlele shows that such behaviour by Uncle is mediated by his own African humanist 
consciousness and not a mere shallow-minded mimicry.  The degree of adaptation of 
Western art forms in this musical performance is depicted as healthy commensurately 
with Uncle’s high degree of self-consciousness, by means of the constrasting images 
created by Uncle’s juxtaposition of Western tunes in counterpoint with such culturally 
authentic black South African compositions as those by Mohapeloa.  Mphahlele 
highlights the non-European tradition of Mohapeloa’s compositions by mentioning the 
indigenous-language titles of the tunes, Chuchu-makhala and Leba.  Here Mphahlele 
humorously refers to the “two streams of consciousness” in a manner that borders on the 
farcical by means of Uncle’s sardonic use of the piano notes (that symbolise 
westernisation) to evoke the sound made by the train (which symbolises the notorious 
indenture system during the apartheid era, in which the train transported cheap labourers 
daily to and from work), with Uncle himself onomatopoeically adding the puffing sound 
that emanates from the coal train while it is herding cheap black labourers to and from the 
white man’s workplace. 
 
The storyline continues by showing that Uncle’s upliftment from abject poverty fails to 
materialise in Pietersburg.  This extends his flight to white residential areas in Pretoria 
where he survives by means of meagre earnings as a domestic worker.  But such a 
widening of the search for social and economic self-fulfilment does not go beyond 
Pietersburg for a significant reason.  It happens after Uncle has been traumatically 
maltreated as a farm labourer by an Afrikaner farmer.  That such dehumanising treatment 
by the Afrikaner farmer traumatises Uncle is revealed in his later years in conversation 
with his nephew in sarcastic observations such as a reference to “how to sit [properly] – 
not like an Afrikaner cow” (Renewal Time 125) and “who do you think I mean [if not the 
black beauty Mary-Jane] – Vasco da Gama’s daughter-in-law?” (Renewal Time 135).  
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For these jarring images, respectively representing hard labour on farms owned by 
Afrikaners and Portuguese colonisation, to have endured even when Uncle is in his 
sixties, is Mphahlele’s way of stressing the immensity of the trauma Uncle suffered while 
only a boy of fifteen. 
 
The foregrounding of apartheid in this story is sustained by Unlce’s memories of 
apartheid brutality borne of confrontational incidents that dog him all his life.  Examples 
are the music teacher Mr Lambeth’s being “tarred and feathered” by white youths in a 
city centre as punishment for associating too closely with blacks (115); Uncle’s being 
called a “kaffir monkey” by a young white man when during a break as a teacher in a 
school he hopes to get service fast at the post office (118); and when as a school inspector 
suspected of being illegally in possession of uncut diamonds the white policemen batter 
him and leave him for dead (119). Mphahlele’s intention is achieved, which is to imprint 
in bold strokes the contrast of the two worlds symbolised by an Africanist expectation of 
social co-existence characterised by warmth and humaneness and the brutality they meet 
with at the hands of some members of the white population due to such white people’s 
racist views of order which they regard as axiomatic. As in the other stories analysed 
above, the foregrounding of apartheid is not done in a threadbare manner that would 
vitiate depth of thought, because Mphahle is one of the Africanist writers who are 
opposed to such superficiality.  Mphahlele skillfully prevents the short story from 
degenerating into a document in which political agenda is thinly veiled.  Apart from 
Mphahlele’s stylistic inventions illustrated through textual scrutiny of the short stories 
considered above, the point can be made that he achieves literary quality despite the 
accent on apartheid, through the complex way in which he uses flashback (in “Grieg on a 
Stolen Piano”).  Flashback is implemented to transport the boy narrator psychologically 
so that he puts side by side the worlds of Afrikaner social violence on the one hand, and 
on the other hand African humanist resistance, which is exemplified in the way Uncle 
exerts himself to deal with the socio-political challenges of the apartheid period.  
Mphahlele hints at the African humanist consciousness within both the narrating nephew 
and Uncle whose life story the nephew is narrating, by not omitting to mention (through 
the boy’s recollection and narration) that during passage through a forest as he flees from 
Pietersburg to Pretoria, the vast patches of pristine nature that he travels through evoke in 
the mind of Uncle a fear associated with the menace of fable and mythical creatures, 
hence invoking the oral tradition.  Mphahlele describes the flight in this way: 
As he travelled through the thick bush [Uncle] remembered the stories he had so 
often listened to at the communal fireplace; tales of huge snakes that chased a 
man on the ground or leapt from tree to tree; tales of a giant snake – that came to 
the river at night to drink, breaking trees in its path, and before which helpless 
people lay flat on their stomachs wherever they might be at the time; none dared 
to move as the snake mercifully lifted its body above them, bent over, drank water 
and then, mercifully again, turned over backwards, belly facing upwards, 
rollingaway from the people. (Renewal Time 114) 
The passage illustrates a fear the source of which is imagery of benevolence (represented 
by Mphahlele’s explanation that the giant snake “mercifully” leaps over the supplicating 
human beings on its way to and back from the river).  The malevolent neuroses generated 
by the urban life Uncle enters into later in life are a far cry from the mystical awe 
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illustrated above.  The malevolent phobias that plague Uncle in urban life are revealed by 
the unacknowledged  restlessness caused by the impenetrability and unintelligibility of 
urban living (as represented, inter alia, by  the enigmatic, passive second wife) and 
Uncle’s reaction to it by the ambivalent combination of actions he engages in – such as 
gambling, ritual appeasing of the ancestors, recognition of the interdependence of blood 
relations, scheming in a consumerist way as when he attempts to ‘sell’ Mary-Jane to 
ghetto business sharks, and so forth.   
  
It is correct to interpret the imagery conjured up by the flashback in “Grieg on a Stolen 
Piano”  as a method of highlighting Uncle’s African humanist mode of existence.  This is 
made clear when Mphahlele says later in the paragraph quoted above that in mythical oral 
tales “always the theme was that of man” (Renewal Time 114).  Mphahlele’s concept of 
African humanism puts man at the centre of a universe consisting of organic and 
inorganic nature as well as all other components of reality, interwoven by the all-
pervading presence of Vital Force or the Supreme Being (137).   This aspect of 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism is confirmed in “Grieg on a Stolen Piano” by 
the way the action of the plot puts man at the centre of nature that manifests itself in 
various ways around him, exposed by phrases such as “huge snakes that chased a man”,  
“before which helpless people lay flat”, “lifted its body above them”, “rolling away from 
the people” (Renewal Time 114, emphases added).   
 
The farmers, the whisky and other lexical items like “piano” being images of colonial 
life, and the black family members and African jungle symbolising African 
consciousness, a metonymic gap and absence are distinctly represented in this short story, 
as in the earlier examples. This example, in a similar manner as other stylistic features 
illustrated through textual analyses of other stories above, testifies to the stylistic 
complexity and excellence of the short stories despite their more overt emphasis on the 
ravages of apartheid.  Critics like Ursula Barnett have identified such a submerging of the 
stark immanence of apartheid as one of the common features of the Drum writers (as 
follows): 
But usually it is not the highly dramatic incidents – the arrests, the raids and the 
brutality – that interest him at this stage [of writing for Drum].  Rather, it is the 
weddings and funerals, a young man’s first acquaintance with the city, poverty 
and illness, in short the ordinary events that go on while people try to survive … 
Throughout, however, there is a note of hope in the spirit of toughness of the 
individual people who refuse to submit to circumstances and continue to aspire to 
a better life. (A Vision of Order 173-74) 
Of course the centralisation of action attributable to individual opinion fades 
progressively as the latter narratives grow in their depiction of the individual’s views on 
existential issues aligned with the overall verdict of the community. 
 
The important feature to mark (which is related to the above description of the Drum 
generation by Barnett) is that there is a limit to the extent to which Mphahlele conforms 
generally to the Drum generation of African writers by virtue of writing in the same 
historical period.   What sets him apart is the unique way in which he protests intensely 
against apartheid.  The analysis of his stories above reveals his maximal use of protest, 
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yet writing subtly and in a nuanced manner while (at the same time) he depicts the 
cultural distinctness of Africans in an affirming manner.  This is because the Drum 
writers are not known so much for political writing as for asserting the permanence and 
distinctiveness of black urban life.  The Drum writers unfurled their writing enterprises in 
varying ways – as the above comparisons of Mphahlele with other Drum writers like Can 
Themba and Todd Matshikiza show – yet as a group reacting to the same environment 
there are features they share broadly.  It is for this reason that one agrees with the 
acknowledgement of both similarities and dissimilarities among Drum writers as 
observed by Lewis Nkosi in his remark about the “misleading insistence on a Drum 
school of writers … if it means a common style more than a common stimulation” (Tasks 
and Masks 99). 
 
2.2.3 MPHAHLELE’S USE OF LITERAL TRANSLATION  
 
What stories like “Grieg on a Stolen Piano” introduce, which is not there in Man Must 
Live and Other Stories,  is Mphahlele’s unique mediation of the difficulty of using 
English (as a foreign language) to carry African culture.   This is acknowledgement on 
his part of the need to mediate what the theorist Said describes as “the formal and 
psychological question of the interdependence of literary and sociological approaches in 
dealing with how English, for example, is at once a national and a world language [tied 
to] the question of the cultural domination of one intellectual or national domain over 
another” (Said, “Conclusion: Vico” 381).  Other African writers recognise this problem 
and the need of African artistic writing to confront it, as Njabulo Ndebele’s following 
observation reveals:  “ South African English must be open to the possibility of becoming 
a new  language.  This may happen not only at the level of  vocabulary … but also with 
regard to grammatical adjustments that may result from the proximity of English to 
indigenous African languages” (Rediscovery of the Ordinary 114).   Ndebele goes on to 
motivate the inevitablity of English “[assuming] the cultural colour of its respective 
users” as a consequence of recognising “that the sphere of human knowledge is much 
wider than any one language can carry” (115).   
 
Such a grappling with a language of colonial or Western origin is one of the challenges 
each postcolonial writer is faced with.  Writing in The Empire Writes Back, Ashcroft, 
Griffiths and Tiffin indicate that the discussion of postcolonial writing cannot but include 
a discussion of the process by which language with its power, and the text with its 
signification of authority, have been wrested from the dominant European culture” (7-8).   
The same writers state in Key Concepts in Post-colonial Studies that the concept of a 
standard English requires to be subverted in postcolonial writing because it is a 
construction of imperial rhetoric that constantly separates “centre” from “margin” (148-
49). 
 
A critic like Daniel P. Kunene (505) rightly illustrates the contradiction in Mphahlele’s 
claim that, though writing in English, the Drum writers wrote material that appealed to a 
black proletarian readership (that only thoroughly understood African languages) 
(Mphahlele, “Landmarks” 53) .  This is because the readership that Drum reported on and 
wrote for consisted of people with hardly any secondary education that would equip them 
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with an adequate knowledge of the English language to fully grasp what was written in 
Drum.   It would have been logical, according to critics like Kunene, to write anything for 
such a readership in the different indigenous languages they spoke and in which they had 
achieved literacy even with the mere elementary school education they had.  What is true 
is that Mphahlele himself, in the way he manipulates language, manages to make his 
expression mean more (to those blacks who have acquired enough English) than it would 
mean to a native speaker of English.  Still, such a black reader would not be a mere 
average speaker of English as a second language.  The clear achievement of such 
complex expressiveness was meant to appeal to the black middle class who in the 1950s, 
according to Mphahlele, were competent enough to grasp messages in the English 
language and also had the will to define themselves as a permanently urban group of 
Africans with a distinct conglomeration of traditions and customs.  Such targeting of a 
middle-class is a departure (unfortunately) from Mphahlele’s usual dislike of elitism and 
any sort of class discrimination.   One potential achievement would have been if 
significant numbers of the English-speaking white sector of society were inspired to 
familiarise themselves with at least some indigenous South African languages and the 
cultures of their speakers.   This is because Mphahlele’s African humanism as 
represented in his writings is non-racial – hence it cannot lock out entry by non-blacks, 
this time through immersion by reading. Yet it is not likely that Mphahlele’s English-
speaking readers noticed the need to know some African languages and cultural practices 
as a means towards complete understanding of Mphahlele’s texts written in English, as 
the English language in the way Mphahlele uses it in his writing appears deceptively to 
be fully comprehensible to non-African readers who understand English. 
 
It is known that Mphahlele frowns upon African writers who address Europe instead of 
addressing fellow Africans.  This is understandable because, rather than demonstrating 
the injustice of colonisation or apartheid, Mphahlele’s literary and expository aims have 
been to strengthen the souls of fellow Africans in continuing to assert their independent 
existence by means of sensitising them to their own distinctness in terms of the concept 
he has chosen to call African humanism.  Without excluding members of other races who 
volunteer to adopt an African humanist existence, Mphahlele focuses on blacks as the 
target audience of his writing.  This justifies why Mphahlele has to resolve the potential 
danger of English becoming a barrier between his writings and fellow blacks who do not 
fully grasp English because it is not their native tongue.  Nor have all of them acquired 
adequate school education through which they would have attained proficiency in 
English.  One mitigating factor for Mphahlele is the untenability of a belief that only 
blacks who belong to the middle-class are competent in English.  This is easy to grasp in 
the light of what Mphahlele indentifies as the non-conventional nature of manifestations 
of class among Africans, brought about by colonisation, when he writes that “class 
stratification has become a more complex condition in Africa today than the relatively 
simple notion of upper, lower and middle class” (“In Search Of” 211).  Such unusual 
manifestations of class among colonised Africans have resulted in some blacks who are 
eloquent in English but do not belong to the middle class, and those who constitute the 
proletariat often being fully conversant in English due to a variety of factors.  It is 
therefore incorrect to conclude that the non-educated blacks who do not belong to the 
middle class necessarily fail to understand a work that is written in the English language.  
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This shows that Mphahlele’s choice of writing in English does not negate his intention of 
communicating with the blacks that need the kind of moral boost he sets out to provide.  
What remains to be probed is how he approaches the task of writing for an audience that 
has to deduce from his writings that he is postulating a specific way of life that he 
proposes they should comprehend fully in order to live it. 
  
One tool Mphahlele uses to sensitise Africans to the concept of African humanism is his 
literal translation of African expressions in his works.  Mphahlele in this way joins the 
company of African writers who, as Ursula Barnett writes, “have … adapted English as 
an African language [so that it] is a new language with symbols and terms of its own” (A 
Vision of Order 36). A writer like Fanon is implying the need for such a domestication of 
the colonial language when he cautions that “to speak a language is to take on a world, a 
culture” (Black Skin, White Masks 38).  One example of such an abrogation of English is 
found in the short story “Grieg on a Stolen Piano”.  
 
In “Grieg on a Stolen Piano” (In Corner B 1967), after Uncle’s altercation with the 
second wife for nagging him about his gambling and illicit trading, he defiantly confirms 
aloud (pretending to direct the conversation to the nephew) that the piano was “lifted out 
of a shop”.  Later in the incident the uncle uses the words “she wants to eat me up and 
swallow me up raw the way she did her first husband” (In Corner B 48, emphasis added).   
The expression here is an idiom literally translated from Sotho languages, hence it 
represents the Sotho culture of the characters by means of synecdoche and in this way is a 
carrier of African culture – even though on the surface the expression is clad in the 
foreign (English) language.  There is no denying that a native speaker of English not 
cognisant of the cultural gap would read this vividly realist language as the individual 
voice of the character, or as pure authorial creation.  However, being a communal 
expression transmitted through the art of orature, the phrase actually contains a 
communal propositional content that reveals a collective cultural attitude that assumes 
that, however brave and feared a man or husband may be, when confronted by a woman 
or wife, the wisdom of a woman always triumphs.   Without sharing in the culture 
manifested by such a collective expression, it is difficult to grasp the true, culture-specific 
meaning of such expressions.   
 
Linguists have long highlighted the difficulty of decoding such literal translations – as 
when Akmajian, Demers, Farmer and Harnish explain that learning to communicate in a 
language involves acquiring a variety of shared beliefs or presumptions, as well as a 
system of inferential strategies (352).  Monolingual English speakers lack the background 
knowledge of speakers of Sotho languages who can also read English. As linguists like 
John Lyons note, “so-called literal translation is at times more appropriate than free 
translation” (326).  This comment is entirely applicable to what Mphahlele sets out to 
achieve with the transliteration of Sotho sayings into his English texts. 
 
Such a mediation of a cultural gap by the writer occurs when Uncle (in the story “Grieg 
on a Stolen Piano”) is depicted scheming with his nephew where the village girl will 
reside while being groomed for the beauty contest.   Considering the blustering 
temperament of his wife, Uncle decides that Kefahliloe/Mary-Jane had best be 
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accommodated in the house of a friend named Tau.  He is made to use the expression “his 
wife has a beautiful heart” (49, emphasis added).  This is yet another literal translation 
from the Sesotho sa Leboa language.  Culturally, that is communally, the expression 
describes someone who puts communal intercourse with fellow men above petty quarrels 
(a survival strategy among Africans).  Other instances of this feature of the dialogue 
featured in the story are “We don’t all have the liver” (emphasis added) and “Are you 
going to wait till horns grow on your head before you marry?”  (61, emphasis added).   
 
More stories published after Man Must Live and Other Stories also bear such instances of 
literal translation.   The narrator’s wife in “A Point of Identity” would often overhear 
Karel laugh with his wife and say to the narrator:  “Hm, just hear how Karel is eating 
laughter!” (Unbroken Song 156, emphasis added).  This is a literal translation of o ja 
lesego from Sepedi, which idiomatically distinguishes a hearty, blissful laugh from less 
hearty forms of laughter such as tittering or giggling.   Signifying that the love affair 
between Manyeu and Tefo in “Down the Quiet Street” (In Corner B) has been dragging 
on for quite a while without people noticing, the writer twice hints at the fact that she was 
pregnant with Tefo’s child by using literal translation of the Sotho idiomatic expression 
mpa ye mpsha as “new belly” (128; 135).  The death of Talita’s husband in “In Corner B” 
is described as occurring when “he turned his back on his people” which is a literal 
translation of the Northern Sotho idiomatic expression o ba furaletše/o sepetše used to 
state that someone has passed on (108); the thieving boy who attempts to collect 
condolence money during the wake is described as having long fingers (which means 
having the tendency to steal) (113); while restraining a philandering husband or flirting 
wife is referred to as “chaining your dog” or “chaining your bitch” ( go kgoka mpša ya 
gago in Sesotho sa Leboa); a remonstrating woman externalises her anger and challenges 
the culprit in the words “I can make her see her mother … ” meaning literally (from 
Northern Sotho) that she will knock the culprit out if a fist fight were to ensue.  There are 
many other examples to prove that Mphahlele, even while writing in English, is 
employing the rich resources of communal Sotho speech.  The proverbs and idiomatic 
expressions that he adapts and cites (without pointing) are themselves the carriers of an 
African humanist value system. 
 
What Rob Gaylard writes in the English in Africa article entitled ‘“A Man is a Man 
Because of Other Men”: The “Lesane” Stories of Es’kia Mphahlele’, is true as far as it 
illustrates Mphahlele’s realism – that he dramatises by means of letting his characters 
speak with the colloquialisms representing their communicative uniqueness as a group.  It 
could be argued that  idiom in the sense used by Gaylard actually refers to dramatic 
devices to effect naturalness of speech and they are applied in real speech by blacks 
irrespective of whether they reside in “urban ghettos” called townships or “rural ghettos” 
called villages.  But the fact that such dramatic devices are indices of speech 
performances unique to blacks surely attests to their idiomatic stature.  But if the 
distinction of the words “idiom” and “idiomatic expression” is kept in mind, it becomes 
clear that Mphahlele implements the device discerned by Gaylard to camouflage the 
underlying uniqueness of the world-view which he has called African humanism.  Not to 
use the punctuating expressions identified by Gaylard would harm the camouflaged 
simplicity of dialogue in Mphahlele’s narrative writings, which would render the 
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dialogue stilted and (as far as the representation of African humanism is concerned) make 
it appear contrived and propagandistic. The “township idiom” Gaylard writes about 
merely renders life-like dialogue by means of tsotsitaal and mother tongue terms like “Ao 
Bathong”, “Fakabond”, “what nawsons is this?” or “Ho, chief!”.  It is the literal 
translations of proverbs and idiomatic expressions that (shown by means of examples 
from the stories above) are the implements employed more significantly by Mphahlele in 
his works, to mediate the divergences between the English medium and African cultural 
ways of interpreting reality.   That the conjuncture of the English language with aspects 
of African languages such as proverbs and idiomatic expressions advances towards 
resolving the problems attendant on writing African experiences in English is attested to 
by writers like Lewis Nkosi, as when he states that “like other peoples, black Africans 
possess a rich and living heritage in philosophy, ethics, religion and artistic creation, the 
deepest roots of which are embedded in the rich soil of African languages” (Tasks and 
Masks 3). 
 
2.2.4 A MORE MARKED APPROPRIATION OF ENGLISH 
 
Short stories like “Mrs Plum” (Renewal Time) abrogate (see below) and appropriate the 
English language more radically than do earlier stories like “In Corner B” (In Corner B).  
This will prove true if one understands the terms “abrogation” and “appropriation” in the 
way writers focussing on postcolonial writing define them.   Within the context of 
postcolonial writing, Ashcroft, Grifiths and Tiffin write that: 
abrogation refers to the rejection by post-colonial writers of a normative concept 
 of ‘correct’ or ‘standard’ English used by certain classes or groups … [It] is 
 usually employed in conjunction with the term appropriation, which describes 
 the processes of English adaptation itself, and is an important component of the 
 post-colonial assumption that all language use is a ‘variant’ of one kind or another 
 (and is in that sense ‘marginal’ to some illusory standard).  (Key Concepts 5) 
In this way, Mphahlele’s purpose of utilising the English language to convey meaning 
from a group of communities whose world-view in some respects contradicts that of the 
West (from where English has originated) has compelled him to add novel features to the 
English language itself.  By this very act of introducing novel features to the English 
language, Mphahlele is abrogating normative English, because in the way he conducts his 
business of narrative writing he is confirming and demonstrating that he “rejects a 
normative concept of ‘correct’ or ‘standard’” English language (5).   In defining the word 
“abrogation”, Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin go on to state that it implies arguing for the 
parity of all forms of English and “offers a counter to the theory that use of the 
colonialists’ language inescapably imprisons the colonized within the colonizer’s 
conceptual paradigms” (5).   
 
The key word here is “inescapably”.  As soon as the significance of the word 
“inescapably” in the above definition of abrogation is fully appreciated, it is clear that the 
coloniser’s language will attempt to taint the mind of the user with the coloniser’s way of 
interrogating reality, but such an effect is not inevitable.  It is for this reason that 
Mphahlele’s choice of writing in English should be seen as manifesting abrogation, the 
purpose of which is to prove that such detrimental influence of the colonial language 
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which one writes in is not unavoidable.  To its advantage, in the process of Mphahlele’s 
abrogating it by means of his mode of literary practice, the English language itself 
undergoes appropriation, which is the quality of adapting itself to meet the pragmatic 
challenges it faces in a situation in which it has to communicate appropriately with 
people whose making of meaning is underpinned by African humanist consciousness. 
The overall effect, tied to appropriation, is the postcolonialist assumption by Mphahlele, 
who adds to the epistemological voice of fellow postcolonial writers like Ashcroft et al. , 
as in the latter’s statement that “all language use is a ‘variant’ of one kind or another” 
(Key Concepts 5). Mphahlele should thus be understood as implicitly asserting that the 
African humanist ‘variant’ of the English language that he harnesses to achieve his 
purpose is as important as any ‘variant’ of English that a writer uses as scalpel to operate 
on the malady of an obtrusive world-view that is ‘inappropriate’. 
 
It is in keeping with the above definitions of the terms “abrogate” and “appropriate” that 
the present writer judges Mphahlele’s later short stories like “Mrs Plum” as more radical 
in abrogating and appropriating the English language (Renewal Time) compared with the 
earlier ones.   While the earlier stories deviate from standard English by using literal 
translation as well as implementation of pure and hybrid African colloquialisms, only the 
later stories go further to signify the thought pattern of the speaker as uniquely African by 
communicating the non-English, African-language syntax underlying the English lexicon 
featured on the surface. 
 
Karabo tells us the story of Mrs Plum, Kate, Moruti K K, Dick and Chimane – directly, 
as first-person narrator.  To an extent this justifies the ‘wrong’ English syntax she uses, as 
it reminds us that she is actually speaking in Setswana.  It is, however, significant that the 
‘wrong’ syntax in English is the correct syntax in Setswana, so that the notion of 
correctness is taken from the propriety of the “center” to that of the “margin.”   An 
example of this occurs when Karabo relates to the reader the teachings of the political 
figure Lilian Ngoyi (conveyed at the squalid Black Crow cafe) and starts off by saying 
“At other times Lilian Ngoyi told us she said …” (175, emphasis added).   This syntactic 
structure is standard in Sotho – o buile a re.   This could simplistically be explained as 
indicative of Karabo’s speaking in English while she is thinking is Sotho –  if one were to 
ignore the significance of such a use of dialogue by Mphahlele as a technique to reveal 
profound meaning.  Instances of Sotho syntactic structure (as explained above) permeate 
the entire short story, occurring (for example) on pages 168 (“I ask her I say”; “She says 
to me she says”), 169 (“I say to Kate I say”), 170 (“I say to her I say”), 176 (“I tell her I 
say”), and so forth.    
 
As this is an intensification and not a reduction of the appropriation of the English 
language typical of postcolonial writing, the earlier device of strategic literal translation 
still occurs.  When Kate describes the physical stature of Mrs Plum she proceeds to 
speculate about her temperament in the words “her forehead seems to tell me she has a 
strong liver” (167, emphasis added) meaning that she is brave.   On another occasion 
Karabo uses an inappropriate English term to describe her attitude towards the actions of 
the liberal white women.  She reveals that Kate reprimanded her impatiently by using the 
words “Kate says with a short heart …” (170, emphasis added).  
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An interesting aspect of Karabo’s situation is that besides being the “kitchen girl” 
attending adult education lessons at the Black Crow, she is also taught English by Mrs 
Plum and her daughter Kate.   Despite the two white women teaching her the correct 
form of the target language both verbally and through stale newspapers, she does not go 
beyond the interlanguage stage in which the deep structure of the mother tongue 
underlies the surface diction of English.  That is why, when expressing her contempt for 
the picketing action of the liberal white women claiming to represent black sentiment to 
government (modelled in reality on the Black Sash movement) she says the women are 
“wonderful” instead of “strange”.  In the Sotho languages the term for the idea of being 
strange and that for the idea of being wonderful is the same – makatša in Northern Sotho.  
The ‘unconventionality’ of the kind of English Karabo uses has been commented on by 
some writers, like Thuynsma, when he states that “[“Mrs Plum” is written] in the simple 
idiom of a girl relating the story to her friend, as if in her own language” (239, emphasis 
added).  Thuynsma in the essay from which the above quote has been extracted is 
analysing Mphahlele’s “Mrs Plum” to emphasise different features of Mphahlele’s 
writings from those this study focuses on.   Thuynsma’s reference to Karabo telling the 
story “as if in her own language” accords with identification by this study of this feature 
of “Mrs Plum” as significant.   The significance of Karabo speaking “as if in her own 
language” is its function of showing that the apparent failure by Karabo to learn 
grammatically ‘correct’ English is a wielding by Mphahlele of characterisation to 
enhance recognition of the behavioural aspect of African humanism resisting defeat by 
whatever existential challenges it may find itself dealing with.  
 
Such a symbolic use of Karabo’s resistance to unmediated cultural assimilation as a 
representative of the black people who (according to Mphahlele) are informed by an 
African humanist consciousness, is confirmed by Maqagi’s analysis of “Mrs Plum” 
(“She’s There” 210).  Maqagi describes Karabo’s determined “planning of entry into 
urban territory” as motivated by a conscious effort to learn more fully by means of the 
boss-servant interaction about the ways of the whites in a way that should empower her 
to co-exist more functionally with white people even in future places of employment 
(210).  Maqagi comments that such a self-planned manner of interaction on the part of 
Karabo reveals “Karabo as being in the subject position” (210).   Maqagi’s description of 
Karabo as being in the “subject position” and her highlighting of Karabo’s search for a 
job in the Johannesburg suburb of Greenside as “consciously planning her entry into this 
urban territory” is worth a comment (210).  Without using the perspective and terms the 
present writer is using in this study, Maqagi in this article is pointing to Mphahlele’s 
revelation of the abrogating quality (by means of Karabo’s “subject position”) on the part 
of groups of people informed by an African humanist consciousness (as symbolised by 
Karabo) in interacting with people of non-Africanist mentality (as symbolised by Mrs 
Plum and Kate).   This has to do with Mphahlele’s stylistic goal.  The moral is revealed 
by the way the interaction of blacks and whites in the apartheid South Africa depicted in 
“Mrs Plum” is not taking place in the way prescribed by the consciousness of the rulers 
(represented by the Plums’ volunteered task of ‘teaching’ Karabo).   The black-white 
interaction is appropriated to happen in the way blacks (whom Karabo represents in the 
story) give it shape – which is what  the verb “planning” means in  Maqagi’s description 
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of Karabo as “consciously planning her entry into this urban territory” (“She’s There” 
210, emphasis added). 
 
As such, the condition of the two women volunteering to teach Karabo their mother 
tongue without suspecting that the structure of Karabo’s mother tongue could be 
responsible for the “mistakes” she makes, is ironical.  In his own way and in illustrating 
features of “Mrs Plum” to pursue Mphahlele’s writings for different emphases, 
Thuynsma has written about Karabo’s position that “She is ‘made’ to eat food that is 
quite foreign to her at the family table with a knife and fork.  She is treated very well, 
paid regularly, and yet there is no real attempt made at understanding her.  She is no 
more than a target for Mrs Plum’s patronising intentions” (“Whirlwind” 238, emphasis 
added).  Teaching something to someone as Mrs Plum and Kate do to Karabo does not 
necessarily have a negative connotation.  Despite the positive connotation teaching per se 
has, teaching something to someone in a patronising manner negatively changes the 
quality of the activity.  It is this patronising, homogenising attitude of Mrs Plum and Kate 
which colours the English language (in the conception of the two white ladies) as if it is 
not amenable to appropriation and thus has only one variety which can be considered 
correct without other equally valuable variants of the same language being possible – 
hence their hellbent efforts to teach Karabo English with the ‘correct’ grammar shown up 
by their  ironically failing to discern that, since she has a home language other than theirs, 
her language ‘errors’ are a result of her following the underlying grammatical rules of her 
own home language (which is Setswana).  Put differently, Karabo’s grammatically 
incorrect English (due to an underlying interference by her native Setswana language and 
culture) is grammatically correct from the appropriating viewpoint that regards all 
varieties of English as correct. Unfortunately Mrs Plum and Kate fail to be ‘taught’ the 
new variety of English by Karabo, because to them Karabo, like the rest of the black 
world, has no worthwhile distinctive identity of her own and therefore, no distinctive 
mother tongue and culture, and nothing important to teach them.  The critic Percy More 
interestingly stretches this aspect of the “Master and Slave (servant) relationship” even 
further by asserting that by the “[according of] more recognition and respect [to animals] 
than black people” in “Mrs Plum”, Mphahlele is “[making] use of the Master/Slave key 
categories such as recognition, reciprocity, dependence-independence, and struggle” (11).  
The significance of such an observation is that it illustrates how Mphahlele counterpoints 
the alienating effect of such apartheid-inflected interpersonal relations with African 
humanist counteraction as displayed by the character Karabo’s non-conformity.  This is 
no different from the way Jackson in the story “The Living and the Dead” in In Corner B 
is depicted as being without identity since that is how he is observed by Stoffel.  Stoffel 
not being a liberal, the similarity of the flaw between him and the Plums in the way they 
treat Jackson and Karabo (respectively) is a revelation that what Mphahlele (being by his 
own admission not racist in his formulation of the concept of African humanism) is 
satirising is neither English liberal nor Afrikaner consciousness at the narrow, almost 
personal level.  What Mphahlele is ironically demonstrating is failure by certain social 
groups or classes to admit that their normative understanding of the world is not the only 
correct one.  This is not to discount perceptions of critics like Ruth Obee when she 
remarks that “[in suggesting blacks are nothing more than animals, Stoffel is] the 
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Afrikaner equivalent of Mrs Plum … [and like Mrs Plum] he also defies easy labels” 
(“The Unbroken Song” 185). 
 
As a point in the continuum of self-assertion, Karabo’s insistence that the Madam should 
buy her a weekend paper with black stories by black writers and her rejection of second-
hand white papers where whatever little is said about black life is said in the voice 
(reflecting the perception) of white journalists, warrants a comment.   This stand she 
takes should be put side by side with Kate’s confession that on Thursday afternoons all 
the black nannies “dress the way of many white madams and girls”, which she thinks 
makes them look really smart (166).  Being one of the black household helpers, by 
making this remark Karabo is confessing that she also behaves like these female domestic 
workers. This manner of dress being a symbol of their cultural assimilation of a European 
lifestyle, it betrays the ambivalence of the women’s position in their present social 
context. However hard they try to resist the temptation of the white culture, the African 
women also do wish to identify culturally with whites.  The author levels the ground in 
making Karabo remark that their Thursday style of dress catches the eyes of white 
women.  Such a reaction by white women is indicative of the paradox of colonisation, in 
which the coloniser wants to assimilate the colonised while at the same time feeling 
threatened by the obliteration of otherness that might result in homogenisation. Such a 
homogenisation is threateningly tied to an undermining of the authority of the colonizer.  
Bhabha refers to the threat and erosion of colonial authority by the mimicking colonised 
when he writes that “The display of hybridity – its peculiar ‘replication’ – terrorizes 
authority with the ruse of recognition, its mimicry, its mockery” (“Signs Taken for 
Wonders” 115).  What he highlights here is that the likeness of manners of the hybridised 
colonised to the coloniser’s is unsetlling because of the inherently usurping bent it bears 
as far as power and authority are concerned (as the terms “peculiar ‘replication’”, “ruse 
of recognition” and “mockery” entail).  The magnitude of such a threat is outlined in 
another remark by Bhahba that “The paranoid threat from the hybrid is finally 
uncontainable because it breaks down the symmetry and duality of self/other, 
inside/outside.” He adds: “In the productivity of power, the boundaries of authority – its 
reality effects – are always besieged by ‘the other scene’ of fixations and phantoms” 
(“Signs Taken for Wonders” 116).  It is the “fixations and phantoms” (to use Bhabha’s 
words) behind Karabo and her fellow female workers’ immaculate western dress on 
Thursdays which instill fear in the white women.  
 
That the white employers are threatened by the black employees once they are rigged out 
on Thursdays is evident from the detail that on such days the black women “dress the 
way of many white madams and girls” and that this makes the black women “catch the 
eyes” of the white women (166). Mphahlele is sarcastically suggesting that the white 
women are possessively aware that, given the opportunity, the black women can 
‘outperform’ them in matters relating to social taste – such as dressing smartly when the 
situation demands. True to the ironic nature of mimicry, the black women looked at thus 
by white madams feel good about it, even though they may be misinterpreting the white 
women’s cultural jealousy as personal envy.   
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Mphahlele being an Afrocentric writer, the black women appear to be stronger than the 
white women as the short story unfolds, because their mimicry of western ways is 
outweighed by their primary identification with African humanism.  It is for this reason 
that when Mrs Plum censures the girl next door for calling  Karabo by the colonial name 
of Jane, Karabo’s response is dismay at the white woman speaking “as if she knew a 
name is a big thing” (Renewal Time 165).   The colonised mindset that would have 
induced someone in Karabo’s position to see Mrs Plum as being at one with her and her 
people’s cause is smothered here by the strong Africanist position which insists on seeing 
Mrs Plum as an “other”.  The progressive ‘decolonisation’ Karabo is experiencing 
enables her to reverse the direction of othering from being invariably from the “center” to 
the “margin”, thus signifying a gradually increasing psychological freedom from 
colonisation.  Mphahlele in this way revolutionises the notion of marginalisation, for the 
ones suffering from this condition at this time are the powerful whites and not the 
politically and socially weaker blacks, as hegemonic order would have it.  Because what 
Karabo says in the dialogue (even though this is reported in monologue form throughout 
the short story) is true not of herself alone but of all blacks in apartheid South Africa; 
dialogue in this story therefore also expresses a public, communal voice.  This public 
voice is permeated by an African humanist consciousness, as revealed by the “english” 
Karabo uses in lieu of English, and shown in her grasp of what is considered moral or 
immoral among blacks. Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, among other writers, distinguish 
English from english in the following words: 
 We need to distinguish between what is proposed as a standard code, 
 English (the language of the erstwhile imperial centre), and the linguistic code, 
 english, which has been transformed and subverted  into several distinctive 
 varieties throughout the world [and has been] employed by different linguistic 
 communities in the post-colonial world. (Empire Writes Back 8) 
This is why the variety of English Karabo uses in “Mrs Plum” is depicted in this study as 
containing a challenging of the “centre” as represented by Mrs Plum and Kate – 
confirming the point that such an approach by Karabo necessarily conveys an African 
humanist mentality.  It is in keeping with this point about Karabo’s dialogue that writers 
like Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin describe their concept of “english” as the  state of a 
communicative system that has been “transformed and subverted” with the purpose of 
appropriating English to carry ontologies recognisably belonging to “others”. 
 
Mphahlele shows that Karabo ends up the victor and that she to some extent calls the 
shots when Mrs Plum goes to collect her from Phokeng after her uncle’s death and burial.  
The story closes after the two dogs Malan and Monty have disappeared (along with the 
love that Mrs Plum lavished on them), so that there is hope that love in the madam’s 
house may now be directed towards human beings instead.  The disappearance of the dog 
Malan also marks the end of a love affair, symbolising failure of liberals to try and 
combine interests with Afrikaner nationalists like the politician Malan.  “Either you are 
on the side of blacks or on that of Afrikaner nationalists” seems to be the point Mphahlele 
is trying to make concerning that stage of South African history.  Both “Mrs Plum” and 
“The Living and the Dead” convey Mphahlele’s message that the solution of the political 
problem in the heyday of apartheid does not lie in liberal humanism, but can only be 
perpetuated by maintaining the apartheid order, or dismantled by means of a take-over by 
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the blacks, who are a majority (as suggested by the claustrophobic atmosphere Mphahlele 
creates in the two short stories, which derives from the large number of blacks swamping 
whites during garden parties and in servants’ backrooms).  Mphahlele depicts the South 
African social and political atmosphere as claustrophobic in “Mrs Plum” and “The Living 
and the Dead”, and defines the claustrophobia (from the point of view of the privileged 
whites) as caused by blacks who overpopulate areas demarcated for white residence.  
Kate’s concern in “Mrs Plum” (Renewal Time) similarly reveals her discomfort at the 
liberal humanism of some of her own people that causes some malaise among the whites, 
as revealed by the narrator Karabo when she says:  “one day I heard Kate speak to her 
mother.  She says I don’t know why you ask so many Africans to the house.  A few will 
do at a time” (181-82).  Comparable to Kate’s standpoint shown in the above quotation, 
Stoffel Visser and Doppie Fourie in “The Living and the Dead” resent the liberalist 
position in Government, which to them comes across as a foolish blindness to the reality 
that such an ideology is leading to an inevitable take-over of government by blacks 
(suggested by the overwhelming presence of blacks in white areas) (33). 
 
While in such stories as “Grieg on a Stolen Piano” and “A Point of Identity” Mphahlele 
manipulates style to juxtapose the typical Afrikaner mentality of the time with the type of 
mindset and cultural profile he has named African humanism, stories like “Mrs Plum” 
seem to show a writer more bent on exposing the impotence of Christian liberalism in its 
attempts to bring about political change in South Africa.    
 
This is the case because Mrs Plum and Kate (as stereotypes) represent collective liberal 
thinking and not just their own private feelings, no less than Stoffel’s apocalyptic tone in 
“The Living and the Dead” represents Afrikaners’ restlessness in the current social and 
political landscape and their conception of the future of South Africa as that in which 
black and white are likely to explode into a conflict much bigger in scale than the mere 
friction at present between mere individuals.  The stereotypical characterisation of Stoffel 
Visser is revealed when he evaluates his role on the political scene as that of someone 
who is “working and sweating to defend ready-made attitudes, stock attitudes that various 
people had each in their own time planted in him: his mother, his father, his brothers, his 
friends, his schoolmasters, his university professors and all the others who claimed him 
as their own” (Renewal Time 37).  The apocalyptic state of Stoffel Visser’s mind 
(symbolising the Afrikaner mentality of the time) is revealed when, in the face of an 
administrative delay ironically brought about by reliance on the domestic services of the 
black man Jackson, the white man (Visser) says in agitation:  
Just what I told these fellows on the commission.  Some of them are just so 
wooden-headed they won’t understand simple things like kaffirs swarming over 
our suburbs, living there, gambling there, breeding there, drinking there, sleeping 
there with girls.  They won’t understand, these stupid fools, until the kaffirs enter 
their houses and boss them about and sleep with white girls.  What’s to happen to 
white civilisation? (33) 
Mphahlele indicates the intensity of the feeling expressed by Stoffel Visser through 
another Afrikaner (Doppie Fourie) in the employ of Government.  Mphahlele explains 
that Doppie Fourie “often hated himself for feeling so inferior.  And all through his 
friend’s miniature oration Doppie’s face showed a deep hurt” (33-34).  This is an 
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indication that the other Afrikaner Doppie Fourie shares Stoffel Visser’s paranoia caused 
by the “liberalist” position of the (apparently opposition party) liberal policies that have 
led to blacks swarming into white residential places.  Blacks are the two Afrikaners’ 
obsession.  The way the two Afrikaner characters maltreat their servants symptomises a 
hatred of the black people.  That is, if we understand that “he who hates has to show his 
hate in appropriate actions and behaviour”, in the way Fanon defines hatred (Black Skin, 
White Masks 53).  The existence of such hatred explains why Mphahlele’s consciousness 
detests apartheid as it is portrayed in this and other stories, for hatred is diametrically 
opposed to the known African humanist value of humane gravitation towards fellow 
humans.  It is behaviour such as this in Doppie Fourie and Stoffel Visser which starkly 
contrasts with the humanism displayed in the action of the black servants in the short 
stories, with which it is juxtaposed. 
 
The story “The Living and the Dead” goes on to portray Stoffel Visser and Doppie Fourie 
as consumerists who put material gain above the sacredness of human life, as shown by 
their interest in their servants’ mechanical performance of menial duties without ever 
caring about the personal lives of the workers.  A similar valuing of material gain above 
the sacredness of human life is shown by the behaviour of the Afrikaner farmers from 
whom the character called Uncle is forced to flee towards the town of Pietersburg (in 
“Grieg on a Stolen Piano” – Renewal Time 114).  Mphahlele describes the dehumanising 
behaviour of the Afrikaner farmers in  the following words: “Those were the savage days 
when the whole white family came and sat on the stoep to watch, for their own 
amusement, African labourers put under the whip” (114) for failing to exert themselves in 
farm labour beyond human capacity. 
 
The railway employee Lebona in “The Living and the Dead” is portrayed as leading a life 
motivated by a philosophy that contrasts with that of the Afrikaner farmers just 
demonstrated in the preceding paragraph.  Lebona displays an African humanist 
prioritising of human life above material concerns.  That is why, unlike the two white 
characters in “The Living and the Dead”, he cannot be associated with attitudes such as 
money-driven expectation that workers must be punctual for work without considering 
such workers’ wellbeing, as well as unconcern about the welfare of people belonging to 
one’s immediate human landscape.  For instance, he expresses horror at the impersonal 
manner in which commuters, in a hurry to get to work, trample over Jackson after he was 
gratuitously assaulted by a group of whites on the train (31).  Such foregrounding of an 
African humanist value system in the opening sections of “The Living and the Dead” 
resembles the way Mphahlele opens “In Corner B” with the following words: “How can 
boys just stick a knife into someone’s man like that?” (141).   Lebona’s consciousness 
conflicts with that of Stoffel Visser (in “The Living and the Dead”), as revealed also by 
his efforts to trace the relatives of the stranger Jackson to deliver a letter that probably 
dropped from Jackson’s pocket when he fell off the train.  Stoffel Visser knows Jackson 
solely in terms of their relationship as boss and servant.  It is only the contents of the 
letter Lebona has brought, the mournful utterances of Jackson’s wife who comes to report 
his disappearance, and his startling discovery of the badly injured Jackson in the servants’ 
quarters that for the first time galvanise Stoffel Visser into looking at Jackson as a fully-
fledged human being who has aged parents back home in Venda, and a wife and children. 
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Mphahlele not only highlights the liberal problem through the conversation of Stoffel 
Visser and Doppie Fourie in “The Living and the Dead”.  To testify to the gravity of the 
inter-racial problem in apartheid South Africa, the character Mrs Plum’s concerns (in the 
short story “Mrs Plum”) are shown as the concerns of the whole liberal establishment.  
Since the story is told by Karabo (the I-narrator) with Mrs Plum as the central character 
of the story, Mrs Plum’s own dialogue is mostly expressed as directed to Karabo.  Mrs 
Plum hardly ever refers to non-whites as blacks without qualifying them (to Karabo) as 
“your people”, as when she says “you know, I like your people, Karabo, the Africans” 
(208).  Mrs Plum’s repeated use (in conversation with Karabo) of the term “your people” 
when referring to blacks by implication identifies Mrs Plum’s own race as “my people”.  
To think in terms of “your people” and “my people” shows that Mrs Plum does not think 
of herself and the socio-political challenges she is facing as personal to her and her 
family, but sees herself as one of her social group and the challenges as shared among her 
fellow liberals.  The converse attitude among blacks as a collective towards legislated 
segregation such as is expressed by the characters Stoffel and Fourie in “The Living and 
the Dead” (as well as Kate in “Mrs Plum”) serves to highlight motivation for the white 
characters to display a malaise as far as living with black Africans is concerned.  One 
autobiographer of Mphahlele’s period, Bloke Modisane, has voiced the flip side of this 
“crisis” of black and white co-existence in the following words: “I cannot live in the 
residential area of my choice; I am committed by the colour of my skin to live in 
segregated ghettos or locations or slums” (Blame Me 308). 
 
Such an exposure of liberal thinking through indications of loathing and contempt for 
blacks as is evident in the conduct of Kate and Mrs Plum (in “Mrs Plum”) is an 
expression of Mphahlele’s dislike of the liberal attitudes displayed by some whites during 
the apartheid period, which he shares with several other African writers.  In the 
expository writing of Ursula Barnett, Mphahlele is quoted as saying that “white 
liberalism … was beginning [since the 1950s] to be stigmatised as paternalism by black 
writers”, and she cites his observation that James Matthews continued beyond the 
bannings of black South African writers in the 1960s and after “to write stories in the 
Drum-school style … deal[ing] with the hypocrisy of white liberalism …” (A Vision of 
Order 21, 23).  Perhaps the above illustration of the similarity of (on the one hand) the 
liberal Kate in “Mrs Plum” and the incarnations of apartheid mentality Fourie and Visser 
in “The Living and the Dead” (on the other), in their opposition to blacks’ desire to live 
in comfortable residential areas like whites, is the best demonstration of the “hypocrisy of 
white liberalism”.  This is because, despite what they profess, in practice such liberals do 
not differ fundamentally from stark proponents of apartheid.  Kate’s protest against Mrs 
Plum’s “[asking] so many Africans to the house” betrays the hatred for blacks no less 
than Fourie and Visser’s remonstrations against “kaffirs swarming over our suburbs” do 
(Renewal Time 33, 181).  That these citations reveal a desire within the oppressed blacks 
to live as luxuriously as the whites is clear.  This is the same constant feeling of desire to 
be given equal treatment with whites which Mphahlele exemplifies in many more scenes 
– as in “Mrs Plum”, when on Thursdays the African maids in the white suburb of 
Greenside “dress the way of many white madams and girls” (Renewal Time 166).  The 
gravity of the white characters’ negative reaction to this desire of the blacks can best be 
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comprehended in the light of Fanon’s observation in these words:  “As soon as I desire I 
am asking to be considered … I demand that notice be taken of my negating activity 
insofar as I … do battle for the creation of a human  world – that is of a world of 
reciprocal recognitions.  He who is reluctant to recognize me opposes me” (Black Skin, 
White Masks 218).  This quotation should serve to remove any doubt that the action of 
the white characters in the two stories opposes the African humanist motives within the 
black characters. 
 
The earlier stories sustain a juxtaposition of the African humanist consciousness with the 
apartheid consciousness by means of dialogue that reveals underlying modes of 
interpreting reality.  Apartheid consciousness within the South African population whose 
living is informed by this mindset (symbolised by characters like Stoffel Visser), in 
Mphahlele’s words includes “a perverse Calvinism, the fear of black revolt, of 
miscegenation and biological extinction” (“The Function of Literature” 419-20).  
Mphahlele’s (earlier) stories that juxtapose the conflict between African humanist and 
apartheid consciousnesses are followed by those that enrich the intended assertion of the 
distinctiveness of Africans by adding transliterary devices by means of which the 
indigenous languages of the Africans creep underneath the surface of what appears to be 
‘normative’ English.  In his more recent stories, the stereotyping of characters who 
symbolise the incongruous world-views of their respective communities intensifies 
Mphahlele’s manoeuvring of the short story form and content to highlight the persistence 
of the African humanist ethos of the peoples distinguished by such a consciousness. 
 
2.2.5 AFRICAN CULTURAL TRACES IN THE SHORT STORIES 
 
Another African humanist (behavioural) aspect depicted in “Grieg on a Stolen Piano” (In 
Corner B) is the explanation that Uncle slaughters a goat for the ancestors and gathers his 
relations whenever he lacks peace of mind (46-47); that he summons a traditional healer 
without hesitation when the need arises, as when something in his financial sphere or in 
the physical well-being of his nephew or himself (47) goes seriously awry; and the 
remark that a black man never starves if he lives among his people, unless there is famine 
(50).  
 
 In “A Point of Identity”, the coloured man Karel Almeida, despite appearing culturally to 
be more white than coloured, amazes the black neighbourhood in the section named 
Corner B when he calls a “witchdoctor” to cure his foot.  This points to the 
counterdiscursive effect of black culture on western culture even as western culture also 
affects black culture.   Belief in witchcraft, the holding of a service in honour of ancestral 
spirits and the practice of consulting diviners, herbalists or any type of traditional healers 
on any matter have been ridiculed as heathen and barbaric within the western Christian 
context of the apartheid period.  Karel Almeida’s belief and involvement in these customs 
is thus a kind of behaviour which counters discourse from the (then) apartheid “centre” 
which had an opposite notion of these customs as heathen and barbaric.  To practise your 
traditional religion quietly and simply should be seen as a sign of greater self-confidence, 
for it is self-confidence that will tell you that you do not need to elaborate and debate 
your cultural customs with members of societies whose customs are opposed to yours.  
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Mphahlele refers to this attitude as a sine qua non in the self-definition of the Africans 
whose collective cultural practices are imbued with an African humanist consciousness. 
With this story falling in the category of those that foreground the apartheid context, the 
traditional healer attending to Karel turns out to be a fatal fraud with Mphahlele subtly 
blaming such vile desecration of a hallowed cultural practice on the evils of apartheid 
rather than on the quack himself.   Nor does Mphahlele maneuvre the short story in such 
a way that the reader is made to put the emphasis on Karel’s embracing of black culture.  
Mphahlele’s description of Africans encompassing a section of the South African 
population then called “coloureds”, and Karel Almeida being described in the short story 
as a “coloured”, there is no way the consultation of the traditional healer can be 
considered as appropriately (or predictably) failing because he is experimenting 
dangerously with ‘foreign’ practices.  It is in order to bring out the African identity of 
Karel Almeida that Mphahlele (through the mouth of the narrator in “A Point of 
Identity”) remarks: “but the Hotnotte, Boesmans and Kaffirs and Coolies are all frying in 
the same pan, boy, and we’re going to sink or swim together, you watch” (Renewal Time 
95). In this way Karel Almeida’s move in consulting a witch doctor is a proper move.   
By mentioning that the next door neighbour Karel and he are “frying in the same pan”, 
the narrator means that they are suffering together under apartheid as Africans.  
According to Mphahlele’s definition of African humanism, traditional medicine men and 
women (according to African cultures) are endowed with the specialist capacity to 
unravel mysteries that an ordinary man or woman may not possess and as such the 
healers must be consulted each time the individual’s balance with the surrounding natural 
forces seems to have been upset.  In this way, Karel Almeida cannot be blamed for 
consulting the ‘witchdoctor’ unless it is proven that he knew the service provider was a 
fake. 
 
The way Mphahlele describes the setting of the story against the background in terms of 
which Karel Almeida’s actions should be judged, the blame for his mishap is shown to 
rest squarely on apartheid’s system of social engineering through pieces of legislation 
like the Land Act of 1913 and the pass laws, which prevented the creation of social 
conditions for blacks that would encourage a stable identity – and that would be  
accompanied by such corollaries as a stable economy and equally-distributed primary 
health care resources in the same way as these were made available to whites.  Mphahlele 
pieces together where Karel Almeida comes from before fate deposits him amidst the 
residents of Corner B, who ceaselessly speculate about who and what Karel is and has 
been, in these words: 
 Me my mudder was African, my farder was Portugalese, Karel often said in 
 conversation, not de Portugalese what come an fuck an’ den dey vamoose off to 
 Lourenco Marques.  An he die sudden, man, just like you blow a candle out, T.  
 [My mother] died in Sibasa, man, way up nort’ Tranvaal [because she] didn’t like 
 Jo’burg not dis much, so I took her back to Sibasa … I’m not a Hottentot or a 
 Bushman, I’ve got European blood straight from de balls no zigzag business 
 about it … But serious now, true’s God, I’ve always lived wit’ Africans an’
 never felt watchimball, er, discomfortable or ashamed … Damn it all man, if my 
 farder slept wit mudder an’ dey made me dat’s dey business.  (Renewal Time 95)  
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The ambient imagery of authoritarianism constituted by references to such items as 
reclassification documents, a marriage certificate, a residential permit and a 
superintendent succeeds in foregrounding the apartheid system.  It does so by creating the 
choking atmosphere which Mphahlele blames implicitly for the deaths (spiritually or 
otherwise) of Africans like Karel Almeida.  Such an indictment against apartheid is 
implied also in the narrator’s conversation one day with the neighbour Karel, when he 
says: “I can’t understand why you cycle to work and back instead of taking a bus.  Just 
look how the rain beats on you and the wind almost freezes you in winter” (95).  When 
the narrator in the latter parts of “A Point of Identity” tells the reader that “death came 
and took [Karel Almeida] away from us”, the image of the man cycling to work and back 
whether in rain or freezing cold and the cruelty of a system whose inhumane policies are 
responsible for this kind of difficult survival are bound to be inextricably entangled in the 
mind of the reader (Renewal Time 109). 
 
The character Lebona – allegorically delineated in “The Living and the Dead” as a 
personification of the co-operative spirit of the black community that pass daily through 
the conduit of the train system on their way to and from work in the whiteman’s world – 
displays an African humanist trait that leaves the symbol of oppressive Afrikanerdom (in 
the person of Stoffel Visser) dumbfounded.  After Lebona has picked up the letter from 
the injured Jackson next to a railway line, he takes the trouble to trace the employer, with 
the hope that the employer would then be able to trace the supposedly dead owner of the 
envelope.  Stoffel marvels at such care taken on behalf of a man Lebona does not even 
know; at the intimate compassion with which Lebona describes the helplessness he felt 
when the man was trampled underneath the railway stairway (In Corner B 91).  The 
trampling that has been initiated by a group of white male commuters symbolises the 
invincibility of the apartheid system in those days, which is by extension symbolised by 
the might of the train itself as a creation that does not wait for anyone who falls off its 
steps to stand up before it resumes motion. 
 
The impatience with which Stoffel listens to (the servant) Jackson’s wife when she comes 
to enquire why her husband never came back from taking the children to the zoo (90), 
and also the impatience and contempt with which Stoffel listens to the news-bearer 
Lebona (88-90) are etched deeply on the mind of the reader by Mphahlele.  When Stoffel 
later finds the bandaged Jackson in a room, the latter explains how he reacted naturally to 
an unwarranted insult by a white man on the train, after which he was brutally assaulted.  
Instead of sympathising with his servant, Stoffel is angered by the servant’s refusal to 
‘know his place’ in the South African hierarchy in daring to protest against (and punish) 
the white man’s contemptuous treatment. Stoffel resolves to continue keeping Jackson 
working for him like a machine, due to his (the white man’s) own convoluted 
consciousness – as already explained in the earlier parts of this study.  The story closes as 
Stoffel hurries to dispatch a document to parliament in which stratagems intended to 
intensify the rules of racially demarcated Group Areas (and other segregation laws) are 
outlined after reminding himself in an overtly “othering” self-address that “He was a 
white man, and he must be responsible.  To be white and to be responsible were one and 
the same thing” (95).    
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Such a juxtaposition of Lebona’s humanity with Stoffel’s inhumanity serves to heighten 
the vividness of such inhumanity in Stoffel, revealing it as a condition much more wide-
spread than the temperament of just one individual. By Stoffel’s own admission (in the 
above conversation), the conditions behind the brutality meted out to Jackson should be 
blamed on the legacy of apartheid, considering that Stoffel is a mere symbol of apartheid 
culture.  The pessimistic message of the short story seems to be the futility of any attempt 
by the black man to accept the white man as someone whose common humanity can be 
relied on.  In the allegory of Lebona and the woman commuter (symbolising the white 
regime) who stares with detachment while Lebona is deeply troubled by memories of the 
incident which the letter in his pocket revives, Mphahlele conveys exactly this message.   
 
It is significant that the woman just gazes at Lebona and the letter he is carrying with no 
interest at all in the contents of the letter: “The letter in his pocket.  It wasn’t hers – no, it 
couldn’t be” (80).  Hopes of a possible romance or marriage are dashed by Lebona’s 
observation that “she just sat and looked at you for no reason; probably because of an idle 
mind” (80).  This allegory thus strengthens the idea of apartheid as a system one cannot 
change or correct, but needs to dismantle.  The pessimism of such a message is tempered 
by Mphahlele’s reference to the woman symbolising the unconcern of the apartheid 
government of the time in response to the plight of the blacks – without emphasising the 
colour of her skin. This de-racialisation of the apartheid system should be seen as 
Mphahlele’s consistency regarding his practice of naming or not naming anyone 
“African”.  Mphahlele has written that white people can be Africans if they “earn” the 
kind of Africanness he has conceptualised.  In other words, it is not the whiteness of the 
people who are behind the apartheid consciousness that matters; what matters is the 
conflicting consciousness in the agents of apartheid.  Fortunately such a conflicting 
consciousness can alter with time and evolve towards an African humanism which (by 
Mphahlele’s own definition) is a pliable, accommodative state of mind and way of life.  
But the people driven by apartheid thinking will have to decide this on their own, for the 
reason that Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism is not a proselytizing one and 
seeks to colonise no one.  Such a qualification of the method of dismantling apartheid as 
neither violent nor militaristic but rather an accommodation of whoever undergoes a 
voluntary change of consciousness is in line also with Mphahlele’s views on the 
distinctive roles of the writer and the political activist. 
 
The consistency mentioned earlier in the stances and concepts articulated throughout 
Mphahlele’s expository writing is evident also in his narrative writings, as regards the 
aspects this study has already demonstrated.  For example, the point on which I disagree 
with Maqagi (namely her implicit interpretation of Mphahlele’s writings as an 
affirmation of the point that traditional African cultures sanction the abuse of women) is 
demonstrated in “A Ballad of Oyo”.  True to the Africanist view Mphahlele adheres to, 
that sees women as pillars of society who must be handled delicately and held in 
reverence, Ishola’s own sister rails against Ishola’s apparent weakness in the following 
words: 
 You are everbody’s fool, are you not?  Lie still like that and let him come and sit 
 and play drums on you and go off and get drunk on palm wine, come back and 
 beat you, scatter the children – children of his palm-wine-stained blood 
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 (spitting), like a hawk landing among chicks, then you have no one to blame only 
 your stupid head (pushing her other breast forcibly into her baby’s mouth for 
 emphasis) (78)  
When the speaker here ruminates on a serious if not life-threatening situation while at the 
same time “pushing her other breast forcibly into her baby’s mouth” she reaffirms a 
woman’s position as nutritious for the sustenance and preservation of society.  To refer to 
Ishola as “everybody’s fool” is a revelation of the remonstrating sister’s sensitivity to 
popular opinion in the village of Oyo concerning the deviant manner in which the 
husband Balogun treats his wife.  As the rural Nigerian residents of Oyo gossip about it, 
the majority criticise Ishola’s reaction to her husband’s cruelty as foolish, hence Ishola’s 
loving sister in the above quote refers to her as “everybody’s fool” – meaning that 
everybody is calling Ishola a fool for not insisting on rightful treatment by the husband 
(Balogun).  That is why the sister here focuses on Ishola’s improper reaction rather than 
on Balogun’s action.  That this is so is revealed by the sister declaring in the above 
quotation, “then you have no one to blame only your stupid head”.  The significance of 
such a remark is subtle, reporting that neither the closely-knit community of Oyo nor 
their African culture is to blame for Ishola’s unfortunate situation.  This is because the 
sister serves as a sounding board of the opinion of the society, whose expression is 
communal and thus informed by traditional customs and values.  As the sister reports in 
her deceptively individualist voice, members of the society do not approve of Ishola’s 
maltreatment by her husband, because their culture does not sanction it.   
 
It is this aspect of the story on which the critic Mbulelo Mzamane appears to have 
misjudged Mphahlele’s depiction of popular censuring of Balogun’s uncustomary 
conduct by the African community of Oyo as “connivance against [Ishola] between her 
husband’s people and traditional authority” (“The Nigerian Short Stories of Ezekiel 
Mphahlele” 50).  That the sister represents the communal voice in the short story (as I 
argue in the preceding paragraph) is supported by Mzamane’s discerning observations 
that “[Oyo] is one of two areas considered to have been the cradle of Yoruba 
civilisation”; and that “Ishola belongs to the tradition of West African market women, 
famous for their aggressive lifestyle but known also for their long suffering” (“The 
Nigerian Short Stories of Ezekiel Mphahlele” 48, 49).  In this way the condition of Oyo 
being steeped in African cultures and the stereotypically Africanist delineation of the 
woman character Ishola are affirmed.  What seems to escape the attention of Mzamane is 
that in the same vein, Ishola’s sister is only superficially individualist in her dialogue 
while in reality she is communal in her pronounced disapproval of Balogun’s disposition.  
This study demonstrates elsewhere that it is the nature of Mphahlele’s concept of African 
humanism to conceive of African women as sacred economic pillars on which society is 
supported as well as the fountain of a people’s perpetual regeneration and self-
conservation.  The two elements of the proclivity of traditional, rural life to be a better 
custodian of Africanness and the revered position of women in African societies are in 
keeping with what Mphahlele approves as the salvaging aspects of African humanism 
that ensure its survival.  As such, it would not make sense for Mphahlele to use 
characterisation of the women in this story (that is steeped in African humanist substance 
-- as this paragraph attempts to clarify) while at the same time failing to affirm African 
humanism.  Despite both Mphahlele and Mzamane belonging to the Afrocentric mould 
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like most of their fellow African writers, Mzamane ironically tends in his interrogation of 
this short story to support a Eurocentric position that would divest any African custom or 
mores of value.  This is brought out when Mzamane judges that “the stranglehold of 
tradition is particularly paralysing” or that the story should “champion the rights of 
women in [the] male-dominated society” (“The Nigerian Short Stories of Ezekiel 
Mphahlele” 48, 52).  What should not be missed is that the prominence of male 
characters in the story is just a fact of the innocuous patriarchal nature of the society 
about which it is written.  They are not a sign of the male characters’ culturally-
determined chauvinistic strain as Mzamane unfortunately seems to suggest.  Unless the  
traditional role of men in African societies were positive (which Mzamane 
acknowledges), it cannot be true that the traditional leader “Baba Dejo decides to chart 
the middle course, a decision that is in keeping with his traditional role” which demands 
that as a father figure to the whole community “the first duty of a patriarch in tradition, in 
cases of matrimonial discord, is to effect a reconciliation and only when all else has failed 
can he sanction a divorce” (“The Nigerian Short Stories of Ezekiel Mphahlele” 51).  It is 
true that Baba Dejo’s integrity in deciding on the matter of divorce between Ishola and 
Balogun is harmonious with the traditional role of a traditional leader.  Such a 
characterisation corresponds with Mphahlele’s approach of weaving aspects of his 
concept of African humanism affirmatively into the fabric of his fiction and 
autobiography.  This is the case because Baba Dejo’s way of handling the discord 
between the husband and wife is in keeping with the African humanist propensity of 
seeking harmony with fellow humans and the universe rather than advocating 
disharmony. 
 
All the same, it comes as no surprise that the theorist Mzamane falls into the trap of 
examining Mphahlele’s works through a feminist filter.  Using only female characters as 
an outlet of societal opinion on the matter of Ishola (highlighted in the story through 
remarks by Ishola’s sister and the women’s continual chattering as they sell their wares 
daily at the Oyo market) could lead one to misinterpret such protests as feminist.  That is 
why it is important to investigate whether the male section of the society takes sides with 
the male culprit, Balogun.  It should be borne in mind that, consistently with Mphahlele’s 
manipulation of characterisation already demonstrated in this study, the opinion of any 
male character, too, should be understood to be communal as opposed to individual. 
 
When Ishola visits the leader of traditional rulers, Dejo, in order to motivate why she 
should be granted a divorce, Dejo listens intently to her account of Balogun’s unmanly 
deportment as recounted by the wife, Ishola.  Dejo then responds in the following words: 
 So he drinks himself stupid.  I know there are certain places in Oyo where you 
 can hear the name of Balogun spoken as if he were something that smells very 
 bad.  So he drinks himself stupid until he is too flabby to do his work in bed, a-
 ah! … If a man gets too drunk to hoe a field another man will and he shall regret, 
 he will see … But a man who comes home only as a he-goat on heat, and not as a 
 helper and father is useless …  Animals look for food for their mates and their 
 brood, why cannot a man? (85) 
As a sounding board not only of the male section of the Oyo community but even more 
importantly as head of the traditional ruling class, Dejo’s reponse does not sanction the 
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male character Balogun’s unmanly behaviour.  The African values within Oyo society are 
revealed: that substance abuse is culturally unacceptable (shown by censure in the  words 
“drinks himself stupid”); that a man, as head of family, should strive to build himself a 
good reputation in the eyes of society (revealed by the censorious tone of the words 
“name of Balogun spoken as if he were something that smells very bad”); that a man 
must perform in bed as that is one of the manly roles according to expectations of the 
society (as it is revealed by the tone of disapproval in “too drunk to hoe a field” in which 
“field” is a metaphor for a wife, associated among others with the societal regard of a 
woman as an economic pillar that nourishes the nation in renewed cycles, like the field as 
seasons rotate, for its survival); and that a man must provide moral and material support 
for his wife and children in addition to performing the other roles (as the the words “not 
as a helper and father” express Dejo’s dissociation from the unmanliness displayed in the 
male character Balogun). 
 
The similarity of stance between the male character Dejo and the female character 
Ishola’s sister confirms that opinion on the errant behaviour of Balogun is motivated 
neither by male chauvinism nor feminism, but that it is informed by the African humanist 
value system common to members of both genders within the Oyo community.  In other 
words, an African female character may deceptively seem to act out of an individualist 
feminism while in truth she is acting out of an African humanist consciousness.  African 
women are expected to take initiative and even lead men in finding the solution of a 
crisis, as revealed by proverbs such as mmagongwana o swara thipa ka bogaleng 
(meaning “a female grabs a sharp blade by her own bare hands [while men run away out 
of cowardice]”). 
 
Such an Africanist conception of the role of a woman in the family and in the broader 
community explains why Ishola’s sister censures Balogun’s behaviour in the same way as 
the male section of society does, yet in a braver tone than that of the male characters, as 
in the following comments:  
I would never allow a man to come stinking of drink near me in the blankets 
(spitting) … Are you a daughter of my father? …  Just a black drunken swine that 
is what he is.  A swine is even better because it can look for rubbish to eat.  
Balogun does not know what people are he would not go a long way with me no 
he would not he does not know people.  Eat sleep and lay a pile of dung, eat sleep 
and lay a pile of dung while men of his age group are working: the woman who 
gave birth to that man … (87) 
The communal nature of the sister’s diatribe is reinforced by some features of the above 
quotation that add to those already revealed in the comment by Deju.  The expression 
“while men of his age group are working” brings to the surface the African humanist trait 
of viewing society as consisting of a social hierarchy in which respect includes the ability 
to distinguish among people according to their age groups or regiments or traditional 
initiation schoolmates – a point that has been made by writers like Kaunda (1962).  
Senior citizens belonging to certain age groups are not expected to work and that is why 
Ishola’s sister does not omit to indicate that in the case of Balogun the contravention of 
social code is not the blanket failure to work in order to provide for his family.  The 
 142
actual transgression of community expectations lies in the fact that Balogun is not 
working “while men of his age group are [still] working”. 
 
One more such consistently presented African humanist aspect is traditional respect for 
death.  Traditional respect for death is still noticeable (similarly to the way it has been 
represented, for example, in the discussion of “Grieg on a Stolen Piano”) in the short 
story set in exile, “A ballad of Oyo”.  In the short story the abused woman Ishola’s 
elopement with Lijadu is reversed as soon as Lijadu announces that Ishola’s father-in-law 
Mushin died the previous night, crying out about the loss of his grandchildren.   Ishola at 
an earlier stage of the story expresses shock when her sister’s exasperation with 
Balogun’s wrong conduct threatens to overlook customary recognition of the borderline 
between the living and the dead.  She protests in the following words upon suspecting the 
sacriligeous direction her sister’s remarks threaten to take: “Sister!  Leave that poor 
woman to lie quiet in her grave”, to which the contrite sister responds: “I will but not that 
wine-bloated creature called Balogun” (87, emphasis added).  In the same way, Ishola’s 
father-in-law Mushin invokes ancestral spirits later on when he chastises his worthless 
son for neglecting paternal responsibilities and maltreating his wife:  “When are you 
going to wake up you useles boy, he gasped, as he had often done  before.  What kind of 
creature was given me for a son! What does your mother say from the other world to see 
you like this!” (86, emphasis added). 
 
This aspect of African humanism in which ancestors are, inter alia, piously invited to join 
in the affairs of the living in times of tribulation or jubilation features in a more sustained 
manner in Mphahlele’s novels after being introduced in short stories such as this. 
 
2.2.6 MPHAHLELE’S USE OF STYLE TO REPRESENT PERSONALITY TRAITS AND 
 INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT 
 
In proposing, defining and refining the concept he is now associated with, that of African 
humanism, Mphahlele has used certain theoretical formulations as well as declared 
specific stances on sociological issues, which may be attributed to him personallly 
although they tackle universal topics.  These are his descriptions of “resonance”,  
“tyranny of place”, “tyranny of time”, “perspective”, “irony”, “Zionist and messianic 
religious practice” and “the strength of women”. It is not enough to examine the presence 
of aspects of the concept Mphahlele calls African humanism without an investigation of 
Mphahlele’s adherence to the ideas and stances enumerated above in his narrative 
writings.  To succeed – in expository writing – in defining and announcing the intention 
to use certain tools and to admit to adopting certain positions on social issues is different 
from being seen in narrative writing to apply those tools and to adhere to the stances 
taken on social issues.  Writing on the relationship between a writer and his work in 1975 
in “The African Critic”, Mphahlele confirms that “a useful poet should be able to let us 
enter his private world and make us feel it is ours” (“Exile” 387).  This statement is 
Mphahlele’s admission that unless he is failing as an artist, his private literary theories 
and personal opinion on certain social issues should be an organic part of his works while 
at the same time these should not detract from the public nature of what he conceptualises 
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as African humanism.  His personality traits thus dovetail organically with aspects of his 
philosophy of African humanism. 
 
As parts of any study are separated only for convenience while in reality they constitute 
an organic whole, the presence of such tools and stances in Mphahlele’s poems and short 
stories could not but be pointed out when other features were explained.  At this point of 
the study the intention is to distill some of those that have already been subsumed in 
preceding analyses in order to highlight their presence in Mphahlele’s writings in their 
own right; and to indicate at the same time those that may have escaped notice.  A 
description of the presence of some of the features will not be repeated where it is felt 
that they have been dealt with sufficiently elsewhere in this study – aspects like 
Mphahlele’s personal description and representation of “perspective”, “irony”, “the 
tyranny of place” and “the tyranny of time”. 
 
Through individual definition and adoption, the features enumerated above have now 
acquired the status of the standard delineations of Mphahlele’s distinct writerly 
personality as manifested in his writing.  If this is so, it makes sense to probe whether the 
plot and themes of Mphahlele’s poems, short stories and novels unfurl as determined by 
such personality features.  It is pertinent also to identify ways in which these personality 
features feature as some of the aspects of African humanism within Mphahlele’s broad 
theoretical framework. It is not as if this study rambles from studying Mphahlele the 
writer to studying Mphahlele the person.  Africanist writers such as Ngugi have, at the 
general level, argued that a writer’s life cannot be separated from the material of his or 
her writing, or from his or her involvement in the challenges that face the people he or 
she writes about and writes for. Mphahlele himself has admitted to a blurring of any 
division between his life as a person and that which he lives as a writer or social activist.  
Some writers on Mphahlele’s creative writing (such as Thuymsma) have also remarked 
about such an enmeshment of Mphahlele the person with Mphahlele the writer because of 
the strong autobiographical element in his fictional writings. 
 
It is therefore not irrelevant in any study of Mphahlele’s fiction to look for aspects that 
constitute Mphahlele’s writerly personality as far as it reflects itself in the style of his 
fiction. 
 
2.2.6.1 THE FABRICATION OF RESONANCE 
 
Apart from the other stylistic techniques of Mphahlele already dwelt on in this study, the 
Africanising device (as employed for example in “Grieg on a Stolen Piano” – in In 
Corner B) functions through the creation of resonance.  Resonance has already been 
described in this study as Mphahlele’s way of maintaing myth and other reflective modes 
mirroring African identity, by means of which African readers relate to their lives as 
refracted in his fiction writing.  Such African readers’ lives are refracted rather than 
reflected, as the depiction is invariably accompanied by African humanist inflections that 
indicate the distinction between African lifestyle and the lifestyles of people in other 
cultural clusters. Resonance (bearing in mind that Mphahlele defines it differently from 
many other writers in whose works one finds resonance) should guide the African readers 
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towards creative solutions of the sociological problems they face, while at the same time 
sensitising them to the trail of their distinctive cultural identity as it has survived through 
the ages.   
 
In “Grieg on a Stolen Piano” Mphahlele establishes resonance through the mythical 
stories interspersed in the opening paragraphs (38) and in the contextualising image of 
the malaita or young men marching in white shorts and tennis shoes for a fist-fighting 
sport in an open spot near Bantule location, and then herded back to the hostels by 
mounted white policemen for amusement.  The image of the malaeta is an 
interconnecting one in that it serves not as a central part of the story, but recedes to the 
fringes of the story for the role of merely creating an atmosphere of a persistent 
repetitiveness that is Mphahlelesque.  The origins of the hybridised institution of malaeta 
among urbanised African are actually to be found in rural herdboys’ traditional sport tied 
to the traditonal ways of preparing young boys for adulthood.  Mphahlele is referring to 
these origins of the  malaita urban sport when he states in Exiles and Homecomings (for 
instance) that “On moonlit nights we used to converge on the sandy banks of the 
Leshoane river to have the regular fist fights in which country boys establish a pecking 
order” (34-5).  The indispensable grounding of fiction within the framework of   
distinctive cultural institutions creates resonances with which the African reader from the 
northern parts of South Africa identifies, in much the same way that the cultural deja vu 
and colourful description of locale in the much later novel Father Come Home does.   
Resonance is created again when commentary by Mphahlele’s busybody characters like 
Seleke’s cousin and Keledi (“Down the Quiet Street”) and the servant Dick (“Mrs Plum”) 
lend an oral texture to the prose and invoke traditional oral narrative devices. 
 
Differently from Mphahlele, the Drum writer Can Themba (The World of Can Themba) 
creates an atmosphere of Africanness by means of a superficial if not distorted reference 
to African customs.  In “The Will to Die”, for example, Can Themba makes a lame 
justification of the morally deviant teacher Foxy’s actions by a distorted reference to the 
African traditional custom of polygamy and the paying of a bride price, in the following 
words: 
 If you are a school-teacher, you can only get out of a situation like  that if you 
 marry the girl, that is if you value your job.  Foxy promptly married – another 
 girl!  But he was smart enough to give Betty’s parents fifty pounds.  That, in 
 the hideous system of lobola, the system of bride-price, made Betty his second 
 wife.  And no authority on earth could accuse him of seduction.  (50) 
 
To refer to the sacredly-held African custom of paying magadi (in Sotho) or lobola (in 
Nguni) as “the hideous system of lobola” is indicative of the unscrupulous manner in 
which Drum writers like Can Themba attempted to convince their black township readers 
of the supposed ‘backwardness’ of some of African traditional practices.  A similarly 
condescending attitude towards traditional cultures (represented in this example by 
attitudes towards the mother tongue) is discernible in the autobiography of another Drum 
writer, Todd Matshikiza, when he writes with evident pride that his Xhosa-speaking 
family allowed an atmosphere in which his erudite father would exhort them “in English” 
(which was their “adopted home language”) to “sing the English song” (Chocolates for 
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My Wife 29).  Such an adoption of English as a home language in a Xhosa family is elitist 
because it lacks the necessary attachment to indigenous languages displayed by ordinary 
Xhosa people.  That is why, in Nat Nakasa’s 1964 autobiographical (journalistic) piece 
about the independence of Xhosaland’s Transkei, one illiterate Member of Parliament 
who is a tribal chief gripes that “the Government have turned [their] Southern Sotho into 
fanagalo” in that “children are made to write what they don’t speak” (The World of Nat 
Nakasa 55, 56).  Traditional leaders being custodians of traditional customs that are 
embraced by their subjects who are mainly ordinary people, the sentiments of the chief 
quoted above is an indication of the value attached by the masses to the use of indigenous 
languages in their everyday life.  The influence of Todd Matshikiza’s home with its elitist 
leanings shown above could be responsible for the elitist tone of his writings of the Drum 
period.  However, the elitism found in other Drum writers like Can Themba (exemplified 
by his dim view of African traditions in the short story outlined above) can be taken as 
evidence of elitist orientations among some members of black urban residential areas like 
Sophiatown (and Queenstown, as in the case of Matshikiza’s family), endorsed by some 
Drum writers (unlike Mphahlele). 
 
Perhaps looking down upon traditional cultures is one of the negative aspects of what 
some Drum writers may have wanted to define as the “Sophiatown Renaissance” – as 
referred to by Essop Patel in the prefaces of both The World of Can Themba (2) and The 
World of Nat Nakasa (x).   But Mphahlele (though one of the Drum writers) does not 
conform to this aspect of   the “Sophiatown Renaissance”, which is probably responsible 
for his denigration by those like the critic Michael Chapman who seem to endorse the 
move by some Drum writers mobilising against the “retribalizing mentality” of members 
of the intelligentsia like Mphahlele with his “sometimes austere standards of African 
worth” (The Drum Decade 201, 214).   The disparity in temperament and thinking 
between the elitist Drum writers and Mphahlele explains their disparate approaches to 
social analysis pointed to above.  While Mphahlele is known for asserting the soundness 
of African identity, other Drum writers like Can Themba and Arthur Maimane go down 
in history as Africans who snobbishly “claimed that [they] could speak no African 
language” (The Drum Decade 191).   Even more startlingly, Bloke Modisane “sought to 
stand apart from what he saw as the undifferentiated mass of black people and cultivate 
his [elitist] individuality” (206).   That the “Sophiatown Renaissance” as a writers’ circle 
did exist is confirmed by commentators such as Ursula Barnett:  “For the English writers, 
Sophiatown in Johannesburg became the centre of literary  activities until this area 
ceased to exist in 1953.  Writers, including Todd  Matshikiza, Ezekiel Mphahlele, 
Lewis Nkosi and Bloke Modisane, formed a  coterie which met to discuss literature” (A 
Vision of Order 16).  It is, however, some aspects of the “Sophiatown Renaissance” other 
than elitist affectation which Mphahlele partly conforms to and actualises in a manner 
differing from that of his contemporaries.  Other Drum writers, for instance, encouraged 
the kind of literary attitude in which “everything that went before in African literature 
was discarded as being crusadingly Christian or unacceptably romantic” and the writers 
revolted “against what they conceived as the naïve and simple-minded generation” of 
earlier Africans “just as the black Americans had revolted against the concept of Uncle 
Tom many years earlier” (A Vision of Order 16).  Belonging to the so-called 
“Sophiatown Renaissance” does not point to any curtailment of each writer’s freedom to 
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pursue writing in his or her individual way.  While Mphahlele and other Afrocentric 
writers like Achebe and Ngugi (already cited in this study) admitted to the need to 
discard some of the traditional practices that are hideous, there is not a totalising 
condemnation of everything traditionally African as ‘hideous’.  It is this difference 
between Mphahlele and the other Drum writers which prompts him to assert “the 
survivals of tradition we see in urban African life” (“The Fabric” 154).  In Said’s terms, 
Mphahlele as a beginner like all other theorists who should be seen as beginners in their 
own right is driven by the impulse “to begin again rather than to take up writing dutifully 
at a designated point and in a way ordained by tradition; … to write in and as an act of 
discovery rather than out of respectful obedience to established truth” (“Conclusion: 
Vico” 379).  To compromise his personal writerly character by conforming servilely to 
the biases of the “Sophiatown Renaissance” as revealed in the attitudes of contemporaries 
like Matshikiza, Modisane and Nakasa would be “obedience to established truth” rather 
than “to write in and as an act of discovery” (in Said’s terms). 
 
There are further distinctions betweeen Mphahlele and his contemporaries of the Drum 
decade.  Like most good writers (including Mphahlele) do, Can Themba in “The Will to 
Die” (as quoted above), does create resonance.  But the resonance he creates is that of 
decadence among black township people probably caused to some extent by the 
repressive laws of apartheid, in which Africans interact with colonisation as peoples 
without any sound culturally-defined consciousness.  The theme of problems facing the 
educated African during apartheid (in “The Will to Die”)  is handled by highlighting the 
dimness of the subculture among the educated African township men or women (such as 
lack of work ethic in Foxy), without any sound recreation of African ethics against which 
unethical behaviour can be judged.  In a manner evincing this flaw, Casey Motsisi’s 
“Riot” (Casey & Co) illustrates the sensitivity of the educated African township man or 
woman towards the injustice of apartheid through the dialogue of a policeman during a 
pass raid, who explains that he is arresting one of the “educated tsotsis” because he “has 
no pass and he’s cheeky” in saying that the policeman has “no right to ask him for a pass 
when he’s in bed” (82).  The same theme receives attention in Mphahlele’s “Grieg on a 
Stolen Piano” and hinges on Uncle’s debauched behaviour, yet with a clear indication of 
Uncle’s African humanist consciousness against which the degree of his behavioural 
deviation can be gauged.  The message from writers like Themba is thus one that may be 
interpreted as calling upon fellow Africans to be assimilated into modern western cultures 
that contain the lure of urbanised lifestyles – suggesting that such ‘new’ cultures should 
at all cost replace ‘barbaric’ traditional customs.  In other words, the unethical conduct of 
characters like Foxy (in Can Themba’s “The Will to Die”) should be judged within the 
framework of the  ‘new, superior’ township culture which itself is nondescript.  Unlike 
what happens in Mphahlele’s writings, the alterity of the Africans in the fiction of some 
Drum writers like Can Themba is unmediated by any distinctive traditional consciousness 
of their own.  That is why in the passage quoted above Can Themba goes on to regret that 
“no authority on earth could accuse [Foxy] of seduction”.  Can Themba as author in this 
statement conveys regret that (due to the barrier of “hideous” customs) Africans like 
Foxy can get away with crimes such as the normatively defined one of ‘seduction’ (which 
according to his sloppy hybridity can be appreciated as a crime only from the dominant 
culture of the coloniser). 
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In this way it can be seen that the personalised narrative patterns of Mphahlele (as 
distinguished from the plane in which he merely shares them with some writers as 
universally-used literary devices because of a common Africanness) form the very 
texture of Mphahlele’s literary style — as they do also in the autobiographies and novels 
(to which this study turns later).  
 
2.2.6.2 THE AFRICANIST ABROGATION  OF WESTERN CHRISTIANITY 
 
Mphahlele’s novels and short stories reveal a dialectical synthesis between western 
Christianity and so-called traditional religions, as practised today mostly (but not 
exclusively) by large numbers of black Africans all over the continent and in the African 
diaspora.  This existential trait is characteristic of African humanism – existential in 
keeping with the “strategic essentialism” that is the result of group shapings by the 
environment through various historical periods.  That my interpretation of Mphahlele’s 
concept as existential and strategically essentialist is correct can be deduced from 
Mphahlele’s statement that he “always take[s] the empirical view in such matters” as 
theoretical constructs that define African existence and his “essays are therefore 
exploratory …” (“My Destiny” 435).  In exploring the religious practices among African 
people in their various cultures, some Afrocentric writers like James (1954), Hlophe 
(2002) and Asante (2004) have gone as far as stating that semblances of Christianity that 
are discernible in such religious practices by Africans are due to such Africans’ 
rediscovery of their own ancient religion on which Christianity was modelled by its 
founders. 
 
Though Mphahlele nowhere conforms explicitly to views by extremist Afrocentric 
writers like the ones cited above – who have written that Christianity started in Africa 
before it came back affected by western culture — the  sustained  representation of 
practices of Christianity as appropriated in Zionist sects by the characters in Mphahlele’s 
works cannot be ignored.  Writings by non-extremist Afrocentric writers like Kaunda 
(1962) and Kenyatta (1979) on a dialectical merging of traditional religions with western 
Christianity are in accordance with Mphahlele’s recognition of Zionist or messianic 
religious practice as one aspect of appropriation which is an example of many more 
African humanist existential modes needed to cope with the changing world.  It should be 
remembered that Mphahlele himself has admitted to an element of strategic essentialism 
that Africans need to draw strength from when their distinctiveness as cultural groups is 
threatened by colonisation, as when he writes of African humanist existential survival as 
attributable to “the collective unconscious” and reliance on “that Africanist essence” (“In 
Search of”  217).  As such, the strengthening of African humanist consciousness cannot 
exclude aspects such as the occurrence of Zionist sects as long as the Zionist sects are a 
manifestation of existential self-definition by Africans. 
 
Mphahlele uses the terms “nationalistic Christian”, “Zionist” or “Ethiopic-Zionist” to 
refer to any breaking away from orthodox Christianity that was inspired by a religious 
nationalism (“Landmarks” 302; “Prodigals” 336).  Such a nationalistic appropriation of 
western Christianity to strengthen the movement among Africans towards intellectual 
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independence  has its origins in African American movements that were inspired partly 
by the belief that Ethiopia was prophesied as the place Jesus would return to during the 
Second Coming (“Your History” 158; 163; 164; 165; 168; 181).  The term “messianic” 
refers to a self-defining African religious leader acquiring the stature of a messiah in the 
eyes of his followers, like Isaiah Shembe who “became the Zulu Messiah and created his 
own hymns” (“Landmarks” 302).  In this way such an appropriation of western 
Christianity usually combines the Zionist nature of the new church with the messianic 
conception of the leader of the sect.  That is why Mphahlele writes about Isaiah Shembe 
as “a leader of a messianic and nationalistic Christian sect” (“Prodigals” 336). 
 
It is important, with regard to the abrogation of western Christian religion by Africans, to 
appreciate that the extremist Afrocentrists do not disagree with the non-extremist ones 
like Mphahlele, Kaunda and Kenyatta on the contemporary existence of a dialectical 
merging of traditional African religions with western Christianity.  On this point there is 
no doubt that they agree.  That is why Mphahlele writes in the essay “From Dependence 
to Interdependence” that “the dependency syndrome has its roots in colonialism and 
conversion to the Christian-Judaic faith”; and also that he has “a sneaking admiration” for 
messianic sects because they have tried to “carve a corner for themsleves where they 
could independently create a simple kind of worship” (“From Dependence” 200-201, 
emphasis added).  This clarifies Mphahlele’s personal preference for the messianic sects 
(such as the ZCC in the way it is described elsewhere in this study) for the reason that 
their mode of abrogation of Christianity is an example of the ways Africans have used to 
break free of dependency on imported religions. What Mphahlele and the extremist 
Afrocentrists cited above seem not to accentuate to the same degree is the origin of 
western Christianity before it could historically enter the African’s consciousness and 
way of life through religious expansionism. Probably because of a dissimilar 
prioritisation of pursuits between the extremist and non-extremist Afrocentric writers, 
Afrocentric writers of Mphahlele’s kind have not gone as far as writing like Asante does 
in the following statements: 
 Greeks who learned philosophy ventured to Africa to study…Colonisation was 
 not just a land issue, it was an issue of colonising information about the land … 
 Imhote, Pthahotep, Amenhote, son of Hapu, Akhenaten, and the sage of 
 Khunanup, are just a few of the African philosophers who lived long before there 
 was a Greece or a Greek philosopher … Philosophy begins first with the black 
 skinned people of the Nile Valley around 2800 BC, that is, 2 200 years before the 
 appearance of Thales of Miletus, considered the first Western philosopher.  
 Thus, even before writing, we have evidence that Africans were engaging in 
 meaningful discussions about  the nature of their environment. (19) 
 
It is clear from the above quotation that by implication Christianity (if considered as an 
aspect of philosophy) is thought of by the writer as having originated in Africa.  Another 
radical Afrocentrist cited elsewhere in this study, James (1954), explicitly states that 
Christ came to study in Africa and as such Christianity originated in Africa. Mphahlele’s 
concern with the way Africans have in present times abrogated western Christianity in 
order to create their own variety of religious worship in a self-defining way is evident in 
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the way he does not omit descriptions of Zionist/messianic religious practices of some of 
the characters in his stories. 
 
In the short stories and novels, a highlighting of such an abrogation of western 
Christianity is achieved by recurrent depictions of African worshippers in 
Zionist/messianic sects that have broken away from mainline American and European 
churches.  An example is the repeated image of Moruti KK who is most of the time a part 
of the place where young women are involved in social upliftment projects in “Mrs 
Plum” (Renewal Time). Mphahlele caricatures Moruti KK as a mere resonance-  or 
perspective-forming background figure, for the reverend is described as the owner of the 
Black Crow who plays no active role besides incessantly coming in and going out from 
the club, looking at the girls busy with various projects “with a smooth smile on his 
smooth round face” (Renewal Time 177).  Moruti KK is presented in “Mrs Plum” as a 
leader of one such Zionist/messianic sect who “had been driven out of the Presbyterian 
Church and had formed his own church” (177).   In Down Second Avenue, again, mention 
is made of the Donkey Church and the priest who breaks away from the Methodist 
Church in protest against the exploitative raising of the tithe particularly against the 
backdrop of the economic slump of the 1930s (100).  True to the role of an activist who is 
bent on nation building, Mphahlele does not fail to parody such priests in his writing for 
their often dubious conduct resulting from greed.  All the same, the moral anecdotes 
about break-away priests is also that apartheid as a variant of western value systems has 
influenced the priests to slant more towards individualistic rapacity than the Africanist 
self-fulfilment through contribution directed towards the well-being of the entire 
community.   
 
Most of Mphahlele’s contemporaries from Drum, except Todd Matshikiza, engage in 
merely superficial ridicule of western Christianity.  Hence they fail to delve any deeper 
than the level of a character’s personal attitude, in order to suggest that the cynical 
attitude towards western Christianity results from adherence to traditional consciousness.   
Even more significantly, such references as theirs to western Christianity tend to support 
the hegemonic discourse of the need for conduct invariably having to be judged against 
the norms of western Christianity.  It is with this shallow mimicry that Can Themba lets 
the cuckold Philemon and his adulterous wife Matilda (in “The Will To Die”) “[pass] the 
church crowd in front of the famous Anglican Mission of Christ the King”  with Matilda 
having “to carry the suit” left behind by the fleeing man caught in bed with her “on its 
hanger over her back” (92).  The image of churchgoers watching someone like this whose 
sinning is paraded in public can only serve to deepen contrition in keeping with the 
western Christian view of interpreting unethical behaviour as sin punishable in the 
afterlife with damnation in hell.  That these are Can Themba’s own assumptions is 
confirmed when Philemon discovers the body of Matilda (after remorse has apparently 
made her commit suicide) on the day of the week indentified as the western Christian 
“sabbath” (96).  To testify to the absence among most Drum writers other than Mphahlele 
of any concern with the merging of traditional customs with western Christianity, not one 
of Casey Motsisi’s short stories anthologised in Casey & Co (published 1978) makes a 
direct reference to religious practices or attitudes.   
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The general lack of focus by Drum writers such as Todd Matshikiza, Can Themba and 
Casey Motsisi on the undercutting of surface westernised township culture with the 
resilience of African humanist lifestyles and thought contrasts them with Mphahlele.  
Both Mphahlele and his contemporaries cited here clearly exhibit engagement with what 
Michael Chapman has described as the then township intelligentsia’s  “petty-bourgeois 
contradiction between identification with a specific local reality and the desire to find in 
art a universalizing, even a transcending image of experience” (The Drum Decade 221-
22).  This is to say that the Drum writers have had to wrestle with the lure of a 
romantically culture-free identity that would put them on equal footing with the 
oppressors, which demands a disowning of their unique lot as urbanised blacks whose 
tearing from the rural setting by the demands of industrialisation has transplanted African 
cultures and ways of interpreting reality onto the urban terrain.  Some Drum writers other 
than Mphahlele resolve this conflict by yielding to the dazzle of mimicking western ways 
in a manner lauded by a critic like Michael Chapman as “the slick sophistication [which] 
acts in defiance of the retribalizing mentality” (The Drum Decade 201).   Mphahlele 
contradicts this very conduct which he sees as deleterious by means of positing the 
reinforcement of African humanism as the right direction the urban African should take.  
Chapman implicitly recognises such an assertion of African humanism in his brief 
discussion of Mphahlele’s thematic evolution evinced mildly in the earlier stories “Blind 
Alley”, “Reef Train” and “The Coffee Cart Girl” and with greater intensity in the later 
“Down the Quiet Street” and “Lesane” stories (The Drum Decade 215). 
 
Todd Matshikiza is among some Drum writers who, similarly to Mphahlele, depict the 
appropriation of western Christianity by Africans during apartheid in a significant way.  
This is revealed when Matshikiza explains that: 
 There was a religious sect back home in the Cape Province ... They were the 
 followers of the Xhosa religious leader Mgijima.  He and his followers had 
 refused to yield the land they had occupied in the Bullhoek district near 
 Queenstown.  They regarded this district as their spiritual home.  But the South 
 African Government wanted that piece of land for re-allotment and White 
 occupation … General J. C. Smuts mowed [them] down and out of the territory.  
 Those of them that remained fled to Queenstown to pursue their religious belief.  
 As youngsters we attended their spectacular Saturday ceremonies and sang with 
 them their rousing flag waving hymn: When ah de lodga see de bla, /I wee pass 
 over you … As young men we discovered Mgijima’s Biblical references in the 
 hymn to be: When I the Lord shall see the blood, /I will pass over you.   
 (Chocolates for My Wife 26-27) 
Mgijima’s was what Mphahlele has commended as a Zionist sect which is a form of 
religious nationalism that sought (during colonisation) to resist the eradication of the 
African identity and to ensure group survival of Africans and their traditions.  The phrase 
“refused to yield the land” in the passage above points to this (Chocolates for My Wife 
26).  The conduct of the religious sect led by Mgijima demonstrates its originating in a 
sense of communal identity that conflicts with the demands of those wanting to remove 
them by force, because they regard the location of their centre of worship “as their 
spiritual home” (which is not the way the agents of apartheid see it) (Chocolates for My 
Wife 26).  The group faithful to Mgijima remain faithful to their communal 
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consciousness, rather than giving in to the attempt to annihilate them because they flee 
“to Queenstown to pursue their religious belief” (26-27).  Recasting of the 
Zionist/messianic hymn in a novel variety of English is an activity already explained in 
this study as constituting (in Mphahlele’s terms) an African humanist aspect conforming 
to a postcolonial re-definition of the self. 
 
That Mphahlele sees the appropriation of western Christianity by African peoples as 
important to the consolidation of African humanism as a consciousness and a way of life 
is borne out by his devoting a large portion of a section in The African Image - Revised 
Edition (revised) to the description of attempts by Africans to Africanise Western 
Christianity and turn it into an organic part of the liberation struggle — what he describes 
as a “religious nationalism” (61-63).  Mphahlele continues in the 1998 essay “Your 
History Demands Your Heartbeat: Historical Survey of the Encounter Between Africans 
and African Americans” to commend efforts by some African Americans and black 
Africans towards a “religious nationalism, which was an expression of a desire for self-
reliance and intellectual independence” (164).  While some Drum writers like Can 
Themba and Casey Motsisi seem not to consider such an appropriation of western 
Christianity as warranting stylistic articulation and support in their fiction, there are those 
like Todd Matshikiza who view literary representation of this self-defining act of 
Africans as crucial. 
 
2.2.6.3 THE PORTRAYAL OF BLACK WOMEN AS STRONGER THAN MEN 
 
In the essay “Es’kia Mphahlele. Man and a Whirlwind”, Thuynsma writes that “Eva 
Mphahlele is the epitome of motherly tenderness – in sharp contrast to the menacing 
father” (226).  Thuynsma goes on to remark that Eva “remains, perhaps to this day, 
[Mphahlele’s] private symbol of Africa’s resilience and tenderness” (227, emphasis 
added).  The description of Mphahlele’s adoration of his mother Eva as a “private 
symbol” is interesting.  The contrast of such an adoration of the mother to the rejection of 
the father’s abusive disposition subtly points to Mphahlele’s taking of sides in relating to 
his two parents.  The immensity and endurance of Mphahlele’s love for mothers or 
women in the family is revealed when Thuynsma explains that the “private symbol” that 
is Mphahlele’s admiration of his own mother manifests in Mphahlele’s conscience – not 
in his view of the place of a woman in just a single, private family.  Curiously, such a 
“private symbol” derived from experiences in a single, private family magnifies in the 
psychology of the then young Mphahlele into a ‘public’ symbol representing (even in the 
mind of the adult Mphahlele today) the admirable qualities of women as opposed to those 
of men in the whole African world.  The significance of Thuynsma’s remark is that it 
points to Mphahlele’s possible personal bias in favour of mothers or women in his 
narrative writings to this day. 
 
The portrayal of Ishola and the other women who work daily at the market for survival as 
constituting the family’s pillar of strength in “A Ballad of Oyo” is congruous with the 
attitude of the African society of Oyo towards women in a family unit as well as in 
consideration of their social roles in an extended family and in their community as a 
whole.  This has been illustrated in this study by communal dialogue that disguises itself 
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as individual dialogue by characters such as Ishola’s sister and the headman Mushin.  
There can be no doubt, therefore, that the regard for a mother or a woman as 
demonstrated in stories such as “A Ballad of Oyo” is a public one espoused by the entire 
African community within the village as a cultural norm.  Against this backdrop, the 
unacceptable temperament of the abusive husband can be appreciated fully for the 
scandal it constitutes.  Such a communally-held view of the place of a woman in society 
as sacred and as a pillar of socio-economic survival has been confirmed by writers like 
Jomo Kenyata (1979) and Malegapuru Makgoba (1997; 1998), who have explained the 
elevated status and role of women in African cultures.  
 
Apart from Thuynsma, critics such as Manganye, Samin, Gaylard and Obee have rightly 
shown that Mphahlele tends to depict women as stronger than men in his fiction.  While 
it is not untrue that the characterisation of women as stronger than men in Mphahlele’s 
fiction represents a cultural value consistent with the definition of his concept of African 
humanism,  such fictional characterisation of women may stem from Mphahlele’s family 
background, Mphahlele’s mother having held the household together while the father 
tended to disrupt its well-being. 
 
Ishola and the other toiling women of Oyo yield a recurring image in “A Ballad of Oyo” 
– the image of cyclic toil starting daily with the break of dawn and ending with the arrival 
of dusk.  The never-ending rhythm of these women’s toil constitutes the rhythm of 
economic and social life in Oyo without which life would cease, like the rising and 
setting of the sun.  What one finds striking is the gender imbalance in this image of toil 
that tilts in favour of the female gender.  It cannot but be an exaggeration of the crucial 
role of women in the economic survival of the villagers, considering that Ishola’s 
husband in the same short story is censured by the entire community for not working 
while men of his age group were working.  What this means is that by the community’s 
own admission (important though the role of women is in the socio-economic sphere) 
men are and should equally play a major role in the daily hard work.  The conspicuous 
fictive marginalisation of males in the economic life of the village of Oyo thus strikes one 
as a sign of Mphahlele’s private bias that tends towards a somewhat capricious 
preference of women to men or wives to husbands.  Without being far-fetched one might 
conclude then that Mphahlele’s personal admiration of mothers is on show here, apart 
from the portrayal of women as economic livewires of the village as supported by the 
ethos of the African community.  Writers like Ekwe-Ekwe (2001) have been quoted in 
this study as stating that men and women’s roles have in Africa traditionally co-existed in 
a complementary relationship. 
 
In the other story written in exile and given a Nigerian setting, “The Barber of Bariga” 
(In Corner B),  the men Anofi, Bashiru and Okeke appear to constitute the rhythm of the 
story in the same way as Ishola and the other women constitute the ‘ballad’ in “A Ballad 
of Oyo”.  However, the opening remark by the philanderer Bashiru (that “A mahn mos’ 
always have to lawve ay-gain un ay-gain” – 7) should alert the reader to the fact that 
within the culture of the Bariga African society itself women are acknowledged to be 
stronger than men as their almost hypnotic power compels men to involuntarily subsist 
on continual sexual intercourse.   It would tilt the scales significantly if Bashiru were to 
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accentuate women as those who cannot live without recourse to sex with men, almost as 
if men were their lifeline.  The cryptic projection of women as stronger than men is 
revealed by the position of Bashiru’s remark as the opening line in the story.  Such a 
position tends to impress it upon the mind of the reader that whatever happens, women 
are on top because men cannot survive without erotic love, the control of which is in the 
hands of women.  At face value it might appear as if the linking of women with coitus is 
a vulgar one that is indicative of some chauvinistic attitude among the men to 
disrespectfully use women as objectified instruments for the satisfaction of their fatuous 
lust.  But for a reader equipped with knowledge of Mphahlele’s personal soft spot for 
women as well as his anchoring of plot and characterisation within the African humanist 
frame of mind, the fate (in the plot of the story) of men – not women – who suffer defeats 
of various kinds should strike one as deliberate. The tone of the Casanova Bashiru in the 
opening line is that of perplexity in the face of the supremacy of women and 
powerlessness of men in the hands of women, as revealed by the following statement that 
precedes the line quoted above:  “Ha ha ha!  Na be fonny worl’ dees” (7).  It is a funny 
world because men appear to be in control while the reality is that women are.  The critic 
Mbulelo Mzamane discerns that the character Anofi bears “[an] attitude of 
disengagement from the life around him … [and as this is] a violation of the people’s 
communal ethic … he pays dearly in the end [when the realisation that] Bashiru also had 
an affair with [his] wife … jolts him out of his customary detachment” (“The Nigerian 
Short Stories of Ezekiel Mphahlele” 45, 47).  Once more Mphahlele plays on the theme 
of appearance and reality to illustrate a point which necessarily has to be detected in 
order for the moral of the story to be apprehended – the appearance of Anofi as an 
economically powerful and weighty socialite until the flaw of unAfricanist withdrawal 
from the rhythms of the community tragically shatters his cocoon of false self-assurance, 
thus exposing the reality that he is weak. This should helpfully be strectched to the 
necessary point of highlighting that the male character Bashiru’s weakness pinpointed by 
Mzamane effectively contrasts his individualist frailty with the communal strength of 
Ishola as a voice of the people in “A Ballad of Oyo”. 
 
A further dimension of Bashiru’s weakness (in “The Barber of Bariga”) from the African 
humanist point of view is his taking advantage of his wealth to seduce married women – 
a weakness for which he eventually pays with his life at the hands of a jealous husband. 
Less wealthy men in Bariga watch powerlessly as macho men like Bashiru humiliate 
them sexually.    But powerful men like Bashiru and ordinary men alike cannot beat the 
power of woman.  The general weakness of the men in Bariga is exemplified in the 
cyclist accident scene when the black man is so bold as to demand ten shillings from the 
white man but shrinks with deference when the white man’s wife confronts him.  
Significantly, the defeated cyclist remarks as he gives in to the bravery of the white 
woman that “If not to say she’s a woo-man, I coul’ ’ave slapped her” (14).  Mphahlele by 
the cyclist’s remark highlights the irony that (because of the commonly-held belief 
among menfolk that they are stronger than women) the defeated cyclist still does not 
openly acknowledge his yielding as a defeat by the power of the woman.  The cyclist 
reacts to the confrontation by the white woman by indicating what he would have done if 
it had been the woman’s husband confronting him.  If it had been the man doing what the 
woman was doing to him, the cyclist would have slapped the husband.  Man-to-man, the 
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cyclist’s strength would have displayed itself.  The message here is that even stronger 
men will pass as such within the Bariga society only in the world of men, but as soon as a 
woman appears on the scene all men are levelled down to a grovelling powerlessness.  
The cyclist behaves no less timidly than the barber Anofi does in front of women.  When 
the driver Andrew temporarily disobeys his wife and is about to pay the cyclist ten 
shillings for the damage, the wife ventures out of the car and wants to hear the version of 
the accident from Anofi.  The erstwhile laughing Anofi fearfully replies to the driver’s 
wife by saying “I never know, I never see not’ing.  I mean moch” after which Anofi 
walks off to the safety of his barber shop (14).  Yet Anofi had been laughing boisterously 
when it was not the wife but the driver Andrew.  While women remain in the background 
as when the driver Andrew’s wife trails behind with the husband taking the lead as they 
try to solicit an account of the accident from the milling crowds, the male cyclist and the 
male barber Anofi display courage and manly confidence.  But as soon as a woman 
asserts her presence on the scene, the male characters shrink back in helplessness.  At 
work here is the African humanist consciousness with which the men face reality – that 
of revering women. 
 
When the womaniser enquires why the barber sounds anxious about his latest escapade, 
the barber answers that he fears the latest sex victim could be a married woman.  Despite 
the sense of morality he possesses (shown by his apprehension as he makes seductive 
advances to the woman he suspects may be married), the barber Anofi still proceeds to 
have sex with the woman.  This is because of the weakness of men in the presence of 
women as has already been intimated in the opening line of the story. The same weakness 
of males in the face of females is evident in the action of Okeke.  Upon discovering that 
Bashiru has been having sex with his wife, Okeke kills him.  Because he is confronting a 
male who has cuckolded him and not a female, Okeke has the courage to kill.  
Surprisingly, no form of discipline or punishment of the wife (who has been part of the 
misdeed) is mentioned.  Anofi reprimands Okeke after Bashiru has been found murdered 
in the following words: “You don’ kill man, Okeke” (19).   The differential treatment of 
men and of women in the case of transgression exemplified in the story by the killing of 
Bashiru while Okeke’s wife’s part in the guilt is neglected, is testimony of the men’s fear 
of women.  The remark by Anofi that a human being should not be murdered for 
whatever misdeed he or she has committed is a reaffirmation of the Africanist view of 
human life as sacred, as the dialogue is Mphahlele’s way of reinforcing the seriousness 
with which the people of Bariga view Bashiru’s murder – irrespective of whether Bashiru 
was in the wrong or not.  That the murder is committed by a man is, however, a subtle 
pointing to men, rather than women, being so weak as to flout public morality with 
impunity. 
 
After the jealous husband Okeke has killed Bashiru for sleeping with his wife, the 
opposite happens when Anofi discovers that his own wife has also been a victim of 
Bashiru.  Anofi does not kill his wife as, unlike Okeke, he is not faced with a male but 
with a female.  The irony of the words Anofi expresses perfunctorily to Okeke (before his 
eyes are open to the truth that comes with the unravelling of the plot) catches up with him 
(Anofi).  Significantly, Anofi’s timidity when confronted with a woman precludes his 
murdering his wife in a fit of jealousy.   Significantly, the power of woman makes Anofi 
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appreciate his wife’s beauty more than before and jealously move house so that he may 
enjoy his wife alone far from any envious men.  By such a characterisation, Mphahlele 
highlights the overwhelming strength and the hold women have on men. Considering 
Mphahlele’s painful descriptions of women abuse in narratives like Down Second 
Avenue, his plots in which women prove overwhelming to men could be seen as an ideal 
tied to the visionary aspect of his concept of African humanism by which not only what is 
seen as part of the African humanist lifestyle is highlighted, but also what is thought of as 
ideally belonging to it.  
 
The same can be said of what may appear to be discriminatory punishment for 
wrongdoing.  The level of obsession with their libido on the part of the male characters 
(indicating a pervasive weakness of men upon females entering whatever scene) and the 
male characters’ helpless reaction when confronted by women in “The Barber of Bariga” 
are exaggerated to the level of betraying Mphahlele’s deep-seated, perhaps unconscious, 
dislike of fathers in favour of mothers.  The one-sided recompense for adulterous 
relations in which men kill men and nothing is done about the participant women, also 
unmasks some private dislike for men or fathers within the family unit in Mphahlele, 
even while it affirms the Africanist value system within the society of Bariga of holding 
women as essential to cultural self-preservation. 
 
A look at Can Themba’s “The Nice Time Girl” and “Marta” (The World of Can Themba) 
reveals women as characters who are central but whose portrayal differs from the way 
Mphahlele handles his woman characters.  In the former story, Eunice Maoela is depicted 
as a dishonest wife who finds her teacher husband Theophilus boring (53).  The frivolous 
woman (Eunice) slips out to a party in Atteridgeville where she flirts with Matthew 
Modise.  Her immorality is perfected when she lures her husband to a desolate spot where 
Matthew Modise and some hired killers murder him.  Can Themba’s tone in the 
description of the bloody scene attests to no attempt to vindicate Eunice’s dishonourable 
conduct, in the following words: “Then the butchers stabbed him to death in cold, greasy 
blood” (56).  The word “greasy” could suggest the sexual motive behind the cruel 
murder.  Through the portrayal of Eunice’s manners Can Themba represents superficial 
reactions of the character to environmental pressure that is rationalised by means of the 
events in the story, rather than as a profound trait indicative of the Africans’ collective 
consciousness.  That is why Eunice’s flirtatious behaviour is portrayed against the 
backdrop of the character Theophilus’s boring nature, and not against any specific 
personality features that could be contrasted with African cultural expectations of 
manhood.  The same applies to the woman Marta (in the latter story), whose irresponsible 
conduct, unbecoming of a married woman, is best summed up by her husband, who 
swears in the following words: “Strue’s God, Marta … one of these days I go to chock 
you tille you die.  I’ll tech you to stop drinking and for to start looking after your house 
… Agh, sies!” (76).  When Sophia and other drinking friends invite her for a binge she 
goes and comes back with a young boy whom she seduces in her husband’s house, upon 
which the husband catches them red-handed and kills the young boy in a fit of rage (81).   
 
As such, Can Themba’s depiction of woman characters in the short stories above does not 
pit the woman characters against customary expectations concerning their role.  The 
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women merely display behaviour that corresponds to social expectations irrespective of 
of culture-specific matrices, such as loyalty in marriage and the valuing of a woman as a 
delicate member of the family who should live up to that image.  This contrasts with the 
depth of characterisation of women by Mphahlele as demonstrated in the above analyses  
of some of his stories. 
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2.3 CLOSING REMARKS 
 
The preceding scrutiny of Mphahlele’s short stories has illustrated that apartheid is 
foregrounded in some of his short stories.    Examples are stories like “A Point of 
Identity”,   “In Corner B” and “The Master of Doornvlei”.   It is probably for this reason 
that Mphahlele has been classified by some critics as a protest writer and lumped together 
with other writers of this ilk in the censure of the weaknesses of this school of South 
African writers.  The interesting point to remember in the midst of this motley of views 
on South African protest literature is that Mphahlele himself is not bothered much by any 
hairsplitting attempts to pin down the meaning of protest literature, as shown by his 
views on this (expressed in the 1971 interview with Lindfors) in the following words: 
 It seems to be a permanent human condition for poetry to be protest poetry of one 
 kind or another.  It will reflect a sense of urgency at one time which it doesn’t at 
 another time in history.  There will always be people who will be writing poetry 
 that does not have any kind of social relevance but is a kind of music box.  It 
 replays a human experience and that is that.  But there will also be poets who 
 simply are committed to some ideal, whose poetry makes a frontal attack on 
 social or political matters of one kind or another.  Today, or say twenty years 
 from now, it may not be the same kind of protest, but it will always be protest for 
 the simple reason that whenever you write prose or poetry or drama you are 
 writing a social criticism of one kind or another.  If you don't, you are completely 
 irrelevant – you don’t count.   (“Es’kia Mphahlele” 171 – 172) 
From this citation it can be seen that Mphahlele’s conception of literature, apart from 
considerations of relevance, spans a wide trajectory.  It includes even seemingly 
purposeless playings with the beauty of words yet stresses that at stressful times the kind 
of writing should entail protest in order to be relevant at that juncture.  This quotation 
makes clear also that Mphahlele’s use of the term “protest literature” is not as narrow as 
the way some other critics use it, and is widely accommodative. 
 
Among critics whose conceptions of protest literature are not as inclusive as Mphahlele’s 
is Njabulo Ndebele.  Ndebele in “The Rediscovery of the Ordinary: Some New Writings 
in South Africa” rationalises the shift among black South African writers of the 1950s 
such as the Drum writers from entertaining stories that “show the growth of sophisticated 
urban working and petty-bourgeois classes”, to a dramatic politicisation of creative 
writing as being caused by the political disillusionment that followed the banning of the 
ANC and PAC (“The Rediscovery” 40).  The result, according to Ndebele (in this 
article), was the birth of protest literature, which he describes as: 
 stories revealing the spectacular ugliness of the South African situation in all its 
 forms: the brutality of the Boer, the terrible farm conditions, the phenomenal 
 hypocrisy of the English-speaking liberal, the disillusionment of educated 
 Africans, the poverty of African life, crime and a host of other things.  The bulk 
 of the stories of James Matthews, Ezekiel Mphahlele, Alex la Guma, Can 
 Themba, Webster Makaza and others falls into this category [of protest literature]. 
 (“The Rediscovery” 40) 
The redeeming feature in those of Mphahlele’s stories that foreground apartheid, as in the 
protest poems, is a counterbalancing of stark representations of apartheid with instances 
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and ideas of African humanism, a factor which links all of these writings as 
characteristically Mphahlelesque.   This feature of Mphahlele’s handling of theme and 
style in his short stories has led to the critic Ruth Obee remarking that  “The Living and 
the Dead” is a good example of how Mphahlele “effectively strikes a balance between 
themes of alienation and African humanism” (“The Unbrokeng Song” 186). 
 
A critic like Ndebele does not seem to appreciate fully the redemptive nature of the 
African humanist essence of the short stories by Mphahlele, for such a focus by 
Mphahlele on cultural detail inevitably supplies the stories with a subjectively woven 
cultural context, which is the nuanced antithesis of spectacular representation.  It 
distinguishes Mphahlele to a great extent from protest writers like La Guma, James 
Matthews and Mtutuzeli Matshoba, and to a lesser extent from those like Can Themba 
whose cultural contextualisation of the plot tones down spectacle to a certain degree.  
This is not to say that Ndebele is not right in pointing to similar dominant themes among 
Mphahlele and the other protest writers (if he can be called such at all).  These are the 
“brutality of the Boer, the terrible farm conditions, the phenomenal hypocrisy of the 
English-speaking liberal, the disillusionment of the educated Africans, the poverty of 
African life, crime and a host of other things” (“The Rediscovery” 40).  Yet the style in 
which Mphahlele provides instances of African humanism in his works atones for 
whatever excesses could have occurred which are typical of protest literature, and in 
practice Mphahlele shows, as Ndebele was to write in “Actors and Interpreters”,  that 
“fiction can never replace politics in the total scheme of things” (“Actors” 95).  Bloke 
Modisane has also observed some aspects of raw experience upon which the fiction of 
writers within the protest literature mould commonly drew, in the following words: 
Church buildings have been among the first edifices of oppression  which are 
 stoned and burnt down, and acts of violation have been committed against nuns. 
 People have deliberately refused to face up  to the truth surrounding these 
 actions, the tendency to become melodramatic with shock, and the over-
 simplification of the issues has been all too frequent; people will not learn that 
 shouting ‘savage’ has not helped the mind in the understanding of the underlying 
 truth behind these acts. (Blame Me 185) 
Surely a writer who distinguishes between merely being an “actor” amidst one’s own 
people and the more challenging exercise of being an “interpreter” will not represent 
society’s failure to analyse experience meaningfully without the subjective infusion of 
prophetic truths. 
 
As such, various writers of the 1950s and 1960s handle raw experience as summed up in 
the quoted words of Njabulo Ndebele and exemplified above in Modisane’s observation 
differently.  Because of this, for a South African writer to write on the common 
contemporary themes tabulated by Ndebele and other critics does not necessarily qualify 
him or her as a protest writer per se, if what critics have pinpointed as the defects of 
South African protest literature are anything to go by.   An alternative view like that of 
Michael Chapman could also help us to see the apparent melodrama of the writings of 
those Drum writers who are accused of stark protest as realist representation of the 
urbanisation of the African in the apartheid era, which “has often seemed spectacular in 
its violence and crime, as well as in its political mobilizations” (The Drum Decade 226-
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27).  However, if Drum protest writers like Can Themba exercise their realism in 
depicting the spectacle that enforced black urban life under apartheid, Mphahlele seeks in 
his narrative writings to assert equal intensity of the drama of self-defined black life by 
means of which African humanism plays itself out. 
 
Aspects of apartheid are made subservient in the “Lesane” stories and others, including 
those published in Drum earlier than the “Lesane” stories, such as “Down the Quiet 
Street”.  Mphahlele’s major achievement in these stories is his successful suppression of 
the melodrama of apartheid spectacle, due to his giving more space to a detailed 
representation of uniquely black (ghetto) characters who move through a setting that 
recalls aspects of African humanist resilience.  The toning down of the apartheid theme, 
not compensated for by much conscious attempt to appropriate the English language (as 
in stories like Man Must Live and Other Stories), may be attributed to Mphahlele’s self-
confessed relative literary naivety of the time, for which he “admits that reading his early 
work is somewhat embarrassing”  ( Es’kia  461).  But even in these early stories the use 
of dialogue to express the communal voice starts to take shape.  The illustration of a 
culture-specific mode of thought and conduct that Mphahlele has called African 
humanism already starts to show in such early works as the title story “Man Must Live”, 
as has already been demonstrated in this study.  For Mphahlele’s intention of asserting 
what he understands to be Africans’ modes of thought and lifestyle to start coalescing 
through the density of his stories as early as those in Man Must Live and Other Stories is 
an indication that he joins other African writers, as W.E. Abraham has remarked about 
African writers in general, “In the preoccupation with the African personality [which] 
they appear to hold … [as] the guiding principles of the future of Africa” because it is 
“authenticated in the African experience and cultures” (Mind of Africa 38). 
 
The self-confessed ‘amateur’ nature of Mphahlele’s writing when he started to write short 
stories such as those published in Man Must Live and Other Stories should not be 
mistaken as having marred his work to any great extent or for too long a period.   This is 
despite even researchers on Mphahlele like Ruth Obee having derogatorily described this 
as early prose of “Man Must Live in which Victorian pastoral settings, contrived romantic 
endings, and mission-press English figured heavily” (“The Unbroken Song” 193).  
Indeed, language in the earlier stories is not harnessed as effectively to serve Mphahlele’s 
theoretical position as in the later ones.  One example is the grandfather in “Tomorrow 
You Shall Reap” explaining that he is revealing that the narrator’s mother has killed 
herself because of chronic mental illness:  “But now, when you are on the threshold of a 
new life, to be master of your own destiny, I have thought it fit and right to tell you …” 
(Man Must Live and Other Stories 49).  The repetitive use of clichés such as “master of 
your own destiny” and “thought it fit and right” renders the language stilted because the 
prose acquires a languid ring.  Similarly, the repetitive use within one paragraph (in “The 
Leaves were Falling”) of descriptions such as “the valley in the cloak of twilight” and 
“almost completely hidden in the valley” in describing the same aspect of the setting 
(which is that the character Reverend Katsane Melato is meditating from the gloom of a 
sunset scene) renders the pace of the story aimlessly static (13).  Far from effectively and 
organically relating the theme and intention of the story, repetition in these and other 
stories produces an unappealing turgidity typical of beginners’ preference for flamboyant 
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style.  By the time he had joined Drum and was publishing later stories like “In Corner 
B” and “Down the Quiet Street”, Mphahlele the fiction writer displayed the stylistic 
accomplishment of a seasoned writer – cited passages from the later stories dispersed 
through this study exhibit the fully functional use of dialogue, setting and expression.  
Whatever seeming unconcern with the impact of apartheid on the lives of blacks these 
stories exhibit should be ascribed to the literary context of the 1950s.  This is  what 
Ndebele remarks on when he states that creative writers in the Drum age  “simply 
titillated the readers with good stories” while it was journalists who wrote (in careful 
English) in newspapers and magazines about politics, sports, fashion and other spheres of 
black life” (“The Rediscovery” 40).  Mphahlele himself, in a 1980 essay, puts it as 
follows: 
 The imaginative writing courted no political confrontation: it spoke of the drama 
 of black life, its triumphs and defeats, survival, its culture and sub-cultures, and 
 the police terror and legislated restriction it was subjected to.  The black writer 
 was asserting his sense of permanence in an urban ghetto life where he was being 
 told he was a mere migrant worker with no hope for security of tenure in his 
 municipal box-house. (“Landmarks” 308, emphasis added) 
The important point to note in the quotation above is that the attitude of the fiction writers 
of the 1950s not to court political confrontation should not be mistaken for detachment 
from the political turmoil of the time – and this is made clear by the fact that (in addition 
to writing on the “drama of black life”) the works of the Drum writers “spoke of … the 
police terror and legislated restriction [black life] was subjected to”.  Such a description 
of South African black fiction of the 1950s is confirmed by short stories of the period by 
other black writers, such as Can Themba’s “Ten-to-Ten” (The World of Can Themba).  
The astute policeman Ten-to-Ten makes the following revealing statement about his job, 
that “It’s a bastard of a job.  Funny hours, low pay, strange orders that make no sense, 
violence, ever violence, and the daily spectacle of the degradation of my people” (71).  
This explains why Mphahlele’s short stories of the Drum period progressively foreground 
apartheid in their creation. 
 
What separates Mphahlele from other fiction writers of the 1950s in terms of theme and 
approach is the emergence in him of a resolute philosophical position which starts to 
reflect itself in his writing.  In this regard Mphahlele has stated that  “the myth [he 
endeavours] to establish is that this part of our South African humanity will yet outlast at 
least some of the malicious gods, even when these have been replaced by another 
pantheon” (“Versus the Political Morality” 374).  By this he means that he has made a 
deliberate choice (in the face of the harsh realities of black life under the then apartheid 
government) to highlight apartheid’s irrelevance to the ultimate value of the lives of the 
Africans while at the same time foregrounding the resilience of African humanist 
existence in its transcending apartheid’s challenges. To Mphahlele, African literature 
should address itself to “what of this ghetto life [under apartheid] can process itself, 
independent of or in spite of the malicious gods that waylay it” (“Versus the Political 
Morality” 374).  In his opinion, over-emphasising the brutality of apartheid at the 
expense of empowering the oppressed to cope spiritually with the existential challenge, 
was in a way a declaration that without apartheid African life did not exist – this he sees 
as black Africans (under apartheid) succumbing to the demand “never … to forget the 
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high-voltage fences” (“Versus the Political Morality” 374).  In positing the concept of 
African humanism, therefore, Mphahlele wanted to assert Africans’ self-sufficient, 
distinctive identity on the strength of which the Africans had survived and would 
continue to survive the age of colonialism. For this reason, even those of Mphahlele’s 
stories that seem to emphasise the immanence of apartheid in the lives of the Africans are 
actually highlighting the existence of an African humanist consciousness that enables 
black South Africans to continue to live without despair.  That is why any apparently 
triumphant depiction of apartheid is always compensated for (thematically and 
stylistically) by an equally insistent assertion of an African humanist existence and 
survival.  This Mphahlele achieves in stories like “The Master of Doornvlei” and “The 
Living and the Dead” by means of the skillful manipulation of style and characterization, 
as demonstrated in the earlier parts of this study.  Right from the late 1950s, while some 
of his peers are still as understated in their writings as critics like Ndebele indicate (“The 
Rediscovery” 40), Mphahlele’s relatively more overt critique of the apartheid system of 
the time is already discernible, as well as a commensurate assertion of the antidote to the 
impact of apartheid that he proposes and represents in his writings as African humanism.   
Theoretical formulations and philosophical stances characteristic of Mphahlele start to 
reach a noticeable prominence in his short story writing – carving for him a distinctive 
niche that sets him apart in the literary world of the 1950s.  A careful reading of 
Mphahlele’s short stories reveals his progressive but artistically subtle deployment of his 
African humanist vision documented elsewhere – in his autobiographies and published 
interviews he addresses social issues, as in his affirmation of the pre-eminent stature and 
role of women in society.  His personal beliefs on writing pervade his writings. 
 
As the choice of the language in which one was to write was topical in the 1950s (as 
Ngugi’s essays of that period indicate), Mphahlele had to devise a resolute strategy with 
which to justify his language choice.  As such, Mphahlele’s incorporation of African-
language idiom from that time until now in his short stories and poetry written in English 
should be seen as an attempt to try and circumvent the language problem and reach a 
readership of black masses, an aspiration that can unfortunately not be reached fully due 
to the sociolinguistic realities of South African societies.  On a more elevated polemical 
level, however, the linguistic approach of incorporating indigenous languages in his 
English literary works should also be seen as paying allegiance to mother tongue oral 
literature in the more remote past and in the more recent past, as well as to literature 
written since the latter part of the 19th century by South African writers in African 
languages.  The distinctive way in which Mphahlele attempts to remove the language 
barrier between him and his readers (whose mother tongues are not English) succeeds in 
demonstrating that to a certain extent the language barrier can be overcome.   
Furthermore, it is an indication that Mphahlele is aware of the continuing debate about 
the problem of writing for a black proletariat audience in the foreign tongue of English, 
which problem Ndebele has written about as recently as 1991 in the following words: 
 South African English must be open to the possibility of its becoming a new 
 language.  This may happen not only at the level of  vocabulary … but also with 
 regard to grammatical adjustments that may result from the proximity of English 
 to indigenous African languages.  (“The English Language” 114) 
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In practice as he goes about writing his fiction, Mphahlele seems to concretise Ndebele’s 
views outlined in the quotation above.  This is despite the presence of some black South 
African writers to whom the success of such an attempt seems to be inconceivable, such 
as Daniel Kunene when he writes that:  “The claim that a book written in English is 
addressed to blacks makes no sense unless one specifies that it is for those blacks who 
have acquired enough English to be able to read and understand it.  Then we would 
understand that it is not intended for the masses, counted in millions, who do not have 
that skill” (“Language, Literature” 505).  Kunene seems not to acknowledge the efficacy 
of the appropriated varieties of English such as Mphahlele achieves in the ways already 
illustrated in this study, as if no other English exists than the one that supposedly fails to 
reach the majority of Africans. 
 
Rather than stress a chasm between black writers writing in English and those writing in 
the indigenous languages, Mphahlele is disposed towards the unification of the two 
literatures into one canon, which, in keeping with his techniques of consolidating and 
asserting his concept of African humanism, will only serve the good purpose of enriching 
the fabric of cultural resonance and perspective. That this is Mphahlele’s polemical stand 
is affirmed by his allegiance to indigenous language literature, expressed in his article 
“Landmarks of Literary History: A Black Perspective”— in which he acknowledges, 
similarly with the writer Daniel P Kunene, that indeed some English writings by black 
writers from the 1950s till the 1960s and beyond are not necessarily superior in content 
and texture to earlier African–language writing, considering texts by Ntsikana, Soga and 
Jordan in the 19th century, as well as other later writings of Jabavu, Mqhayi, Dhlomo, 
Mofolo, Vilakazi and Sekese in the early 20th century (“Landmarks” 37-57).  It is not 
only Kunene who regrets the ignorance of some African writers writing in English of the 
good quality of literature written in African languages.  Regretting Michael Chapman’s 
separate survey of South African literature written in English from its African language 
counterpart, a critic of African language literature Maje Serudu writes in his critique of 
selected Northern Sotho literary pieces published in the period spanning 1951 to 1983 
that “South African literatures written in the vernacular are as [profound] and committed 
as any literature written in English, French or Portuguese” (“South African Vernacular 
Literature” 235).  Though the article “Landmarks of Literary History: A Black 
Perspective” exposes Mphahlele’s relative oversight in denying the merit of black 
language literature of the 1960s to the present day (claiming that the whole oeuvre was 
stilted by negative apartheid attitudes towards African languages), at least his homage to 
the earlier writers is consistent with his well-known belief in the need for younger writers 
to “[reassemble] the fragments of Africa into a whole and single consciousness” 
(“Landmarks” 57).  This task, according to Mphahlele, should be tackled in the form of 
continuing (from the point where what he considers past good literary works stopped) 
with the “long unbroken song” of African excellence (Unbroken Song 2-3). 
 
Mphahlele’s stylistic traits can be recognised both in the poetry and short stories he has 
written. These stylistic traits assert the subjectivity of the African narrator and characters 
in the making of meaning. They function as expression of communal statements through 
the use of apparently individual dialogue, the reconstruction of orature and other 
components of the traditional past (by means of imagery as well as metaphors and 
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symbols that possess an allegorical loftiness) – hence all these stylistic aspects of 
Mphahlele’s writing collectively establish the Mphahlelesque resonance and perspective.   
It remains now to probe whether longer prose writings also display such patent 
craftsmanship.  
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3. THE AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 
 
 
3.1 OPENING REMARKS 
 
Among Mphahlele’s longer prose narratives, Down Second Avenue (1959) and Afrika My 
Music (1984) are the two autobiographies. The two works exist in a complementary 
relationship: while Down Second Avenue tells about the writer’s life since the age of five 
until he leaves for exile in September 1957, Afrika My Music describes his life in exile 
from 1957 up to 1983, after he had returned permanently (in 1977) to his place of birth 
and had settled in the semi-urban area of Lebowakgomo – just twelve kilometres from the 
village of his childhood, Maupaneng.  Obviously the relationships between the two 
autobiographies are many and varied, with the one I typify above as just one example.  
Aggrey Klaaste, for instance, has singled out continuity of the search for ideal cultural 
environment within which to write as the link between the two: 
 His search, in exile, took him across the world and brought quite joltingly home to 
 his sensitive spirit that phenomena such as race, hate, fraud, perhaps even love 
 and anger were universal.  He has come back home … to his roots to find the 
 scum, the filth and the hate still very much around … [The] bitterness captured 
 in such fresh and vibrant colours in his first novel, Down Second Avenue, still 
 breathes angry life into his latest book, Afrika My Music. (104) 
Awareness of these and other relations between the two books should help to clarify 
Mphahlele’s interpretation of what it is to be black in apartheid South Africa continually 
since he was five years old in 1924 until the events of 1983 described in Afrika My 
Music. 
 
It should be remembered that the preceding section of this study shows that Mphahlele is 
more importantly an “interpreter” rather than just an “actor” in the way he handles his 
poetry and short story writing.   In other words, Mphahlele as a theorist does not only 
reflect unmediated raw experience in his writings.  This is not to refute that his narrative 
writings are a reflection of reality that is represented in a dialectical relationship with his 
subjective re-interpretation of it, which departs from the way other theorists work.  This 
is the kind of operation which Said has affirmatively described in an interview with Gauri 
Viswanathan as “concrete circumstances and highly abstract appetites (and even fictions) 
[combining] to provide one with an intentional method of formulating projects for 
oneself” (“Beginnings” 22).  Of course Mphahlele’s project (as this study has shown and 
will continue to show) is that of positing and clarifying the concept of African humanism 
as the apt tool for the self-preservation of Africans in the wake of colonisation.   Hence 
this chapter will explore whether the literary features ascribed to Mphahlele’s writing 
through the earlier considerations of his poetry and short stories are also discernible in the 
autobiographies.    
 
What the critic Thuynsma has written about Mphahlele’s works will be helpful to 
consider.  Thuynsma has observed that although Down Second Avenue is an 
autobiography, its narrative is poetic enough to involve the reader in the world of a novel 
(224). As for Afrika My Music, the same critic remarks that the book is “so 
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Mphahlelesque” (224).  Afejuku concurs with Thuynsma by remarking that “in Down 
Second Avenue” and literary autobiographies by other African writers such as Abrahams, 
Gatheru, Laye and Soyinka “descriptions, whether of atmosphere or the physical 
environment, gain aesthetic appeal through the various means employed by the writers to 
give their autobiographies the stamp of artistry” (“Setting in” 248).   Thuynsma’s 
position, therefore, is that both of the autobiographies can be enjoyed as novels if the 
reader were to opt to read them without reference to their autobiographical verity.   In  a 
1972 interview with Cosmo Pieterse Mphahlele responded to a question about the extent 
to which Down Second Avenue is “true” by saying that  perhaps “there is only 
autobiographical fiction or fictional autobiography in the final analysis”  (quoted in A 
Vision of Order 225).  Presumably he means by this that his autobiography employs 
fictional devices to the same extent as his fiction contains autobiographical material.   
 
The above quotation indicates that fictional elements are a common denominator in both 
Mphahlele’s writings described as autobiography and those classified as fiction.  For this 
reason, instances of African humanism are presented at two levels in Mphahlele’s 
autobiographies.  The first is the level he occupies as a veiled “interpreter” of the 
experiences of his people by endowing his fictional narratives with African humanist 
aspects.  This is why the critic Keith Shear’s remark, that scenes in Down Second Avenue 
that depict Eseki’s childhood “convey, rather, in their very lack of specification, a sense 
of timelessness [because] the author does not really recognise himself in these images of 
boyhood” (“Depictions of Childhood” 46), is significant.  This observation is accurate as 
it points to what this study will call metonymic representations (in Down Second Avenue) 
of the consciousness and way of life Mphahlele has termed African humanism.  That this 
is essential to autobiography is affirmed by the critic herself when she writes about the 
genre’s partial basis in “perceptions of the available identities that [the autobiographers] 
could subscribe to in their childhoods” (49). 
 
The second level at which exemplifications of African humanism take place is the one 
which Mphahlele assumes when he interprets the life of his people directly, taking his 
own personal life as an example.  This is shown by the role he plays as an “interpreter” in 
autobiographical writing which depicts subjectively patterned experiences and 
developments (in a personal search for the self).  Mazlish and Manganyi respectively 
describe autobiography as a “a picture from a specific present viewpoint of coherent 
shaping of an individual past” as well as “[a sorting] out [of] themes and patterns [and] 
not dates and mundane calendar events which sort themselves” (Mazlish as quoted by 
Barnett in A Vision of Order 224; Exiles and Homecomings 5).  The exclusion of “dates 
and mundane calendar events” in writing autobiography should be understood as the 
throwing into relief of the autobiographer’s rigorous task of interpreting, rather than 
merely recording events and motives as they occur in the day to day experiences of a 
person or people.  It is for the same reason that Edward Said has said of his 
autobiography that it “is an attempt to make sense of an effort at self-liberation” from the 
imprisoning or limiting life that he had as a child (“Edward Said Talks” 15, emphasis 
added).  To use Mazlish’s words, Said’s “specific present viewpoint” is self-liberation, 
while the “individual past” he wants to depict is “imprisoning and limiting life” that he 
and fellow Palestinians have gone through since his childhood (A Vision of Order 224; 
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“Edward Said Talks” 15).  The hazard of reporting on the behaviour of a people rather 
than infusing an intellectual interpretation into the everyday events, is that in the 
behaviour of ordinary people “There exists a brutality of thought and a mistrust of 
subtlety which is typical of revolutions” (“Spontaneity” 117).  From this quotation of 
Fanon’s essay, it is clear that the spontaneous behaviour of ordinary people, especially 
during political resistance, conflicts with the social scientist’s theorisation of the formal 
culture of a people as demanded by his or her role as (what Ndebele has called) an 
“interpreter”. 
 
The way in which the postcolonial writer Mphahlele handles his “interpretive” role on 
fictional and autobiographical planes is furthermore reminiscent of what Ndebele says in 
his theory concerning the function of literature during the struggle for liberation. In 
“Towards Progressive Cultural Planning”, Ndebele points to the functional demands for 
liberation literature in the following words: 
 We aim not only at changing the content of our cultural expression, but also at 
 efficient social organisation where such expression can be assigned a definite 
 place.  The aim is to restore to the community of the oppressed, a practical sense 
 of organised and organic civic society … For the oppressed do have a culture; 
 what they need to do is pay closer attention to its material expression during the 
 process of struggle, such that that culture itself can constitute the material content 
of a  changing alternative consciousness.  (“Towards” 131) 
An analysis of Mphahlele’s poetry and short stories has already demonstrated that its 
content and expressive devices are alternative to those of the domineering culture of 
oppression on home ground and in exile abroad, within which he writes.  His positing of 
the concept of African humanism as the organising principle underlying the social 
ordering of Africans satisfies Ndebele’s requirement of liberation literature attending to 
“efficient social organisation” (“Towards” 131).   Our consideration of his poetry and 
short stories has also indicated that the cultural construct of African humanism which 
Mphahlele asserts does “constitute the material content of a changing alternative 
consciousness” as Ndebele believes literature should do “during the process of struggle” 
(“Towards” 131).  It should be remembered that “In the case of a political identity that’s 
being threatened, culture is a way of fighting against extinction and obliteration … [and 
is] a form of memory against effacement” (“Rendezvous” 159). 
 
A search for specific ways in which Mphahlele is an “interpreter” of the plight of the 
oppressed blacks during apartheid should thus also ask whether he interprets in an 
adequately intense manner such as Ndebele and Said project in the above citations.  The 
key thing in analysing autobiographical fiction or fictional autobiography such as 
Mphahlele’s is probing both of patterns that represent fictive elements and those that 
constitute the autobiographical data of the writer.  The two autobiographies will thus be 
discussed in order to establish how Mphahlele uses them as a vehicle to convey to the 
reader his moves towards elucidating and communicating his concept of African 
humanism.  In addition to discussing Mphahlele’s own assertion of the concept by his 
deployment of the contents of the autobiographies, the texts will also be analysed with 
the intention of establishing how Mphahlele employs them to enable his readers to 
develop their understanding of the concept of African humanism. 
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3.2.1 GENERAL INSTANCES OF AFRICAN HUMANISM IN THE AUTOBIOGRAPHIES 
 
In the chapter of Afrika My Music chronicling Mphahlele’s experiences in Philadelphia 
from 1974 to 1977, the writer explains the career crisis facing his wife in terms of an 
outlook that is imbued with African humanist thinking. Being a social worker, Rebecca is 
said to be living at a crossroads of consciousness: 
She is aware, on the other hand, that her approach to human problems is severely 
ethical or indeed moralistic: she feels passionately what one’s behaviour should 
be.   Because of this, she is always going to have to rethink her set of ethics in 
relation to the social problems of other people whose ethics are totally different 
from hers (and mine), which derive from  African humanism. (Afrika My Music 
150) 
 
In a passage following the cited paragraph with its expository narrative style the writer 
switches to vivid descriptive narrative when he evokes the waste polluting Philadelphia 
pavements in the form of “dog diarrhoea messes” (150).   Significantly, Mphahlele 
hastens to mention that the dogs are “outrageously” pampered by their American owners.  
In narrative writing containing a number of the culturally metonymic images such as 
“gravestones for pets” and “his diet pills” (with the pronoun “his” indicating a pet dog) 
the American way of life is clearly depicted as conflicting emphatically with the African 
humanism of the writer’s perspective.  Mphahlele betrays this cultural conflict in the 
statement that “western attachment to animals, wild and domestic, that goes beyond basic 
utility, disgusts [him]” (African Image - Revised Edition 71).  At the heart of this remark 
is the African humanist outlook of valuing human life in such a way as to reserve certain 
modes of affection for human beings – thus making sure not to misdirect such 
manifestations of love towards animals or other parts of nature.  The same prioritisation 
of love for humans is evident in the way Mphahlele expresses conflicting attitudes 
between westerners and Africans with regard to relaxation.  According to the African 
humanist way of life (as Mphahlele writes in the essay “The African Personality”), 
“[Rather than] go out to lonely places for a vacation, just for the scenery, [Africans] go to 
other people” (African Image - Revised Edition 71-72).  This quotation is yet another 
demonstration of the Africans’ conscious focus on humans rather than on other 
components of the universe, in keeping with the African philosophical premise described 
by another African theorist (Mbiti) as “an extremely anthropocentric ontology in the 
sense that everything is seen in terms of its relation to man” (African Religions and 
Philosophy 15).  This is another way of saying love and other ways of showing attention 
must be directed towards man and not other things accompanying man in nature – with 
the exception of less important forms of such attention. 
The dialogue of the American characters portrayed by Mphahlele contains expressions 
such as “he loves oxheart” (151) (with the pronoun “he” referring to a pet); “don’t sit on 
that chair, our cat Suzie won’t like it” (151); “When’s the burial?” (151); “Was at the dog 
morgue this morning” (151); “His crushed little body  ... It’s hideous, all these trashy 
drivers deserve to be shot …” (151).   The writer’s satirical tone is unmistakable to the 
reader cognisant of the African humanist consciousness from which the perception 
emanates.   A close look at the performed speech acts in these citations reveals a national 
psyche that does not put man at the centre.  It becomes crassly evident, in this way, that 
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American “face wants” and African “face wants” or conventions of politeness are not the 
same (using these terms as shown earlier in this study – in the manner of linguists like 
Matsumoto and Fraser).  What this means is that it might be socially acceptable within 
the American culture to speak in such a way that the person one is communicating with 
receives the message that the life of a pet is valued to the same degree as that of a human 
being, but that within African cultures with an African humanist outlook such dialogue 
reveals a perception deviating from the social value system. 
In Chocolates for My Wife, his own autobiography, Todd Matshikiza writes of a similar 
attitude among white South Africans valuing dogs’ lives to the same degree as those of 
humans, as follows: 
 When we go visiting [the nice girls who live in at their places of domestic 
 employment] at their quarters, we share their food which is  whatever’s left over 
 from the boss’s table.  It’s really meant for the dog.  But if you’ve been ducking 
 the cops through the white suburbs for an hour, you get there hungry … (13) 
The passage quoted above exposes a practice of South African whites resembling that of 
the Americans Mphahlele describes in the previously cited part of Afrika My Music (150).  
It is because food feeds the white employers, then goes to the dogs, and is then only 
available to the live-in employee if not given to the dogs (as the employers expect).  In an 
autobiographical piece published in The World of Nat Nakasa, Nakasa contrasts the 
treatment of dogs by African Americans living in Harlem with the way whites spoil theirs 
in downtown New York as follows: 
I did not see poodles and fox terriers in [Harlem].  I did not see housewives take 
dogs for afternoon walks, a practice I know only as having to do with [whites] … 
When I asked if the community had its poodle-raising set, I was told a story about 
the last riot.  Appparently someone swiped yards of sausage from a shop during 
the riot lootings,  only to be besieged by Harlem’s dogs as he went down the 
sidewalk.  The dogs, it is said, forced the man to the ground and made off with 
much of his loot.  I can well imagine the same thing happening in Edenvale, 
Johannesburg. (116) 
The absence in Harlem of “housewives [taking dogs] for afternoon walks” indicates that 
such cosseting of dogs as whites indulge in does not happen in Harlem.  The humorous 
tale of the African American who steals sausages only for Harlem dogs to relieve him of 
the delicacy attests to the inverse prioritising of man in acts of intimacy such as feeding 
people rather than dogs which, like the black domestic workers back home in 
Johannesburg, are made to survive only on left-overs.  The exile Nakasa’s noticing of 
these parallels between Harlem and the African residential area of  Edenvale in South 
Africa is a way of highlighting the bond of common social behaviour between the two far 
distant black worlds which (in Mphahlele’s terms) should be seen to spring from their 
underlying African humanism.  As has been demonstrated earlier in this study, African 
humanism (as Mphahlele describes it) binds together Africans the world over, due to 
common historical experiences (such as subjection to racial prejudice) that have impacted 
on them in the same way.  A common historical heritage is equally the explanation why 
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whites in societies as distant as Johannesburg and New York display a similar treatment 
of Africans that emanates from an underlying, shared consciousness. 
 
The fact that the conversing characters in the citation above from Afrika My Music are 
not mentioned by name signifies that, in typical Mphahlele style, the dialogue conjoins 
the personal voice with that of the public (150).   Such a technique subtly demonstrates to 
the reader that the views expressed here are societal and have nothing much to do with 
individual character traits.  Mphahlele being an African humanist, it is only natural that a 
work by him should concern itself more with the communal voice.   The Black 
Consciousness philosophy of the exiled writer remains ineradicable; he persists in 
looking at society from a communal orientation, due to his Africanist consciousness. 
 
Upon sampling life in Nigeria and Kenya, the writer states that back in South Africa 
stubborn sediments of the Africans’ collective personality dynamically helped them 
shape ghetto life to make the best of it, in the face of the cultural onslaught of apartheid.   
This contrasts with the cultural exuberance and abandon the narrator experiences in the 
free African states – behaviour that is informed in a similar way as that of South Africans 
by an African humanist consciousness because of the closeness of the cultures of the two 
groups of people. 
 
In a Down Second Avenue chapter named “Saturday Night”, Mphahlele describes how 
the Marabastad people in general and Aunt Dora and Grandma specifically survived by 
illicitly brewing home-made beer (among other strategies).  One paragraph describes the 
beer-making practice in this way: 
Women brewed some of the most terrifying compounds.  ‘It’s heathen!’ 
grandmother said indignantly.  ‘My beer’s the pure and healthy food a man’s 
stomach needs.’   And we never had the fighting type of customer.  ‘But even 
with that, God’ll help  me make money to send my children to college.’ (Down 
Second Avenue 43) 
Similarly to the example from Afrika My Music quoted earlier, there is a theme of cultural 
resilience underlying the above example from Down Second Avenue.  It is the humanist 
cultural perspective from which the grandmother conceives her surrounding which impels 
her to put man at the centre.   The economic hardships do not debauch the female 
character (Grandma) to the vile practice of putting material gain above the sacredness of 
human life.   That some African women (as the above quotation shows) do indeed 
concoct deadly liquids that they sell for beer suggests Mphahlele’s recognition that 
individual depravity does exist alongside the collective consciousness informed by 
African humanism.   
 
Indeed, the brewing of such deadly concoctions  in the townships (perceived as a cancer 
that had to be stopped from consuming  society), was a concern of the South African 
black writers of the times – as is revealed by Can Themba’s agitated reference to such a 
phenomenon in “The Will to Die” (The World of Can Themba).  Here he speaks of “a 
violent, alcoholic concoction brewed in the location called Barberton” that contributed to 
destruction of the health of the teacher called Foxy (51).  But in Mphahlele’s Down 
Second Avenue such an indictment against the women of Marabastad for brewing lethal 
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substances like “Barberton” spares Grandma only at one level.  At another level all 
women who deal illicitly in liquor are acting criminally.  It is for this reason that 
Grandma flatters herself after extolling her beer for being “pure and healthy food” when 
she continues and says “but even with that, God’ll help me …” (43).  Despite her beer 
being the traditional, nutritious type, Grandma still needs God’s help in order to survive 
police raids and make enough money to send her children to college (43). The irony of 
Grandma trying to efface the ‘criminality’ of her practice in order to focus on other 
women’s crime in  which she does not share is Mphahlele’s subtle way of trying to 
indicate that apartheid is to blame for the illicit trade (and not the brewers themselves as 
indicated by the way Grandma shifts the blame from herself).  Through Grandma’s 
unassailable moral primness, Mphahlele wants to show that even in conditions of 
dehumanisation such as the Marabastad women experience, conscience influenced by 
African humanist values is still expected to prevail.   Despite accentuating the resilient 
nature of African humanist consciousness as exemplified by Grandma, another layer of 
meaning remains an admission that the aberrations of some black characters – such as the 
women who brew corrossive concoctions with a disregard for human life – are their 
desperate bid to rise above the morass of conditions thrust upon powerless Africans by 
apartheid.  In this regard Mphahlele has written that “[Africans must] recover from the 
violence African humanism has suffered”, meaning in this instance that the other women 
of Marabastad should do as Grandma does and stick to brewing healthy traditional beer 
(“Humanism and Corporate World” 132).  Another Drum writer, Nat Nakasa, explains 
the apartheid origins of township-style shebeens as follows: 
 For too long [the non-whites] have been the stewards serving whisky to whites in 
 places where no black man can drink.  Out of these  conditions, from the bottles 
 stolen from hotel cellars, the shebeens were born.  As outsiders, excluded from 
 the hotel lounges by law and convention, we drank our drink the shebeen way – a 
 way outside the normal human experience of drinking in bars, hotel lounges and 
 clubs.  (The World of Nat Nakasa 58) 
The double-layered crime that sets the other women apart from Grandma is Mphahlele’s 
way of indicating the enormity of apartheid’s impact on the township blacks who are 
doubly grappling with the hardships visited on them by apartheid as well as attempting to 
reclaim the African humanism that is battered by apartheid practices.  Only the 
underlying vestiges of African humanism and the enduring cultural orientation that 
accompanies its purposeful orderliness undercut whatever frenzy might seem to reign on 
the surface of daily living in Marabastad.  The critic Afejuku seems to be detecting the 
achievement of African humanist consciousness within Mphahlele’s characters who 
manage to maintain “some order” when he remarks that “in Down Second Avenue … 
Mphahlele’s description of his environment is … graphically vivid … [but] subtly creates 
humour by the ambiguity of the phrases which suggest that there is some order in the 
disorderliness described” (“Setting in” 257, emphasis added). 
 
It should be borne in mind that Mphahlele’s definition of African humanism includes its 
ability to survive.  That is why Mphahlele has written that “whatever happens, human life 
must survive as a collective or communal force” (“Notes Towards” 138).   It is from this 
ability of African humanism to survive that Mphahlele derives the encouragement and 
hope needed to defeat the challenges that threaten to submerge him throughout his life, as 
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the following statement reveals:  “The smiles on those old and young faces, the simple 
humanity of my people at a time when white people were reported to be buying firearms 
by the dozen, was enough to give strength to my resolve to return permanently at a later 
stage” (Exiles and Homecomings 17).  According to Mphahlele’s observation (above) 
upon arriving at Jan Smuts airport on his temporary return to South Africa in 1976, the 
survival of African humanist qualities within the Africans who are welcoming him at the 
airport is imprinted on the “smiles on those old and young faces”, because such 
countenances are (as the quotation testifies) an expression of “the simple humanity of [his 
people]” (17, emphasis added).  As a way to reaffirm his own description of African 
humanist individualism as partly defined by what the community demands of the 
individual,  Mphahlele in the remark above ties his own resilience as an African after 
almost two decades in exile to the larger resilience of his fellow Africans gathering at the 
airport to welcome him.  That is why he contrasts these people’s constant “simple 
humanity” with the hostility of the whites (whose consciousness is opposed to African 
humanism) at the time when the latter “were reported to be buying firearms by the 
dozen” (17).  The effect of the reference to “firearms” is to make vivid the brutality of the 
political climate within which Mphahlele is landing, for the visit is happening at the 
height of the shootings and torture that follow the recently past ‘riots’ of June 16, 1976. 
 
In sketching the historical background through which the peoples empowered by African 
humanism have moved, Mphahlele concedes that the violence African humanism 
suffered through the challenges of colonisation (which includes the impact of apartheid 
on urban ghetto life such as is experienced by Grandma and the other women in 
Marabastad) is massive.  The critic Colin Gardner pays homage to such a contribution by 
Mphahlele (Down Second Avenue) towards the fostering of much needed “acute shared 
awareness of what white rule has meant in the lives of black people ... [which is] 
essential as a background to serious political negotiations” (especially in the wake of 
F.W. de Klerk’s 2nd February 1990 speech that was a “response to a process of inexorable 
change”) (“Two Thrusts” 18, emphasis added).  Because of the immensity of the impact 
of apartheid on the lives of the blacks represented successfully by the characters in Down 
Second Avenue, ensuring survival of the African humanist consciousness and way of life 
is not an easy task.  This is why Grandma in the earlier quote from Down Second Avenue 
(43) is portrayed as the solitary figure that cares about morality and is swamped by the 
majority who are unscrupulous about the unhealthy kind of beer they trade in – a point 
we gather by means of  Mphahlele’s use of the opening word “Women”  (instead of 
“Some women”).  Such an image of  a solitary figure asserting the survival of African 
humanist values against immense odds prefigures Mphahlele’s own steadfast role (as 
depicted later in Afrika My Music) in the face of adversity inflicted on his African 
humanist consciousness by the alienating experience of exile.  This may be why critics 
Ogude, Raditlhalo, Ramakuela, Ramogale and Thuynsma say (in their editorial note in 
the collection of Mphahlele’s essays Es’kia) that in writing Down Second Avenue 
“Mphahlele confirms his identity” (Es’kia 455).   
 
The handling of autobiography in both Down Second Avenue and Afrika My Music plays 
around with notions of “fiction” and “imitation” (theorised by Pavel) in an intriguing 
manner. It is in this aspect of Mphahlele’s writing of autobiography where the truth of 
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Thuynsma’s remark (quoted above) about imaginativeness conjoining both Mphahlele’s 
plain fiction as in novels and short stories on the one hand, and on the other hand his  
autobiographies that in the hands of a different writer would most likely remain at the 
imitative level.  The latter would show this quality to mimic reality directly, considering 
that characters in autobiography are real-life people whose actions are imitated or 
recreated in the organising of events exactly as they are in the life they lived.  Mphahlele 
bulges out of such a conventional way of describing autobiography.  It is this feature of 
his autobiography that enables him to “[confirm] his identity” as Ogude et al. rightly 
observe (Es’kia 455), because it is constituted by the sublime artistic texture of his 
autobiographical writings which presences imaginativeness that would regularly have 
been absent.  It is in imaginative writing where a person may “[confirm] his identity” and 
that of his people who he relates with in a communalism that is a constituent of African 
humanism as Mphahlele characterises it.  Such an imaginative element enables 
Mphahlele’s two autobiographies to be laced with what the writer interprets to be 
symptomatic action springing from an African humanist consciousness.  A mere direct 
imitation of reality as conventional autobiography has no room for such theoretical and 
visionary interweaving, because lived life in direct reflection of its surface plainness does 
not hesitate in a discursive manner from being, or propose in a visualising manner what it 
is not – it simply is.   
 
The American literary theorist, Thomas Pavel (2000), analyses the difference between 
factual writing and fiction in terms of criteria that may be very simply described as 
distinguishing between plain imitation of reality on the one hand, and on the other hand 
as maneuvred imitation of reality, in an essay published in 2000.  Pavel remarks on the 
primacy (in fiction) of inferred messages (as against overtly stated messages) in these 
words:   
We use literature as a springboard for reflection about the human condition, and 
 because of this, to gauge the mimetic success of fiction is far less important than 
 to seek in it the opportunity for raising questions, pondering hypotheses, and 
 debating issues relevant for the kind of beings we are. (“Fiction and Imitation” 
 522)   
This means that according to writers like Pavel fiction is a direct imitation of life at a 
certain level.  But there is a more important level at which fiction provokes readers to 
question the imitated reality in order to make meaning of their own existence.  To use 
Ndebele’s terms, the place of the writer in the fiction he/she writes as an “interpreter” is 
more important than that of him/her being just one of the “actors” in the slice of life he 
/she is depicting. 
 
Pavel’s elevation of the creative act to a force assisting us in “raising questions, 
pondering hypotheses, and debating issues relevant to the kind of beings we are” can be 
linked with Mphahlele’s even more explicit statements, such as his remark that “every 
good artist goes beyond the moment into the future [and] must have a vision” (in Looking 
Through 35).  It can be posited that it is the African humanist consciousness infused in 
the characters of Down Second Avenue, and the same consciousness in Mphahlele 
himself emanating from discontinuity of simply acting life out without pondering about it 
as the fictive element of his autobiography accommodates that endows them with “a 
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certain quality of control” (as observed by Gardner 18)  leading to Down Second Avenue 
picturing “a black person reaching the end of his tether, but at the same time holding 
himself together, refusing to be destroyed by the ‘system’” (“Two Thrusts” 21).  Such 
control is epitomised by the disciplined reactions of the character Grandma in Down 
Second Avenue in coping with apartheid challenges to Africans’ existence in Marabastad 
as well as in Mphahlele’s “controlled” stylistic responses to life under apartheid.  In 
positing African humanism as an organising principle in the lives of Africans, Mphahlele 
can be said to be administering “control” or order which apartheid otherwise sought to 
destroy.  Noting this, Gardner says of the reader of Down Second Avenue that “what [he 
or she encounters] is the heroism of endurance, of survival” (“Two Thrusts” 21), both of 
which are qualities shown in this study to be associated with Mphahlele’s concept of 
African humanism. 
 
The images yielded by phrases like “most terrifying compounds” (referring to the lethal 
brews of some women in Down Second Avenue – 43) may be taken to symbolise the 
socially corrosive hybridity caused by modernisation under apartheid conditions – the 
antithesis of African humanism.  Mphahlele’s characterisation of the consciousness and 
culture he has titled African humanism includes the ability to rely for subsistence and 
survival on organic material.   One example of this practice is the use of African 
medicine in traditional healing (“Notes Towards” 139).   That the beer brewed by 
Mphahlele’s grandmother has pure organic matter as ingredients is borne out by her 
statement in the above citation that the beer is “pure and healthy food a man’s stomach 
needs.”  Grandma’s pride in adhering to the practice of using only organic material in her 
home beer business accords with Mphahlele’s explanation of one aspect of African 
humanism as “an extension of that connection between the human being and nature as a 
vital force” shown by the fact that – in his treatment of his patient – the medicine the 
traditional healer dispenses “is organic: an animal or vegetable product” (“Notes 
Towards” 139).  Hence, the grandmother’s dialogue on the type of home beer she cooks 
is to be read as a communal declaration, and not a mere private opinion.   By this is 
meant that her words express the way the African community of Marabastad view 
(culturally defined) proper conduct.  The grandmother’s invocation of God to help her 
afford college fees for her children is another confirmation of the basic tenet of African 
humanism, to see the sustained presence of the Supreme Being in every phenomenon. 
 
Since the long narratives presently under scrutiny are autobiographies, Mphahlele in 
these texts takes the liberty of directly stating his convictions about the desirability of a 
sense of community, as in the following declaration from the later text:  “I cannot today 
help feeling nostalgic about the sense of community we shared in Marabastad; nostalgic 
even about the smells, the taste and the texture of life as we experienced it in those days – 
even though I would not want to live in a slum again” (Afrika My Music 11).  Parallel 
instances of Mphahlele’s sense of the African humanist psyche abound also in the earlier 
autobiography, Down Second Avenue.   When the book opens with Eseki and his two 
siblings going to stay with their paternal grandmother in rural Maupaneng, the seminal 
image of the grandmother sitting “under a small lemon tree next to the hut, as big as fate, 
as forbidding as a mountain, stern as a mimosa tree” (11) sums up the boy’s impression 
of the cosmic milieu. 
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The concrete entities denoted on the one hand by means of the terms “lemon tree”, 
“mimosa tree”  and “grandmother” and on the other hand the abstract concept denoted by 
the term fate are juxtaposed in a manner transcending categorical demarcation.  The 
protagonist Eseki, who is still a boy, still perceives reality in a novel way at this point.  
The stylistic merging of the components of reality — in such a way that they defy 
classification as animate or inanimate, human or non-human, abstract or concrete, 
physical or spiritual, positivist or romantic — represents the boy’s vantage point, 
whereby the universe (according to the way Mphahlele defines the concept of African 
humanism) is a continuous whole with man at the centre (“Notes Towards” 137; “Social 
Work” 240).   Man is represented here by the paternal grandmother, for the boy’s focus 
on the environment unfolds from his perception of this psychologically larger-than-life 
personage.   In keeping with Mphahlele’s notion of African humanism, Eseki conceives 
of the grandmother as being in the centre of the ambient reality.  Such a positioning of the 
human being at the centre of the reality which he or she is simultaneously at one with and 
distinct from is a premise of African humanism. The plausibility of such an interpretation 
of the way the boy Eseki encounters the Maupaneng setting – not as a revulsion against 
what most critics (among them Thuynsma) often stress to be the cruelty of “his tyrannical 
paternal grandmother” Mathebe (Es’kia Continued 404), but as a process of making sense 
of nature and its meaning for his own existence – is supported by a comment Mphahlele 
makes much later as a more critically mature adult in the biography Exiles and 
Homecomings: that “[he] did not want to be crushed by the human and physical 
environment around [him]” (34).  In other words, Eseki’s reaction to the apparently 
hostile environment of Maupaneng is an assertion of his subjectivity and centrality to 
reality – as Mphahlele’s theory on African humanism requires. 
 
Another point that confirms the above reading is Mphahlele’s view that to the African, 
the Supreme Being exists as an all-pervading vital force in the mountains, the rivers, 
valleys, the plant and animal kingdom (“Social Work” 240).  This description of a 
pantheistic aspect of African humanism agrees with the philosophies of writers like 
Tempels, who noted that the idea of a ‘vital force’ expresses the belief among Africans 
that all that exists shares in the one life force (see Okolo 1993, 15).   The way Mphahlele 
describes the frightful hue of the mountains that skirt Maupaneng village exposes his 
awareness of the vital force informing all matter: “the mountain darkness, so solid and 
dense” (Down Second Avenue 11).   A solid and dense kind of darkness suggests here the 
idea that the particles of the darkness are glued together by some living spirit, some 
innate power.  Similarly, the description of the raging Leshoana river as evincing “a long 
wailing cry [across] the ugly waters [where] big rocks rolled … thundering as they hit 
and bounced on their track” points to the presence inside the waters of a vital force.   The 
awe which the description inspires in the reader is reminiscent of the awe with which 
Africans regard nature, as in every aspect of nature they detect the presence of God or the 
Supreme Being.  That the African humanist conception of the presence of the Supreme 
Being in all matter coincides with the views of some of the European writers who are 
known for their pantheism (such as William Wordsworth) is perfectly understandable.   
African humanist societies do not deny similarity or dissimilarity with any other 
community whose existence may be based on similar principles. Their immediate 
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concern is self-definition, however, as is evident in Mphahlele’s declaration analysed 
earlier in this study, that in asserting African humanism in the 1950s and calling for a 
suspension of focus on the racist consciousness in South Africa, that defined other sectors 
of mankind maliciously, he was educating fellow Africans to ignore (for the time being) 
whatever similarities or dissimilarities might exist between European and African 
humanisms.  It should also be remembered that according to Mphahlele’s reasoning, 
whatever similarities may exist result from the universal features shared between the 
humanisms of Europe and of Africa, which he has attributed to our common humanity.  
At the deeper level, the non-exclusivism of African humanism is an acknowledgement of 
such similarities between European and African consciousnesses that might have been 
diminished or obliterated along the passage of time by geo-political and other factors.  
What Mphahlele does not call for in his description of the African humanist 
consciousness is pre-occupation with the ravages of apartheid, which he sees as standing 
in the way of self-definition. 
 
According to the Africanist world view Mphahlele portrays in the autobiographies, man 
can live in harmony with the universe because he or she is informed by the same vital 
force which pervades nature.  The vital force in man has been referred to by writers like 
Kofi Awoonor and Donatus Nwoga as the chi or personal god.   It can be a bad or good 
chi which an individual chooses to follow, according to Donatus Nwoga (as cited by 
Mphahlele – “Notes Towards” 140).    According to Kofi Awoonor (as quoted by 
Mphahlele), whether one follows a bad or good chi  is determined by whether the 
person’s role enhances or diminishes his or her position in the scale of values which are 
consonant with their society’s ultimate goal (“Notes Towards” 140).   Acceptance and 
encouragement of culture-specific individualism is a constituent of African humanism.  It 
is in order to alert the readers to this that Mphahlele writes in the following words in a 
1975 essay “The African Critic”: 
 I am saying here that the individual vision and private concerns have a place in 
 our lives, unless there is an utterly monstrous falsification of life through and 
 through.  The African sage, elder, doctor, high priest and so many other people in 
 traditional life took time to be alone in order to contemplate experience.  It is like 
 the sick kind of loneliness we do not yet share with the Western world. (Es’kia 
 387) 
Mphahlele’s reference in the above quotation to the “sick kind of loneliness” found in the 
Western world is caution against mistaking apparent similarities between forms of 
African and European existence for real, profound ones.  By indicating that Africans do 
not yet share the “sick kind of loneliness”, Mphahlele is pointing to the danger of 
elimination of African humanism by westernisation if Africans do not consciously make 
efforts to preserve it.  The churchgoing character Old Segone in Down Second Avenue 
testifies to the African humanist belief in the idea of the chi, recognising a community-
inclined personal vital force or chi when he utters the following words orature-style as he 
is sitting among other men at the communal fire-place: “Let them; what right have we to 
see other people in their naked selves when we wouldn’t be caught with our pants down! 
And besides, we all have our secret little gods, Christian or none” (14, emphasis added).   
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The words Old Segone utters at the village fire-place are prompted by implied 
recountings by the other residents of Maupaneng who, like Old Segone, stay in the 
‘Christian’ zone of the village.  The stories shared at the fire-place tell of the supposedly 
‘heathen’ practices of residents occupying the section of the village Mphahlele describes 
(inferring absence of western Christian civilization) as “tribal kraal communities” (14).  It 
is the tales of speculation on the mysteries of the initiation school belonging to the “tribal 
kraal communities” that prompt Old Segone’s reference to “our secret little gods”.  The 
colonised consciousness of the villagers residing in the Christian zone of Maupaneng 
leads them to denigrate the traditional practices of the villagers on the other side, as these 
are interpreted as heathen abominations.  The rift that exists between the Maupaneng 
‘Christians’ and ‘heathens’ is as ludicrous as that which divides villagers living on either 
side of the Honia River in Ngugi’s The River Between.  The prejudice with which Old 
Segone’s neighbours view the ‘heathens’ is no less acute than the way (in The River 
Between) the girl Nyambura’s father Joshua despises the ‘heathens’ who in his opinion 
are as uncouth as the boy Waiyaki in what he sees as his ‘heathen’ temperament.  Joshua 
justifies his self-important condemnation of the boy who is in love with Nyambura in the 
following words:  “Do not think I am blind.  I am not that old.  And don’t you cheat 
yourself I have not heard things. If I hear that you have been seen with that young devil 
again you will no longer live in this house … And don’t you remember how they burnt 
the hut of a man of God?” (116).  The irony of the words “do not think I am blind” lies in 
the fact that Joshua and fellow ‘Christians’ in The River Between are blind to the 
underlying Africanness that binds together villagers lying on both sides of the  Honia 
River, despite the veneer of difference brought about by the advent of western 
Christianity. 
 
The significance of Old Segone’s comment lies in his ironic meaning, which is that, 
irrespective of whether one is on the ‘Christian’ or ‘heathen’ side of Maupaneng, the 
‘chi’ or “secret little god” or individualism of each community member is the one that 
should be the focus.  Because each community member has his or her distinctive 
individuality which allows them to choose between good or evil (or between a good and 
bad ‘chi’), Old Segone is exhorting villagers on the Christian side to refrain from blaming 
the ‘heathens’ they intrude upon, for the traditional customs the ‘heathens’ are privately 
practising.  Even in cases when untoward conduct reveals itself among the heathens it 
should be blamed on the individuals’ private option for evil.  One such inhuman practice 
under the spotlight in the traditional fire-place meeting at which Old Segone is speaking, 
is the disposition of the ‘heathen’ initiates who chase and whip any member from the 
‘Christian’ side venturing into the vicinity of the initiation school.  In fact, Old Segone’s 
remarks reveal his awareness of the irony in the callousness of the Christians who fail to 
realise that the actions of the heathens are a sign of collective cultural self-preservation – 
a quality which they (the Christians) lack. 
 
On a profound plane, Old Segone’s dialogue satirises the ironic blindness of the 
‘Christians’ to their own persisting African humanist values despite their superficial view 
of such notions as ‘heathen’ or backward.  Such an ironic contradiction is captured in the 
image of the village fire-place around which the men sit each evening, for basking in the 
warmth of such a fire is still a sign of basking in the warmth of the African traditional 
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cultures that the fire-place symbolises.  Mphahlele confirms this function of the village 
fire-place by describing it as “a place where I learnt a great deal about the history of the 
area, African traditions and customs, communal responsibility and the limits of personal 
conduct” (Exiles and Homecomings 35). 
 
It is African humanist consciousness that equips Mphahlele and Rebecca (in Afrika My 
Music) during their stay in Philadelphia with the sensitivity to feel the contrast between 
Africanism and American cultures.  Mphahlele exposes the pain of exile that is 
exacerbated by the awkward juxtaposition between his and his wife’s African 
personalities and their American context in Afrika My Music.  By recounting in the same 
book the mixed feelings he has when he perceives the freedom with which Africans 
function in post-colonial Nigeria and Kenya, Mphahlele enables the reader to appreciate 
the difference between African humanist experience that is not repressed (as shown in his 
description of the admirable abandon among the Africans resident in Kenya and Nigeria) 
and that which is repressed (recalled by Mphahlele’s memories of confined life in 
Marabastad and other black domicilia back home in South Africa).  The narrator’s 
repeated expressions (in Afrika My Music) of a longing for life in Marabastad – without 
wanting to return to its slum condition – is Mphahlele’s way of emphasising that ghetto 
conditions are not an organic part of African humanist existence, but have been grafted 
onto it by westernisation. It is also a statement by Mphahlele that the influence 
westernisation has on African cultures is irreversible and that the best Africans can do is 
to accommodate themselves to it provided they do so in a self-constituting manner. 
 
Exemplification in Down Second Avenue of a regard for human life as central to African 
humanism as illustrated by Grandma’s remark about the beer trade achieves its 
indictment of apartheid in much the same way as it reaffirms the place of a woman as a 
pillar of the home and community.  The African humanist view of man’s place as the 
centre of the universe is illustrated in the vivid descriptions of the opening parts of Down 
Second Avenue which evoke Eseki’s interaction with his paternal grandmother and with 
nature in Maupaneng.   
 
The Africanist definition of culturally-appropriate individualism can be deduced by the 
reader from Mphahlele’s use of the dialogue by Old Segone and the other men residing 
on the ‘Christian’ side of Maupaneng.  The clash of consciousnesses that expresses itself 
through Rebecca and Mphahlele’s rejection of American values, in Afrika My Music, 
depicts Africanist individualism with its granting of freedom of choice between either 
following good or bad ‘chi’.   Mphahlele and Rebecca choose the ‘proper’ individualism 
of adapting to an American lifestyle only to the extent to which such an accommodation 
does not strip them of their distinctive African consciousness.   
 
 It can therefore be seen that the two autobiographical works of Mphahlele advance the 
readers’ comprehension of the concept of African humanism.  Characterisation, dialogue 
and symbolically potent images are the tools that Mphahlele uses to achieve the above 
results in the two autobiographies.  In his demonstration of the similarity between the 
Igbo idea of the chi and the way a character like Old Segone emphasises the kind of 
individualism assumed by the members of the African community of Maupaneng, 
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Mphahlele is indicating that in this aspect of African cultures the Igbo and the Northern 
Sotho are similar.  This position of Mphahlele’s should not be mistaken as suggesting 
that African cultures are identical or similar in all respects. 
 
3.2.2 OTHER REPRESENTATIONS OF AFRICAN CULTURES 
 
The nuanced use of transliterations of Sotho idiom (in English) that was pointed out in 
the analysis of Mphahlele’s short stories, is interspersed throughout Down Second 
Avenue.   For example, shortly after Eseki and his siblings have joined their father and 
mother in Marabastad and the mother rails against the father’s penchant for spending all 
his wages on liquor, she protests in the following terms: “What are you standing up for?” 
(25) or (on the traumatic day when the hot curried vegetable stew  is thrown into Eva’s 
face) by saying: “What are you standing up to do?” (28).   This is a literal translation of 
the popular Northern Sotho accusation “O ikemišeditše eng/go dirang?” meaning What 
are you up to?   Similarly, when Dora gossips with a friend about Ma-Lebona’s failure to 
retain husbands, she states that Ma-Lebona “kept a rough twig between the husband’s 
buttocks long enough to drive him mad…” (61). This is a direct translation of the Sotho 
idiomatic expression “go tsentšha motho legonyana ka maragong” meaning to nag a 
person.   When Dokie and other women of Marabstad gossip at the communal water tap 
about the tortoise that was found in Ma-Legodi’s yard, the bearer of the news only 
reveals Dora to be the source of the story after much persuasion, and to protect the source 
she pleads with the enquirer (Dokie) that when asked by other people about the source of 
the gossip she should evasively answer that she “got it from a goat by the roadside”. The 
original Northern Sotho expression is “ka pudi ya tsela”, meaning a little bird told me 
(29-30).  The gallant Dora’s repeated words about men are that she is not afraid of them 
and can always beat up a “thing in trousers”, “until its price had gone down”:  this derives 
from “ka mo tšhiphiša” in Sotho, meaning mortify him (79).  When the boys tease one 
another about their timidity in proposing love to the now pregnant girl Maisie, one of the 
boys confesses his fear of the latter’s boldness to the incredulous mates by using the 
words “by your ma”, which derives from a Sotho idiomatic expression “ka mmago” – 
meaning that he was no longer trifling about an ordinary girl but was now talking 
apprehensively about a girl of an outstandingly self-assertive temperament (112).  In one 
of the “Interludes”, Mphahlele mulls over a conversation he once had with his Jewish 
friend Sasha about the possibility of the living conditions of blacks being improved to be 
equal to that of whites, and in the face of hopelessness the two reassure each other by 
repeating to themselves the heartening proverb “what has no end is a miracle” – derived 
from  “se se sa felego se a hlola” in the language Sesotho sa Leboa/Northern Sotho, 
meaning there is an end to everything (204); and so forth. 
 
On the South African scene, other Drum writers such as Can Themba share such a use of 
indigenous languages or their syntactic forms, albeit in their own distinctive ways.  For 
example, in “Mob Passion” the Basotho vigilantes affirm that they believe in the Xhosa 
young man Linga’s pretence of being a Mosotho from Teyateyaneng by saying, “Che!  It 
is no Letebele this; this is a child of at home”, a literal translation from Sesotho meaning 
No! …; this is one of our own and he hails from our hometown back in the countryside 
(18).  Another example occurs when (in “Marta”) the drunk Marta is about to leave for 
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home with the boy she has lured from a shebeen for erotic satisfaction.  Sophia objects to 
their departure by saying that it is too early for them to leave as “we stand right” – this is 
a literal translation of the Sesotho idiomatic expression re eme hantle meaning that their 
pockets are fleeced with money which they still need to use to buy more liquor (80).  In a 
similar way, when the gangster Macala (in “The Urchin”) greets his mates after a 
rampage that leaves some Ndebele vendor with the toppled container of her street-stall 
merchandise, the mates return his greeting with the words “It’s how there?”,  translated 
literally from the Sotho way of greeting Go bjang mouwe? which means (in 
unappropriated English) How do you do? (99-100).  What sets Mphahlele apart from such 
Drum writers as Can Themba in the dialogic use of indigenous languages is his anchoring 
of such utterances in a clearly defined, enduring variety of African  culture while the 
other writers use the same device to point to the transient township sub-culture that will 
probably disappear with the disappearance of apartheid conditions.  This aspect (of 
recovering and asserting the cultures of Africans by formulating the concept of African 
humanism that delineates the distinctive cultural identity of the African as a building 
block) makes Mphahlele a more significant postcolonial writer than his contemporaries, 
if the role of culture is understood properly in the way Cabral describes it (in the 
following words): 
 A people who free themselves from foreign domination will not be culturally free 
 unless, without underestimating the importance of positive  contributions from the 
 oppressor’s culture and other cultures, they return to the upward paths of their 
 own culture … We see therefore that, if imperialist domination has the vital need 
 to practice cultural oppression, national liberation is necessarily an act of culture.  
 (143) 
The practice of a writer like Can Themba who depicts in fiction only the hybrid culture of 
the township dwellers without any conscious recreation of the unhybridised African 
cultures that underpin the behaviour of the township Africans, neglects the duty of the 
postcolonial writer to make sound meaning of the historical meeting of Africa with 
imperialists.  Apparently Mphahlele is expressing dissatisfaction with this defect of Can 
Themba’s fiction (mentioned above) as well as a similar cultural superficiality in the 
fiction of some Drum writers in his 1960 remark (which Michael Chapman describes as 
follows):  “Mphahlele could see in Drum only a trivialisation of black experience” (“Can 
Themba: Storyteller and Journalist of the 1950s” 269).  Mphahlele’s awareness (shown in 
the quotation above) of aspects in which his vision differs from his contemporaries agrees 
with the observation of some critics.  In a comparison of Mphahlele with Can Themba, 
for example, the critic Dorothy Driver remarks that “Es’kia Mphahlele [was] writing 
during the same time as Themba but generally [provided] more complex and submerged 
commentary regarding black/white relations” (“Women and Nature” 463). 
 
Other Drum writers like Casey Motsisi fail to rise above the flaws mentioned, inter alia, 
by the critics Chapman and Driver above. In Motsisi’s short story “Mita” the boyfriend  
Thomas loses money following his flirting with a former girlfriend (Sponono) and 
drinking exessively (due to addiction to European spirits) – the illustration of which is 
when he is told of Mita’s having given birth to his son and stops as usual “to buy a nip of 
brandy” (73, 76).  This addiction to strong drink produced in the West is described also in 
“Riot” when Maria habitually “pulls out the ashtin” to quaff whole bottles of brandy (80), 
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and in “Boyboy”, where Esther’s son loses his sanity probably due to continual stealing 
of the concoction skokiaan/Barberton (87), already mentioned in the discussion of 
Mphahlele’s Down Second Avenue and Can Themba’s “The Will to Die”.  Yet such 
township sub-culture is depicted with transient shallowness that lacks anchorage within 
an alternative consciousness against which the improper manners of the actors can be 
measured.  Such baseless characterisation is symptomatic also of the author lacking the 
definite aesthetic stand one finds in Mphahlele, as in his description of a writer as “the 
sensitive point of [his or her] community [to whom] the social impact about you must, if 
you are a true artist, help you define and redefine the African personality, to explore it 
without flinching at the social realities of your time” (African Image - Revised Edition 
77).  Writers such as Themba and Motsisi clearly reproduce the daily drama of African 
life in the townships without any signs of theorising about it (as the words “define and 
redefine the African personality” imply), in the way Mphahlele expects “a true artist” to 
do (African Image - Revised Edition 77). Failure to satirise the Africans’ uncritical 
mimicry and their lack of attempts at self-discovery is evident in Motsisi’s “Mita” when 
the traditional custom forbidding a father to come close to a newly-born baby before it is 
at least ten days old is “cursed” by the acculturated father Thomas and referred to as “that 
old and stupid African custom” (74).  The implication that risks being censured as elitist 
from the perspective of Afrocentric theorists such as Mphahlele and Ndebele here, as in 
Can Themba’s stories, is that the white people’s culture in these aspects is better or 
superior.  This is strongly reminiscent of a similarly superficial dismissal of the African 
institution of lobola in Can Themba’s “The Will to Die” (discussed earlier in this study).  
Remarks such as these are made without the suggestion of modernised African customs 
that have been creatively hybridised to tackle urbanisation and westernisation effectively.  
In these ways, Motsisi displays a failure to bolster criticism with suggestion of a well-
thought-out alternative to the cultural eradication with which the urbanised Africans of 
the 1950 were faced.  
 
Mphahlele does not only counterbalance the void in the fiction of contemporaries like 
Can Themba and Casey Motsisi demonstrated above by means of judicious, transposed 
use of African language proverbs and idiomatic expressions in the dialogue of his 
characters.  In addition to his practice of using Sotho idiomatic expressions and proverbs 
(examples of which are given above) the Sotho linguistic formula – exemplified by 
means of phrases now made  recognisable to Mphahlele’s readers by the short stories –  
makes a  predictable reappearance in Down Second Avenue.   One example is 
Mphahlele’s evocation of the old woman Ma-Lebona’s dying days: “She fought with 
death six months and one day she said to Joel she said Joel I saw death last night and he 
was ugly so I know more than ever before …” (Down Second Avenue 158, emphasis 
added). 
 
Mphahlele does not only share with the writers cited above in the stylistic use of 
transliterated proverbs and idiomatic expressions from the indigenous African languages 
that are the mother tongues of some of his potential and probable readers.  In a statement 
cited in A Vision of Order, he observes that the object-driven use of African language 
idiom in South African black writing “is incidentally part of a whole pattern of African 
literature throughout the continent” (in A Vision of Order 36).  The dimension not to be 
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ignored in African writers using African language-inflected English is that such a practice 
is not gratuitous.   The African outlook invariably accompanies such use of language – in 
the same way as this style is a vehicle for conveying and asserting an African humanist 
consciousness in the case of Mphahlele.    The profundity with which transliterations of 
African language idioms are employed by Mphahlele and other African writers like 
Okara and Achebe to measure individual action against the backdrop of cultural 
consciousness reveals culturally significant meaning.   Being oblivious to the presence of 
such transliterated meanings weakens what would otherwise be a richer, more complete 
understanding of such writers’ narratives. 
 
Because most characters in Afrika My Music are exiled academics, artists and political 
activists and thus communicate through the medium of English, this particular device is 
scant in Mphahlele’s latter-year autobiography. The tendency of the author in this text to 
focus on his memories of exile prompts critics Ogude, Raditlhalo, Ramakuela, Ramogale 
and Thuynsma to describe it as a “memoir … [which] excavates the condition of exile” 
yet is elevated into an art form by “ironies” (Es’kia 457).  What the critics describe as 
“ironies” are instances in the lives of Mphahlele and the other African exiles whose 
memories of friction between their African humanist sensibilities and the strange 
conditions they come in contact with in host countries he conveys.  One way to symbolise 
these conflicts is Mphahlele’s more diffuse use of African language in Afrika My Music.  
Despite Mphahlele’s use of the English language to serve the purpose of articulating the 
unEnglish concept of African humanism, the resulting tension is mediated by his 
distinctive style of abrogation that domesticates the foreign language – a practice which 
Edward Said describes as a general pattern among postcolonial writers in his remarks that 
“along with … nationalistic adumbrations of the decolonized identity, there always goes 
an almost magically inspired, quasi-alchemical redevelopment of the native language” 
(“Yeats and” 79).  In the hands of Mphahlele, English becomes a native language due to 
the extent that he reconstructs it in addressing his fellow Africans rather than a foreign 
audience.  To a critic like Edward Said, the phenomenon of taming a foreign language 
into a “native” language is an integral part of postcolonial theorising. 
 
From the examples above of African language functioning in abrogating the English 
language, it is evident that Mphahlele still stands apart because of his unique way of 
implementing this same technique (that he shares with fellow African writers).  While 
Mphahlele and other African writers similarly make use of this kind of English-African 
language dialogue, it is in Mphahlele that one discerns an intensification of such a device 
when the characters of his short stories, autobiographies and novels go further to speak 
even by means of the Sotho syntactical formulae such as “he/she says to me he/she says”. 
Gabriel Okara (in The Voice) does abrogate the English language in a more marked and 
even egregious way than most other African writers for reasons different from 
Mphahlele’s assertion of the African humanist consciousness and its connectedness to the 
African languages spoken by the people; Mphahlele’s expressions also limit their 
deviation from conventional English – as the many examples of terms and sentences 
given above testify.   
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Apart from the use of  Sotho syntactical formulae that deepens his abrogation of the 
English language, Mphahlele’s use of dramatic colloquial forms of conversation (such as 
the interspersing of  phrases like “Bathong”, “Strue’s God” and “Jealous down” that have 
already been illustrated  in this study in critical support of Gaylard) intensifies the 
appropriation of English not only to carry African expressions but also to evoke – in a 
manner other varieties of English would probably fail to achieve – conditions unique to 
the Africans’ cultural resilience in the face of apartheid.  Because Mphahlele and his 
contemporaries of the 1950s working for Drum were writing on conditions in the same 
group of townships – such as Bantule, Newclare, Sophiatown, Noordgesig, Orlando and 
Marabastad – similar colloquial phrases typical of black township communication 
heighten dramatic effect in the dialogue of (for example) Can Themba’s short stories  
collected in The World of Can Themba. 
 
 
3.2.3  AFRICAN RELIGION 
 
The communal water tap of Down Second Avenue’s Marabastad is where the women of 
the township are accorded the opportunity of acting out the tradition of oral storytelling.   
The oral tales from characters like Dokie and Ma-Janaware are presented in the 
autobiography as cheap gossip (similarly to the way a character like the woman Keledi in 
the short story “Down the Quiet Street” is outwardly portrayed as a worthless 
chatterbox).  A closer look at the rumours the women exchange at the Marabastad 
communal tap (like the rumour in “Down the Quiet Street” about the policeman Tefo and 
the shebeen queen Manyeu) reveals that they are authentic accounts with a moral about 
real men and women in the township. What sets them apart from traditional orature is the 
fact that their imagery takes on a cautious modernity.  This should be seen as yet another 
way in which Mphahlele stresses that while customs, values and traditions that constitute 
an African humanist consciousness endure a total uprooting, they cannot but survive in 
forms that have been affected by colonisation. The world of the African characters in 
Down Second Avenue and Afrika My Music is one in which the image of a tortoise (which 
is a metaphor of belief in witchcraft and traditional healing) mixes with that of a police 
van (which is a metaphor of police brutality during the period of apartheid); the image of 
nutritious sorghum beer cohabits in symbolic contrast with that of alcoholic spirits of the 
Western world; and the image of a cemetery for humans uneasily tolerates that of a 
cemetery for pets. 
 
Mphahlele’s demonstration (in Down Second Avenue 30) of the hybrid existence of the 
African characters does not stop with the women recounting with relish to each other how 
a  tortoise used for the dark practices of witchcraft has been sighted in Ma-Legodi’s yard.  
It is important to Mphahlele to show that all the women agree that this creature is part of 
Ma-Legodi’s hidden possessions – as sure as witchcraft is real.    For the same purpose, 
when the chance arises for men also to mix in the Marabastad real-life oral theatre, male 
characters like Old Rameetse use the opportunity to remark on the communally 
unacceptable temperament of the rogue Boeta Lem.  Intimidated by Boeta Lem’s 
criminal acts, the community remarks – through the mouth of Old Rameetse – that the 
dead man’s blood is going to make Boeta Lem so mad that “he will jump one day on 
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everybody in the village” (31).  The action of “jump[ing] on” someone (which Mphahlele 
derives literally from the Sotho “fofela”) is to go beserk and dive on someone in 
(unprovoked) fight.  In a communal piece of dialogue uttered by Mphahlele’s 
grandmother, the village verdict is that if one kills a human being made in the image of 
God, one can never wash off the blood (31).   
 
In African religion (as a component of the outlook Mphahlele calls African humanism) 
life continues after death.   People join the happy realm of their immediate ancestors 
when they die (“Notes Towards” 138).  That is why Africans hold that human life is 
sacred – for the ancestors, who are the living dead, still have the capacity to take revenge 
on and generally punish those who violate the social code.   It is for this very reason that 
a character like the exile Dineo, in remonstrating with her husband in London for 
yielding to drug addiction, keeps punctuating her tirade with the words “… me, the 
daughter of Mabiletsa who’s sleeping at Croesus” (Afrika My Music 117).   Instead of 
writing off her father who has since died, Dineo speaks in words that express her belief 
that Mabiletsa is watching and still has the capacity to intercede between quarreling 
spouses, hence her reference to him as only “sleeping” in the graveyard of Croesus.  It is 
the same Africanist belief in the eternal existence of man beyond physical death which 
makes Mphahlele’s grandmother always punctuate her serious talk with the words “by 
Titus who lies in his grave” (one example features in Down Second Avenue, on page 91).  
This occurs on the occasion when grandmother exhorts the boy Eseki never to listen to 
Boeta Lem again when the latter tells his stories (which glorify the life of the riffraff) in 
the streets.   In gossiping to grandmother about Rebone and her father who have just 
arrived from Johannesburg, Ma-Lebona emphasises that in her judgement Rebone is a 
thug, swearing “by my Father Elisha and my Mother Rabeka who are sleeping quietly in 
their graves – bless their souls – in the Free State …” (56).   On another occasion, an 
unnamed character recounts the ghastly poisoning by brazier smoke of some Marabastad 
residents one very cold winter night.   To articulate his agitation, the character says that 
the people were discovered dead as his/her father who lies at Bantule cemetery.  This 
Africanist eschatological belief is particulary clearly expressed by Old Segone as he 
muses on the cyclical nature of life, referring to the four seasons of the year: “and then 
you know you’re part of that which dies and yet doesn’t die” (Down Second Avenue 16).   
 
This respect for the departed takes on a more profound intensity when the older 
Mphahlele writes Afrika My Music, the second autobiography.   The stylistic aspect of 
talking directly to the dead in supplicating fashion emerges with authorial maturity in 
instances such as:  “You pulled the strands together in Drum, Can” (123) where the 
narrator addresses his former colleague Can Themba (now dead).  Again, thinking about 
the Drum years while in Denver, Colorado, Mphahlele addresses the late Gwigwi Mrwebi 
directly:  “You used to say to me, Kyk hierso, nefie, you’d say, jy’s a teacher nie a 
reporter nie” (124).  But more importantly, the way Africans interpret death is supportive 
of the survivalist aspect of African humanism that stresses continuity of individual and 
community life beyond death, as the following description of Aunt Dora’s burial service 
illustrates: 
 Khabi and I had to leave for Pretoria where [Aunt Dora] was to be  buried.  I had 
 failed to see her alive but the occasion gave me a chance to see old acquaintances 
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 and visit family graves.  In the lengthy funeral rituals that followed, I was back in 
 the rhetoric of death-and-life during the nights of the wake: words, words, words, 
 poetry as ritual, ritual as poetry, death as the poetry of life, life as the poetry of 
 death …That is how the Black man can soak himself in grief, until he can endure 
 the sense of loss and its pain and not break. (Exiles and Homecomings 21) 
Mphahlele’s references in the above passage to human existence in conjoining terms like 
“death-and-life”, “poetry as ritual, ritual as poetry” and “death as the poetry of life, life as 
the poetry of death” signify his African humanist view of life as an “unbroken song”– the 
import of such a description is that, according to African world-views, there is no 
existential division between physical and spiritual life.  This explains why Mphahlele 
typographically emphasises the line that explains  “the rhetoric” during the funeral 
service, while parts of the passage that focus merely on Aunt Dora’s physical death are 
not stressed.   
 
Of course one more Afrocentric aspect Mphahlele is displaying by extolling the heroic 
stature of the deceased (whose memory he is reviving), is that of praising deeds by fellow 
Africans as a way of depicting Africans as equal in intellectual excellence to people from 
any other group.  Writing of the same tactic used by African writers from parts of Africa 
other than South Africa, Fanon has remarked that:  “ Because the New Guinean or 
Kenyan intellectuals found themselves above all up  against a general ostracism and 
delivered to the combined contempt of their  overlords, their reaction was to sing praises 
in admiration of each other” (Wretched 171).   It is important to perceive that Mphahlele 
“[sings] praises in admiration of [his fellow Africans]” (as the above citation from Afrika 
My Music demonstrates) not merely to counter the colonisers’ contemptuous disregard of 
Africans at the social level.  His is a way of leading by the example as the protagonist of 
the autobiography, by instancing the African humanist living mode in which individual 
efforts are lauded in so far as their behaviour is seen to have advanced the image or lot of 
his or her fellow humans.  Can Themba and Gwigwi Mrwebi are lauded respectively for 
asserting an African humanist lifestyle, and for appreciating Mphahlele’s attempts to 
resist alienation by fighting on to survive despite having been banned from his real job of 
teaching,  during the Drum years.  These are the meanings of the ascription to Themba as 
having “pulled the strings together in Drum” and Mrwebi’s message behind the 
expression “jy’s a teacher nie a reporter nie” (Afrika My Music 123, 124). 
 
Another social phenomenon that is never far from Mphahlele’s awareness is the practice 
of the Zionist Christians in African communities.  Mphahlele is unequivocal about his 
sanction of religious practice displayed by Africans who have broken away from 
churches that practice orthodox Christianity, as expressed in the following statement: 
“Let us not despise the followers of Lekganyane, Modise, Shembe and their kind … 
[because] the kind of self-abandon and joy they can express in their groups fulfill a 
hunger for contact with the Higher Power through direct contact with the ancestors, 
through their own body language and song; through a communally-shared religious 
experience free of intellectual sermonizing” (“Colonial Conquest” 255).   The AICs meet 
his approval because their mode of worship is African humanist. 
 
 185
The existence of the Zionist black churches in places Mphahlele saunters through from 
primary, high school and college days appears to inject vigour into the way he grapples 
with making meaning out of life.   A passage in Down Second Avenue (99–100) describes 
the innovative handling of western Christianity by breakaway leaders in Marabastad like 
the “prophet” in the Donkey Church.   The activities of such religious leaders appear to 
excite Mphahlele due to their abrogation of the white man’s religion in such a fashion 
that it actually promotes and ensures economic and spiritual survival.  After studying at 
Adams College and joining the Ezenzeleni institute for the blind, Mphahlele’s lonely 
isolation (while studying privately for matric at night) is broken by the singing, far away 
in black residences, of the Zionist sect he describes as “half-pagan, half Christian” (150).   
During such nights,  the narrator appears to gravitate mentally towards these noises, the 
communal spirit of which dispels the solitude of the otherwise individualistic occupation 
he finds himself in as a result of the ambivalent existence westernisation has thrust on 
him.   
 
In African humanism as a way of life a person always gravitates towards other people. 
That is why Mphahlele writes in a 1994 essay (“African Humanism and the Corporate 
World”) as follows: “The communal spirit – sense of community, the compulsion to 
gravitate towards people – is the attribute that has proved to be the most resilient” (133). 
One point that communal existence is one of the ways through which Mphahlele’s 
Africanism shapes reality is borne out by the above-mentioned example and some others.   
That is why there is such frequent use, in the dialogue of Down Second Avenue, for 
instance, of  the plural pronoun forms instead of singular forms –  in phrases like “Let 
them”, “have we”, “their naked selves”, “we wouldn’t” and “with our pants down”.  
These examples point to the fact that Old Modise, for instance, speaks as a “community 
self” and not an individual self.   According to Craffert, an individual self is seen as a 
distinct entity isolated not only from other individuals but also from the outside world 
(206).   On the other hand, a community self has his/her self-definition closely connected 
to that of a social group (206).   As a community self, Old Modise is an individual whose 
“face” or politeness wants are defined in African cultural terms, according to which one 
defers to the expression of community feeling or opinion.  “Face” refers to the public 
self-image that every member of the community claims for himself or herself 
(Matsumoto 404).   
 
One remarkable strand in Pan Africanist religious conceptions is the recognition of the 
power of religious leaders to heal and/or perform miracles.   Mphahlele predictably does 
not overlook this aspect of African life.  Nzama, the leader of a breakaway African 
Initiated Church called the Gaza Church is depicted as a faith healer.   Mphahlele tells of 
an occasion when a woman takes a paralysed son to Nzama for faith healing (Down 
Second Avenue 100).  That Nzama rashly cuts the stiff joints of the patient with fatal 
results could indicate Mphahlele’s perception that the meeting in his consciousness of 
traditional Africanness and alien forms of religion has not been negotiated soundly, hence 
the degenerate nature of the hybridity he displays.  Nzama is almost like Chimba in 
Chirundu – with the difference between the two being the fact that with the latter it is his 
failure to negotiate the confluence of African consciousness with Western politics (and 
not with Western Christianity) that leads to a ridiculously botched abrogation of 
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European political modes of ruling.  By portraying the kind of lopsided hybridity driving 
Nzama’s religious practice, Mphahlele is in no way pointing to being sceptical of the 
efficacy of African faith healing practices.  This probably resembles attitudes towards the 
efficacy of Zionist performance of miracles one finds in other Afrocentric writers such as 
Todd Matshikiza when he describes an incident in which a sect led by Mgijima believes 
that “bullets would turn into water” if state forces led by General Smuts were to attack 
them, which of course does not happen (and leads to casualties) (Chocolates for My Wife 
26).  It is unlikely that Mphahlele makes an outright denunciation of Zionist brands of 
western Christianity as spurious (by examples such as Nzama’s disgraceful acts of faith).  
This cannot be the case if he affirms the religious aspect of African humanism as follows: 
 But we need to acknowledge that African Humanism was originally a religious 
 state of mind producing moral action; attachment to the soil; social relationships; 
 the art of healing; the sense of community and its welfare; and a sense of organic 
 unity or oneness in the universe in which man is the principal participant, and 
 which is a process permeated by the Supreme Being.  All these and other qualities 
 are basically religion at work.  So they are firmly rooted in the personality and 
 determine the extent to which adoption of or adaptation to Western ways can 
 go … The Western mind [was originally] Christian, but of itself the interest in the 
 classics was not religiously inspired.  The Western mind was later to draw a line 
 between the intellect and God … [whereas] African humanism still has a religious 
 base.  (“The Fabric” 154-55) 
According to the passage above, African humanism does not make a distinction between 
religious and intellectual life.  As such, African humanism without genuine religious 
practice is unthinkable, and communal living is spiritually sanctioned. 
 
For this reason – I would contend – the South African writer Nat Nakasa does not end his 
visit to Harlem during exile from apartheid before participating in a religious gathering of 
the African Americans, in which: 
 The handclapping took on a faster pace and more people said ‘Amen, praise the 
 Lord, Sister’. Then, as if in a trance, the girl let out some gibberish and moaned 
 and twisted her body and contorted her face until I thought she would smash her 
 head on the floor.  Finally, the congregation switched to a new, cheerful tune and 
 the girl began to swing and sing the gospel blues like Mahalia Jackson.  (The 
 World of Nat Nakasa 124) 
Clearly this is not conventional worship in western Christianity.  Healing follows this 
appropriated mode of Christian worship as “the congregation [switches] to a new, 
cheerful tune and the girl [begins] to swing and sing the gospel blues” (124).  Yet despite 
this affirmation of the African Americans’ appropriation of western Christianity (and in a 
similar way to Mphahlele), Nakasa harshly satirises charlatan messianic leaders.  He does 
so, for instance, when in a journalistic piece “Beware the Swindling Beeshops” he 
parodies a Zulu nightwatchman who enters a newsroom announcing that he is “the Arsh 
beeshop of the Zion African Shesh of Saud Afrika and Zoolulend” and that the joining 
fee to his church “is only one shilling” (75-6). 
 
Nakasa displays respect for adapted traditional African worship by contrasting the two 
types of religious leaders above.  His message is equivalent to that which Mphahlele 
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transmits by relating incidents of spurious religious practice such as Nzama’s bizarre 
healing act in which he cuts the stiff joints of a boy who later dies (Down Second Avenue 
100). What Mphahlele and Nakasa are demonstrating is not a rejection of the healing 
aspect of African humanist appropriation of western Christianity.   They are pointing 
either to personal failure of some individuals to preserve the wholeness of African 
humanist consciousness when faced with existential challenges or to the personal choice 
of an African individual evilly to impersonate a power he or she is not capable of 
wielding.   In the same way that he does not spare charlatan traditional healers in his 
satirical portrayals, Mphahlele does not spare corrupted Africans who masquerade as 
messianic faith healers while they do not possess this specialist art.  He stresses that one 
has to be gifted in order to perform the role of the traditional healer when he states that 
“he invokes the presence of his ancestors and that of the patient to strengthen the healing 
medium [and the] power of the spoken word is right there in the healing process, in the 
poetic incantation” (“Notes Towards” 139). 
 
Mphahlele’s reference to the “power of the spoken word” derives from an elided 
transliteration of the Northern Sotho proverb “melomo ke dithunya”, literally meaning 
mouths are guns.  What the proverb means is that words spoken by humans have power 
comparable to those spoken by a god, with the effect that nature heeds what is uttered in 
earnest through the mouth.  This view of the mystical power of the spoken word is linked 
to the ontological aspect of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism whereby the Vital 
Force or Supreme Being informs all of nature, including humans.  It follows then that 
man can vicariously speak and then cause what the word expresses to materialise, with 
the same powers the Supreme Being is believed to possess.  Recognition of giftedness as 
in traditional healers is widely accepted as an aspect of African cultures, although people 
with such special gifts are regarded as ordinary humans who derive their elevated powers 
through constant interrogation of communal mores and consensus.  Soyinka, for instance, 
distinguishes between the communal inclination of traditional African priesthood and the 
“dogmatic finality of [priests] in Christianity or Islam” – without denying that there exists 
in African religions “the monopolistic orbit of the priesthood” (Myth, Literature and the 
African World 54).  This means that people gifted to commune with the spirit world do 
not impose their verdicts from a position of detached authority, but rather democratically 
through consultation with and involvement of the community. 
 
In its pure African form, faith healing is represented in the first Mphahlele autobiography 
by the “witch doctor” character, Mathebula.  Mathebula is the MuTsonga tenant in 
Eseki’s township home.  The writer creates a lasting image of Mathebula the traditional 
healer in the description conveying how awe-inspiring he is felt to be:  “At one end of the 
backyard Mathebula could be seen any morning sitting on a mat, his bones scattered in 
front of him while he mumbled magic words in Shangana.  All of us, visitors alike, tried, 
as much as room allowed, to move clear of Mathebula’s sphere of influence” (Down 
Second Avenue 36).  In order that the traditional institution symbolised by Mathebula 
should not be mistaken for an idiosyncracy of the Mphahlele household’s, the writer 
broadens our perception of the cultural atmosphere of the entire narrative when he relates 
the incident of a young woman being hit by someone throwing a stone at her (37).   The 
girl picks up the stone and, together with her parents, takes it to a ‘witch doctor’ for it to 
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be treated with some “medicine”, in case the stone has been bewitched.   In this way it is 
borne in on the perceptive reader that one of the ways in which the narrative creates 
cultural perspective is through depicting the dependence of the characters on the 
traditional healer for their wellbeing.   The fact that the traditional healer (as cited above) 
mumbles “magic words in Shangana” (Down Second Avenue 36) signifies reliance on the 
part of the healer on a religion in which the ancestors and Supreme Being are invoked to 
intercede to ensure the well-being of man.  Mphahlele notes the social role of the 
traditional healer as a building block of the consciousness he calls African humanism.  
Mention of the domestic situation in which everybody moves “clear of Mathebula’s 
sphere of influence” reveals that it is a “positive face want” in African culture to respond 
with awe to the religious institution of faith healing.   
 
“Positive face wants” have been described as the need to be accepted as a member of the 
group, while “negative face wants” comprise the basic claim to territories, personal 
preserves and rights to non-distraction (“Reexamination of the Universality of Face” 
403).  Cultures differ at the level of defining face wants, meaning that what is polite or 
desirable for some cultures may be perceived as impolite or undesirable for others 
(“Reexamination of the Universality of Face” 403; “Indirectness and politeness in 
requests: Same or different?” 142).   Writers like Mphahlele (“Humanism and Corporate 
World” 127), Mbiti (1969) and Okolo (28-29) have remarked that in African cultures the 
definition of self is that of the self-in-community.   
 
As a person striving to carve his Black Consiousness or African humanist meaning out of 
available reality, Mphahlele has grappled with the Western European orientation of 
conventional Christianity:  
 In 1947 I decided not to go to church any more.  The white press, the white 
 radio, the white Parliament, the white employers, the white Church babbled their 
 platitudes and their lies about ‘Christian trusteeship’, the ‘native emerging from 
 primitive barbarism’,  ‘evangelizing the native’, ‘white guardianship’... 
 Fellowship?   Love?   Obedience of the law?  Suddenly I did not know what these 
 meant in terms of my place in society, and I revolted against such preachments. 
 (Down  Second Avenue 163)  
Mphahlele’s suspicion of a hegemonic agenda in western Christianity (as this quotation 
shows) is consonant with the sensitivity of a critic like Said to the perils of cultural 
hegemony which have been even more devastating to colonised peoples than the 
preceding, direct political domination in the process of imperialism. Of the harm of 
imperialist cultural domination which subsumes the religious domain, Said has remarked 
that “entities such as races and nations, essences such as Englishness or Orientalism, 
modes of production such as the Asiatic or Occidental, all of these in my opionion testify 
to an ideology whose cultural correlatives well precede the actual accumulation of 
imperial territories worldwide” (“Overlapping” 68).  Said, similarly to Mphahlele’s 
preference for abrogated, Africanised forms of Christianity in his writings, emphasises 
that “cultural experience or indeed every cultural form is radically, quintessentially 
hybrid” (“Overlapping” 68). 
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Said criticises the idea of purity within his theory of beginnings, as when he remarks on 
“the dense interwoven strands of a history that mocks linear narrative, easily recuperated 
essences, and the dogmatic mimesis of pure representation” (“Resistance and 
Opposition” 333).   Mphahlele’s rejection of ‘pure’ Western Christianity is in line with 
this position.  In other words, if we were to suppose that African cultures are “a history” 
while the existence of all mankind is a “narrative”, such African cultures should be 
understood as discontinuities within the narrative in which African cultural essences 
unresponsive to the emprical present are not accommodated.    Equally unwelcome are an 
imprisoning imitation of and struggle towards a reproduction of pure, traditional African 
culture.   For similar self-constitutive reasons as Mphahlele, other African writers 
including Mphahlele’s contemporaries such as Bloke Modisane, have expressed a 
rejection of western Christianity, as Modisane does below: 
 … for so long as the the orthodox Church shall remain white, will continue to 
 react white, for so long will black South Africa disrupt the perfect unity of the 
 Church.  This break-away from white orthodoxy is an accomplished fact: by 1957 
 there were 500,000 Africans in what was described by the Anglican Bishop of 
 Pretoria as ‘separatist  churches’….The Church has become a symbol of 
 everything that is white in a country where white is the symbol of political 
 domination and racial superiority.  There is a need for a Martin Luther. (Blame
 Me 185) 
 
These remarks reveal an insistence on self-determining subjectivity among the 
Afrocentric theorists.  The voice of Mphahlele the African humanist is evident in the 
statement that “In 1947 [he] decided not to go to church any more” (Down Second 
Avenue 163), in keeping with what he writes in 1994 (in “African Humanism and the 
Corporate World”), that one plane of African humanism is that in which it is “a social 
order, a possible option for a way of life, and a purposeful act of knowing and of 
behaving in a human context” (“Humanism and Corporate World” 128).  What this 
means is that African humanism can be an intellectual tool which one uses to reach a 
specific goal, apart from believing in and living according to it.  One implication of such 
a view of African humanism is that Mphahlele consciously uses it in writing 
autobiography, as a way of purposefully enabling his readers to look at life from the 
specific angle that is the African humanist consciousness.  For this reason Mphahlele 
states that the two levels of African humanism are divided for the sake of convenience, 
but in reality they are “two aspects of an indivisible concept of thought and belief” (128).   
The former quotation from Down Second Avenue (163) and the latter from “African 
Humanism and the Corporate World” (128) are indicative of Mphahlele’s consistent 
approach to life, in which he reconciles his personal outlook (that is, his unconscious 
African humanist belief and lifestyle) with his deliberate delineation of African 
humanism in his autobiographies and fiction (as a conscious intellectual activity). 
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3.2.4 BLACK WOMEN AS STRONG 
 
It is the nature of African societies to respect the culturally-defined place of women in 
society.   Jomo Kenyatta (1979), for example, has stated that in traditional Kikuyu 
homestead, visitors to the family are welcome but are received in the main hut belonging 
to the husband.  It is taboo for the next of kin and strangers alike to tread in a hut 
belonging to any of the wives.  This is because the woman, being the source of progeny 
due to her ability to give birth, has a sacred place in African society.   Transmission of 
culture is closely tied to the ability of a people to reproduce itself by means of filiation.  
Emphasis within African cultures of the central role of women in filiative self-
perpetuation explains why Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism regards women as 
pillars of society. 
 
Kenyatta is only one of a number of Afrocentric writers who have documented the 
traditional regard for women.  Dr Chikunyere Kamalu of Nigeria (in Foundations of 
African Thought) explains the rationale behind the traditional respect and valuing of 
women in African cultures as the recognition that “the natural line of descent is through 
the mother” (quoted in Sesanti 6).  Mphahlele himself, in an interview on his fiftieth 
anniversary of married life with Mrs Rebecca Mphahlele, was quick to acknowledge the 
positive contribution (to such a long and successful marriage) of the African humanist 
outlook commonly held by himself and his spouse:  
 In African homes where conflict between the old and the modern has not yet 
 blighted our ancient wisdom, women have much more power than white 
 anthropologists imagine.  And husband and children recognise this power, which 
 was built into our culture.  Economic and political forces have come in to shake 
 these foundations.  (“Half a century of HAPPINESS” 87) 
Mphahlele being an African humanist and believing (along with other Afrocentric 
writers) in the powerful social stature of woman, it is predictable that the texture of his 
narratives should reflect this. 
 
More instances of this awareness of the culturally-defined centralisation of women in 
African societies is evident in Mphahlele’s depiction (in the 1959 autobiography) of 
economic and spritual survival in a black township, when he describes a Saturday night 
in Marabastad: 
 My aunt was straining the last few pints of beer to pour into a gallon oil tin; and I 
 was keeping watch outside in the yard.  ‘Dig the hole deep, my son’; ‘Stamp hard 
 on it, my son’; and so on.  The same old cycle.  Leave school, my daughter, and 
 work.  You cannot sit at home and have other people work for you; stand up and 
 do the white man’s washing and sell beer.  That’s right – that is how a woman 
 does it; look at us, we do not sit and look up to our husbands or fathers to work 
 alone; we have sent our children to school with money from beer selling … 
 (Down Second Avenue  41) 
It is Aunt Dora and the grandmother who are the hub of economic survival in the 
Mphahlele house, as are all other poverty-stricken wives, sisters and aunts in many more 
Marabastad families.  This is in keeping with the African humanist view that women are 
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sacred in society (within the religiously-based outlook of Africans who associate 
recognition of social roles and harmonious relations with sacredness) due to their 
association with nutrition, fertility and birth which are a sine qua non for the healthy 
preservation of African humanist cultures and societies. This is not to deny that by 
coincidence the pivotal role of women in economic survival of the Mphahlele family 
emanates from the abuse and irresponsibility of the husband.  It is to be acknowledged 
also that generally the arduous and debasing conditions of urban ghetto life in which 
these women find themselves (in contrast with relatively stable rural life in traditional 
communities) also sharpens the reality of the central role they play in the economic 
survival of the family unit.  But the description of women’s roles in more favourable 
situations attests that the role of women as pillars of the family is not necessarily the 
result of their husbands’ failure, or the result only of urban hardships.  For example, 
description in Afrika My Music of Mphahlele’s wife Rebecca as “unsinkable” actually 
shows that she could take the punches of apartheid and exile far better than Mphahlele 
himself with his ever fragile identity (described in imagery as “man in a glasshouse” 
“Exile” 283).  Aunt Dora, too, does not come across as a woman of indefatigable 
resourcefulness because her husband is abusive – in fact it is the husband who, though 
shown respect traditionally due to him by his wife, is rather meek.  The same can be said 
of Grandma, whose fond memories of the male “Titus” who is resting at Bantule 
cemetery are not suggestive of any hard feelings that could have resulted from 
chauvinistic abuse or economic neglect. 
 
Prior to his laudatory description of the fortitude in the woman characters of Down 
Second Avenue, Mphahlele has impressed upon the reader’s mind the callous 
heartlessness of the state as manifest in the conduct of the police.   This he achieves by 
effectively creating a hostile atmosphere through images such as “ominous scream”, 
“pierced into the darkness of the night”, and “kicking my legs about” (41).   The 
morosely lyrical lines perfect the crescendo of the unbroken black song (of misery in the 
face of apartheid) of which the Marabastad cacophony is but a segment: “Saturday night 
and torchlights”; “Saturday night and police whistles”; “Saturday night and screams”; 
“Saturday night and cursing and swearing from the white man’s lips” (41).  That the 
economic activity of the woman characters takes place in this kind of atmosphere 
magnifies the image of the women (as Mphahlele depicts them) from that of  mere 
economic pillars of their families to the more eminent one of spiritual pillars of the entire 
community.  The immensity of the impact of apartheid on individuals within single 
families as well as individuals constituting whole communities (who have to contend 
with the destructive effects of apartheid while also having to cope with abusive husbands) 
is appreciated better when the role of women as the power sources of their respective 
families is extended into that of spiritual pillars of the entire community. 
 
That Marabastad is only a microcosm of collective black slum life is attested to by a later 
relation of the incident in which one of the countrywomen selling sweet potatoes, peanuts 
and home-baked cakes on a patch of grass in Marabastad has her sickly boy child dying 
on her lap in the open (71–72).   Significantly, the women in the mother’s company have 
come from the countryside north of Pretoria by ox-wagon to outspan on open ground on 
the outskirts of the location.   That one of them is compelled by circumstances to come to 
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the marketplace even though her child is seriously ill is indicative of the desperate 
poverty in which black families in general live at this time.     
 
The woman’s child dies just after the women have been rounded up by police who insist 
that they are “making the place dirty” where they are trading and that if they come one 
more time “all these things will be destroyed and you’ll go to prison” (71).  In this way 
Mphahlele creates a refrain about the circumstances of black women’s economic activity 
as an enterprise that is invariably and cruelly disrupted by the instruments of the state and 
yet continues as a sign of resilience.  Such an elasticity of spirit is symbolic of the 
cultural resilience associated with Mphahlele’s African humanist propensity towards 
sanguinity rather than capitulation.   The refrain punctuates the unbroken black song that 
maintains black existence, complicating and deepening the reader’s understanding of that 
reality of the texture of African lives under apartheid. 
 
In the desolate circumstances of the woman who loses her child, the men in black society 
occupy the background.   It is grandmother and Aunt Dora whom the young Eseki finds 
bending over the bereaved woman.   The African humanist in Grandmother and Aunt 
Dora makes Grandmother take the dead boy from the lap of its mother with Aunt Dora 
trying hard to console the devastated woman.  In this way their African humanism 
crowns the women in black society, in much the same way as they carry the mantle of 
custodians of economic survival and spiritual resilience in their communities.  The more 
powerful position of women relative to that of men in African society is re-emphasised 
by Mphahlele when he writes in the 1987 article, “Social Work and the Politics of 
Dispossession” that “Marriage, the bride price, succession and inheritance, residence, 
erection of a place of abode, ancestral rituals related to the fertility of the soil and woman 
– all these and other activities are part of the rhythm of life.  It is a rhythm controlled by 
the Life Force or Vital Force that has established a chain linking all beings” (240).  That 
ancestral rituals performed to ensure the fertility of the soil invariably include 
supplication for the fertility of women is an indication that women, more than men, are 
crucial in the African humanist way of life.  The above quotation also explains why 
women, and not men, are married through a paying of the bride price as ritualistic 
reverence and acknowledgement that without women the rhythm of life (without which 
there would be no survival of the entire community and its consciousness) would stop.  
Ritual activities described in the above quotation indicate that women, the Supreme 
Being, the life of the whole tribe and survival are inseparably linked. 
 
It is against this social backdrop that the courage and assertiveness of Aunt Dora is best 
understood.   Mphahlele describes Aunt Dora as a woman with a sharp tongue, who could 
literally fling a man who took too long to pay a debt for beer out of the house; she is 
known as Aunt Dora of Second Avenue, that woman who throws a man over a fence; as 
the woman famed for habitually saying “What’s a thing in trousers to me!  I could toss it 
on my little finger and fling it in the dust and roll it around until its price had gone down” 
(Down Second Avenue 76, 77 and 79).  In one instance the Indian shopkeeper Abdool 
cheats the young Eseki.   It is the woman Aunt Dora who stands up against this injustice.   
She drags Eseki to Abdool’s shop, demands  justice and extracts it from the businessman 
by knocking him out in a fist-fight watched by a mainly cheering audience, after which 
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the communal voice in Marabastad proudly pronounces, “Trust Dora of Second Avenue 
to beat up a man” (107–110).  Mphahlele does not describe Aunt Dora in a manner that 
portrays her as an indiscriminate man-hater or an amazon, though.  He explains that Dora 
“obeyed” her husband, “to the amazement of many” (79).  Aunt Dora’s husband is 
described as someone “who spoke quietly and couldn’t be rushed [and yet] exasperated, 
because he disarmed, anyone who came to him like a steam-roller” (79).  The dignified 
manner of Dora’s husband contrasts with the terrifying noisiness of Eseki’s father Moses.  
To portray Dora as respectful to her husband is to lend some honour to Dora’s way of 
relating to men.  It is an honourable thing for a woman to accord her husband his rightful 
position of head of the family provided that he deserves it in a way similar to Dora’s 
husband (being an antithesis of the abusive Moses).  Such a rounded description of Dora 
enables the reader to understand her fierce stand against any male who is guilty of any 
kind of woman or child abuse as the justifiable reaction of a woman who is otherwise 
obedient to the social code that demands of women to respect their husbands as heads of 
the family.  In this way, Abdool’s abuse of the boy Eseki can be said to revive memories 
of Eva’s abusive husband Moses which Aunt Dora witnessed – hence Dora’s emotional 
manhandling of the shopkeeper.  The possibility that Moses’ boisterous deportment may 
have traumatised Dora is strengthened when Dora always confirms the indelible 
memories of Moses’s behaviour in the following words:  “If that limping hyena called 
Moses had married me instead of you … he’d see trams for flying vultures by the time 
I’d done with him”, meaning that she would beat Moses up to the point of his losing his 
mind (80). 
 
In the scene of Afrika My Music describing the narrator’s friend Khabi Mngoma’s near-
fatal car accident in the region then called Zululand, Mphahlele characteristically 
connects the presence of Khabi’s wife Grace at the hospital bedside to the miracle of his 
healing (221).  Miraculously, Khabi survives “weakening kidneys, hypertension and 
other enemies” because of his wife “waiting at his bedside” (221).   The silver oak Grace 
gives to Mphahlele and his wife Rebecca during their first visit to the hospital is now a 
towering tree back home in Lebowakgomo.  Conjuring up an idea of the woman Grace as 
a fountain of life, Mphahlele writes: “The silver oak has now become for us a symbol of 
that vital force by which a man’s body clawed its way up out of a dark pit … reaching for 
air and sun” (221).  More instances of woman characters as touched with quasi-divine 
grace and as stronger than men are found elsewhere in the autobiography of 1984.   What 
is important to bear in mind is the communal, African humanist context in which women 
are thus centralised, signified in the quotation above by reference to a “vital force”. 
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3.2.5 MPHAHLELE’S EXTRAORDINARY DESCRIPTION OF  THE SETTING 
 
Concerning the night he celebrated obtaining his M.A. degree in his Orlando house, 
Mphahlele writes:  “There were the inevitable gate-crashers, among them a local woman 
with a large  bosom, rather tipsy, who insisted on kissing me because ‘you’re so great, 
Zeke,’  as she said.  She was fond of playing younger than her reputed age of fifty” 
(Down Second Avenue 199). 
 
It is significant that this woman is on the fringes of the main event of celebrating a 
graduation, as she is not a fully outlined character.  Leaving the woman unnamed 
decreases her role even from the relative status of a caricature and actually marginalises 
her on the outskirts of the action.  Phrases like “a local woman” and “with a large bosom” 
in the quoted passage (above) manipulate the reader to see the gate-crasher as a mere part 
of the locale (99, emphasis added).   In the stereotypical fashion of the streetwise 
township woman who has succumbed to the vulgarisation of courtesies caused by the 
stresses of urban economic survival, she insists on kissing the celebrity Zeke, with whom 
she is not acquainted.   Moreover, the writer describes her as pretending to be younger 
than her actual age.  These attributes, coupled with the foregrounding of the anonymous 
woman’s “large bosom”, suggest that this is a socially aberrant woman who will not stop 
at anything to generate income, including selling her own body. Mphahlele’s stylistic 
technique of depicting the woman as a mere constituent item of the setting shifts the 
blame from her as individual, however, instead soliciting sympathy for her as a victim of 
the township setting.  The woman is merely another creation of the ghetto influence of 
Marabastad and other inner city dwellings of blacks the world over, like Boeta Lem and 
the women who (unlike Aunt Dora and Grandmother) brew deadly concoctions with 
untraditional ingredients, passing off these dangerous drinks as supposedly nutritious 
traditional home beer. 
 
In Afrika My Music Mphahlele writes:      
 In fiction … you need an intimate familiarity with the world you depict.  You 
 need a locale, its smell, its taste, its texture … in the process of composition, you 
 are tied to the place that contains the  experience, however fictional it may be.  
 Some people say they can write novels in which place does not matter, in which 
 place and time do not need physical and temporal qualities.  They can create a 
 theatre in the mind.  This kind of experiment goes against everything I hold 
 sacred in the composition of fiction.  (Afrika My Music 168)  
Mphahlele has consistently reiterated this position in his other works (along with The 
African Image), detailing the relationship between himself as a writer and the locale he is 
writing about, and within.  
 
In his concern as writer with blacks as a people with the distinct psyche and way of life 
he calls African humanism, it is not surprising that Mphahlele should choose to utilise the 
locale to extract symbols of African humanism (on the one hand) and those indicative of 
western hegemony (on the other).   Contrasting these two kinds of symbols could be said 
to crystallise his characterisation of African humanism, for by contrasting what one 
desires to describe with its converse or antithesis, one etches the essence and scope of 
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one’s actual subject in unmistakable relief.  Mphahlele’s poetry, short stories and longer 
narratives all contribute to the pursuit of this goal that he has set for himself.  It is 
understandable that Orlando — as he describes this township (in Down Second Avenue) 
subsequent to his marriage — has features very similar to the Newclare setting of the 
“Lesane” short stories, or the Marabastad of his youth: 
 Below us, along the railway line and a small river carrying water from the mines, 
 was Shanty Town.  It was then a three-year-old squalid little settlement.  Breeze 
 blocks had taken the place of the first tin-and-shack huts that 8,000 squatters had 
 put up after their mighty exodus from the small overcrowded houses of Orlando 
 East.  It was an act of protest against the city council for not building more houses 
 for Africans.  The Council had then built the breeze blocks, cut them up into 
 single rooms, each to hold a family.  Corrugated asbestos had been placed on top 
 and stones used to hold it down.  Occupants had to transform raw ground into 
 something like a floor. 
 
 The squalor and poverty here touched me deeply.  I was back in Second Avenue.  
 I tossed and turned in my waking and sleeping hours, and I saw no way out of the 
 mental and spiritual conflicts that were harassing me … (Down Second Avenue  
 162–163) 
The congruity of this specific description of Orlando with Mphahlele’s impression of the 
physical and spiritual atmosphere of the urban black slum in general is unmistakable.  If  
one remembers poignant paintings of a ‘street’ in a black location like Marabastad 
(among others) in terms identifying the concept of a ‘street’ with “dirty water and flies 
and dead cats and dogs and children’s stools” (Down Second Avenue 33), it is clear why 
at this point Mphahlele considers going into exile. 
 
The examples above from Down Second Avenue and Afrika My Music testify to 
Mphahlele’s unique use of the setting of his stories in the form of vivid memories (while 
in exile) of the squalid township environment, memorable descriptions of the squalor in 
his portrayal of places where his characters live, and vivid portrayals of the wayward 
behaviour of some characters as products of the inhuman conditions under which they 
live (in the locations).  This should be understood as Mphahlele’s way of emphasising 
that one way apartheid achieves the dehumanisation and thus distortion of the 
consciousness of a people is by manipulating residential conditions to destroy the identity 
of blacks under apartheid.  African humanism (as Mphahlele delineates it) highlights a 
mystical relation between man and place, to the extent of viewing land the umbilical cord  
bonding humankind with the ancestors whose mortal remains lie buried in it.  This is 
mentioned to remind the reader that Mphahlele emphasises the need for an Africanist 
writer to merge place, characterisation and action in a markedly intense manner because 
such an approach is a scale of such a writer’s awareness of African humanism as the 
consciousness moving the human actors (in the depicted drama) to action in ways 
consonant with African humanist consciousness. 
 
Focusing on the depth of spiritual damage that such a manipulation of residential 
conditions causes in migrant labourers – whom the apartheid system concentrated (for 
example) in mine compounds – Manganyi writes that “there is a certain psychological 
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ecology to living-space and that the character of this space has much to do with whether 
an individual experiences a mortification and invasion of selfhood or not” (Looking 
Through the Keyhole 129).  The lot of the township resident is not much better than that 
of the migrant mineworker living in the mine compound, considering Mphahlele’s 
emphasis on the squalor of the townships.  The “psychological ecology to living-space” 
(in Manganyi’s formulation) leads to “a mortification and invasion of selfhood” of 
characters in Mphahlele’s poems, short stories and autobiographies.  Selfhood in 
Mphahlele’s terms is the African personality or an individual’s African humanist 
consciousness.  Because the township living space seeks to hollow the African’s identity 
and sense of purpose, it is understandable that Mphahlele’s characters engage in self-
constituting identity formation that manifests itself in the many modes of economic, 
social and political survival that his fiction depicts – such as the example of the gate-
crasher at Mphahlele’s graduation party in Orlando (Down Second Avenue 199). 
 
 
3.2.6 EFFACEMENT OF THE APARTHEID THEME IN THE LONGER NARRATIVES 
 
In the Epilogue to Down Second Avenue (occurring, one learns, just as he prepares to 
leave for exile in Nigeria), Mphahlele explains that in the ten years prior to writing the 
autobiography his intentions have changed from wanting to produce escapist writing, to 
the decision to write protest writing, and then into a desire for something of a higher 
order, which he describes as “the ironic meeting between protest and acceptance in their 
widest terms” (217). 
 
Since he matured artistically beyond the aim of producing  protest literature even in the 
shorter writings (considered earlier on in this study), it is not surprising that Mphahlele 
replies to friends’ questions and doubts in the manner he  does –  friends who insist that 
he should not leave for exile, as the inspiration to write is abundant in apartheid South 
Africa.    He replies that the spur in apartheid South Africa is a paralysing one because it 
allows no moment to think of human beings as human beings and not as victims of 
political circumstance (Down Second Avenue 210).   The way he has been wanting to 
justify himself and his fellow blacks to the white man in the protest literary mode has 
given way to the desire to justify himself to himself and his kind (218).  It is the 
collective consciousness and memory of a people that he has now turned to, rather than 
focusing only on incidents on the surface of day to day living (219).  In this way, 
Mphahlele acknowledges that defining the consciousness of Africans is a more 
worthwhile cause than describing the impact of apartheid on their lives and describing 
their reaction to apartheid conditions.  In the words quoted above Mphahlele is also 
acknowledging that he once wrote his fiction in the protest mode.  The interesting thing is 
that even as he joined his contemporaries and wrote protest literature, his style diverged 
from those of his contemporaries who dwelt purely on the surface of the lives of black 
South Africans in the way they reacted to apartheid’s atttempts to order their lives.  While 
apparently writing protest literature, Mphahlele simultaneously delved deeper to search 
for and define the underlying cause of the topography of the lives of the Africans in the 
face of apartheid.  And what he found deep down in the souls of his people was a 
distinctive perception of reality which he calls African humanism.  It is this African 
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humanism he is clarifying by means of characterisation, setting, dialogue and imagery in 
his works. 
 
The same idea is expressed when he is taking stock of the Colorado exile experience, in 
his statement that a writer has to use the prose of everyday life if he is to engage 
successfully in creative writing that justifies the African to his/her own conscience 
(Afrika My Music 131).  It is the same point expressed by Ndebele when he calls upon 
black South African writers to transcend preoccupation with the spectacular presence of 
apartheid by “rediscovering the ordinary” in their writing (“The Rediscovery” 55).  A 
writer who wants to promote political revolution, Mphahlele writes, must go out among 
the crowds as a mere citizen and go into action and not fool him- or herself that writing 
will produce such a revolution (Afrika My Music 131).  
 
It is not surprising then, that the apartheid setting of Down Second Avenue is a mere 
backdrop to the unmistakable, towering heroism of ordinary men and women in 
Maupaneng, Marabastad and other black ghettoes. Afrika My Music sets out to paint 
black characters in their completeness on a global plane, as if to wave in the eye of the 
sceptic the fact that the unbroken black song resounds beyond the South African borders 
to African states and over the whole reach of the diaspora in the Americas and Europe.  
The vividness and intensity with which Mphahlele recounts interaction with notable 
African figures like Nkrumah, Gerard Sekoto, Breyten Breytenbach andLéopold Senghor 
cannot be mistaken for anything less than the creation of a black perspective on a global 
scale.   This is commensurate with Mphahlele’s conception of African humanism as more 
than PanAfricanist, for, similarly to African writers like Ngugi (1986) and Achebe 
(1988), he holds that all blacks the world over live from a common black-consciousness 
perspective.  It is for this reason that Mphahlele states that Africans are a collective of 
clusters of people on the African continent “that displays features suggesting a unity of its 
cultures [and this] confers upon us the right to claim an identity that distinguishes us and 
the African diaspora from other cultural clusters” (“Notes Towards” 135).  Achebe is 
highlighting the same point, that people with an African humanist consciousnesses 
include all of those on the continent and in other parts of the globe who were tied to 
Africa before historical periods that brought displacement or are now identifying with 
Africanness irrespective of their past origins, when he writes that “Africa is not only a 
geographical expression; it is also a metaphysical landscape – it is in fact a view of the 
world and of the whole cosmos perceived from a particular position” (Hopes  63). 
 
It is a feat indeed for Mphahlele to have succeeded in making plausible, notable 
characters out of ordinary aunts, fathers, grandmothers, boys, girls, old men and old 
women in Down Second Avenue and in Afrika My Music in order to characterise black 
achievers as world achievers equal to any other on a world scale.   The organisation of 
both Down Second Avenue and Afrika My Music, as well as the characters’ stories, derive 
from everyday attempts at economic, cultural, religious, historical and political survival.   
Due to the inclusion of encounters with luminaries like Nkrumah and Senghor, Afrika My 
Music goes further than personifying black survival in eulogising black excellence.  This 
became possible because of Mphahlele’s characteristic literary invention of African 
humanist devices such as “resonances” which collectively culminate in the creation of 
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“perspective”, coupled with his uniquely intimate painting of the locale which intensifies 
such “resonances” and “perspective” in his narratives.   Through these autobiographies 
and other writings Mphahlele indulges his life-long wish to produce creative writing in 
which black characters are drawn in their completeness as human beings with a cultural 
depth and a distinct identity. 
 
3.2.7 MPHAHLELE AS A POSTCOLONIAL WRITER  AND THEORIST 
 
It is important to bear in mind that Mphahlele’s personal stance on modern sociological 
conditions of Africans as well as his distinctive use of literary devices in the manner 
explained in the preceding section are not only as a result of his being Afrocentric.  
Afrocentrism is a way of correcting distorted views of the African.  Displaying such an 
attitude does not preclude an African from commonly sharing on the global level 
attitudes that are not poised merely to oppose demeaning inventions about Africanness, 
but also to counter belittling fictions also about other distinctive cultural clusters 
constituting the oppressed of the world.   This happens in a confederally concerted effort 
manifested by an attitude that is postcolonial in a culturally heterogeneous sense.   
 
It can thus be argued that Afrocentrism in an endemically African attitude which is a 
tributary of the all-sweeping river of postcoloniality.   Postcolonialism becomes relevant 
and occurs initially for the African within the context of colonisation and during the era 
in which African states and those of the diaspora have just gained independence.  But as 
the impact of the historical phenomena of colonisation and imperialism reverberates 
across geographical boundaries and at the global level, postcolonial attitudes within 
Africans are in concert with broadly similar attitudes all over the world in a sense that 
diminishes such geographically defined behaviour as oriental sensibility, African 
Americanism, Arab cultural cohesion, etc.  It is proper, therefore, to proceed from 
identifying African humanist consciousness among Afrocentric theorists, to identifying it 
in relation with postcolonial theory.  To use Mphahlele’s literary texts as our vehicle 
towards making such a comparison, it can be demonstrated that the two autobiographies 
succeed in unfurling representations of postcolonial modes of behaviour such as mimicry, 
hybridity, ambivalence, counterdiscourse and reconstitution on a broader canvas than the 
shorter texts discussed in earlier chapters could achieve.  Writers like Ashcroft, Griffiths 
and Tiffin (1989; 1998) have described mimicry (found among people that have been 
marginalised by population groups occupying the Western and Northern hemispheres) as 
the imitation of the manners, values and traditions of the people occupying such a 
domineering position.  Such powerful people from the “centre” use discourse to dominate 
the thinking of the subaltern or marginalised peoples of the world.  It is by means of 
counterdiscourse that the subaltern will mediate the inevitable hybdrity that is brought 
about by social interaction between people from the “centre” and those from the “orient” 
or “periphery” (or otherwise marginalised peoples).  Hybridity is the consciousness 
within the people who have undergone “alterity”, the source of which is contact between 
the “centre” and the “periphery” or “orient”.  Ambivalence is the resultant behaviour of 
both the peoples occupying the “centre” and those peoples whose lifestyle and thinking 
they seek to alter, which is a sign of the mutual hybridisation of both parties involved in 
the colonising act. 
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As already indicated in the Introduction, awareness and countering of the hegemonic 
discourse of the “centre” is the lifework of postcolonial writers, irrespective of whether 
they themselves write from the “centre” or the “periphery”.  Mphahlele as one of them, 
has for instance written counterdiscursively of his attitude towards Drum magazine 
(Down Second Avenue 187).   He was forced by circumstances to join Drum in 1956 as 
sub-editor, fiction editor and political reporter (see Woeber and Read, 6).  He had to work 
for Drum after being banned from teaching in 1952 for opposing the introduction of 
Bantu Education, and also after teaching in Lesotho in 1954 for six months and at St. 
Peter’s school in 1955 before the government closed the school for being oppositional in 
its teaching practices (to the South African government’s Education legislation and 
rules).  
 
On Drum itself, Mphahlele has written: 
My whole outlook resisted journalism: my attitude towards the white press; 
towards the double stream of newspaper policy in South Africa where there is a 
press for whites and a press for non-whites; towards Drum’s arbitrary standard of 
what the urban African wants to read: sex, crime and love stories; its use of 
Sophiatown as the yardstick of what the South African non-white should read. 
(Down Second Avenue 187–188) 
The above quotation fits Mphahlele into the category of postcolonial writers such as 
Minh-ha when she writes that “otherness becomes empowerment, critical difference, 
when it is not given but re-created” (“Not You/Like You” 417).  Mphahlele and Minh-ha 
display a similar postcolonial attitude, for Mphahlele in the above quotation is rejecting 
his ascribed otherness and that of his people in order that he may recreate it, using 
African humanism as the tool to achieve such a recreation of identity. 
 
Brooding on his early years as a writer of short stories, Mphahlele admits that there was 
an element of escapism in 1940s and 1950s black South African writing.   Such an 
escapism bordered on snobbery, which Mphahlele imagines is the most ridiculous 
perspective that could be adopted by a black writer purporting to be the voice of township 
folks (Afrika My Music 17).   This reveals Mphahlele’s postcolonialist, Black Conscious 
frowning on the mimicry naturally informing such snobbish or pretentious behaviour.  
 
A scrutiny of works by Drum writers like Can Themba reveals some kind of cynicism 
towards the ‘low’ subculture of the majority of township dwellers.  In “The Suit”, for 
example, Matilda transforms herself into a more attractive woman in the midst of the 
psychological torture she is suffering because of her husband’s insistence that the suit of 
the secret lover who has fled through the bedroom window should be treated like an 
important visitor to the house (89-90).  Interestingly, the commendable improvement by 
Matilda is not compared only to her former disenchanted attitude towards the husband 
Philemon.  It is ascribed further to Matilda’s discarding of the appearance of a traditional 
African woman, as revealed by Can Themba’s explanation that “the dress she wore 
brought out all the girlishness of her, hidden so long beneath German print” (90).  Since 
“German print”, (called motoitšhi in a language like Northern Sotho), refers to the 
traditional dress worn by African women in modern times (as opposed to times when 
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Africans wore animal skins), for Can Themba to state that Matilda’s resplendent beauty 
has been “hidden so long beneath German print” is the same as saying that Matilda is 
more attractive to her husband because she has left behind her (backward) traditional 
dress style.  Such a snobbish view by Can Themba of the average modernised African 
(who adheres to his or her traditional consciousness albeit in ways that accommodate 
present times) is evident also in the short story “The Urchin”, when the central character 
Macala (complacent after maltreating a traditionally-dressed Ndebele hawker) boasts that 
the bullying of the woman “proves the superiority of the townsman over these odd 
creatures from the country” (99).  This statement cannot pass for a satirising of the 
general behaviour of the gangster and his mates (which is tied to the central theme of the 
story in which the writer undoubtedly condemns township gangsterism of the time), 
considering that Can Themba refers to the disgusted audience who are watching such 
disrespectful sauciness as the “passing generations’ men and women” (99).  In this way, 
the Drum writer’s assumption is revealed by the sub-theme, which is that African 
traditional culture (in which behaviour such as that of Macala provokes popular 
abhorrence) should be accorded the status of a relic of the past.  Such an attitude towards 
Africans who still adhere to traditional values is a revelation of a type of elitist snobbery 
on the part of Can Themba, an attitude which Mphahlele accuses the Drum writers of in 
the above quotation. 
  
Consistently with Mphahlele’s valuing of  behaviour that stems from adherence to 
African humanist consciousness (of which traditional customs are an aspect) he later in 
Afrika My Music contrasts Nigerian and Kenyan cultural freedom with the quality of 
South African ghetto life, pervaded by hegemonic culture, that he and his compatriots 
had to survive (28).  This he refers to as a civilisation (i.e “white” or “western” 
civilisation) that beckoned to him and his people from across the colour line, but that at 
the same time resisted the Africans and denied them full participation in its life.   
Sensitivity to this kind of humiliating hybridity brought about by interaction with the 
“centre” is typical of the perceptions and insights of postcolonial thinking and writing.   
Pronouncing on the inevitable ambivalence of Africans within the apartheid milieu, 
Mphahlele indicates that the Africans back home lived within a bricolage containing 
some appropriated western cultural elements as well as dregs of an African humanist 
consciousness buried deep in their resilient collective personality, in the following words: 
 And we flourished in Nigerian freedom, even while it was still a colony.  And we 
 were drawn into its life by the people, who were at ease with themselves … 
 Nigeria restored Africa to us.  We had come to think of ourselves as urbanised in 
 South  Africa – those of us who were located in ghettos on the fringes of towns 
 and cities as a work force to serve the white man.  Of course we had been 
 uprooted from our traditions: we used modern means of travel; our eating habits 
 had changed; families had been broken up and discovered new arrangements 
 permitting the extended family to survive, commerce and industy had created new 
 desires and wants in us, and our modes of dress had changed accordingly. (Afrika 
 My Music 28) 
 
In the section recording exile experiences in Philadelphia from 1974 to 1977, Mphahlele 
recognises his having matured from formerly writing in order to express his hatred of 
 201
racism to the more positive orientation of asserting the worth and life of the oppressed as 
those of a  profound, rounded people.  Before the mellowing of sensibility afforded him 
by exiled life in America, the dominant feeling of hate for the white oppressor obstructed 
the greater goal of writing of Africans as a whole people beyond their homogenisation 
and of writing beyond reflexively jaundiced opinions dividing blacks and whites, caused 
by the distance between them engendered by apartheid – in which the blacks were 
“defined only by work situations and by a counter or window frame between the server 
and the served” (156).  A stand against the homogenisation of the “periphery” or the 
“orient” by the “centre” is one trait of the writing of postcolonial writers and thinkers.  
Mphahlele’s attempt to portray African characters in his fiction should thus be 
understood to be an assertion of the complete humanity of Africans both as individuals 
and as a group, as well as a clarification of his postcolonialist standpoint meant to counter 
any homogenising conceptions of people found in the “periphery”. 
 
Of course, with an encounter between the “centre” and the “orient” bound to have an 
effect on both sides, the exiled Mphahlele now no longer sees the oppressor race in 
homogenised terms, either.  That is why a 31 May 1975 visit by an old friend (the 
musician Khabi Mngoma) to the Mphahlele family in Wayne reminds Mphahlele of the 
African humanist white woman named Norah Taylor back in South Africa.  In true 
African humanist sense the white woman mentors and shapes talent in Mphahlele, Khabi 
Mngoma and the Syndicate of African Artists while Mphahlele teaches at Orlando High 
school; she supports the Mphahlele family financially after Mphahlele has been banned 
from teaching; she also voluntarily offers lessons in speech and drama in African schools 
and teacher-training colleges to try and water down some of the worst effects of Bantu 
Education on the black mind (158).   It is due to emotional and intellectual growth during 
exile that Mphahlele now refines and adapts aspects of his new attitude as “an African” 
with a cultural identity cutting across the racial divide.   This new attitude of his can be 
contrasted with his earlier convictions (held back in South Africa after the African 
National Congress had been formed in 1912) that belief in non-racialism was a mere 
strategic compromise (with white power), while the radical black consciousness in the 
Pan Africanist Congress camp would have been the more appropriate attitude for a black 
South African political opposition group (157). 
 
In a manner more poetic than prosaic – because it is integral to the lyrical prose and plot 
of the narrative – Down Second Avenue tackles the concerns of the postcolonial writer 
even more subtly than his shorter texts do.  Down Second Avenue depicts two apparently 
conflicting world views, those of western Christians and of believers in traditional 
African religion.   This ‘clash’ is shown up as being merely superficial, if contrasted with 
the evidence of the two groups’ deeper connectedness.  The communal voice in Down 
Second Avenue in the form of Old Modise’s dialogue expresses the profound and 
enduring notion of a common African religion cutting across the two sections of the black 
community and indissolubly connecting them.  That is why he speaks in favour of the 
‘heathen’ circumcision practitioners deserving to be left alone, for instance.  As P.H.D. 
Mashabela has observed (quoted by Teffo), some places in traditional Pedi/African 
religion were “endowed with an aura of sacrosanctity” (“Science, Religious Pluralism 
and the African Experience” 102).  Circumcision ground is one such place.  African 
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thinkers, including Mphahlele himself (1974) and Mbiti (1969), have stated that 
traditional religions are by no means extinct despite adaptation of African cultures to 
modernisation (including proselytization).   One of the many aspects of traditional 
religious practices is initiation by means of the circumcision school. 
 
Negation of mimicry in the religious sphere as illustrated in Down Second Avenue is 
evident again in the same book in the depiction of Mphahlele’s maternal grandmother.   
The grandmother bans the children from being in the Marabstad streets after dark unless 
they go to evening church service (Down Second Avenue 78). The social sanction 
prevailing here is an African humanist one of respect for the ancestors, as the sacrosanct 
reason she advances for this family rule is simply that it was their late grandfather’s law 
before he died.  As indicated elsewhere in this chapter, the grandmother punctuates her 
earnest talk throughout Down Second Avenue with the phrase “as sure as Titus sleeps in 
his grave”, thus invoking the continued presence of the departed in the affairs of the 
family.  The social attribute of letting the ancestors remain part of the family is a feature 
of African religion (see Kudadjie and Osei, 40) and expressive of the African humanist 
ability to continue to honour and evoke elders even after they have passed away, a 
practice Mphahlele evidently treasures.    
 
The older Mphahlele in Marabastad takes advantage of the proliferation of breakaway 
African churches and starts roaming from one denomination to the other on different 
Sundays (Down Second Avenue 99). When after such exploits he relates to his 
grandmother how an A.M.E. pastor amusingly mixes English and Sotho in his sermons, 
the grandmother retorts that one day the pastor will face retribution when his ancestors 
descend upon him and ask him where he has thrown his mother tongue (99).  Though a 
devout Christian and despite the above conversation relating to the action of a Christian 
preacher that takes place in a Christian church building, Grandma can still not think in 
terms of moral judgement without making reference to the superior guardianship of the 
ancestors rather than punishment in hell.  The irony of such utterances by Grandma lies in 
the dogmatic forbidding of ‘ancestor worship’ within the Christian church establishment.  
By means of dialogue such as Grandma’s, Mphahlele wants to show that African 
humanist belief in the ubiquitous presence of ancestral spirits among the lives of the 
living persists in the face of a modernisation process that seeks to outlaw it.  
 
If the apparent divergence of world views in the two sections of the Maupaneng 
community as well as apparently firm western Christianity in the urban characters like 
the grandmother were not relatively superficial, African values like respect for ancestors 
and perception of the Supreme Being in things like a piece of ground would not be 
portrayed in the autobiography.   It is clear that beneath the apparent cultural-religious 
heterogeneity there is an underlying homogeneity. 
 
With the teenager Mphahlele living on the “Christian” side of the Maupaneng village, he 
is among those fed on stories depicting the “heathens” as witches with whose footprints 
and shadows one had to avoid contact.   Boys being boys, Eseki and his fellow goatherds 
and cattleherds constantly cross over to the “heathen” side, where one day they even 
naughtily explore the taste of baboon meat at the communal fireplace.   The remarkable 
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fact is that the boys are received warmly.   The warm hospitality of the traditionalist 
section of the Maupaneng community evinces a conviction of affinity that defies the 
supposedly insurmountable differences between the two sections. 
 
Apart from the modification and reshaping of religious practice evinced in the examples 
we have just mentioned, Down Second Avenue also contains instances of mimicry.   For 
example,  in describing the Mphahlele house facing Barber Street in Marabastad, the 
author mentions that in addition to the spectacular malaeta barefist boxers herded by 
mounted police on Sunday afternoons, women strolling past (as the family habitually sat 
on the verandah) particularly fascinated the Mphahlele family with their various styles of 
dress (35).  While some of the black women were truly smart in their dress, others 
“hobbled past in awkward high heels, evidently feeling the pinch” (35).  The tone here 
works counterdiscursively to ridicule their inept mimicry, for the latter category of black 
women is clearly at pains to imbibe supposedly superior western culture. 
 
As indicated earlier on in the Introduction, PanAfricanist writers of the “Black 
Consciousness” persuasion interrogate the nature of the post-independence nation-state.   
Although not denying the role of politicians, Mphahlele stresses the important role artists 
have to play in the state in forging an appropriate national consciousness.  In this 
connection he has stated that imaginative literature should revitalise or keep alive a 
language and experience, and should increase a people’s capacity to feel (Afrika My 
Music 131).   These two aims he sees as “perennial revolutionary imperatives”.  The self-
constituting psyche of a nation freed from a hegemonic onslaught from the “centre” has  
been a central concern of all postcolonial writers, as Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin (1989; 
1998), Edward Said (1978) and Homi Bhabha (1981) have indicated .  
 
Appropriation of western Christianity (as in the example shown above of linking 
religious activity with reverence of the ancestors) is one aspect of the African humanist 
consciousness Mphahlele intends to see ordering the behaviour of the postcolonial 
African.  The postcolonial theorist Pieterse has stressed the need for colonised people to 
appropriate Christianity in the following words: 
 Empire is an ideology as well as a practice, a discipline and also a  conscience.  
 One of the strategies of emancipation … for the oppressed is a strategic necessity 
 to address the oppressor in its own language, the language which it knows and 
 understands … In the world of Western imperialism this has largely been the 
 language of Christianity and accordingly the history of emancipation from 
 Western imperialism has also been a history of the recovery and mobilization
 of the revolutionizing aspect of Christianity. (368) 
Mphahlele as a postcolonialist writer (as in the above examples from Down Second 
Avenue) uses African humanist practices such as invocation of the ancestors to 
revolutionise Christian precepts and dogmas (that forbid ‘ancestor worship’ and 
initiation), and this is clearly consistent with what Pieterse states above. 
 
 
3.2.8 MPHAHLELE’S  WAY  OF  MAKING  MEANING 
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Down Second Avenue relates how after completing the junior certificate at St. Peter’s 
School Mphahlele as a young man goes for teacher training at Adams College in 
Amanzimtoti, Natal.  After completing the teacher’s certificate in 1940, he is employed 
as a clerk, short-hand typist and teacher at Ezenzeleni Institute for the Blind in 
Roodepoort.  After completing the Matriculation Certificate in 1942, he leaves 
Ezenzeleni in 1945 for a teaching post at Orlando High School in present-day Soweto.   
In the same year Eva, his mother, dies of a diabetic coma shortly before Mphahlele’s 
marriage to Rebecca on 29 August 1945.   
 
While Mphahlele was still studying at Adams College, Marabastad had been moved to 
Atteridgeville by the Smuts government.  An uncle of Mphahlele’s had used his savings 
as a bus driver to buy a stand and build a home in the neighbouring township of Lady 
Selborne where he went to live with the author’s maternal grandmother.  Aunt Dora and 
her children, too, had gone to live in Lady Selborne where Aunt Dora had bought a stand 
and a house.  Mphahlele’s mother had had to leave her washing job to work at the 
Pretoria mint, so as to be able to live in Atteridgeville with her other two children. 
 
After describing all the sad uprootings following the forced removal of Marabastad after 
it was declared by government to be located in an area earmarked for exclusive 
occupation by whites, the next chapter of Down Second Avenue is an “Interlude” in 
which Mphahlele muses about all these events.  In the typically pensive mood of an 
“Interlude” the writer thinks: 
Marabastad is gone but there will always be Marabastads that will be going until 
the screw of the vice breaks … And the Black man keeps moving on, as he has 
always done the last three centuries, moving with baggage and all, for ever 
tramping with bent backs to give way for the one who says he is stronger … 
Before the house came down in which he had hired a room, Siki the tubercular 
guitarist, coughed, coughed and coughed until the blood came out and he died.   
Many Sikis will be born yet but few will die the way he did with his fingers 
entangled in the broken strings of his instrument. (Down Second Avenue 157) 
 
Mphahlele’s aesthetic belief in the literary artist’s ability to create resonance comes to the 
fore in this excerpt.   The image of Siki the guitarist dying while playing music on his 
guitar symbolises what Mphahlele has chosen to call “the unbroken song” (1974, 1981).   
The opening statement itself (above), that there will always be Marabastads, reinforces 
the notion of an “unbroken song” as symbolised by the singing of the Marabastad 
musician that is described as surviving the physical death of the character Siki himself.    
Mphahlele’s preoccupation with the need for a cultural connection of the present to the 
past and the future has been articulated in many instances in his essays, such as 
“Educating the Imagination”, when he writes that in literature myth must be created to 
highlight “that never-ending story of life: children are still being born, women still wait 
and endure, men still betray one another, we still dream both idle and meaningful dreams 
… and we must keep trying to negotiate the meeting point between art and history” (182).    
Siki’s perpetual coughing signposts the crushing conditions under which blacks have 
perpetually been forced to live.   The statement in the quotation,  that the black man 
keeps moving on as he has always done in the last three centuries, is yet another 
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disclosure of the theme of distinctive historical perspective from which a people should 
always make their own distinctive meaning out of what life offers them.   The deeper 
meaning of the term “moving on” should not escape the reader undetected.  It refers to 
the resilient African ability of continuing to be who they are as a cultural entity despite 
being forced to contend with an adverse environment, while it refers simultaneously and 
more obviously to the physical act of  continually being torn from the pieces of land that 
belong to them and to which they belong. 
 
The importance of learning the history of one’s own people as a way of creating 
resonance has been emphasised by Mphahlele, for instance when he writes the following 
in Afrika My Music: “So we think history began when we were born and we don’t bother 
to study the available history of our political struggle and that of our writers and artists, 
of our achievers” (254).  To stress that one’s history is the resonance of one’s people, 
Mphahlele goes on to chronicle black South African history together with the meaning he 
makes of it, as when he writes: 
Soweto, place of the grinning skull, / -- Death in life, life in death --/  What are 
They doing to us? … When my dream of a non-racial society was shattered, 
dating from Sharpeville, I realised that the white ruling class and its electorate 
were in effect rejecting African humanism, which is traditionally inclusive … 
Away from home it dawned on me that our immediate need was not to try and 
win over whites to the side of non-racialism but to strengthen our sense of an 
African identity.  Our African consciousness at the deeper levels of culture where 
it is felt as a spiritual necessity.  We would need to defer for now the ideal of non-
racialism as a political slogan. (254-55) 
The passage above demonstrates that Mphahlele’s polemical and narrative writings have 
been shaped by his interpretation of the explosive slum conditions of Soweto and 
elsewhere that erupted in the form of June 1976 student riots.  His narrative writings and 
his consolidation in the expository sphere of the concept of African humanism have been 
influenced also by the Sharpeville massacre of black people marching against the 
broadening of apartheid pass laws that sought to include black women.  These historical 
events and his interrogation of them are the resonances that give perspective to 
Mphahlele’s own life, to his concept of African humanism and to the lives of African 
characters in his narrative writings that aim to highlight the very African humanist 
perspective and resonances of black existence during apartheid.  It is this very self-
constituting facet of the history of one’s people that Spivak recognises as a necessary 
practice of the postcolonial writer when she writes that “ “Reified history” is in this case 
our monumentalized national-cultural history of origin combined with ideas of a 
miraculated resistant hybridity; “embodied history” our disavowed articulation within the 
history of the present of our chosen new nation-state”  (471).  Congruously with the way 
the postcolonial thinker Spivak defines the role of historical awareness in the quotation 
above, Mphahlele uses the history of survival of Africans under apartheid to outline a 
perspective that serves to strengthen the versatility of African humanism to make 
meaning of past history while at the same time using African humanism to regulate the 
responses of his people to experiences of the present moment.  He cannot ignore the 
important role historical events have played in shaping the African humanist 
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consciousness to its present-day model, because (as he has stated) “history has been the 
paramount agent of change in Africa this far” (“Function of Literature” 421). 
 
One more example of Mphahlele’s uniqueness in wielding metaphors, symbols and 
dialogue in his narrative writings is mythmaking which is the deliberate creation of the 
impression of repeated patterns of life, or an explanation of such repeated patterns, which 
according to Mphahlele is another way of creating the resonance that forms part of 
African humanist consciousness (“Educating the Imagination” 182-83; Es’kia 33).  In 
Down Second Avenue, for example, Mphahlele tells a legend of how a cluster of 
disgraced stars were dismissed from heaven and were during their fall towards earth 
changed to white sand.  After heaping up, the sand was washed into the Leshoana river 
(13, 14).  In this way, the continued washing away of sand by water in the Leshoana river 
and the explanation of how this has come about have the effect of myth which reassures 
the people living around the river that life continues even beyond their and their 
countrymen’s physical death.  Such a hope for survival is one of the features of 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism. 
 
In addition to the employment of resonance by means of a critical revival of the historical 
events and the impact of such historical events on the lives of his people, as well as by 
means of mythmaking, Mphahlele’s impeachment of liberalism, his conception of the 
“tyranny of place” and his formulation of the “tyranny of time” are among his key 
discoveries as a postcolonial writer and thinker.  The following statements by him clarify 
what he means by “the tyranny of place” and the “tyranny of time”:   
 The tyranny of time.  The tyranny of place.  The muck, the smell of it, the fever 
 and the fight, the cycles of decay and survival.  And ‘the sounds begin again’; I 
 want daytime, I want place, I want a sense of history.  Even though place will 
 never be the same again for me – because its lights and shadows may change – I 
 want to be there when it happens. (“Exile” 278)  
In the above passage indicating Mphahlele’s longing for a return home while in exile, he 
compares the inconvenience of suffering on home soil under apartheid rule (that is, the 
tyranny of time, of the time in South African history when life happens to be subjected to 
apartheid) with that of suffering in exile (which is the tyranny of place, of living in a 
place which alienates you because you are missing the familiarity of home ground to 
which you are spiritually attached).  That the second line in the passage above 
concentrates nostalgically on a sensuous description of apartheid South African life in the 
black ghettos indicates that at this point of his exile life Mphahlele has started to resolve 
to go back home to South Africa “even though place will never be the same again for 
me” – he aims to go home despite the fact that the apartheid system remains in power 
together with the tyranny of time that goes with it.  That is why after his return  in 1977 
to South Africa (as described in Afrika My Music) Mphahlele explains that he “must 
submit to the pull of place” and deal with “the tyranny of time”, i.e. he must deal with life 
under apartheid in as much as he cannot resist the pull of spiritual attachment to home 
soil (11).  For him “the sounds begin again” because the apartheid experiences he had 
before going into exile are now again happening to him (11). In true postcolonial spirit, 
Mphahlele chooses rather to come home and counter hegemonic suppression as a living 
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example so that he may appropriate life under apartheid to suit himself and his project of 
cultural reclamation for his people. 
 
Reflecting on the years during which the politics of South Africa were dominated by 
debate between the African National Congress and the All Africa Convention, Mphahlele 
reiterates his stance that the category ‘black’ must include coloureds and Indians (Down 
Second Avenue 190).   While he agrees with the All Africa Convention on this, he regrets 
the Convention’s accommodation of the liberal ideology of the time.  Mphahlele cannot 
but see treachery and the desire to cling to hegemonic dominance as the disguised basis 
of liberal thinking: “Now it’s the white liberals you’re flirting with and they’re the ones 
telling you to use democratic and constitutional methods of struggle” (189). These 
“democratic and constitutional methods of struggle” prescribed by Liberals are what 
Frantz Fanon sees as “neo-liberal universalism” which the “fight for democracy against 
the oppression of mankind will slowly leave” as soon as colonialism has been defeated 
(The Wretched of the Earth 119).  Writing in his essay “The Pitfalls of National 
Consciousness”, Fanon denounces the tactics of neocolonialism in the following words:  
“The Western bourgeoisie, though fundamentally racist, most often manages to mask this 
racism by a multiplicity of nuances which allow it to preserve intact its proclamation of 
mankind’s outstanding dignity” (131).   Mphahlele’s scepticism about the role of liberals 
in the fight against colonisation should be properly understood to be a caution against the 
same neocolonial tactics as the citation of Fanon above describes, which “mask this 
racism by a multiplicity of nuances” serving but to “preserve intact” colonialism’s 
imposition of the norms for proper governance. 
 
Like any consciousness, liberalism has evolved over the years (“Versus the Political 
Morality” 370).  Mphahlele expresses his appreciation of the evolution of liberalism as 
follows: 
 White liberalism constantly pleads that the law be obeyed, and that the 
 political morality of the rulers can only be subverted when the same rulers 
 experience a change of heart …We must acknowledge that activist liberalism (as 
 distinct from garden party or paternalistic liberalism) has moved a few paces 
 forward since 1948, on questions like the franchise and rate of political 
 change, and seems unequivocally against the ideology of separate development.  
 And yet the constraints it set for itself in the manner of resistance remain: extra-
 parliamentary mass resistance is out of the question. (“Versus the Political
 Morality” 370) 
It must be understood that Mphahlele, like most black leaders of the time, regretted the 
claim by liberals to represent black interests in parliament instead of debating in favour of 
blacks being allowed into the then all-white parliament to speak for themselves.  
Mphahlele sees such a “sinister” attitude in liberalism as indicative of “white liberalism 
in this country [feeling] constrained to operate from a Christian base”, which makes the 
liberals “believe that the white fascist or tyrant is capable of attaining grace and thus of 
ruling with a human wisdom” (369).  According to Mphahlele, it is this belief among 
liberals that they are the (chosen) saviour of (reprobate) blacks which engenders 
“historical liberalism’s abhorrence of violence (by blacks) and preference for gradualism 
in the liberating process” (369).  What this means is that liberal whites  prescribe their 
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norms and values in order to perpetuate the oppression of blacks, and that this has led 
them to stand up against any method (such as violent military overthrow)  that may attain 
the termination of white rule. 
 
Mphahlele’s criticism of liberalism is supported by details of his contemporary Todd 
Matshikiza’s autobiography, as when Matshikiza depicts a meeting he holds in London 
with the Englishman William Smythe as characterised by harangues, as follows:  
 What is all this business about you Africans wanting to have equal  share of any 
performance put on for the Whites down there? … You Blacks are filled with a 
sense of injustice.  You think anything happening to you is unjust.  You’re full of 
complaints about everything … You blokes want to start a Black theatrical 
movement …You are  hoping to get your Whites to come and see you in Orlando? 
Be reasonable.  Why should they come to Orlando to the segregated Bantu area to 
see natives doing Shakespeare by candlelight?  (Matshikiza, Chocolates for My 
Wife 43-44) 
It is fair to assume that Matshikiza’s depiction of William Smythe is meant to satirise the 
South African liberals’ apparently paranoid revulsion against any liberatory action of 
blacks smacking of radicalism. 
 
Mphahlele most clearly explains his scepticism about the honesty of liberals (in their 
claim to support the liberation of blacks from apartheid) in the following passage: 
 The liberal tries to allow for a variety of of human foibles that can  result in 
 misrule and tyranny.  The underdog’s ‘backwardness’ or ‘primitivism’ make the 
 liberal’s heart bleed, and so he ends up praying for both the oppressor and the 
 oppressed in one breath: may  they both find grace and acknowledge each his own 
 moral shortcomings and love each other. (“Literature Versus Political Morality” 
 (369-70) 
As long as they were politically disenfranchised, blacks like Mphahlele, however, saw 
extra-parliamentary mass action as the only effective way to put across their demands to 
Government.  It is understandable then that the position of liberals (indicated in the 
passage above), in opposing black mass action, aroused suspicion among blacks that the 
liberals wanted no real change to occur and that they (as a ‘saviour’ race) wanted to 
continue to ‘represent’ blacks “in the two houses of parliament” (“Prometheus in Chains” 
354).  Moreover, it should be understood that dependence (as opposed to self-reliance 
and self-constitution) is one of the things postcolonial writers including the Afrocentric 
writers of Pan Africanist persuasion in general and Mphahlele with his African humanism 
in particular oppose.  Mphahlele defines dependence as “refer[ring] to a condition or fact 
of relying on someone” (200).  Tracing the apartheid ruling class hostility towards black 
self-reliance back to student formations of the 1970s – like SASO, spearheaded by 
student leaders Steve Biko (later murdered in custody by the police) and Onkgopotse Tiro 
(assassinated by the apartheid government while exiled to Botswana) – Mphahlele writes 
that:  “The ruling class was out to kill the spirit of self-reliance SASO generated at 
grassroots level.  The white man … is in charge of every aspect of our lives, except, in 
some respects, our spiritual existence …We have waited until the white man gave or did 
things for us” (“From Dependence” 199).  Because the liberals were part of the white 
ruling class with its attitude of wanting to do things for blacks, thus negating black self-
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reliance (as explained in the quotation above), Mphahlele’s African humanist 
consciousness cannot accept the socio-political stance of liberalism.  This (for 
Mphahlele) has been made possible by the surviving “spiritual existence” or African 
humanist sensibility that has survived the obliterating policies of the apartheid 
government of the time in some form. 
 
Emphasising the need for postcolonial populaces to do things for themselves as opposed 
to dependence on the fomer colonial power thinly veiled as the bourgeois ruling class, 
Fanon proposes “political education” in the following words: “To educate the masses 
politically does not mean, cannot mean making a political speech.  What it means is to 
try, relentlessly and passionately, to teach the masses that everything depends on them 
…”   (The Wretched 159, my emphasis).  Mphahlele’s championing of self-reliance 
shown in the quotation above clearly agrees with Fanon’s opposition to colonial agents or 
neocolonial African bourgeoisie “making a political speech” to the ordinary citizens.  The 
reason for Fanon rejecting “political speech” is due to the danger of such speeches 
echoing neocolonial dictations through the mouths of bourgeouis African leaders  who 
“will prove themselves incapable of triumphantly putting into practice a programme with 
even a minimun humanist content”  (The Wretched 131).  In other words, Fanon believes 
in programmes that inculcate self-reliance in the ordinary men and women by “[making] 
adults of them”, rather than an approach which “[treats] the masses as children by 
deciding things for them” (The Wretched 146).  It can thus be seen that Fanon emphasises 
post-colonial enlistment of the population from the point of view of government, while 
Mphahlele stresses the importance of postcolonial self-constitution from the point of 
view of the ordinary people. 
 
Mphahlele’s detection of liberalism’s agenda to perpetrate neocolonialism is evident in 
short stories like “Mrs Plum” (The Unbroken Song) and “The Living and the Dead” (The 
Living and the Dead and Other Stories), as discussed earlier in this thesis.  One finds it 
difficult to agree with Ursula Barnett in her remark that “Mrs Plum’s liberalism is quite 
genuine” (A Vision of Order 177).   This is despite the same critic’s judicious observation 
that “Mrs Plum’s liberalism … is completely impersonal, directed at idea rather than at 
people” thus lacking in Mphahlele’s ideal of  “ruling passion, a feeling of compassion for 
one’s fellow men” (A Vision of Order 177).  This “feeling of compassion for one’s fellow 
men” is one of the chief aspects of Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism.  It is the 
same lack of African humanist orientation shown above in the depiction of liberals which  
Mphahlele is exposing among outright apartheid champions by constructing the dialogue 
of characters like Stoffel Visser and Doppie  Fourie (in “The Living and the Dead” cited 
earlier in this study), themselves being adherents of hardcore apartheid.  To Visser and 
Fourie the future of South Africa lies either in continued domination of blacks by whites, 
or (if whites are lax in enforcing racial separation) a takeover by blacks (who are also 
likely to practice apartheid in reverse in the form of brutal domination of whites).  
Mphahlele’s African humanism being a strategy that adapts itself from time to time to 
prevalent social attitudes, it is understandable why (in the above quotation from Down 
Second Avenue) he expresses a belief that at that point in the history of South Africa, the 
correct attitude of Africans is strategic or temporary exclusivism, which will include 
whites only later when their prevailing patronising tendency shall have abated.  That 
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Mphahlele will not indulge in indiscreet trust of those who have until the recent past been 
on the side of power and control that worked against the survival of Africans (whether 
overtly or covertly) is revealed in the following blunt comment (which he made as 
recently as 1990):  “No, we have been victims of white dishonesty for too long for us to 
be indulging in non-racial wet dreams, let alone any degree of orgasmic satisfaction at the 
sound of words such as ‘forgiveness’, ‘reconciliation’, ‘New South Africa’ – even before 
the other race has earned these tender mercies” (“Disinherited Imagination” 18, emphasis 
added).  So to Mphahlele there has been “white dishonesty” during colonial times, and 
nowhere does he exclude liberals in his judgement of whites (during the apartheid era) as 
dishonest particularly in their treatment of blacks. 
 
Mphahlele’s abhorrence of the patronising politics of the South African liberals is tied up 
with his recoiling from neocolonialism, as he describes what he experienced as an exile 
when he tried to make inroads in Hastings Banda’s Malawi: “So here I am with Chiume 
in his large office.  The pictures on the walls give me an eerie feeling.  I am surrounded 
by colonial ghosts, who peer out to remind me that they had steered the caravan of 
history across this country” (Afrika My Music 46).  President Banda and the regime he 
leads are exposed in this quotation for the neocolonialists they are.  That is why 
Mphahlele feels in the atmosphere of Banda’s office the same unease he experiences in 
the face of liberalism.  It comes as no surprise then, when Mphahlele is shooed out of the 
African President Banda’s office and his bid to advance the self-expression of Africans 
through the arts is aborted (Afrika My Music 46).  Fanon laments the neocolonialism that 
characterises some African states after liberation as follows:  “We observe a permanent 
see-saw between African unity, which fades quicker and quicker into the mists of 
oblivion, and a heart-breaking return to chauvinism in its most bitter and detestable form” 
(The Wretched 126). The neocolonial chauvinism Mphahlele meets with when he 
attempts to include Malawi in post-independence self-constructing programmes in the 
name of African unity, is an example of the aspect of neocolonialism referred to by 
Fanon above.  Here, neocolonialism works in direct opposition to the African humanist 
treatment of Africans as one all over the globe. 
 
Of course, the creeping danger of neocolonialism in independent African states has been 
the obsession of every Africanist thinker, including heads of postcolonial states such as 
Nkrumah, Kaunda and Nyerere.  In a 1996 essay, “The Function of Literature at the 
Present Time”, Mphahlele spells out what he conceives as dangers that face the newly-
independent African state, in the following words:  “The focus is now on social manners, 
the betrayal of the nation by corrupt black dictators, the individual’s relationship to 
political and economic power, the neo-colonial subversion of national goals, and so on” 
(421).  The above citation makes clear that Mphahlele is sensitive to the potential dangers 
of neo-colonialism in his pursuit of the survival of African humanist values and practices 
beyond the period of apartheid or colonialism, in newly independent states. 
 
While Down Second Avenue chronicles Mphahlele’s struggle with the tyranny of time in 
apartheid South Africa, Afrika My Music graphically and microscopically explores the 
tyranny of place as Mphahlele experiences it during exile even in African states like 
Malawi and Kenya.  The “tyranny of time” and the “tyranny of place” are interrelated for 
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Mphahlele. Tyranny of time to him in actual life is the tyranny of the historical time at 
home in South Africa in the form of the apartheid era as a segment of the long, unending 
history of black existence.  Tyranny of place on the other hand indicates the cultural 
unfamiliarity of place experienced in exile, as well as the excruciating attraction to home 
soil which is at the same time rebuffed by conditions under apartheid.  The harshness of 
exile in African states is best summed up when (upon his attempt at getting an 
appointment with President Banda of Malawi being snubbed) Mphahlele asks: “why is 
your government so hostile to South African exiles and refugees, especially Africans?” 
(47). The irony of Mphahlele’s life history is that where the tyranny of time seems to 
abate in exile due to political and cultural freedom, the tyranny of place becomes 
dominant; back home where cultural convergence with fellow blacks and the South 
African locale eliminates the tyranny of place, the tyranny of time in the form of 
apartheid is the norm.  For harmony to exist, time and place have to coincide in mutually 
reinforcing, non-tyrannical ways.   
 
The author describes the tension of his life history as follows — while brooding on the 
condition of exile in his Philadelphia days of wandering:  
 I could, if I chose, renew my lease indefinitely in this glasshouse, quite forget, 
 write off my past, take my chances on new territory.  I shall not.  Because I’m a 
 helpless captive of place and to come to terms with the tyranny of place is to have 
 something to live for that saves me from stagnation, anonymity.  It’s not fame 
 you want, it’s having your shadow noticed.  It’s the comfort that you can show 
 control over your life, that you can function.  Comforting also to feel you can coil 
 around the ego centre, feel the juices flow within and when time is ripe, uncoil, 
 stretch out and feel the spiral motion of body and mind interwoven with other 
 lives as a specific time and place.  The place is not here alas, so the moment must 
 wait its renewal time. (Afrika My Music 161–162) 
Place is tyrannical to Mphahlele in that he cannot rip himself from a place whose colours 
and smells he is familiar with and still remain himself, whereas time is tyrannical to him 
because he cannot be himself in a historical juncture devoid of freedom.  Reference to life 
in exile as “this glasshouse” reveals Mphahlele’s regard of such a life as fragile because it 
is hollow.  The hollowness of an exile’s life is caused by Mphahlele’s inability to have 
his “shadow noticed”.  This means that, in contrast with alienating American life where 
one hankers after individualist fame, life back home is amenable to his African humanist 
consciousness whose pursuit is to  have one’s memory immortalised after one’s death 
(probably due to the recognition of perennial ancestral presence in human affairs). 
 
The longing for a meaningful existence among fellow African humanists back home in 
South Africa is expressed by means of the image contained in the term “coil around the 
ego centre” as well as the image elicited in “uncoil, stretch out” – meaning that the 
African humanist consciousness is strengthened back home, through the nourishment one 
derives from familiar territory and social context (with the idea of nourishment captured 
in the image “feel the juices flow within”).  Equipped with such a revitalised African 
humanist consciousness, (once back home) the author will have that “something to live 
for” without which life in exile is characterised by lack of impact on fellow humans due 
to his alienation from them (as indicated by “stagnation, anonymity”).  After receiving 
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nourishing renewal of his African humanist awareness (with reference to consciousness 
indicated by means of the term “ego centre”), Mphahlele will perfect the meaningfulness 
of his life back home by interacting with fellow Africans.  Such later action will yield 
synergy that is bigger than any one individual, and is equated to the existence of a whole 
people who transform in oneness into a distinctively African segment of the continuum of 
human existence (according to the way this catalytic power of African humanist synergy 
is described in the expression “body and mind interwoven with other lives as a specific 
time and place”).  Such a depiction of the collective power of Africans may be the 
author’s way of exhorting fellow Africans that their strength lies in contiguous, united 
effort rather than in a state of brooding on issues in isolation as exile may compel one to 
do. 
 
The personal experience of seeing the Marabastad community subjected to forced 
removal by the apartheid government to make way for developments hatched by and 
known only to the powers that be (Down Second Avenue 151, 152) assumes a higher 
significance with Mphahlele’s departure from South Africa into exile.  While in exile, 
however, his attachment to his home never leaves him in peace, which feeling leads to 
‘place’ (in exile) turning tyrannical.  The tyranny of place proves shallow and short-lived 
as Mphahlele packs for home.  Despite apartheid’s continued dominance (i.e. the tyranny 
of time), Mphahlele as an African humanist achieves self-fulfilment by making the 
choice for a life of meaningful contribution to the survival of the identity of his people.  
The “sounds” of the familiar apartheid milieu “begin again” inter alia as he applies for a 
job at the University of the North and (because of oppressive apartheid attitudes) is 
denied the position (Afrika My Music 6), but Mphahlele finds the revival of his African 
humanist consciousness among groups of people sharing the same spiritual character with 
him, fulfilling.  These milestones in his own personal history alternate (in his 
autobiographies) with bigger historical events like the Sharpeville massacre and the 
Soweto student uprising, and together they lend a remarkable resonance to his books as 
well as forming a specifically African humanist perspective because of the way the books 
record the way he has interpreted these events in terms of his African humanism. 
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3.3 CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Mphahlele’s thematic focus on the “tyranny of time” and the “tyranny of place” binds all 
his writings together, starting with the 1946 collection of short stories, enduring through 
the autobiography of 1959 and the 1960 poem “Exile in Nigeria” and persisting into the 
later autobiography of 1984.  While the short stories seem to incline more towards a self-
asserting celebration of life and pay tribute to resourceful black women, the poetry and 
autobiography deal more pointedly with the apartheid and exile themes.  Mphahlele’s 
constant emphasis on the tyranny of time exerted on him and fellow Africans by the 
apartheid government of the time should be interpreted as his reaction to what he not only 
sees as a threat to the material well-being of Africans under apartheid, but more 
importantly as an expression of his awareness of its more profound threat to the 
underlying African humanist consciousness, whose self-constituting preservation and 
capacity for redefining survival have been his life long concerns.  Even as he tries to 
evade the tyranny of time by going into exile, its alienating effect on his African 
humanist composure and the displacement he suffers through the estranging experience 
of exile evoke in him a longing for communing with fellow African humanists back 
home.  Unfortunately, memories of the delightful familiarity and identity with home 
cannot but enter Mphahlele’s mind in tandem with the associated apartheid experiences 
which (by no choice of his own) are inseparable from the idea of home, as a result of the 
historical times in which he and his fellow South Africans live.  In this way, Mphahlele’s 
concept of African humanism cannot be defined without inclusion of its self-preserving 
capacity to strengthen resistance against the violence inflicted upon it – first by apartheid, 
and later by exile (combined with traumatising memories of apartheid). 
 
All the works spanning the genres attended to so far conform to Mphahlele’s tenets of 
African humanism in the way he describes the concept as a state of mind, a way of life 
and a meaning-making approach to life.  There is indeed a characteristic Black 
Consciousness perspective (barring the parochialism imposed on the Black 
Consciousness Movement by its proponents, which Mphahlele is known to have 
criticised) to the works the study has so far looked at, probably externalising what 
Mphahlele has called the dialogue of two selves that is the “irony” of black existence 
(African Image - Revised Edition 79). 
 
In the way Mphahlele describes it, the “dialogue of two selves” is a state in which the 
African writer needs to negotiate (by means of metaphors and symbols) the meeting point 
between the distant past and the immediate present, and success in this enterprise leads to 
the writer speaking in a prophethic voice (“African Literature” 267, 268, 271).  Simply 
put, the dialogue of two selves within a writer is the source of alienation.  A prophet is 
one who sings “and in what he sings he repeats a number of things [where] one note 
echoes what you said before” (“African Literature” 271).  Different writers with different 
pasts will necessarily have varying dialogues of two selves, so that in the African 
American, for instance, one dialogue concerns slavery while the other dialogue results 
from the African American’s life in contemporary American society.  If an African feels 
alienated in exile, he or she had better go back to his or her continent, “because there the 
present and the past live side by side [as] the traditional past is also the present” (“African 
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Literature” 270).   Of course the act of going back to Africa might end at the 
psychological level in embracing African consciousness without one’s being physically 
able to relocate – as in the case of African Americans, people of the diaspora and other 
Africans for whom it may not be feasible to terminate physical dislodgement.  
Management of the dialogue of two selves succeeds when the two selves are dialectically 
reconciled.  For an African writer, it is African humanist consciousness that will enable 
him to deal with the dialogue of two selves, because of the ability of such a 
consciousness to accommodate change and still retain its own distinctive identity.  That is 
why Mphahlele writes that as an African writer with the proper consciousness:  
You can commute between the European stream and the indigenous.  You can 
 make reference to the one while you are in the other.  The indigenous 
 consciousness is there.   It is solid.  It is changing physically, yes … and yet age-
 old custom has survived, and this is why the dialogue continues between the old 
 and the new. (“African Literature” 270) 
Such a dialogue “between the old and the new” is brought to the surface in Mphahlele’s 
narrative writings by means of images of the traditional past that are constantly made part 
of the fabric of writing/vision in combination with images of culturally African existence 
during historical times unfolding currently.  This characteristic practice is what the critic 
J.U. Jacobs draws our attention to in stating that “Mphahlele crosses and re-crosses 
cultural thresholds deliberately to mediate discourse” (“Language and Liminality in 
South African Autobiographical Writing” 98). This very device is what Mphahlele calls 
resonance in the African humanist sense, by means of which he includes images of 
orature and myths (to achieve the repetitiveness of the notes of the prophet that he 
explains above, as oral literary devices are a repetition of what ancient Africans used to 
narrate).  The cumulative effect of such culture-specific repetition is creation of an 
African humanist perspective.  This is the case when we correctly acknowledge the 
rupture and discontinuity that may occur between the cultural past and present which 
would require modification in present forms in which culture is dialectically repeated and 
continued. 
 
Perspective is achieved in Mphahlele’s writings in yet other forms.  One is his 
characteristic dialogue with or interrogation of the setting.  Such an unusual infusion of 
the setting with life achieves an unmistakable embodiment as well as analysis of resilient 
survival of black life painted in all its minutiae.  This almost allegorical animation of the 
physical milieu enables the author to attain a significant stylistic consistency, joining the 
short stories and the autobiographies.  The generic confines of the short story, requiring a 
taut adherence to a single theme and limited emphasis on other parts of the narrative, 
does place constraints on what could otherwise be abundant applications of this effective 
style as far as representations of African humanism function to provide relief from 
ambient apartheid conditions.   Predictably, the liberty of the longer narrative in terms of 
form gives latitude to the writer to indulge in this technique of painting the locale so 
graphically that the locale itself is elevated to the higher functional level of supplying 
resonance within the narratives.    
 
The superior artistry of the autobiographies written by a number of black South African 
authors is explained by a writer like Ursula Barnett as being the consequence of freedom 
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on the part of the black African writers to:  “shed all pretence of using [their] 
imagination” as is the writing of fiction under the unpropitious apartheid conditions yet 
with “all the elements which make the short stories interesting and readable [available to] 
be incorporated in the autobiography”  (A Vision of Order 221-22). This generic stylic 
pattern can be applied to Mphahlele among the other writers discussed above by Barnett. 
 
Concerning characterisation in Mphahlele’s autobiographies, a continuity is established 
through the examples of obsequious black instruments of white power (such as Mfukeri 
in “The Master of Doornvlei” and the treacherous Swazi who join forces with the 
voortrekkers to overpower Sekhukhune as described in Down Second Avenue), flowing 
from the shorter fiction to the real-life actors of the autobiographies.  Much as Mphahlele 
humorously satirises the mimicry of the black characters of the short stories and 
autobiographies, actions spawned by uncritical reactions to hegemonic culuture (such as 
the maids wearing beautiful western outfits on Thursdays in a manner that seeks to 
outshine the white madams in “Mrs Plum”, and Grandma’s restriction of Eseki and his 
siblings from playing with some of the children in Marabastad on the grounds that they 
are “heathen” or “uncivilized”), much sarcasm is also directed towards whites who are 
unable to acknowledge mutual cultural influence between blacks and whites, resulting in 
ambivalent consciousness and behaviour that is a corollary of colonisation.   Such failure 
to acknowledge ambivalence is shown when the white madams (in “Mrs Plum”) feel 
intimidated by the sleekness of some of the maids in western dress on Thursdays.  
(Recognition of the Africanness of the black domestic workers undergoing a dialectical 
fusion with western manners should supposedly replace fear with a positive appreciation 
of diminishing cultural division on the part of the white ladies.)  One more aspect of 
characterisation that links the short stories with the autobiographies is an eye-opening 
portrayal of actors who are prone to neocolonial influence.  In the shorter narratives, the 
actions of Ishola’s husband (in “A Ballad of Oyo”) can be seen as an inadvertent hero-
worshipping of the colonial culture that is inclined towards a plundering of weaker 
persons and territories and hoarding of money and other material possessions obtained 
through such conquest or subjugation.  This is seen when the husband rotates among his 
different wives in different geographical locations only to feast on whatever harvest the 
toiling women might have secured while he was away loafing and drinking without 
engaging in any beneficial economic activity.  While westerners indulge in leisure only 
after hard work, imperfections and misjudgements that go with mimicry confuse Balogun 
to perceive only one aspect of the whiteman’s spectacular culture – that is, enjoyment of 
material possession acquired through making other people toil who are perceived as 
being weaker.  Mphahlele proceeds in the longer narratives to debunk the lurking peril of 
neocolonialism, exemplified by the snobbishness of President Banda of Malawi in Afrika 
my Music. 
 
From the above it is clear that the devices employed in Mphahlele’s shorter works of art 
are put to more vivid and effective use in the autobiographies.   All the stylistic features 
identified earlier on and attributed to Mphahlele’s writing abound in the later works — 
the autobiographies that have been the subject of the present section of this study.  He 
engages, by the very stylistic devices he uses to instance aspects of his concept of African 
humanism, with issues that preoccupy theorists like Ndebele.  An example of such a 
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theoretical engagement by Mphahlele includes how he resolves in his writings (as our 
analysis of the autobiographies demonstrates) the problem which Ndebele has stated in 
the following words:  “The role of English in South Africa is a matter the complexity of 
which goes far beyond the convenience and correctness of its use, for that very 
convenience, and that very correctness, are, in essence, problematic.  The problem is that 
recourse to them is fraught with assumptions” (“The English Language” 103).  It is the 
assumptions regarding the very “convenience and correctness” which Ndebele is talking 
about above that Mphahlele attempts to resolve by the use of  tactics such as literal 
translation that accommodates the African way of thinking.   Mphahlele is also aware that 
“recourse to [convenient and correct English] is fraught with assumptions” (“The English 
Language” 103).  That is why his handling of narrative writing as evidenced also in the 
autobiographies displays an awareness that writing in “correct” English would work 
against the agency that the concept of African humanism is all about.  Such an abrogation 
of the English language by Mphahlele reveals his recognition of the problematic of 
communicating to the colonised in a language that is an item in colonial hegemony – 
similarly to the way Ndebele does.  Cautioning against attempting to stick to ‘correct’ 
English, Said has written that “there is a generalized awareness that the colonial language 
can be used to attack the system of political control”by means of which “as a world-
language English has a rather menacing side when it is exported” (“Beginnings” 30, 31). 
 
It remains to be probed, as the latter part of this study will now attempt to do, what the 
texture of Mphahlele’s novels is and whether the kinds of writings exemplified in them 
serve to further clarify the concept of African humanism (or not) within the fictional 
medium, what the themes of these writings are and whether such style and themes as 
feature in the novels function effectively in the quest to give the readers a fuller 
understanding of the concept of African humanism.  It is only logical to posit that if 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism is as coherent and nuanced at it avows, it must 
prove so in different environments, especially environments farther removed from Africa 
both geographically and spiritually.  Hence the crucial need to test the strength of this 
philosophy on a global, postcolonial scale.  The milieu of Mphahlele’s novels should 
prove to be even more fertile ground against which to test the strength of African 
humanism, because of their more extensive and complex globality than that of an 
autobiography like Afrika My Music.  If anything may appear repetitive to the senses of 
the reader in the next chapter, it will be as the result of the fictionality linking 
Mphahlele’s fiction with autobiography; definitely not as a result of the autobiographies 
being anywhere close to the novels in their global stride of action and vivid colouring of 
disparate culturally-definable consciousnesses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 217
4. THE NOVELS 
 
 
4.1     OPENING REMARKS 
 
Having explored Mphahlele’s autobiographies in the preceding chapter, it is relevant 
(before moving on to his novels) to compare autobiography as writing on one’s own life 
history with the novel as fiction. It has already been indicated that on the need for a 
relevant writer to “have vision” in Mphahlele’s terms (Looking Through 35), he or she 
must go beyond the evident and the obvious.   
 
Ndebele has remarked that in order for the writer to be relevant “during the process of 
struggle” such a writer should “pay closer attention to [the] material expression … such 
that culture itself can constitute the material content of a changing alternative 
consciousness” (“Towards” 131).   Fanon similarly remarks that “the popular struggle 
[for liberation]” and “the fight for culture” should develop in an intertwined manner 
because “this struggle which aims at a fundamentally different set of relations between 
men cannot leave intact either the form or content of the people’s culture” (“On National 
Culture” 187, 198, emphasis added).  For the “form or content of the people’s culture” to 
be transfigured as Fanon suggests (by means of the italicised words above), the writer has 
to “pay closer attention to [the] material expression” following Ndebele’s view of the role 
of the writer as an “interpreter” – that is, the writer should not reproduce empirical reality 
as it is, but should “pay closer attention to it” by interpreting it in line with his or her 
hypothetical solution of existential challenges.  From these statements it is clear that 
Fanon, like Mphahlele in asserting “vision” and Ndebele in advocating “a changing 
alternative consciousness”, sees the need for writers among the oppressed of the world 
representing the reality of the people while at the same time forging an understanding, a 
questioning or a theory springing from a response to the specific challenges posed by the 
environment. In distinguishing fiction from such factual writing as historiography (which 
is a divergent mode of representation from fiction in that it stops at reporting 
“objectively” on “bare facts”), Pavel (commented on in the preceding chapter) thus 
agrees with Fanon, Mphahlele and Ndebele’s views that fiction should reach beyond a 
mere reproduction of the everyday events it imitates.  This is what Mphahlele means by 
differentiating “[writing on] the moment” from a mode of writing which “goes beyond 
the moment” and expresses a vision (“Fiction and Imitation” 522; Looking Through 35; 
“Towards” 131).   
 
What these statements by Fanon, Pavel, Ndebele and Mphahlele highlight is the double 
function of literature — both as a straightforward reproduction of the conditions about 
which it is writtten and as a purposefully adapted or arranged reproduction of such 
conditions.   The state of the representation of reality in fiction being filtered through the 
author’s artistic and moral choices mediates what would otherwise be a somewhat 
punctilious reproduction into imaginative, persuasive writing.  According to what Achebe 
states in “The Truth of Fiction”, “man’s imagination” is the “apparatus” through which 
“[man] has the capacity … to create fictions” whose function is “to help [humans] out of 
particular problems [they] encounter in living” (Hopes 139, 140, 141).   This means that 
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to “have a vision” as Mphahlele puts it (Looking Through 35), or to “create fictions” (in 
Achebe’s terms) (Hopes 141), is aimed at resolving “particular problems … 
[encountered] in living” (Hopes 140), or (as Mphahlele formulates it), is a means towards 
“[going] beyond the moment into the future” (Looking Through 35).  This explains why 
Mphahlele had inevitably to create the “fiction” of African humanism in order to enable 
himself to “go beyond” the existential challenge of cultural obliteration faced by Africans 
at a particular point in their history.  
 
The arguments cited above by Pavel, Ndebele, Mphahlele and Achebe imply that in 
reading fiction (including Mphahlele’s own fiction) the reader must not expect an 
unmediated modelling of the fictional events on everyday occurrences.  In this sense, 
autobiography stands between historiography (as objective, factual reproduction of reality 
according to Pavel) and fiction as far as skilful imitation of reality is concerned, because 
in autobiography one reports on the bare facts of (both personal and public) history while 
at the same time reporting on one’s own subjective opinion about and reaction to such 
historical facts.  Chapman rightly explains that for the South African autobiographer who 
is engaged in recording personal and public historical moments, “the larger issue of racial 
oppression” inevitably leads to “the roles of artistic consciousness and social conscience 
… resist[ing] the literary critic’s discrete classifications” (“Identity and the Apartheid 
State” 230).  This can be said to account for the thin line between Mphahlele’s fiction and 
autobiography as resulting from the common element of subjective interpretation of black 
life in the face of colonisation and apartheid.  Because the autobiographies also contain 
Mphahlele’s subjective reaction to conditions under apartheid/colonisation, they are a 
representation of a life lived that skilfully encodes existential hypotheses and beliefs.  
Manipulated representation of reality is bound to be especially reliable in the case of a 
writer like Mphahlele, who has been described by witers like Ogude, Raditlhalo, 
Ramakuela, Ramogale and Thuynsma as “using literature to come to terms with his own 
life” as well as “explore the meaning of raw experience in fiction” (Es’kia 461).  By this 
the writers mean that Mphahlele makes use of his writing (whether it is autobiography or 
pure fiction) to reach for a meaningful interpretation (for himself and his compatriots in 
particular) of his life experiences and those of the society he writes about. This is 
responsible for Mphahlele’s autobiographies and fiction having the common denominator 
of arising from and interpreting the writer’s personal experiences.  If Mphahlele’s 
autobiographical works chronicle his biographical history in dexterous literary ways (as 
demonstrated in the analysis carried out in the preceding sections of this study), and if 
Mphahlele’s approach to life and literature is as it is described in the quotation above 
from Ogude et al., then his autobiographies are very close to fiction in the way they 
reflect reality.  As such, only a flimsy partition exists between Mphahlele’s 
autobiographies and novels.  The difference between fiction and “imitation” as described 
by Pavel clarifies the position of autobiography as straddling historiography (as objective 
imitation) and fiction (as manipulated imitation), which should justify moving in this 
dissertation from an analysis of writing that is closer to historiography to scrutinising the 
mode that is further away from such “factual” writing, proceeding from autobiography to 
the novels.  
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Mphahlele’s disapproval of tendentious promotion of ideology in creative writing as well 
as the way he counteracts such simplification in his fiction through detailed attention to 
the achievement of resonance and cultural perspective (demonstrated earlier in this 
study), suggest the aptness to his writing of Ndebele’s theory.  In “Against 
Pamphleteering the Future” Ndebele iterates his approval of the writer functioning as an 
“interpreter” when he remarks that: “The power of the written word in the moulding of 
social perceptions should never be taken for granted” (“Against Pamphleteering” 141).  
He then condemns simplified writing in the following words: 
 We should not pamphleteer the future.  Nor should we pamphleteer the past.  To 
 pamphleteer the future is to reduce complex issues to simple formulations such 
 that understanding is prevented, or at best, clouded.  Pamphleteering the future 
 means writing that establishes its case without the onus of proof; writing that 
 challenges without educating, that is heroic without being too convinced of its 
 heroism.  Pamphleteering the future might also mean conviction without 
 knowledge.  (“Against Pamphleteering” 142) 
Of this flaw (of being simplistic and facile in analysis of society) Said has written that 
“There is nothing more indecent in criticism than someone who uses a lot of marginal 
nonsense … as a substitute for serious refutation” (“Beginnings” 9). 
 
Writing in 1983 on the impoverishing results of any literary work which compromises 
needed complexity in social commentary that goes beyond incitement to action without 
concomitant education of readers concerning the details of the context within which such 
action may occur, Mphahlele expresses his convictions on the role of an “interpreter” in 
the following words:  “I propose that we think of literature as a compulsive cultural act – 
an act of self-knowledge, an act of language.  Against such a proposition  we can best 
see how intimately literature can monitor intellectual and emotional growth and 
contribute to its refinement at the personal and social levels” (“Versus the Political 
Morality” 361). 
 
The position expressed above by Mphahlele convinces one that in his writings he resists 
compromising circumspection and racial inclusiveness, while articulating the 
predominantly black cultural-experiential identity he calls African humanism.   This 
should be why he has observed that “Every culture” including African cultures “has its 
own abominations and crudities but, if it is developed, we expect it to display awareness 
of these and institutionalise efforts to purge itself” (“Versus the Political Morality” 362).  
To display an awareness of the follies within cultures in a non-partisan manner as 
Mphahlele professes above tallies with his views that literary production should be “an 
act of self-knowledge” so that “literature can monitor intellectual and emotional growth 
and contribute to its refinement” (“Versus the Political Morality” 361).  On this point 
Ndebele too has exhorted that:  “We need to create a broad literary culture founded on the 
understanding that writing in all its various forms represents the attempt of the human 
mind to reach  out towards ever increasing intellectual refinement” (“Against 
Pamphleteering” 143). 
 
In another affirmation of the views on literature cited above, Mphahlele in an interview 
with Manganyi recalls an incident when he visited Fort Hare university, in which one 
 220
staff member expressed a concern that African humanism could exclude people of races 
other than African if its artistic expression should “have a sense of self-pride and work 
with [its] own African idioms” (Looking Through 35). On this score Mphahlele argues 
that the African humanist artist is not bound to be racially or culturally exclusive, in the 
following words:  “There is no reason why he should be [exclusive] if he is a good artist.  
He must have a vision and there is no reason why he should become exclusive.  If he 
does, it is because he is very local in his appeal.  But there is nothing wrong with that, as 
a starting point” (Looking Through 35).   Here Mphahlele reiterates the importance of the 
African humanist writer moving beyond a mere direct reporting on instances of life to the 
higher level at which the writer’s vision leads him or her to evoke a richer interpretation 
of life.  In keeping with this line of argument, the Pan Africanist writer may (appear to) 
exclude non-Africans in the fiction he or she writes, as long as this is only the first-level 
meaning of the work of art.  In the same way (according to Mphahlele’s point cited 
earlier), there is nothing wrong with protest literature, provided that it is enriched with 
African humanist detail – identified by him as myth, resonance and perspective.  This is 
the case because, as soon as the work is interrogated at the higher level where the writer 
infuses it with his or her vision, every reader will make his or her own subjective 
interpretation of it, whether African or non-African.  Such a vindication of focusing at the 
primary level on the identity of Africans is consistent with Mphahlele’s conception of 
African humanism as a strategically essentialist concept whose behavioural essentialism 
could be discarded when people of other identities have acknowledged the existence of 
Africans as a distinctive cluster of worthy cultural groups bound by a fundamentally 
common  behavioural identity born of  geo-political factors resulting from events of the 
past such as brutish slavery, imperial colonisation and apartheid exclusivism.  Such a 
transformation of exclusivity into inclusivity is parallel with the proper harnessing of 
literary style redeeming a work of art from pedestrian sloganeering that imposes ready-
made solutions on the reader in order – instead –  to equip the reader with a catalyst of 
the imagination enabling him or her to understand and resolve existential obstacles.   
 
Espousing the philosophy of African humanism which he has described as incapable of 
exclusivity, Mphahlele cannot but practise inclusivity as an ingredient of the free, 
unselfcensored, creative imagination.   In the interview with Manganyi quoted above, the 
writer concedes that to be exclusive as a writer is to be unrealistic, as life itself is (at the 
higher level) characterised by complex inclusivity/holism; and to be exclusive is to 
censor oneself and take away from oneself the freedom of creative imagination, since 
reality consists of more than one’s own chosen focus of attention (35-50). The inclusivity 
or holism of life itself (in Mphahlele’s reasoning) functions at the secondary level where 
a number of exclusive identities meet to form a complex; and that is why the African 
humanist artist should not ignore the exclusivity (at the primary level) of Africanness in 
order to arrive at the rich inclusivity of the secondary level. It is for this reason that in 
defining African humanism as an inclusive concept, Mphahlele himself (as well as 
Afrocentric writers like Manganyi) have in a sustained and consistent manner illustrated 
the incompatibility of creative writing with any laying of borderlines for the imagination.  
In “The Censored Imagination”, Manganyi writes:  “Let us say what the censored 
imagination is not; let us celebrate its poverty by eulogising the creative successes of the 
free imagination and we will gradually come to know the former” (Looking Through 54, 
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emphasis added).  Manganyi here stresses (as Mphahlele does, above) the indispensable 
need for any imaginative activity (including narrative writing) to be free and uncensored. 
 
Following the above description of Mphahlele’s relationship with his work, one would 
expect only a slight difference between his autobiography and fiction.  The difference is 
expected to show with regard to what Mphahlele foregrounds at the primary/mimetic 
level in the autobiographies as contrasted with what he foregrounds at the 
primary/mimetic level in the novels.  But because Mphahlele’s handling of language in 
the autobiographies is no less profound than in the novels, at the higher level of 
representing the invisible norms and values that inform the observable (imitable) action, 
one should not expect any difference in terms of impact.  Their literary art (as opposed to 
plain preachings of pre-set ideas) should rescue the novels from the sloganeering that 
Mphahlele has criticised, making them creative explorations of what constitutes African 
humanist lifestyles and practices and what the challenges to these are.  In this way, the 
novels take the form of journeys of discovery for the author as well as for the reader. 
 
The analysis of The Wanderers and Chirundu will be guided by this view which I share 
(though critically, as I show above) with writers like Pavel when he asserts that:  
“Literary fictions … differ from history (but not from myth) insofar as they emphasize 
the problematic nature of the links between observable (imitable) action and the invisible 
norms and values that inform it …” (532).   If concurrence with (the editorial note of) 
Ogude, Raditlhalo, Ramakuela, Ramogale and Thuynsma, that Mphahlele’s 
autobiographical work is so poetic as to attain the stature of works of art (Es’kia 461) is 
valid, then the literary quality of the language in the autobiographies should result in a 
greater blurring of the line between fiction and direct imitation of life than Pavel 
suggests.  The common ‘fictional’ quality shared by Mphahlele’s autobiographies and his 
novels is brought about by his consistently subtle and complex representation of African 
humanism in both of the genres.  
 
Mphahlele’s The Wanderers (1971) and Chirundu (1979) are both about wandering as 
well as transformation.  The themes of wandering and transformation are handled in 
inverse proportion in the two novels.  The former novel places wandering (of individuals 
and groups) under a magnifying glass in such a way that individual transformation of 
characters both as individuals and as members of groups is depicted in fine detail.  This is 
due to what Ogude, Raditlhalo, Ramakuela, Ramogale and Thuynsma observe when they 
describe The Wanderers as “[leaning] heavily on the autobiographical as it confronts the 
thoughts and events Mphahlele lived through” (458).  The latter novel centralises 
personal and societal transformation while exile/wandering is pushed to the periphery.  It 
is important to perceive that the theme of wandering still forms the background of 
Chirundu, for, as the above critics rightly state, “characters both local and refugee” in 
Chirundu “are often based on real people” (Es’kia 460). 
 
Predictably, these two books, in different ways and to varying degrees, make bold 
attempts at dismantling and redefining the form of the novel.  Mphahlele’s comments on 
the form of the novel are relevant here: 
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We must not delude ourselves that the novel as we have inherited it from the 
white world is the ideal genre in its present form …We also need to evolve 
another kind of narrative by way of domesticating the novel, without necesssarily 
telling people to stop writing the novel in its present form.  Also, autobiography 
should be encouraged.  Epic forms should be revived. (“The African Critic” 386) 
Mphahlele’s asseveration of the need to “[domesticate] the novel” exhibits the similarity 
of his theoretical stance with Said’s recognition that “in the main … the European novel 
[is] a cultural form consolidating but also refining and articulating the authority” of 
imperial Europe (“Consolidated Vision” 91).  The above statement by Mphahlele about 
domesticating the form of the novel, is compatible with the style and aim of his literary 
project: of conveying and reinforcing the concept of African humanism.  Reinforcing 
African humanist inclinations – relatively foreign ideas in the western world – could not 
have been a pursuit of the novel when the form of the novel was conceived and evolved 
in the western world. Orature, which is an African literary form as far as Mphahlele’s 
theory goes, has always included praise poetry (whose content is usually 
autobiographical) as well as epic renditions of a tribe or nation’s history, ancestry, myths 
and envisaged fate.  It is because such a traditional use of autobiographical and epic 
orature are native to this continent that Mphahlele believes (as he states in the quotation 
above) that their encouragement and revival in modernised forms should ensure the 
survival of an African humanist consciousness, in much the same way as appropriation of 
the novel form should. 
 
Critics like Lokangaka Losambe and Rina Minervini have written perceptively and 
analytically about Mphahlele’s rupture with the normative structure of the novel as 
determined by Europe.  However, this they have done without necessarily identifying the 
constitutive devices in the same way as this study attempts to do.  Losambe subscribes to 
the view that there is no universal norm regarding structure for the novel when he 
remarks that: 
 Structure is, in essence, the framework from which the plot evolves, and the 
 author builds his novelistic world around its internal, complex relationships.  This 
 world may envelop as many persons, things and relationships as possible, but 
 these must not conflict with its aesthetic framework, refered to here as 
 structure … This argument lead us to the conclusion that just as we have various 
 designs for various types of houses, we can have various structures for various 
 types of novels … Perhaps the major mistake often made by critics who try to 
 evaluate various novels is their assumption that there is only one possible and 
 fixed structure for the novel.  (“Apartheid and Es’kia Mphahlele’s Aesthetics in 
 The Wanderers” 156) 
It is similarly with reference to the peculiar way Mphahlele handles the structure of the 
novel to dovetail with his theory of African humanism that the critic Rina Minervini 
observes redefinition of novelistic form in his novel Chirundu :  “Unusually structured in 
third-person marrative, dramatic dialogue and first-person  narrative, the novel explores 
the moral dilemmas of its greater stage through the  lives of its central characters and  
something like a Greek-chorus commentary  involving a group of South African exiles” 
(“Chirundu” 40).  Without the need for focusing especially on the representations of 
African humanism in Chirundu, Minervini uses terms such as “moral dilemmas of its 
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greater stage” and “Greek-chorus commentary” to refer respectively to the African 
humanist elements of existential alienation from Africanist consciousness, and 
communality of dialogic expression depicted in this novel. 
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4.2   THE TYRANNY OF PLACE AND TIME PORTRAYED IN BOLD 
 
In his newspaper review of The Wanderers, Guwa (8) describes the book as a “semi-
autobiographical novel … set in South Africa” which in part -- and he correctly ascribes 
the intention to a statement by Mphahlele himself -- tries to show that exile begins at 
home.  The following passage is one of the many examples from this text that shows 
black life in apartheid South Africa as no less alienating than life in exile: 
 In fact, Bongo reporters found out that several [black pass-law offenders] had 
 been forced onto the trucks; that white farmers raided labour bureaux and police 
 stations to collect their human cargo for their farms.   On these farms they were 
 stripped of their clothing and dressed in sacks.  They worked from dawn to after 
 sunset at the point of a whip.  At night they were chained and locked up in high-
 walled  compounds. (The Wanderers 18) 
Although for the black farm labourers the place is familiar South Africa to which they are 
intimately tied as it is their home, the inhumane conditions in which they are forced to 
live constitute an experience akin to exile in that the dehumanisation taking place here 
clashes with their African humanist consciousness that values human life as sacred (and 
as such cannot compromise the well-being of people for material gain).  The early 
sections of the novel set in South Africa are in fact a continuation of the theme of exile-
at-home which starts (albeit in subtle ways) in as early a work as Down Second Avenue, 
which for many may appear to have nothing to do with exile as it is entirely set in South 
Africa.  It is likely to have been detection of the atmosphere of psychological exile that 
obtains in the earlier work that led Gready to remark that “During the course of Down 
Second Avenue the comfort of community and family recedes into the background as 
bitterness and frustration take root” (159). It is the progressive intensification of a feeling 
of exile-at-home caused by the unrelenting, crushing effect of living conditions wrought 
of apartheid that leads to “frustration tak[ing] root” among characters in the early work as 
well as within Mphahlele himself as a participant-observer in the real life which the work 
echoes.  Evident in this early autobiography is the same theme of exile-at-home that we 
now encounter in the opening sections of The Wanderers. 
 
The experience of exile which underlies the story of The Wanderers is depicted through 
the description of the characters and the setting as starting in South Africa and ramifying 
through the whole of Africa until it refracts at the global level.   It is important to specify 
that the experience of exile is refracted (and not just reflected) in that it is experienced 
and expressed subjectively by the narrator (imbued as he is with a restive African 
humanist consciousness) in the form of interpreted reality rather than as a life that is 
axiomatically accepted to be without alternatives.  Mphahlele himself seems to have 
consciously intended to highlight the broadness of the parameters within which the 
oddysey that is The Wanderers unfurls, having to contend with a broad and disparate 
variety of local demands, as the story advances towards the close of the novel, when he 
assembles a sordid montage of reportage such as: “And the telegram came from Dar es 
Salaam.  Felang had been killed” (312); and: “Steven Cartwright … was yesterday killed 
during heavy mortar fire now raging between government and rebel forces near the 
Eastern province border in the Congo” (315).  The concentration of depressing reports 
like this in a single closing section of the novel and through the senses of the same 
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recipient creates a heavy atmosphere that is the antithesis of the exile detailed in Afrika 
My Music, that ends happily when Mphahlele returns home to South Africa (Afrika My 
Music 1).  The fact that The Wanderers was written while Mphahlele was still in exile 
during which he obsessively revealed the fear of being unable ever to return to South 
Africa (“Africa in Exile” 124, 125) should enable us to sense an expression of 
Mphahlele’s own fear of death in exile in the images of death in these closing lines of 
The Wanderers.  Attwell’s take on Felang’s death (Wanderers 312) is that it is “chiefly 
psychic, a stripping of illusion in the consciousness of the narrator himself” 
(“Mphahlele’s The Wanderers” 70).  I agree that at one level, the gory death of Felang 
and other freedom fighters could express Mphahlele’s belief that it is futile at this 
juncture to utilise one’s youthful years to fight either the menacing obduracy of settler 
governments that are still intact (like the one in apartheid South Africa) or lop-sided 
black nationalist governments in the free states of Africa now plagued by evils like 
ethnicity, corruption or neocolonialism (as he has experienced in Iboyoru).  But this 
image of what happens to the lifeless bodies of young freedom fighters does go further to 
externalise Mphahlele’s own fear of dying in exile where he will be without a grave (as 
the image of being entombed inside living corocodiles actually suggests).   What causes 
Mphahlele’s resentment at the idea of dying before the freedom he is striving for is 
achieved, is that the apartheid regime would actually dig its roots even deeper as well as 
grow stronger once it has been relieved of the agitation that his own actions as an artist-
revolutionary could inflict. 
 
Timi’s experiences in Iboyoru are significant for revealing the survival of an African 
humanist consciousness in him.  While it is correct to link Timi’s seeking of solace 
within an atmosphere of community during his wanderings to “the author’s concern with 
creating identity” (as the critic Ramakuela does), one might observe that the author 
Mphahlele’s concern, through such a delineation of Timi’s character, is “with creating” 
the specific identity called African humanism (“Exile and Return” 43-44).  This is the 
case because the cultural tendency to find fulfilment in performing whatever one does 
within and to the benefit of the community is a tenet of the concept of African humanism, 
as Mphahlele has characterised it.  After Timi Tabane’s psychological exile at home in 
South Africa has developed to a physical one in the African state of Iboyoru, he takes up 
teaching at Takora University.  The common African humanist consciousness in the exile 
Timi and the Iboyoru citizen Awoonor impels them both to express a yearning for the 
Africanisation of educational structure and content in Iboyoru, now an independent state.   
 
While both men chafe psychologically against the neocolonial educational, social and 
economic culture, through the authorial voice Timi’s lonely condition of exile elicits the 
anguished self-awareness typical of exile: 
 And what power did he represent?  None.  He was not even sure that he knew the 
 problems of Iboyoru sufficiently to suggest a single remedy.  He was a black 
 foreigner, and could only talk to a man like Awoonor who could not possibly 
 mistake his inquiring habit for the arrogance of an alien … Then the howling of
 the long-tongued hounds his dreams seemed to symbolise – the hounds from the 
 far south, his home country: could he cease to heed them? (The Wanderers 203-
 204) 
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In the cited quotation it can be seen that the protagonist is haunted (even though he is 
now in a supposedly different context) by a similar, if somewhat differently coloured, 
sense of alienation as has been the case in his South African home village of Jericho and 
neighbouring villages like Sekoting, neighbouring towns like Tirong and abominable 
farms like Goshen where the dehumanising conditions of black labourers could not but 
intensify the sense of alienation of a person with as inquiring a mind as Timi Tabane.  
What he is experiencing in Iboyoru is xenophobia, which is a less severe form of 
alienation as contrasted with the intense psychological exile he has experienced in 
apartheid South Africa.  The nightmares he has about “the hounds from the far south” 
indicates that the trauma of estrangement and fear in apartheid South Africa does not 
relent even after he has departed from South Africa.   Such an imprisonment to “place” 
that is apartheid South Africa defying the distance of physical exile has to do with what 
the theorist Attwell calls “the fugitive['s] double consciousness” in which “he is both 
within and outside the prevailing order … [because] the fugitive never quite loses his 
investment in the politics of place” (“Es’kia Mphahlele’s The Wanderers” 69). The 
introspective question Timi asks himself regarding whether he will “cease to heed” the 
hounds from the far south reveals intimacy with the plight of blacks back home in South 
Africa (i.e. “his investment in the politics of place”) – a feeling he is still struggling to 
overcome after initially hoping that it would abate upon his attaining the ‘freedom’ of 
exile.  Exactly as Ramakuela has observed, Timi’s “search” for freedom and his truer self 
“begins at home in South and ends with the recognition that, to be fully himself, he needs 
to return there” (“Exile and Return” 44).  Such a longing to return home despite the (at 
the time) continuing prevalence of apartheid is to pursue Timi throughout his whole 
exiled life, similarly to the way Mphahlele has described his own anguish during exile: 
 I also realised that the longer we were away from South Africa, the angrier, the 
 more outraged I felt against the plight of the black Africans – out of sheer 
 impotence.   In a sense my homecoming was another way of dealing with 
 impotent anger.  It was also a way of extricating myself from twenty years of the 
 compromise that exile itself is.  Indeed, exile had become for me a ‘ghetto of the 
 mind’ ... For us, the best thing would be to move back home, we decided. (“Africa 
 in Exile” 124, 125) 
By referring to exile as “a ghetto of the mind” Mphahlele is exposing the soul-destroying 
quality of ghetto life (as he experienced it in apartheid South Africa), which is ironically 
continuing to live within him in exile after he had hoped to leave it behind.  This initial 
hope in African writers of the time, who opted for self-exile, is borne out by what Bloke 
Modisane expresses in his autobiography (which closes just as he leaves for exile):  “I 
wanted a little peace, some amount of freedom, and a little time to reconstruct my 
battered soul under an easier political climate where I could humanise myself. Ezekiel 
Mphahlele had been writing me sane letters which implied that he was on  the road to a 
human recovery …” (Blame Me 250). 
 
Ironically the “sane letters” referred to above were not sane at all, as the above metaphor 
of “a ghetto of the mind” (in Mphahlele’s words) reveals (“Africa in Exile” 125).  At a 
subtle level the metaphor of “a ghetto of the mind” reveals the hybrid personality 
composed of exile experience and persistent African humanist consciousness, which 
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creates a tension that Mphahlele only resolves at the “actor” level by returning home to 
live meaningfully among his own people. 
 
The pain of psychological attraction to the familiar cultural context of South Africa while 
being physically exiled is the nightmare not only of Mphahlele during exile, but also of 
fellow exiles.  In Nat Nakasa’s “Met with Smiles and Questions” (The World of Nat 
Nakasa), we are shown how Nakasa joins the thrilling night life of New York to go and 
attend a performance by the exiled South African musician Hugh Masekela, in which the 
trumpeter blows “Pondo and Swazi tunes in Greenwich Village” (114).  For Nakasa to 
notice the Pondo and Swazi rhythms of Masekela’s music in a New York nightclub is a 
revelation of the lingering African humanist aesthetic values remaining with him in exile.  
After Masekela’s performance, Miriam Makeba’s daughter gives a poetry peformance 
which for Nakasa reveals that “she obviously” longs for South Africa (114).  Hugh 
Masekela confides to Nakasa and fellow exiles soon after the show that he wishes he 
could go home “just to hear the music of the people there – the Pondos, the Zulus and the 
Shangaans” (114).  Todd Matshikiza similarly describes an incident in London when he 
meets a black Nigerian student who confides in him that “when you come to study in the 
white man’s land, brother, you take out only the white water, an’ you swallow the black 
blot” (Chocolates for My Wife 14).  What the speaker means is that the pull of home can 
only be atoned for by pretending to nourish one’s brains by means of distilling the 
European section of one’s hybrid culture and repressing the African recesses of one’s 
soul, in order to deal with the alienation of (temporary) exile.  Matshikiza himself 
describes such an experience in words that reveal his longing for South Africa.  When he 
is directed to the Club in Norfolk Street and leaves the African who has just directed him 
with a smile on his face, he says:  “Me and my frozen smile.  Frozen on my face like the 
butcher’s display window freezes a pig’s head and trotters, or sheep’s head and trotters.  
We called it the Smiling Face in Johannesburg …” (14).   
 
The smile is frozen on Matshikiza’s face because the pain of separating from the African 
with whom he has in the short while they walk together become intimate transports his 
mind longingly to South Africa from which he has been ripped in as dehumanising a 
manner as butchers treat the animals they slaughter, display and sell.  Despite bitter 
memories of apartheid back home in South Africa, something the exiles miss in the 
African social milieu makes them long perpetually to return home.  African exiles share 
this surviving spiritual attraction to home soil.  They may differ in how each individually 
resolves the “dialogue of two selves” that alienation puts them through – Nat Nakasa, for 
instance, subsequently falls “from the seventh floor of a New York City skycraper” and 
dies aged 28 (The World of Nat Nakasa xii).  This happens possibly because he cannot 
repress the passionate longing for home raging within him in the face of the unrelenting 
alienation of exile.  In Mphahlele’s terms, the nostalgia of the exiles (illustrated above) is 
a manifestation of their underlying African humanist consciousness that survives the 
overwhelming alienation of exile. 
 
Africans face alienation whether on foreign or home soil.  This is exemplified in The 
Wanderers when Timi joins Bongo magazine but not because he loves journalism.  He 
does so “after being thrown out of secondary school teaching”, as Arthur Maimane would 
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say of Mphahlele in his memoir on his time with the latter on the staff of Drum (“I 
remember Zeke when …” 38).  More significantly, his “unruly” behaviour as a teacher 
under Bantu Education is a mere outward concretisation of his conscience that does not 
allow him to continue teaching his people “only those things that would make them 
willing followers of the white man’s instructions” (11).  That Timi is forced by 
circumstances to leave teaching and become a journalist is revealed by the following 
words of the narrator himself: “I had never really thought of making journalism my 
second love [after teaching, because I loved teaching so much that] it could not ever be” 
(11).  Timi’s conscience that does not allow him to feed young black minds with the kind 
of education determined to perpetrate black people’s humiliation by the apartheid centre 
should be understood as being a manifestation of the deeper African humanist conscience 
within him.  In the way Mphahlele has defined African humanism, the concept refers to a 
consciousness that leads the people it drives to collide with “othering” attitudes displayed 
by non-Africans (such as the non-African rulers’ imposition of educational content for 
Africans, described above), so they seek to behave in a self-constituting manner.  If 
African humanist consciousness is the motive behind Timi’s revolt against the education 
system, it then becomes clear that the act of abandoning teaching is an indication of his 
undertaking to define himself.  Timi’s non-voluntary joining of Bongo magazine as an 
attempt at self-definition expands from personal self-realisation to self-realisation as an 
existence-through-communal-experience.   
 
The journey Timi undertakes with Naledi in search of her husband is one that increases 
self-definition, because it grows beyond individualist concerns into communal concerns.  
The slave conditions the two unearth at Goshen farm and the search for Naledi’s husband 
form a broader, more profound discovery of self in the communal sense; the state of mind 
Mphahlele has called African humanism.  The novel thus exemplifies “the tyranny of 
time” by way of depicting the tyranny of apartheid at the time in history that is its 
context.  The reality that their lifespan coincides with the heyday of apartheid alienates 
Timi and his people from their otherwise loved and intimate setting.  The alienation of 
Timi and fellow Africans is brought about by their African humanist consciousness, 
whose co-existence with incongruous apartheid consciousness gives rise to friction.  
Place, too, comparably to its role in exile, proves to be tyrannical to the probing mind of 
Timi, because the rulers have replaced its (pre-colonial) familiarity with (colonial) 
unfamiliarity – for the natives.  In this sense, for Africans living in South Africa under 
apartheid, the meaning of life resembles that experienced by those in exile in foreign 
territory.  Hence my concurrence with Guwa (1984) (stated at the beginning of this 
chapter) that the novel sets out to show that (psychological) exile begins at home, 
although Guwa falls short of detecting that this exiled condition of Africans in their home 
state is informed by the consciousness Mphahlele has called African humanism, and as 
such is not just a superficial reaction to the action of the champions of apartheid. As his 
self-definition grows broader and deeper, Timi realises more and more clearly that 
Africans as a people are strangers both at home and outside the borders of South Africa.  
Such sensitivity is evidence of Timi’s African humanist consciousness that enables him 
to appreciate the severity of the African’s alienation.  This consciousness equips him to 
contrast the two conflicting consciousnesses that have led to those in whom power 
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resides seeking to counteract the distinctive identity of the powerless by means of an 
obliterating brutality. 
 
The huge impact on the senses caused by Timi’s sensitivity to the denial of African 
humanist values in the way Africans are treated by the powerful whites is revealed by the 
imagery that indicates that on the white farms Africans were “stripped of their clothing”, 
“dressed in sacks”, worked “at the point of a whip”, as well as being “chained and locked 
up in high-walled compounds” (The Wanderers 18).  Through the eyes of the narrator 
Mphahlele conveys the gravity of such maltreatment from the African humanist point of 
view in a similar way to that of another  Black Conscious writer, Manganyi (1981), who 
describes the living conditions of Africans during apartheid  as out of step with 
botho/ubuntu or African humanism, as follows: 
 Today, when we talk about black housing needs, we are referring to two sets of 
 conditions.  In the first instance, we are talking about requirements that are 
 generally well known.  We know, for example, that for most family settings the 
 standard four-roomed house with its  notorious deficiencies is inadequate for 
 family activities – something  which in reality is more than sleeping at night.  This 
 activity means, amongst other things, that parents should be able to engage in a 
 quarrel or make love for that matter, without intruding on the delicate 
 sensibilities of growing children … the other facet has to do with community 
 consultation and participation. (Looking Through 155-156) 
Mphahlele’s orientation towards communal, African humanist living is revealed in 
statements such as the one he expresses by means of the character Timi, quoted in this 
section (The Wanderers 18).  As he is himself an intellectual motivated by African 
humanist consciousness, Timi needs to be portrayed as sensitive to problems besetting 
himself and his fellow Africans. 
 
The hobbling conditions under which Africans are made to live, “locked up in high-
walled compounds” and in the “standard four-roomed house” (as Mphahlele and 
Manganyi depict in The Wanderers and Looking Through the Keyhole respectively), can 
be looked at as natural choices of representation in terms of Said’s theory (The 
Wanderers 18; Looking Through 156).  Said describes the act (which necessarily negates 
self-definition) more fully in the following words: 
 I’m not sure I could define it economically, or neatly for that matter, but certainly 
 representation, or more particularly the act of representing (and hence reducing) 
 others, almost always involves violence of some sort to the subject of the 
 representation, as well as a contrast between the violence of the act of 
 representing something and the calm exterior of the representation itself, the 
 image – verbal, visual or otherwise – of the subject.  Whether you call it a 
 spectacular image, or an exotic image, or a scholarly representation, there is 
 always this paradoxical contrast between the surface, which seems to be in 
 control, and the process which produces it, which inevitably involves some 
 degree of violence, decontextualization, miniaturization, etc.  The action or 
 process of representing implies control, it implies accumulation, it implies 
 confinement, it implies a certain kind of estrangement or disorientation on the part 
 of the one representing.  (“In the Shadow” 41) 
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Through the eyes of Timi, Mphahlele can be said to penetrate the “calm exterior of the 
representation” signified in the quotations above by the terms “locked up” and 
“standard”.  The serene façade suggested by these terms is in contrast with the 
“violence”, “decontextualisation” and “miniaturization” (to use Said’s terms) the blacks 
face inside the compounds the dehumanizing conditions of which are exposed in The 
Wanderers by Timi Tabane’s journalistic ventures.  Incisive sensitivity that equips Timi 
to pierce through such sham normality as the conditions of South African blacks 
portrayed in The Wanderers should justify why his gradual self-discovery – revealed 
initially by his protest against the education system and later by his reaction to the 
dehumanisation of blacks that he reports on in Bongo magazine – is necessarily 
accompanied by a sense of estrangement that is so acute as to amount to psychological 
exile even at home and before he embarks on formal exile in Iboyoru.  Timi’s intimate 
interaction, later, with more exiles of all races and religious beliefs (who come from 
South Africa) in Iboyoru and other parts of the globe can be said to culminate in an 
African solidarity that enhances his self-discovery on a bigger canvas and in higher relief.  
Timi’s interaction with African exiles of varying backgrounds reinforces Mphahlele’s 
conception of African humanism as inclusive of people of whatever race, whose 
consciousness earns them the description “African”.   Mphahlele’s global setting for this 
story (achieved by the exiled characters who wander to any part of the world) elucidates 
his definition of African humanism and transcends continental and national boundaries.  
 
Timi’s contestation of Babs’s suggestion that he should take Iboyoru citizenship (204) 
clarifies Mphahlele’s anti-homogenising conception of African cultures as much as it 
expresses sensitivity towards the hollowness of life in exile.  Timi articulates an 
awareness of non-acceptance by fellow blacks in Iboyoru.  The numerous examples of 
interracial marriages in Iboyoru high society is interpreted by Mphahlele as vain attempts 
at forging a post-independence synthesis of cultures that recognises no racial barriers, as 
the following sceptical question makes clear:  “Do you represent fissures in an otherwise 
impenetrable wall of tradition, of culture?” (204).  By likening the interracial marriages 
in the independent state to shallow cracks in a wall of tradition or culture that remains 
impenetrable, Mphahlele should be understood to be frowning upon the superficiality of  
behaviour that lacks  the basis of a distinct, identifiable consciousness. Because the 
distinct Africanist consciousness has been eroded by colonisation, Africans should make 
a conscious effort at self-discovery.  Mphahlele’s apparent anxiety about post-colonial 
social conduct such as mixed marriages in Iboyoru seems to stem from the fear that such 
an apparent synthesis of African with Western cultures might take the wrong direction (of 
neo-colonialism), further endangering the survival of African humanism instead of 
consolidating it into a modernised yet distinctively African humanist culture.  Elsewhere 
he wrote: 
Our own lives in Africa have, like those of the Western world, become 
 fragmented, differentiated, even within the large area of the ‘African 
 consciousness’.  Political and economic styles, including systems of land 
 ownership and the technology that we inherited [from colonialism], have brought 
 us to this point.  And so we have to make the journey back.  (“The African Critic” 
 382) 
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However, a cultural event that is supposed to unite Timi Tabane with other Africans 
beyond the borders of South Africa does not evoke a sense of solidarity either.  The 
African drums in the Iboyoru township of Oro (near Takora University), rather than 
cementing the protagonist’s sense of shared culture with his fellow blacks in the social 
setting of his exile make him more aware of the differences between African culture 
practised in this part of Africa and  the African cultures practised by different groups of 
black South Africans:  “– his ancestors had thrived in other climes, they had stamped 
their feet, clapped their hands to other rhythms … had drunk beer from corn and wild 
fruits and not  palm wine … had fought other wars with other weapons …” (202).  The 
drums that evoke the feeling expressed here symbolise a supposed marriage of cultures 
which should result in the protagonist harmoniously identifying with the Africans 
participating in the social event, as black life back in South Africa is undoubtedly 
associated culturally with the playing of drums.  What the author is illustrating is that 
(under current neo-colonial conditions) trying to marry the lives of black South Africans 
with those of Africans in other African states is as superficial and confused as attempting 
to marry blacks and whites (in racially mixed connubium) prior to a thorough and 
genuine Africanisation of the souls of the marrying parties that would not stomach the 
neo-colonial tendencies in the corruption with which the host country is riddled. 
 
The message Mphahlele is putting across by stressing the heterogeneity of African 
cultures is that African humanism is a deeply embedded consciousness that binds 
Africans together at an underlying level without homogenising the cultures that they 
practise in everyday life.  That is why superficially the combination of the protagonist 
and these Africans (similarly to that of blacks and whites in mixed marriages) seems 
perfect until its façade is exploded by a revelation of the protagonist’s feeling of 
alienation – which is indicative of the need for a deeper harmony of consciousness that 
should pave the way for its own genuine manifestation at the surface.  Extant materialism 
that is a sign of cultural colonialism on the part of whites (now indulging in whitewash 
mixed marriages) and newly acquired materialism among the petit bourgeois are not 
congruous with African humanist values on the underlying plane, so that any veneer of 
harmony between the protagonist (who is informed by African humanist values) and the 
white and black post-colonial citizens of independent Iboyoru (who are driven by neo-
colonialist values) is false.  Of course, the author here is also deriding facile notions of 
African solidarity that do not accommodate localised differences.  As a young exile 
probably still steeped in visionary rather than pragmatic views of African unity, Timi is 
awakened by this incident to the stark reality that African unity should be conceived at a 
certain level more in terms of heterogeneity rather than homogeneity.  However, the rift 
between Timi and the fellow Africans of Iboyoru is also the result of ironic rootedness in 
a particular African culture that may prevent a feeling of belonging in another African 
culture, similarly to the way ethnicity hampers one from contributing positively to 
African solidarity that is needed in the liberation struggle of Africans and beyond.  From 
this perspective, Timi’s estrangement from Iboyoruan Africans is a hint of his need to 
grow with the experience of exile to grasp the need for accommodative selflessness 
among African humanists.  
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As a mode of existence, African humanism is shaped by the environment (signified by 
“thrived in other climes”).  Africans who live in different environments interact in their 
own unique way with the conditions of the environment (signified by the metaphor in 
“stamped their feet, clapped their hands to other rhythms”); they are influenced by 
specific environmental factors which results in their African humanist behaviour differing 
on the surface from the behaviour of other cultural groups also endowed with African 
humanist consciousness (signified by the metaphor in “drunk beer from corn and wild 
fruits and not palm wine”) who fought against colonisation and in pre-colonial wars 
according to their environmental factors (as the image in “fought other wars” indicates). 
It is for this reason that in the 2000 essay “Africa in Exile” Mphahlele states that he 
“absorbed the African environment outside South Africa and felt at home in cultures that 
were so similar in essentials to [his] own” (in Es’kia 122, emphasis added).  It is known 
that the inhospitality Timi is exposed to in Iboyoru is the same reception Mphahlele 
experienced in his exile within Africa, in which he was nevertheless contented with the 
fact that his and the cultures of his hosts were “similar in essentials”.  Yet manifestations 
of cultural differences at the profound level of consciousness (like neocolonial 
corruption) offend him, because they threaten the unity Africans would otherwise enjoy 
by acknowledging and enacting a shared African humanist consciousness putting 
advancement of the community above that of the individual.   
 
A similar definition of African culture as various is supported by a writer like Losambe, 
who remarks that through the psychological conflict in Timi, Mphahlele is indirectly 
criticising adherents of negritude likeLéopold Senghor in their belief in the “universality 
of the Negro culture” (“Apartheid” 165).  Losambe’s statement is valid in showing that 
Mphahlele conceives of African cultures as differing among peoples, nevertheless joined 
together by African humanist consciousness, because cultures as the concretisation of 
African humanist psyche are shaped differentially by varying environments. Of course 
the fact that the wanderers include white characters like Cartwright also testifies to the 
fact that Mphahlele does not describe Africans in essentialist terms that would 
concentrate on aspects such as the black skin and biological genes.   
 
Brooding despairingly on the dominance of whites in the Iboyoru civil service, Timi 
comments that “they’ve come out to … tame a wild continent but never try to mix with 
the native element” (220).  To mix with “the native element” is to allow the humanism of 
Africa to penetrate one’s European consciousness (in this instance) in order to allow 
dialectic interaction.  Protesting against the injudicious accommodation of whites by 
black independent states, which opens them to the risk of neo-colonial regression (while 
ironically rejecting black expatriates imbued with African humanist consciousness that 
could help check such neo-colonial tendencies among the black middle and ruling 
classes), Timi’s internal monologue rings out stridently in the remark: “And what about 
us from South Africa?  No use in assuming an immediate common heritage among 
Negroes everywhere.  No use.  You’re an expatriate” (221).   Colonisation (from which 
Iboroyu has just recently emerged) is still etched on the minds of its citizens and 
reinforced by neo-colonialism to the extent that it blurs any affinity of Africans that is 
supposed to arise from their common Africanness.  Mphahlele’s unpalatable awareness of 
the extent to which colonisation has harmed African humanist consciousness – as 
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manifested by  neo-colonial lifestyles creating  schisms among Africans – causes Timi’s 
despondency regarding the existence of  “an immediate common heritage among Negroes 
everywhere” (221, emphasis added).  It is important to perceive that Timi’s (quoted) 
words lament a latent but not wholly absent African humanist consciousness or “common 
heritage” that permeates all African existence.  The agent of such a debilitation of 
African humanist consciousness is colonisation, which (as Mphahlele holds) has 
fortunately not succeeded in totally stamping it out in its adapted form. 
 
In a microcosmic, sardonically depicted episode, Timi’s fellow South African exile 
Holeng (who helps him settle in Takora upon his assuming a lectureship there) is asked 
by a bar patron in front of other self-assured Iboyoru patrons whether he has received his 
training in the UK.  He retorts: “Why should it always be the UK that can train a person?  
… Why don’t you think of Fiji Islands for a change?” (243-244).  The casual 
conversation takes on a serious tone when Holeng whips out a knife and charges at the 
speaker after being called a slave and reminded by a patron that South African exiles are 
free in the patrons’ country and slaves in their own.  Summarily insulting all South 
Africans as knife-throwers, the ‘civilised’ Iboyoru citizens lose their pompous 
composure, pick up their beers and run out into the yard.  
 
Holeng then resorts to haranguing the bar owner at the counter, with the words of the 
supposedly ‘backward’ exile exuding his sharply perceptive awareness of neocolonial 
brainwashing (which the taunters who have left are blind to): 
 ‘You’re all big-mouthed, that’s what!’ he shouted.  ‘Slave!  Did you hear him call 
 me slave?  Yes you heard him.  Think because you’re independent you’re smart,  
 eh!  Well you aren’t.  You’ll still need us to come and teach you.  Because you 
 won’t wake up in time, start work in time, your teachers are running for senior 
 service in government.  All you do is beg for favours, clean the floors with your 
 bellies prostrating.  The machines are going to flatten you out one day while 
 you’re on your bellies! (The Wanderers 244) 
As would be expected of the African humanist Mphahlele, the dialogue of the self-
important Iboyoruans in which they enquire of Holeng whether he has received his 
training in the UK is an expression of private feeling only on the surface, while at the 
profound level (which matters more) they are articulating public feeling.  The public 
nature of this dialogue matters more because it points to the bigger picture of a 
discriminatory attitude towards African exiles which exists at regional/national level.  
Holeng’s dialogue, too, expresses more than his individual feeling and spirals into 
communal feeling shared by exiles who (like Timi) come from South Africa.  In terms of 
the theory of pragmatics in the way it is asserted by linguists like Matsumoto (1988) and 
Fraser (1990), both the cynical Iboyoru citizens and the pair of South African exiles in 
the bar scene (cited above) are aware of Africanist “positive face wants” that demand of 
the communicator to align his or her message with communal opinion on the issue at 
hand.  The stance of the Iboyoruans in this instance rejects the ethic of interdependence 
between them and the exiles, while Timi and Holeng affirm the need for Africanist 
interdependence, as confirmed even by their contemptuous remark that the citizens of 
Iboyoru will “still need [them] to come and teach” in Iboyoru. 
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The harshly comical nature of the scene serves to inculcate the truth that the problematic 
condition of exile persists in whatever context – whether grave or comical, formal or 
casual, urban or rural, African or non-African.  The images of “bellies prostrating” and 
the “machines” flattening out those crawling on their “bellies” in the indented quote 
(above) represent colonised mimicry and hegemonic power (respectively).  Reference to 
the Iboyoruans’ failure to adhere to disciplined professional conduct in going about the 
duties of their jobs in the postcolonial government reveals sensitivity to corruption in the 
conscience of Holeng and other black South African exiles.  The dangers of corruption, 
along with the army of other perils that neocolonialism is endowed with, have been 
identified by Pan Africanist thinkers like Fanon (1967) as threatening to post-
independence black states.  Mphahlele is expressing a similar repugnance against 
postcolonial bourgeois tendencies when he remarks that “we should compel them to 
realize that their survival lies in thinking African” (“In Search of” 232). 
 
The serene or even complacent state in which the Iboyoruans and the population they 
symbolise live contrasts with the agitation of Holeng and the section of Iboyoru society 
that he represents.  This throws into relief the depth of the anguish felt by the exiles: it 
would be less disturbing and difficult for Timi, Holeng and other exiles to point out the 
dangers of neocolonialism and corruption to Iboyoruans who are not smug but sensitive 
to their deplorable situation – rather than trying to awaken a lulled people to the 
unsettling reality of their neocolonial post-independence, as is the case with the Iboyoru 
elite represented in the citation by the bourgeois bar patrons. 
 
Writing on his own conception of the non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory 
national and cultural identity he proposes for a postapartheid South Africa, Manganyi 
(Looking Through 69-10) writes of a synthesis culture emanating from a dynamic 
integration of the separate “siege cultures” in apartheid South Africa as Africanisation — 
the precondition for which is a process of exploration, development and consolidation.  In 
his own formulation (as preceding chapters show), Mphahlele’s African humanist view of 
the postolonial state concurs with that of Afrocentric writers like Manganyi.  With this 
background in mind, Mphahlele’s disappointment with the polarised coexistence in 
Iboyoru and Lao-Kiku between native blacks and those who have come as exiles on the 
one hand, and on the other hand, blacks of whichever background with resident and 
expatriate whites, will be better understood.  Such characterisation and use of dialogue 
(explained above) demonstrates Mphahlele’s poignant sensitivity towards the alienating 
experience of wandering or exile as foregrounded throughout in The Wanderers. 
 
Mphahlele himself has confessed to the frustrations of exile that The Wanderers 
exemplifies.  Despite acknowledging some gains in personal growth, as McClurg has 
rightly observed, he found the condition generally deplorable: “Certainly he felt the need 
to be ‘engaged in the struggles of [his] people’ and had decided early on that there was 
something demoraliszing about life in exile” (14).  McClurg’s observation would imply 
that the organising principle in The Wanderers – which the writer Longaka Losambe has 
formulated as an “unquenchable desire or quest for self-realisation” (“Apartheid and 
Es’kia Mphahlele’s Aesthetics in The Wanderers”161) does not find fulfilment in exile. 
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One more important aspect of The Wanderers is an introduction of the theme of mental 
indigestion that Mphahlele has called “the dialogue of two selves” which is explored 
further in Chirundu.  As explained earlier in this study, the “two selves” that enter into a 
dialogue within Africans that are facing change are the conflicting consciousnesses of the 
distant home country and of the country of exile (in the case of exiles); or those of the 
distant pre-colonial past and current post-independence condition.   I equate such a crisis 
of consciousness to “mental indigestion” in that it characterises failure to ‘digest’ or to 
accommodate the two conflicting sensibilities described above into a meaningful 
synthesis that should equip one to perfect an African humanist lifestyle which then 
survives in intelligently adapted forms.  There is a recognition (emanating from a better 
synthesis of the two selves within them than that of nationalist bourgeoisie in 
postcolonial African states) by exiles like Timi and Holeng of  such mental indigestion 
within the leaders of postcolonial Iboroyu.  Timi and Holeng’s awareness of this 
condition is displayed by their detection of failure by post-independence despots and civil 
servants to handle alterity rationally.  Yet their awareness heightens their own exilic 
alienation, or what Mphahlele would call both the tyranny of place (which is being in the 
Iboyoru state itself) and of time (which is its neocolonial post-independence condition).  
Elitist propensities displayed by those at the helm of Iboyoru government intensifies  “the 
dialogue of two selves” within the exiles – first as social distance from fellow Africans 
ruling Iboyoru, and secondly as distance from the “pull” of their countries of origin. The 
ludicrous colonial mimicry of the bar patrons (cited extract, above) and the dictatorial 
ruler of the post-independence black state of Lao-Kiku, do signify their mental 
indigestion.  By contrast, capable handling of cultural transformation within the post-
independence citizen amounts to healthy absorption of new social realities, in a way that 
is appropriate to emancipation and ensures survival of the Africans’ African humanist 
psyche. 
 
The theme of exile that pervades The Wanderers is again in evidence when Timi is about 
to leave for another teaching post at Kambani College in the black independent state of 
Lao-Kiku.  Timi’s alienation has been sharpened in Iboyoru (as explained earlier) and 
this leads him to weigh the chances of ever coming back to Iboyoru.  Probably, optimism 
about a healthier accommodation to postcolonial realities in the Lao-Kiku leadership 
spurs him on.  As a result he admits that the chances of his ever returning to Iboyoru are 
slim, since he cannot honestly as a teacher continue working among people in whom he 
has lost faith.  Neither does Timi foresee finding complete self-fulfilment in Lao-Kiku, as 
this is to be yet another protraction of the condition of exile.   But at least he hopes to 
reduce the double layer of alienation to a single one through stronger identification – 
which so dismally evaded him in Iboyoru – with the supposedly African humanist leaders 
of Lao-Kiku.  
 
In a monologue that expresses the growth in insight that he has acquired while grappling 
with the condition of exile, Timi remarks:  “ You see, once you have left your native 
shores, you continue to circle up there, like a bird in a storm.  Only, the storm is inside 
yourself this time.  When I have thought things over, I may come back: but I suppose it 
must always be on terms other than my own” (The Wanderers 264).  The agony of the 
admission that there is no freedom in exile (as the image of lostness in “circle up there” 
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indicates) is the realisation that it is a fallacy to believe that the self-fulfilling freedom 
that you fail to reach in the country of your birth can be found anywhere else, in exile.  
The action described as “circling” suggests the monotony and removal of creativity one 
experiences in exile whereas “up there” qualifies the ‘circling’ movement as intellectual 
detachment. The psychologically stifling environment of exile reaches near-fatal 
proportions as it takes the form of introvert intellectualising that is not good for one’s 
mental health, as is made clear by Mphahlele’s statement that “the storm is inside 
yourself”.  In addition, the reference to the storm being “inside yourself this time” subtly 
points to an insidious stunting of self-constitution (tallying with the subtly undermining 
effect of neocolonialism), which may be worse than more spectacular alienation one 
experiences in apartheid South Africa with its stark apartheid policies, for in an 
arrogantly dehumanising atmosphere one is able to release the tensions within by means 
of unrestrained counterdiscourse.  That the prospect of ever coming back to Iboyoru 
“must always be on terms other than [Timi’s] own” ironically articulates the danger of 
one’s being compelled to live one’s life as prescribed by others.   Such a view of exile 
has been described elsewhere by Mphahlele as the “impotence” of exile.  
 
Timi’s speculation about possibly better exile conditions in Lao-Kiku meet with a blunt 
answer in his dialogue with his candid colleague George as they chat during a pompous 
presidential function to which they have been invited:  “Africa is still a whiteman’s 
paradise, not a black exile’s.  The white man may eventually have no future in Africa, but 
he’s certainly making himself indispensable as long as he can, while the black man still 
wants him or is still  aspiring to be his equal” (304).  George’s declaration that Africa 
“is still a whiteman’s paradise” confirms Timi’s own observation of the neocolonial 
tendencies of the nationalist bourgeois leaders in independent African states of the time 
(echoed in George’s reference, above, to “the black man ... aspiring to be his equal”).  
The comprador bourgeois men and women of the independent African states are not 
spared, as revealed by George’s critique of Africa’s postcolonial failures, for this is the 
meaning of the whiteman “making himself indispensable … while the black man still 
wants him”.  As described by a writer like Ngugi, comprador bourgeoisie consciously 
enlist dependence on the former colonising power after independence while the 
nationalist bourgeoisie unconsciously yield to continued dominance by the former 
colonising power through such lax behaviour as corrupt hankering after western 
consumer goods (Decolonising the Mind 101). 
 
In The Wanderers, Mphahlele depicts instances of the way African humanism empowers 
his characters to cope with the alienating experience of psychological exile in apartheid 
South Africa as well as geographic exile beyond the borders of their country of origin.  
While estrangement from the central characters’ African humanist consciousness is 
atoned for by the “pull” of familiar physical and social landscape prior to their departure 
from apartheid South Africa, once in physical exile in foreign states, the characters feel 
the double-edged cut of longing for the native land as well as harassment by the 
incompatibility of exile with their innate African humanist values. 
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4.3   THE TYRANNY OF PLACE AND TIME  PORTRAYED  IN FINE PRINT 
 
I partly agree with Tucker (1979) that the main theme of Chirundu is “the clash between 
the ways of the white man, the old ways of the tribes and the ways of the new rulers 
trying to reconcile the other two” (10).  My position is that attempts by postcolonial black 
rulers to map out a synthesis culture for the post-independence citizen is the core of the 
story and the central theme of the novel.  Abrahams (1979) succinctly sums up the central 
theme of the novel as “power and problems of transition” (15).  Frantz Fanon has defined 
one of the problems of transition in newly independent but neocolonial African states (the 
subject of Chirundu) in the following words:  “National consciousness, instead of being 
the all-embracing cystallization of the innermost hopes of the whole people, instead of 
being the immediate and most obvious result of the mobilization of the people, will be in 
any case only an empty shell, a crude and fragile travesty of what it might have been”  
(“The  Pitfalls” 119).  The action in Chirundu of the populist Moyo is successfully pitted 
against that of his bourgeois uncle Chimba, precisely because Chimba and the ruling 
class he represents fail, if one were to put it in Fanon’s terms, “to repudiate [their] own 
nature … in so far as [they are] the tool of capitalism, and to make [themselves] the 
willing slave of that revolutionary capital which is the people” (“The Pitfalls” 120). 
 
Forging a new culture for the new unified state which dialectically merges the hitherto 
racially, ethnically and religiously polarised part-cultures has been acknowledged by 
post-colonial writers as a most challenging task facing newly freed African states and 
their rulers.  Mphahlele himself has declared the adaptive nature of culture as a building 
block of the way of life he calls African humanism.  It is in this vein that Mphahlele has 
been quoted by Sesanti (1999) as saying:  “But we should not regard culture as a museum 
artefact.  It should continue to absorb and redefine the technological, economic and 
political systems, which we must master if we are to participate effectively in 
international business and politics” (“Africanise our Education” 6). 
 
While in The Wanderers the narrative expands to trace Timi Tabane’s saga in the 
oddysey that spans no less than three countries, in Chirundu Mphahlele confines himself 
to portraying the exile experiences of several exiles, including the Zimbabwean Chieza 
and the two South Africans, Pitso Mokae and Studs Letanka, to one central African state.  
Partly, this is the case because (unlike with the former) the central focus of the latter 
work is not the theme of exile but that of the erosion of the African humanist 
temperament by neo-colonialism.  Like the Iboyoru and Lao-Kiku states of The 
Wanderers, the Central African state of Chirundu has just been freed from colonial rule. 
 
The delimitation of exile to one state effectively leads the reader’s focus from wandering 
and concentrating excessively on the theme of wandering.  This enables the reader to 
focus on the workings of a single state in a postcolonial climate within which the 
character Chirundu exemplifies the intricacies of making meaning of independence.  I see 
the demotion of Chimba Chirundu from being the political head of the interior ministry to 
heading the ministry of works as an allegory of the state itself deteriorating due to 
neocolonial corruption that eludes control by the black man.  In the characterisation of 
Chimba, Mphahlele seems to warn more urgently than ever before about “a manifestation 
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of the fact that capitalism, graft and political dishonesty have no race or colour” (“Your 
History” 177).  Chimba’s arrogant highhandedness ironically pits the ordinary men 
(whom ‘proletariat’ nationalist leaders vowed to fight for, before facing the vicissitudes 
of actual independence) against elites (led by Chimba himself).  It is significant that the 
leader of the worker organisation is Moyo, a black youth of ordinary rural upbringing, 
described in a heated argument by Chimba himself as “this herdboy come to the city” 
(24).  Mphahlele has observed that in developing his African humanist sensibilities, the 
rural setting has become even more important than the urban one (Exiles and 
Homecomings 32), and that memories of his own rural upbringing as a young boy are still 
pursuing him to this day in the form of “a dual sensibility that was to influence [his] 
responses to a diversity of experiences in [his] adult life” (“Growing Up in South Africa” 
64).  By “dual sensibility” Mphahlele is referring to the tension between western and 
African or urban and rural values that exists within modern Africans.   For this reason, 
the rural boy Moyo (who leads the labour movement towards a strike) should be 
understood as possessing a deeper African humanist consciousness than corrupt 
characters like his uncle Chimba (a feature which Mphahlele elsewhere ascribes to rural 
upbringing which involves less contact with the abrasive influences of westernisation). 
Moyo seems to be presented as the alter ego of his uncle Chimba, who has also had a 
rural boyhood upringing where he “used to learn in primary school that only nine per cent 
of [their] country was fit for farming” (Chirundu 110).  That the two are alter egos is 
attested to by their similar rural upbringing and political activism as young men.  
Chimba’s deviation from the good morals associated with rural nurture comes about due 
to the diametrically opposed ways in which Moyo and he resolve the tension integral to 
their “dual sensibility”.  Moyo manages to draw from his African humanist consciousness 
which, together with African culture “is … more intensely present” in rural Africa 
(“African Thought and Belief” 280), in order to make sense of postolonial reality, while 
his uncle Chimba fails.  This is why Ursula Barnett has remarked that Moyo “represents 
the hope of a new dawn … for unlike Chirundu, he has not lost touch with real tradition” 
(A Vision of Order 147).  Likewise Ruth Obee has remarked that Moyo “combines the 
best of two worlds” because he “adheres to the best African humanistic values without 
experiencing conflict” (“Colonials in Black Skins” 179). 
 
The problems besieging the post-independence state unfold at the miniature level around 
the life of the central character, Chimba.  The prologue to the challenges facing Chimba’s 
family takes the form of Tirenje staking a claim to the heart of her husband Chirundu.   
At the macroscopic level, Tirenje’s subjectivity is a symbolisation of the voice of the 
hitherto culturally marginalised section of the newly independent state (that has all along 
been geared towards the promotion of imperial values).  This is the case because Tirenje 
takes a firm stand against injustice at the same time that a supposedly African humanist 
or African democratic state is emerging.  Such a purposeful coincidence of her positive 
rising to power within Chimba’s family with the rise to power of the new African state 
(albeit in inverse proportion) should be understood as the author’s way of likening the 
preservation of African humanist sensibility embodied in Tirenje with what the 
independent African state should ideally represent.  Seen from this point of view, the 
pitting of the decolonised Tirenje against the neocolonial Chimba is symbolic of 
neocolonial alterity that stalks the supposed continuity of the African humanist lifestyle 
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after independence.  Because African cultures characteristically treated women 
empoweringly as hallowed pillars of communal survival (as discussed earlier in this 
study), the coupling of Chirundu’s abuse of Tirenje with his other tendencies 
contravening African humanist values can be attributed to the fact that he is neither 
Western nor African humanist in his conduct towards his wives.  He expediently draws 
on whichever aspect/value of each of them happens to be useful at the time, making a 
hotchpotch of them both as he goes his selfish way.  His ‘morality’ is mere expediency; 
he is self-serving first and always in the later, ‘city’ part of his life.  It is such selfishness 
and self-centredness that discount Chirundu from the category of African humanists who 
are known for harmonising a valuing of self with communal interest. 
 
Chimba’s flaws as a political leader stem from neocolonial opportunism misrepresenting 
both European and African values for corrupt convenience.   The satirical tone of the 
novel allows for a ridiculing of bourgeois characters like Chimba to such an extent that 
Mphahlele may portray them farcically as being ludicrously out of step with current 
western cultures they purport to model their behaviour on, while under the spell of self-
deceit.  Consistently with the way Mphahlele handles the debauchery of African 
characters in the face of colonisation or apartheid (as in Down Second Avenue and “Down 
the Quiet Street”), it is important to realise that this novel does not blame the conduct of 
characters like Chimba solely on neo-colonial manipulation by colonial “centres”.  
Whatever foreign influence is partly responsible for Chimba’s ignoble conduct combines 
with the vulgarization of African patriarchy in men seduced by the temptations and 
luxuries of neocolonial politics.  More importantly, as individuals these characters are 
held responsible for their misconduct without shifting the blame to western influence or 
disfigurement of harmless cultural social roles attached to sex.  This is proved when the 
male characters’ flaws floor them as the action of Mphahlele’s narratives mounts to a 
climax – as when Chimba’s sophistic straddling of African and western cultures 
eventually leads to his disintegration as a leader and socialite. 
 
Chirundu’s defeat in the court action Tirenje brings against him and his overpowering by 
the voice of the toiling workers (indicated by the haranguing of his government 
department by ordinary men and women, dramatised by their march – Chirundu 154), are 
thus an indication that the African humanist cultural orientations of the people should be 
the basis on which emerging independent states are structured.  This implies harsh 
criticism of the errant behaviour of the small postcolonial elite whose African humanism 
is eclipsed by aspects of selfish, acquired western consciousness.  The masses who join 
the march to multiply an apparently narrower discontent among the workers storm the 
seat of government and soil the presidential residence with buckets of faeces (Chirundu 
154) to express the proletariat’s revulsion against and rejection of the despicably invalid 
direction taken by the emerging state.  That one symbol of the disgraced state leadership 
takes refuge during this demonstration in a church building significantly points to the 
affinity of the black elite with neo-colonialist structures rather than with African 
humanist structures in the land. 
 
Considering that African humanism (as Mphahlele has been demonstrated in this study as 
defining it) endorses individualism and the freedom of the individual to choose between 
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good and evil despite some of the individual’s behaviour necessarily aligning itself with 
communal opinion, the apparent influence of neocolonialism on Chimba should not be 
misunderstood as equalling an exoneration of his personal responsibility for the faults he 
makes as an agent of Government.  In the same way as African humanism holds an 
individual personally responsible for maintaining a balance between individual and 
communal needs, the African (in government or civilian life) is personally responsible for 
maintaining a balance between those features in the postcolonial era that are good and 
should be absorbed into African humanist consciousness in the postcolonial context. The 
African humanist consciousness should be the value base of the African independent 
state.  Mphahlele has described this responsibility of selecting creatively in order to 
dialectically combine suitable elements, calling it “taking charge of the synthesis beween 
the best and enduring values from both sides of the cultural encounter” (“Notes Towards” 
141).  For this reason, failure to digest – intellectually and socially – the new realities 
facing the independent state is to be blamed neither on a history of colonialism nor on 
resistant African humanism, because it results from a personal weakness of the individual 
who is required to integrate the two social practices through the process of mental 
digestion.  
 
Like the condition of the imprisoned Pitso’s bowels that are regularly described to the 
fellow political detainee Chieza as not “hav[ing] worked this morning”(Chirundu 1), 
Chirundu’s brains are not functioning properly as a result of mental indigestion.  The 
malaise suffered by Pitso and other prisoners (often presented by the indigestion or 
constipation, suffered by Pitso) symbolises a similar condition in the mental make-up of 
Chimba and his fellow career politicians.  Mphahlele could not have bothered to describe 
the set-up in prison in such vividly clinical imagery if the disturbed state of the prisoners 
does not symbolically convey a bigger meaning – as he does in the following passage: 
 Previously the warder came to taunt them during the noon meal.  Of late he is in 
 the habit of haranguing the detainees first thing in the morning like an addict who 
 has to slug down a drink to start a day.  This, because Pitso’s nightmares are 
 becoming more frequent.  He jumps from his bunk as if it were the middle one or 
 the highest, beats on the steel door and cries like a wounded bull.  And Chieza 
 will always begin the day’s conversation with ‘How are the bowels – have they 
 worked?’… In the twenty-seven months they have been in detention, Pitso has put 
 on plenty of fat.  To see him now you wouldn’t think he used to be slender 
 … Chieza believes firmly that frequent bowel movements can set Pitso right. 
 (Chirundu 2) 
It is not difficult to see parallels between Pitso’s physical condition (described above) and 
Chimba’s mental state (that should be understood by analysis of the whole novel). It is 
likely that Chimba and other local career politicians are facing a situation in which 
“[their] nightmares are becoming more frequent” because of the challenges that 
overwhelm them in their occupations; they also “[have] put on plenty of fat”, probably 
due to feeding on sumptuous meals which their salaries allow them to buy, but more 
importantly as a symptom of moral or mental ill-health; and “to see [them] now you 
wouldn’t think [they] used to be slender”,  probably as a recompense for their greed in  
eating more than one body can stomach.   In the midst of sarcastic remarks from the 
prison warder and brotherly advice from sympathetic fellow detainees – as when Chieza 
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advises him to “keep [his] gall bladder in check” to avoid his “ulcer acting up again” – 
the exile Pitso keeps harping on the point that “my uncle always said, clean up your 
bowels [because] that’s where most troubles begin” (1, 2).  One’s uncle in terms of 
traditional kinship relations being a senior to be heeded, Mphahlele’s use of such 
dialogue by Pitso is his way of guiding the reader towards the theme of unhealthy 
(mental) indigestion at the higher level, in members of the postcolonial ruling elite (like 
Chimba).  In the case of Chimba and his colleagues in post-independence government the 
bowel problem assumes a mental dimension as it has to do with thinking and deciding 
aptly in order for Government to be run properly.  That Pitso and other characters are 
showing these unhealthy symptoms while languishing in detention is a satirical 
intimation that (though they are unaware of it) Chimba and his colleagues are also 
prisoners – but to their own aberrant behaviour – despite their deceitfully prosperous 
appearance and belief in their own power and freedom. 
 
One more symptom of Chimba’s mental constipation is in the topsy-turvy reasoning he 
and his fellow politicians use in deciding to incarcerate black exiles, rationalising it in the 
following words:  “They might be spies acting for Portugal, Zimbabwe or South Africa” 
(50). Yet the whites from Portugal, Zimbabwe or South Africa are found in large 
numbers in the newly independent state, and are treated humanely, never suspected of 
spying for their governments.  Only treacherous minds like those of Chimba and his 
colleagues can brazenly justify self-important corruption like this, using the subterfuge of 
suspected espionage.  As the story of the novel proceeds, it becomes evident that the 
white expatriates who are not thrown into detention are spared so that they can build the 
economy and further benefit the material needs of the small elite.  In terms of 
Mphahlele’s African humanism, the seemingly hospitable treatment of the white 
expatriates reveals that it is not the whites the rulers love, but their wealth-generating 
skills and hard work.  According to the African humanist outlook, human beings must be 
loved and have their lives held sacred for their own sakes and not for the wealth one 
hoards through their toil.  In this way, the whites who appear to be favoured by the 
government are perhaps as abused as the incarcerated blacks, for in both respects the 
common factor remains dehumanisation.  The consciousness behind the superficially 
partisan favouring of the white expatriates is one thing Pitso and other detainees find 
inscrutable, resulting in their own mental indigestion or failure to make sense of this, 
which manifests itself in the image of abdominal indigestion.  In choosing to satisfy their 
greed for material gain, profit and luxury, Chimba and his colleagues have repressed their 
African humanist consciousness to such an extent that it requires a real jolt such as the 
protesting voice of the people taking the form of the strike led by Moyo to re-awaken this 
value system.  Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism hence does not flinch from 
facing the strategic need for violent action – as encountered in earlier parts of this study 
in the analysis of poems like “Death”. 
 
The majority of critics who comment on Chirundu seem to play down the centrality of 
the theme of broader mental indigestion to which neocolonialism and the challenges of 
independence are factors and allow the individual frailties of Chimba Chirundu to take 
centre stage.   The individualist assumptions the critics employ in analysing Chimba do 
not take into consideration his transgression of African humanist values (according to its 
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uniquely African “face wants” that demand determining the communal voice before 
articulating one’s own voice); they tend to treat Chimba as if the western and Africanist 
notions of individualism are exactly the same.  If such a universalist focus on Chimba’s 
individualism were accurate, Mphahlele’s opening of the novel with the prison scene (in 
which the health trouble with Pitso’s bowels is foregrounded) would have to be seen as 
arbitrary.  Far from being purposeless, Mphahlele thus opens the novel in order to hint at 
the dominant theme of mental indigestion on the part of the new rulers, symbolised here 
by Pitso’s clinically constipated condition.  That is why, as the narrator puts it: “There is 
not a single day when Chieza does not ask Pitso if his bowels have moved … And Chieza 
will always begin the day’s conversation with ‘How are the bowels – have they 
worked?’” (2).  The prisoners’ refrain punctuates the novel, especially in its early parts, 
and represents the communal voice which is an index of the public’s regard for Chimba 
Chirundu and his fellow nationalist bourgeoisie.  It is on these grounds that I agree with 
the writer Ruth Obee when she points out that “In addition to the three-part narrative” 
consisting of the voices of Chirundu, Moyo and Tirenje, “Mphahlele utilizes a chorus of 
commentators (the people’s voices, as opposed to that of the authoritarian, omniscient 
narrator) in the form of southern African exiles” (“Colonials in Black Skins” 172-173).  
The “chorus” (to borrow Obee’s term) is pitted against the ironically individualist 
nationalist discourse of Chimba Chirundu.  Chimba’s discourse in this novel is 
individualist like that of a westerner in the sense that it departs from communal African 
mores regarding the institution of marriage as well as from African humanist ways of 
ruling that should be informed by consultation, involvement, compassion and 
selflessness. 
 
Pitso and Chieza have now been imprisoned for twenty-seven months (1) on Chimba’s 
orders (3).  They come to be informed of Chimba’s humiliating court case and other 
developments outside prison life through sympathetic visits by Moyo and Letanka (3).  
Such visits give rise to Pitso and Chieza reading about Tirenje’s charge of bigamy against 
Chirundu.  The charge of bigamy, as well as Tirenje’s eventual court victory, signifies an 
abortive marriage of western and African ways that is thwarting coherent thinking in the 
brains of the ruling elite that Chimba symbolises.  Typically of a state of mental 
constipation, the outcome of the court case leaves the justification of the bigamy – as 
pieced together by the political heavyweight Chimba and the section of the elite sharing 
his confounded views – defeated.  Their views have no firm cultural groundwork. That 
the small drama revolving around Chimba’s private life symbolises the macrocosmic 
drama within the minds of the rulers is accentuated by the satirical refrain (as I explain 
below) of “One nation! Kwacha!” bleated continually by the prison warder.  The dawn of 
the new day of freedom referred to by “kwacha” is juxtaposed on the one hand with the 
warder’s recitations, and on the other hand with confabulations between the two prisoners 
concerning Chimba’s court action.  Such a joining together of “kwacha” and the court 
case against Chimba highlights the fact that mental indigestion (which the court case in 
this instance symbolises) is brought about by the historical fact of a new day of 
independence dawning in the state.  It is at such a point in the historical evolution of 
African societies that neocolonialism proves a menace, as the new leaders are not yet 
experienced in the practice of governing and colonial experiences are still fresh on the 
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people’s minds.  The African-Caribbean writer Frantz Fanon describes one 
disappointment of the middle-class rulers of newly independent states as follows: 
In under-developed countries, we have seen that no true bourgeoisie exists; there 
is only a sort of little greedy caste … too glad to accept the dividends that the 
former  colonial power hands out to it.  This get-rich-quick middle class shows 
itself incapable of great ideas or of inventiveness … [and] becomes not even the 
replica  of Europe, but its caricature.  (The Wretched of the Earth 141) 
The above quotation can safely be applied to Chimba and the prison warder, who 
symbolise the “caricature” of Europe in the African state in which the story is set.  
 
The prison warder, as a symbol of the new government, is not exempt from its confused 
state of mind, as the following dialogue reveals: 
 ‘… I hear in your countries the white man splices your balls in the jail.  It’s like a 
 picnic for you here … You there from South Africa, just you scream again and 
 disturb people in their sleep, you’ll shit bricks.  And you there the man from 
 Zimbabwe, muttering to yourself won’t help you one bit.  One country!  I know 
 when you two meet out here in the yard you’re badmouthing me and this country.
 We’ve given you sanctuary and saved you from life in the streets begging for food 
 and shelter.  Back in your own countries you’d be shitting bricks.  One nation!  
 Kwacha!  Kwacha!’  (Chirundu 1) 
Chieza’s grumbling that he is warned about represents the rumblings beyond the confines 
of prison walls against the unjust political order from the mouths of all other refugees and 
sensible compatriots like Moyo.  The insults hurled at the South African Pitso, so 
reminiscent of the bar mini-drama in The Wanderers, articulate common opinion in the 
ruling class.  To think as the warder does (as do the rulers, whose opinions he echoes) 
and maltreat fellow Africans in the wrong belief that one is being merciful (as contrasted 
with the treatment the exiles get at home), is nothing other than a symptom of gross 
misjudgement and blindness to one’s own inhumanity.  To disturb people in their sleep as 
Pitso is charged with in the extract, is to act like Ellen Mwansa, Letanka and Moyo do 
and shake the populace from their sleep and enlighten them about their democratic right 
to fairness and justice. 
 
Mphahlele’s focus (in Chirundu) on detained exiles takes forward his exploration of the 
condition of exile from an African humanist perspective.  In The Wanderers, 
maltreatment of the exiles intensifies the acuteness of the experience of exile.  But, unlike 
in The Wanderers, a juxtaposition of the prison experience with the glaring symptoms of 
political leaders’ failure healthily to merge influences of the present and the past pushes 
the exile experience to the margins.  An introduction of Chimba’s story to the reader 
through Pitso and Chieza’s conversations gears the reader to conceive of the condition of 
exile as a mere background to the greater drama hingeing on the personal drama of 
Chimba.  Because Chimba is a representative of rulers who fail to take advantage of their 
African humanist culture in order to interrogate recently-won independence from 
colonisation, the theme of neocolonial corruption is pushed to the centre of the plot.  To 
prune the theme to its pith for even greater clarity, rather than focus on the evils of exile 
or neocolonialism, Chirundu dwells on failure by individuals to shape the experience of 
independence into acceptably adapted forms of African humanist existence. 
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It is therefore correct to state that the theme of African humanist adaptation to a new 
historical era here takes ascendancy over that of exile or of the tyranny of time and place.  
In this novel Mphahlele dramatises failure on the part of the rulers to handle the onerous 
demands of a state in transition from colonial domination to freedom anchored in local 
cultures – which would be freedom based in African humanism. 
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4.4   A FURTHER DIMENSION TO MPHAHLELE’S NARRATIVE WRITINGS 
 
Mphahlele’s novels, especially Chirundu, are successful explorations of the effect of 
hybridity on married life.  Hybridity is (with regard to Mphahlele’s writings in general 
and Chirundu in particular) the way and extent to which one’s African humanist social 
behaviour absorbs change brought about by historical transitions such as colonisation and 
independence.  It is important to distinguish the relationships of married couples as 
straightforward characterisation from the symbolic dimensions of such marriages. 
 
A consideration of Chimba’s marriages to Monde and Tirenje, and that of Letanka to his 
wife should suffice to illustrate this point.  Gagiano (2001) makes the interesting 
observation that although politically speaking Letanka is the opposite of Chirundu, the 
novel shows that significant parallels exist between the two male characters “in the way 
they treat and think about the women in their lives” (33).  While Gagiano’s “Unmasking 
‘African machismo’”  succeeds in illustrating plausibly that even characters who differ in 
conceptions of political justice in a way gang together in perpetrating male societal 
domination, what I see as more centrally holding the men together in the unjust treatment 
of their wives is their analytical failure in their attempt to deal with hybridity. 
 
Tirenje is a traditional woman who is not alienated from African culture by western 
education and sophistication.   Yet she is not a docile kind of woman who is afraid to 
stand up to injustice, as we can see when, for example, she insists on a Western-style 
marriage that should empower her to reclaim her position as the woman in the centre of 
Chimba’s family life. This firm decisiveness which Tirenje displays is due to her stronger 
and healthier African humanist consciousness (compared to her husband), referred to by 
Letanka’s calling her “a lovely girl of ordinary”, rural upbringing (144).  Confirming 
Letanka’s description of Monde in a talk with Chieza, we see that she is clearly 
westernised:  
 Well – wide mouth, nose that doesn’t stand out like Tirenje’s, powdered face, 
 pencilled brows, dark lips – almost indigo – that’s all I remember of her.  I just 
 don’t know what to make of her – she’s a difficult script, man, tough. You look at 
 the other wife and you could go slowly over each line a few times to understand 
 the script and the line would still be there for you to come back to.  And then 
 there is the depth you don’t immediately sense looking at Monde.  (Chirundu 100) 
Letanka’s dislike of the mimicry exemplified here by Monde is consistent with what he 
hates in his own wife.  While teaching at Fort Hare during the days of nationalist 
sentiments in black circles, Letanka was bored with his wife precisely for mimicking 
western culture and looking down upon traditional African women (144).  He then fell in 
love with a teacher in a local primary school whom Letanka himself describes as “a 
lovely girl of ordinary peasant upbringing” (144).    Perhaps it is this consistency that 
saves Letanka from developing symptoms like those of Chimba and the other males that 
are indicative of their failure to deal with change.  Letanka knows exactly what he wants 
and what he does not want.  Letanka’s resoluteness should be credited to his fair success 
in controlling the way he modifies native African humanist consciousness to adapt to the 
condition of exile.  Mphahlele’s demonstration of Letanka’s closeness to Moyo (as in 
their sending newspapers and heartening messages together to Pitso, Chieza and other 
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detainees) is a way of confirming their shared effort ably to manage the transmutation of 
African humanism as demanded by the exigencies of historical change (3).  
 
Chimba’s pathetic state of indecision is externalised by parts of the narrative such as the 
following: 
 Monde was good in her own way at acting hostess to my important guests.  She 
 was smooth and graceful … She made protocol feel like a thing rolling on ball 
 bearings, conducted at the same time with grace, self-confidence.  Yet I felt 
 something was missing in Monde.  Something unnameable.  Maybe something 
 that keeps a woman’s feet on the ground, as Tirenje’s were. (Chirundu 47) 
Chimba clearly fails to resolve the ambivalence evident here; he fails to balance western 
beauty with African beauty without making either suffer.  The important point Mphahlele 
makes in describing Tirenje is that although she is a traditonal woman she is not 
uneducated or unsophisticated.  The moral is that as African humanism is a dynamic way 
of life, anyone with such a mindset can adapt to western cultures without necessarily 
suffering cultural self-alienation.  Tirenje’s assertiveness in declaring she won’t share her 
husband with another woman is congruous with African cultures, but in their adapted 
form.  If some African men could marry more wives without considering whether the 
chief wife agreed to it or not according to cultural norms, Tirenje here is asserting that 
African women within the framework of Africanism cannot be treated as objects.  It is 
known that traditionally a husband obtains the permission of his wife or wives to add 
another wife to the clan.  For this reason it is difficult to agree with a critic like Ursula 
Barnett in her remark that Tirenje fails to grasp the traditional notion of polygamy in 
indicating that she won’t “share [her] man with another woman” (A Vision of Order 146).   
Chimba’s marrying Tirenje through the ordinance subsequent to a customary marriage 
(as a way of admitting that marriage according to western law overrides the traditional 
one), and his contradictory claim later in life that marriage under colonial ordinance 
cannot supersede traditional custom, should be seen for what it is – a mixing of African 
and western customs in an unintelligent, muddled way, as the contradiction reveals.  Even 
though western clinching of his marriage with Tirenje was done upon the latter’s 
insistence, the contradiction remains, because it is western marriage that the former is 
now invoking while at the same time attempting to justify traditional (and not western) 
polygamy, thereby displaying inconsistency. 
 
Tirenje contrasts with Chimba in that she is a self-assured adherent to and adaptor of 
African culture, the endowment her husband Chimba clearly lacks.  The author portrays 
Chimba satirically in terms that conflict with African humanist temparement, as an 
arrogant and self-righteous person. Chimba’s face value contestation of the hegemonic 
overshadowing of African customs by colonial norms and values is opportunistic as it 
does not point to his being essentially and primarily driven in his day to day living by an 
African humanist consciousness in the same way as Tirenje.  Flashbacks linking his rural 
childhood with his present urban adulthood serve to remind the reader that the 
environment in which he grew as a boy has failed to guarantee that he survives as a 
positively adapted African humanist after being affected by the temptations of 
neocolonial power.  Without denying admonishment the author directs at him, occasional 
outbursts of the African humanist value system that has been battered out of shape by 
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socio-cultural colonialism within Chimba should be accepted as Mphahlele’s way of 
making a strong case for the resilience of African humanism beyond friction with change, 
albeit sometimes in tremendously disfigured forms.  It is in this respect that Chimba and 
characters like Letanka share a common trait.  That Chimba’s lawyer is a white man 
whom it is a bit too ambitious to expect to have a thorough knowledge of and respect for 
African customs, is again a revelation of Chimba’s failure to manage the inevitable 
hybridity that has to result from creatively synthesising African and western cultures 
within an individual. What makes Tirenje a victor is her honesty (as opposed to Chimba’s 
often opportunistic hiding behind African customs) as well as her capacity to handle the 
inevitable hybridity due to Africa’s encounter with Europe with equilibrium and integrity, 
living true to Mphahlele’s conviction that African humanism should continually redefine 
itself to absorb world civilisation. 
 
Tirenje and Letanka, though at the conscious level they manage the synthesis of cultures, 
do not end up without minor bruises – Tirenje to an appropriately negligible degree, 
however, as she survives and manages to move into a new set of circumstances with 
courage and resolution.  The drugged conviviality and opportunistic carousel of 
Letanka’s social life lead to his tragic death after a car accident.  Importantly, Mphahlele 
subtly sustains awareness of the adverse effects of exile as partly responsible for 
Letanka’s tragic end.  Though putting on a brave face, Letanka externalises his anguish 
when he confides one day in Moyo: 
 But we cannot now hold ceremonies over the millions dead and gone during the 
 long journey in slavery – the journey across the seas.  Memory should strengthen 
 us, it should not detain us in the funeral parlour or at the graveside – it gets 
 tiresome to have to keep going to funerals without corpses – I am tired, God!  It’s 
 what Mojo’s doing gets me off on my pet subject. (Chirundu 141) 
The same demoralisation leading exiles like Mojo to stage a funeral for rumoured deaths 
of relatives back home in South Africa in order to collect condolence money from fellow 
exiles and then squandering it on liquor and other drugs, is responsible for Letanka 
himself drinking heavily.  All these exiles are depicted as self-deceitfully hoping to drug 
the frustration of exile away – which leads to their spiritual death, as in the case of Mojo, 
or both spiritual and physical death, as is the case with Letanka.  Mphahlele’s emphasis 
on the way death is regarded with religious awe in African humanist social behaviour has 
been noted. By portraying the moral decay among exiles such as Mojo and Letanka, the 
author does not in Chirundu efface the impact of exile on African humanist 
consciousness. He sustains the alienating impact of exile on African humanist existence 
in the background of the actions of his characters. 
 
What Mphahlele achieves in the novels through the microscopic examination of erotic 
love and marital life is a new fibre in his literary output.  This is the case because his 
profound dissection of married lives such as Chimba’s and Letanka’s is a dimension 
found very scantily and superficially in the autobiographies.  Down Second Avenue 
explores in detail only the kind of husband-wife relationship based on the author’s own 
parents.  The majority of married people in the autobiography are drawn at the stage 
when they are already single parents due to death, desertion or divorce, so that focus 
shifts from the intricacies of married life to survival and resilience under apartheid 
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conditions. In Afrika My Music married men and women are not so much explored in 
relation to their married co-existence as the symbolic dimensions of their individual lives 
and for their communal characteristics, as in the example of Khabi Mngoma’s wife’s 
presence at the hospital bedside.  Such a profound and intricate portrayal of erotic love 
and marital life as we find in Chirundu is an indication of Mphahlele’s maturity at this 
stage both as a person and a writer.  Subjective embroilment in Moses and Eva’s married 
life together (in Down Second Avenue) is replaced in Chirundu (published 20 years later) 
by an objective, unemotional analysis of relationships.  A similar maturity shorn of 
emotional attachment is evident in Mphahlele’s projection of his concept of African 
humanism.  One example of such objective growth on Mphahlele’s part is his (already 
explained) shift from a vitriolic attack on negritude earlier in his career and as a young 
man to a rational exaltation of those aspects of negritude that reveal purposes common to 
his in mooting African humanist approaches to life and the arts.  Similarly, as Chapman 
has observed, “soon after leaving South Africa in anger and disillusionment” Mphahlele 
emotionally expresses his disappointment with Can Themba’s fiction in such strong 
words as “romantic imagery, theatrical characters, Hollywood, with a lace of poetic 
justice” (269).  It is the absence of an African humanist basis in Can Themba’s fiction 
which Mphahlele scoffs at here.  Significantly, after returning to South Africa in 1977 
Mphahlele writes of the same Can Themba unemotionally as a writer whose fiction 
“helped fashion a liveable myth”(269).  For Mphahlele (later in his life) to perceive finer 
detail in love and connubial life, and for him also to discern similar attempts in 
contemporary Africanist writers towards mythmaking (which he considers an 
indispensable constituent of African humanist existence) is a sign that his later writings 
show an improvement of the manner in which he expatiates his conception of African 
humanism as well as asserting it as a tool with which to preserve a distinctive African 
identity. 
 
In the same vein, Mphahlele’s The Wanderers (published 12 years after the 
autobiography Down Second Avenue) exhibits Mphahlele’s growth as a writer due to its 
rounded delineation of white exiles such as Cartwright.  Whereas white exiles are 
mentioned in the autobiographies (as in Afrika My Music) they are flatly catalogued with 
the sole purpose of avoiding racist undertones in the handling of the theme of exile, no 
less than the way white liberals are described as fighting on the side of Mphahlele and his 
people for social justice in Down Second Avenue.  In this aspect of objective and rounded 
characterisation of white characters, Afrika My Music (being an autobiography) exhibits 
progression from and greater maturity than Down Second Avenue, as it was written 25 
years after the first autobiography.  Mphahlele’s publishing of two novels between the 
second and the first autobiography serves to tame the emotional attachment that initially 
prevents him from seeing white characters in other dimensions than in stereotypically 
racist relations with blacks during the apartheid years as in Down Second Avenue.  
Chapman’s observation that in this autobiography “we encounter … an intellectual, 
artistic attempt to work through the hurts left by apartheid towards coherence and 
recovery” (“Identity and the Apartheid State” 244) is an adequate analysis of the different 
thematic accents between earlier works like Down Second Avenue and later ones like 
Afrika My Music.  It is true that in writing the earlier work Mphahlele focussed more on 
the threat apartheid posed against the identity of blacks than on demonstrating that whites 
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should not be regarded in a homogenising manner as racist. Apart from development in 
fictional style sketched above, the fully multidimensional portrayal of the white character 
Cartwright in The Wanderers should be understood correctly to point to Mphahlele’s 
development of a genuinely non-racial concept of African humanism to include whites 
who earn the name African. This contrasts with his earlier rhetoric on the same (racial) 
aspect of African humanism.  The earlier narrative writings are not accompanied by 
satisfactory representations of white characters who are cogently absorbed as Africans 
equalling blacks in Africanness and (as is the case with this later work) as persons with 
fascinating insight into the problems Africans face both at home under apartheid, or 
across the borders as exiles, due to their African humanist consciousness resisting their 
alienating experiences. 
 
In this way, it can be seen that Mphahlele’s novels represent African humanism in its 
much more refined phase than the forms in which the concept is represented in the 
autobiographies.  Understandably, in the writing of autobiographies Mphahlele writes 
more subjectively than is the case with novels that allow relative detachment due to  
biographical aspects presenting themselves in a more indirect way.  Unlike harsh 
condemnations expressed by a critic like Lewis Nkosi about elements of subjectivity in 
Mphahlele’s novels (Tasks and Masks 102), I conceive of this as Mphahlele’s way of 
taming the form of the novel to serve the African aesthetic tenet of self-praise, as in 
orature forms such as the praise poem or legend.  This, and the fragmentary depiction of 
events in The Wanderers, should be seen as aspects of Africanist aesthetic orientation 
whereby it is acceptable for the self artistically to interconnect seemingly disjointed acts 
(of which he or she is the subject) in self-eulogy without facing accusations of egoism or 
egotism. 
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4.5 FAMILIAR STYLISTIC THREADS CONTINUED 
 
Mphahlele’s characteristic devices for asserting and exemplifying African humanism in 
his narrative writings occur in the two novels as well. 
 
When the teacher Shuping puts Timi Tabane in the picture concerning circumstances in 
the Goshen area he describes a meeting where community elders were incited by an 
Afrikaner Commissioner against black journalists from big cities like Tirong whom the 
Commissioner and neighbouring farmers branded communists (The Wanderers 77).  A 
community elder retorts after being called to order by some obsequious induna that “I 
cannot say it is a zebra unless I see its stripes” (77).  This literal translation of the Sotho 
proverb Ge re tla re ke dipitsi re tla bona ka mebala, together with the turn of phrase in 
Shuping’s recounting the scene – the words “He said to the white man, he said” (77) – 
depart from standard English idiom and become an expression in “english” through 
which Mphahlele reinforces the reader’s sense of the fabric of African culture within 
which the action of the novel unfolds.  It is African humanist consciousness that 
engenders affinity with the denigrated journalists and precludes the community elder 
from believing the propaganda of white farmers about the manners of fellow Africans, so 
that subtly the community elder is urging the gathered indunas to dismiss the claim by 
people of a foreign group who are not likely to know the rumoured behaviour of their 
fellow Africans better than the locals themselves.  In this way, the dialogue of the 
community elder employs the African-language  proverb to apppeal to the African 
humanism informing the consciences of the fellow indunas to find the right direction for 
communal opinion that (as Africans with a humanist psyche which values communal, and 
not individual opinion) they need to arrive at on this particular issue.  
 
Similarly, when Chimba describes the feebleness of Tirenje’s mother’s body after she 
had seen nsato the python, she says that the mother’s body looked like a log that had been 
“vomited by the river on its banks” (Chirundu16).  This is a direct translation of the 
Sotho way of expressing the idea of something being washed onto the river bank.  
Considering the African humanist definition of rivers as occupied in their essence by the 
Vital Force or the Supreme Being, the condition suggested by the image above of 
Tirenje’s mother being washed onto the bank by the flood of the river is indicative of a 
bigger meaning, which is that she was tossed about by nature and God in coming face to 
face with such a sacred, mystical creature as the python (16).  The python (according to 
the traditional religion of Tirenje and Chimba’s people) “seldom wants human flesh, only 
if he has gone mad” (16).   Yet it is so scary to come across nsato that “you never want to 
see him again” (17).  The preceding description of nsato’s effect on the lives of humans 
comes from Chimba’s internal monologue – in other words, it is Chimba himself who 
believes that “you never want to see [nsato] again” (16).  Tirenje herself reacts to the 
traditional aura with which nsato is regarded by saying that she wants “to see him again” 
(17).  In this way, the image (above) of a woman who has seen nsato being shaken 
around by Creation itself as a warning to avoid looking too closely as if to challenge the 
axioms of traditional custom, is a revelation of Chimba’s own attitude to life.  It is 
important that, while Chimba believes life as it presents itself should not be questioned 
and challenged, Tirenje believes the opposite (shown by her boldness in the quotation 
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above to want to see nsato again).  Tirenje’s spiritual orientation as revealed by her 
dialogue above explains why she questions Chimba’s opportunistic way of taking refuge 
in traditional custom in order to get to the bottom of his character.  In this way Tirenje is 
shown to possess a more authentic African humanist consciousness than her husband, for 
it is in its nature to probe things and re-shape itself.  Chimba displays a flawed approach 
to the challenges pitted against African humanism by change, because to him African 
humanism is a stagnant, inflexible consciousness which should be obeyed without close 
scrutiny and adaptation.  The explanations in the examples given above demonstrate that 
Mphahlele employs African language idiom and syntactic forms to ground the actions of 
his characters in an African humanist consciousness, thus indicating the success or failure 
with which the various characters draw strength from their distinctive group identity in 
order wisely to tackle challenges of the time. 
 
It is with the same effect that similar use of African proverbs and idiomatic expressions 
occur in Chirundu after Tirenje has confronted Monde in Chimba’s city house, and 
Chimba returns from government work the next day to find a letter left by Tirenje in the 
apartment he had temporarily arranged for her and the children to occupy after they had 
joined him and the second wife in the city (Chirundu 59).  The letter by Tirenje recounts 
an aspect of her scuffle with Monde as follows: “… what pierces my heart like a spear is 
when she says to me she says when are you returning home?” (59, emphasis added).  The 
African language syntactic formula reminds the reader that Tirenje speaks from the 
perspective of African modes of existence.  The same effect is achieved in an earlier 
scene when Moyo confronts Chimba about the need for Tirenje to discuss their marital 
problem traditionally in the presence of senior members of the extended family, and 
Moyo emphasises the therapeutic effect of talking about problems by saying “it helps the 
boil to burst” (24).  This expression is literally the Sotho idiomatic expression phula 
sekaku boladu, referring to the act of baring one’s heart.  Demonstration of an African 
behavioural matrix also occurs when Chimba recollects some of the humorous incidents 
during his rural upbringing in which an inebriated uncle accidentally stumbles in the dead 
of the night into the hut of one of his father’s wives and onto her bare body (32).  Chimba 
explains that after his father had whipped the mischievous uncle he chased him out of his 
compound the following day by means of the Sotho idiomatic expression “next day my 
uncle was shown the road”, from the Sotho go mo šupetša/šupa tsela (32, emphasis 
added).  One comes across the use of Sotho idiomatic expression also during Chimba’s 
visit to the village of Musoro after Tirenje has gone back to her father’s house in anger 
(55).   Expressing his admiration of the way his father-in-law embraces the Christian faith 
while maintaining a strong African humanist resistance, Chimba remarks in a monologue 
that the father-in-law once “hauled the fat Baptist preacher over the coals” after 
disagreement on an issue (55, emphasis added).  This is a Sotho idiomatic expression bea 
ka marago leretheng la mohwelere which means grilling someone mercilessly while 
taking them to task on an issue. 
 
The same stylistic device is continued in The Wanderers, as when Naledi describes to 
Timi how she found the conduct of the German missionaries who once employed her 
enigmatic (58).  Puzzled by Reverend Schwartz’s ever-studious manner, Naledi one day 
enquires from Mrs Schwartz why the reverend always reads many books and if reading 
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the Bible was not enough, and in reporting on Mrs Schwartz’s reply Naledi says “she told 
me she said ‘The master is learning about butterflies’” (58, emphasis added).  Naledi’s 
use of the Sotho syntactic formula reinforces one’s sense of her identity as an African 
woman who thinks and speaks in a language encoded with an African humanist world-
view.  Awareness of such an identity in Naledi is useful to the reader in that it heightens 
her difference from members of the Schwartz family and justifies her wide-eyed 
wonderment at their lifestyle (directed by a cultural consciousness that makes no sense to 
her at all).  Effective use of African language expression appears also when Timi and 
Naledi’s painful search for Naledi’s husband Rampa takes them to the Shuping family 
near Goshen farm (110).   Worried whether their sojourn in the family of the poor couple 
will not be burdensome, Timi asks whether there is enough food in the house and the 
wife of their host replies with the words “It is not much but children of a family must split 
the head of a locust when the need comes” (111, emphasis added).  This reply is bound to 
reassure Timi and Naledi that they are safely among the members of a family which lives 
an African humanist existence that values human life and safety above material 
parsimony, because it literally contains the Sotho proverb Bana ba motho ba 
ngwathelana hlogwana ya tšie – meaning that moral support to fellow men or women 
should be provided even in conditions of abject poverty.  It is important to realise that the 
journalist Timi and Rampa’s wife Naledi need such human warmth as an antidote to the 
behaviour of the farmer Van Zyl of Glendale farm whose consciousness is foreign and 
antagonistic to their African humanist expectations.  This is because Timi and Naledi 
have just been shown Rampa’s grave on the fringe of Ha-Pitsi village where he was 
buried after dying of wounds inflicted on him first by guards and then the farmer Van Zyl 
– for breaking down under inhuman farm toil and failing to finish the preposterous load 
of work given him on a particular day (109). 
 
A more direct description of African humanism is found when Timi Tabane’s family 
discusses the untoward behaviour of the son Felang, with the sibling Duma pestering the 
father with questions that are difficult to answer (The Wanderers 306).  Thinking hard on 
the plight of children whose parents are in exile, Timi laments the opportunity the 
children are missing that they would have had if they had been growing up among their 
own people back in South Africa: 
 Throw morality to the dogs – their kind of morality.  What have the white man’s 
 two thousand years of civilisation to show for it?  What have three hundred years 
 of South African fascism to show for it? … Had to use traditional African 
 humanism for the children’s moral guidance: what I learned from my 
 Grandmother, now dead  these three years, from my mother, now dead these 
 twenty-two years; what I learned from my people.  Something passed on to us 
 through poetic speech, not through the printed word … they gave us the wisdom 
 of the elders … nothing belongs to you except what you have eaten … you are a 
 person  because of other people … share with others what you have and the 
 ancestors will  sleep in peace and that will bring you peace … a guest has short 
 horns: he cannot take liberties.  But you must never throw a visitor out or do him 
 ill.  He says a  woman is like a calabash: do not kick it around, it holds your 
 water, your milk, it gives generously.  (The Wanderers 307-308) 
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Timi’s noting (above) of the facts that his grandmother had died three and his mother 
twenty-two years ago (like Mphahlele’s) is a reminder that there is a distinctive way in 
which his concept of African humanism looks at death.  The phrases above “learned from 
my people”, “passed on to us” and “gave us the wisdom” emphasise that the concept of 
African humanism does not only define death but it also defines education.  The phrase 
“wisdom of the elders” teaches the reader that education in African humanist 
communities is perpetually transmitted from the elders to coming generations.  The 
phrase “wisdom of the elders” serves also to link the definition of education with the 
conception of death, because elders within traditional social hierarchy are revered for 
their closeness to entering the realm of the ancestors – access to which is through death.  
After he has reminded the reader about the meaning of death and education within an 
African humanist framework in the ealier sentences of the passage above, Mphahlele uses 
the remaining lines of the passage to reveal the method of teaching and the subject 
matter.  The statements constituting the latter part of the passage above are all literal 
translations of African language proverbs.  The proverb “nothing belongs to you except 
what you have eaten” in Sotho is sa gago ke sa ka mpeng, which urges pragmatism rather 
than too visionary an inclination; “you are a person because of other people” in Northern 
Sotho is motho ke motho ka batho, which means that a human being finds self-fulfilment 
in acting individually yet in such a way as to meet with the communal approval of other 
people around him or her; “share with others what you have”  is the Sotho proverb go fa 
ke go fega which refers to the sacred duty of sharing; “a guest has short horns” is literally 
translated from the Sotho proverb moeng o naka di maripa and it means that when in a 
new environment one should wait and learn from those acquainted with the situation 
rather than be presumptuous; “you must never throw a visitor out” is the Sotho moeti ga a 
rakwe, meaning that one attracts blessings by being hospitable to strangers; and “a 
woman is like a calabash” is the Sotho proverb mosadi ke sego sa meetse” meaning that a 
woman should be handled with reverence as her good health and role is central for the 
survival of the family and the entire community.  In short, the dimensions of African 
humanism that we learn from the passage above is that the dead within African cultures 
are immortalised through their teachings which are transmitted by elders by means of 
proverbs and idiomatic expressions; loss of such lessons is loss of one’s African humanist 
identity. 
 
A similarly undisguised instruction about the concept is found in The Wanderers when 
Shuping agrees that the elderly woman of the house should be told the painful story of 
Rampa in the words: “you know what our people are like – they want to share all your 
joys and all your sorrows, even if there’s nothing they can do about them” (71).  This is 
an aspect of African humanism Mphahlele has identified as the propensity to “gravitate 
towards other people”.  A more indirect lesson on African humanism comes in describing 
Timi’s boredom (in London) with museum artefacts and his longing for “just as many 
people as could … give him a sense of community” (208).  Mphahlele is dramatising a 
rebellion of Timi’s African humanist inclination (that thrives in constant company of 
other people’s bodies and minds) against the practices of London social life in which one 
needs to draw strength from one’s own individuality.  If Timi’s boredom with art 
galleries in London risks misinterpretations of African humanism as a cultural attitude 
that does not tolerate preservation of the lost past in artefacts, such misunderstanding 
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should be dashed by Timi’s fascination with the Austrian Irmelin’s sculpture, expressed 
in the following words: 
As a priestess, and in the sculpture she produced to revive a defunct 
 historical shrine, Irmelin worked with those people who were in touch with the 
 basic realities of life, and whose religious beliefs were not  cluttered by 
 theological argument and sermonising … No doubt, she had found the satisfaction 
 and self-fulfilment in Iboyoru which she had failed to attain in Austria. (The 
 Wanderers 234-35) 
Although European (according to the passage above), Irmelin does not work on her 
sculpture in individualist isolation, as the phrase “worked with those people who were in 
touch” reveals.  The religious practice she immortalises in her sculpture is that of a 
people “whose religious beliefs were not cluttered by theological argument and 
sermonising”.  At once the understanding of the concept of African humanism is 
deepened to include the aspect whereby an artist is regarded in the community as a priest 
or priestess whose craft has immense spiritual use necessary for the survival of the 
community, in keeping with Mphahlele’s statement that art “is a compulsive cultural act”.  
The artist in this instance being a European, a further definition of African humanism 
becomes clear as a state of mind and as social attitude available irrespective of one’s 
pigmentation or continent of origin.  If the European, white Irmelin were not an African 
humanist, she would not be fascinated in her sculpture with the representation of peoples 
“whose religious beliefs were not cluttered by theological argument and sermonising” – 
an unequivocal reference by Mphahlele to traditional African religions that were 
characterised more by practice rather than theory. 
 
African humanism’s ability to accommodate change in a dialectic manner (that should 
not end in self-endangerment) is evinced also in an incident during Chimba’s boyhood 
(Chirundu 29). In a flashback that recaptures his boyhood relationship with his obstinate 
father and his schooling days, Chimba recalls the words of Corkery, the Irish teacher of 
Principles of Education: 
 He urged us to use the school for the tools it could afford us … learn new things, 
 learn how to seize power and to hold on to it … not to forsake our ancestors for 
 something Europeans were themselves throwing out on the dung heap.  ‘If I were 
 to run an educational system on this continent,’ Corkery said, ‘I’d begin where 
 your elders left off, and I would be guided by their wisdom in deciding what to 
 put into a curriculum.  I would stress human relations all the way … But once 
 being here I tremble, as if I were in the presence of an oracle.  That oracle is you 
 put together in front of me.  I now realize all the more what a perilous thing it 
 is when you undertake to teach those outside your own culture.’ (Chirundu 29) 
Corkery acknowledges his inadequacy as a teacher of Africans while as a European he 
does not have the background knowledge of African cultures, when (in the passage 
above) he states that he realises “what a perilous thing it is when you undertake to teach 
those outside your own culture”.  Such a sense of impotence caused by limits set by the 
experience of exile is strongly reminiscent of Mphahlele’s own feeling of irrelevance 
while a teacher exiled in America as well as a similar problem faced by his wife Rebecca 
in the field of social work.  As Corkery concedes his lack of knowledge about traditional 
African cultures, Mphahlele prevents whatever possible confusion by the reader who 
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might mistakenly assume that Corkery is a white African humanist.  Corkery’s advice to 
African students is dominated by terms that express universal postcolonial views that are 
not confined to marginalised peoples of African attachment only but apply to whatever 
group of people qualifies to be described as “oriental”, “subaltern”, “on the periphery”, 
and so forth.  Corkery’s use in dialogue of terms such as “use the school for the tools it 
could afford us”;  “learn new things”;  “learn how to seize power and to hold on to it”; 
“not to forsake our ancestors for something [European]”; “begin where your elders left 
off”;  “would be guided by their wisdom in deciding what to put into a curriculum”; and 
“stress human relations all the way” – are expressions calling for appropriation of 
western tools to reach a self-definition that counters the very discourse of the centre, 
whose tools have been turned to use opposed to their apparently totalising intention.  
What can be deduced from the example above as Mphahlele’s expanded definition of the 
concept of African humanism is its ability to accommodate the globally-defined 
postcolonial attitude that employs ideas like “appropriation”, “abrogation”, 
“counterdiscourse”, “Empire”, “subaltern”, “oriental”, “othering”, and others already 
explained in this study in the way they are used by postcolonial writers such as Ashcroft 
et al., Said, Spivak, Cabral, Pieterse and others. 
 
Corkery’s African humanist emphasis (in the passage above) on Africanising any modern 
institutions that the Africans cannot but interact with in their continued existence as a 
people, is designated by means of Chimba’s contrasting character.  His facing a charge of 
bigamy in a supposedly modern African court of law in his capacity as a modern African 
occuping the position of cabinet minister is a parody of Mphahlele’s ideal of the modern 
African humanist.  It is important to note that Chimba’s obscure African humanism is 
still the feeble stimulus in his adaptation of consciousness to modern institutions, albeit in 
a greatly jaded state.  The appropriating task such as Chimba faces necessarily includes 
embracing those aspect of colonial existence that are good and merging them dialectically 
with those aspects of African humanism that are good.  This also implies abandonment of 
traditional practices that are bad, such as those recognised by the young and not yet 
corrupted Chimba in discussing genetics with a German district surgeon (31).  The 
modification of consciousness that is taking place within Chirundu’s mind is revealed by 
his statement that: 
I got a picture of the horrors of in-breeding my bowels could hardly bear.  There 
 were several families which suffered heavy casualties, some more than others.  
 One branch of the Chirundu line was a case in point … There were to be found in 
 the Chirundu family an adult with  a monstrously huge head which he had carried 
 since birth; a homicidal maniac; drunks; bums and hoboes; non-starters; petty 
 minds; mental cases and other nameless deviates. (Chirundu 31) 
The above citation makes clear that in-breeding is one of the traditional practices that are 
not good and should be forsaken.  It is important that Chirundu learns this from a German 
national.  By this dialogue Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism defines itself as 
accommodative of acceptable inputs from any well-meaning people one comes in contact 
with, whether they are of African or European origin.   
 
Chimba’s alterity brought about by westernisation should not be mistaken for a complete 
void within him as far as African humanist consciousness is concerned.  That is why 
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Mphahlele makes a point of dispersing rural, traditional patches of Chimba’s childhood 
and growth throughout the novel.   The function of these details is also to indicate that a 
wholesome African humanist upbringing is no guaranteee that an individual will retain 
those wholesome values, demonstrated by the eventual disgraceful way in which Chimba 
conducts himself in family and political life.  One technique by which the author keeps 
constant the reminder that Chimba’s consciousness is an aberration from a basically 
African humanist basis despite his deviant behaviour in adult life is the use of flashbacks 
in which Ambuye’s approach in bringing up the young Chimba is continually 
reconstructed.   This is hinted at when Ambuye continues to inculcate African humanist 
precepts into Chimba’s mind even in his adulthood, as in the following statement:  “… 
that reminds me about your late father, and that always takes my mind to that terrible day 
– I have told you many times before – it shows how one thing goes into another and this 
also goes into another and you see how the ancestors work through the animals and the 
trees and the rivers—you feel the mystery of things child of my son”  (Chirundu 117).  
Reference (in the citation above) to the memory of Chimba’s late father and past 
historical events –  “when Tumbuka people were spilling over the north-eastern border 
from Nyasaland” – is Ambuye’s way of keeping the memory of the dead alive.  Ambuye 
goes on to mention to Chimba that “ancestors work through the animals and the trees and 
the rivers”.  The notions of the universe that Ambuye is repeating to Chimba are what 
Mphahlele has been shown in this study to describe as the vision of African humanism.  
Mphahlele’s technique of using flashback reinforces the reader’s awareness of Chimba’s 
consciousness consisting of some aspects of African humanism, for the above dialogue of 
Ambuye is told in the novel by the I-narrator Chimba in a flashback (116).  For Chimba 
to be able to re-tell incidents that surrounded his birth and growth in a flashback like this 
and include evidence of an African humanist outlook, should leave us with no doubt that 
Chimba, like Tirenje and other African characters, has had all the opportunities for 
developing a wholesome adult consciousness and professional code by having been 
brought up in an environment characterised by African humanist values.  However, 
Chimba does not succeed like the latter in maintaining an African humanist existence, 
once faced with the lures of neo-colonialism.  What is at stake in the novel is how an 
individual or groups of individuals adapt their African humanist consciousness to 
historical change. 
 
In Chirundu it is again indicated that in traditional African cultures women were always 
treated with respect.  Reminiscing nostalgically on what Elena Mwansa taught them 
when she and her peers were still schoolgirls, Tirenje quotes Elena as saying: “Our 
fathers knew what a woman is worth, where her power lies.  But young men of your age, 
even mine, think that because they call  themselves modern, because more women are 
going to school, more things are open for us to do than there were for our mothers, so 
more women are also open to men to take and use” (Chirundu 83-84).  For Elena to start 
her social analysis of the way the modern day African woman is valued by society 
against the backdrop of the traditional regard for women (as expressed by the words “our 
fathers knew what a woman is worth”) is acknowledgement on her part that people living 
within African cultures in modern times are failing to synthesise the modern with the 
traditional in a sensible way.  Mphahlele’s portrayal of the teacher Elena Mwansa as a 
sophisticated, professional woman of formidable intellect (as one gathers from Tirenje’s 
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respectful remembrances of her), yet with a firm grasp of the way Africans traditionally 
treated women, is intended to elucidate her deep-lying African humanist consciousness.  
This is akin to the way Mphahlele generally depicts Moyo as coping with urban life 
without ignoring demonstrations of his African humanist consciousness (in ways shown 
above).  All these purposeful portrayals serve to reinforce Mphahlele’s criticism 
implicitly levelled throughout the text against failures to adapt African humanism to the 
transition from colonialism to post-independence, and not on any complete absence of 
African humanism within the psychological make-up of the African characters such as 
Chimba in Chirundu.  Elena’s admission to her secondary school learners  (above) that 
“more things are open for us to do than there were for our mothers”, is Mphahlele’s 
highlighting of the dynamic quality of African humanism that allows it to redefine the 
traditional role of women without detracting from an enduring commitment to Africanist 
values within the modern  African woman. The wise Elena’s mention of the modernist 
tendency leading to “more women … [being] open to men to take and use” is a 
castigation of the errant utilitarianism to which individuals failing to digest the 
confluence of tradition with modernity are prone. 
 
As the paragraph quoted above proceeds, Elena goes on to affirm Mphahlele’s view of 
black women as strong in a description of struggling South African women that evokes 
memories of the women characters in Down Second Avenue – as when she says:  “… 
those people down there in the south also lost their lands, but they do not sit gaping at the 
sun – they cook food and brew beer to sell – good beer that is as good as food.  They go 
out to the factories, they sew clothes and sell – many things” (84).  
 
The portrayal of black women as stronger than men is exemplified once more when 
Chimba argues that Tirenje should neither assume the position of secretary in his political 
life nor  feels happy about her returning to teaching, because he “believed firmly that 
woman’s place is with her family, in the house”(42).  Chimba’s failure to redefine the 
position of an African woman in modern times is ironically preceded in the monologue 
by his admission that “there had been women heroes in history, like the warrior queen 
Mma Ntatise of South Africa who led her people from one conquest to another in the 
1820s” (42).  To admit that traditionally African women can excel in any role no less 
than men and yet deny your wife such an opportunity (in reclaiming the subjective 
position denied her) in which she is sure to excel hints at a fear within Chimba of the 
power the woman possesses that could even lead to her outperforming him. An 
observation like this is confirmed by a description of one of Elena’s supportive teachings 
to her learners stating that “the man who wants a woman for a thing to kick about is 
himself very weak” (84).  The image of a woman in African society as the source of life 
is painted very strongly also when Moyo describes how as a young rural boy his family 
found it extremely hard to make ends meet (122).  Moyo predicates the pauper status of 
the family on his alcoholic father’s “going down”, whereas the family is salvaged from 
the menacing ruin by the fact that “[his] mother grew pumpkin which she bartered for 
sorghum or maize” (at times when the family is not saved from starvation by charity) 
(122). The imagery of life-giving nourishment elicited by words such as “pumpkin”, 
“sorghum” and “maize” and linked to the role of woman whose agency is borne out by 
her demonstrable resourcefulness (suggested by the word that explains that she 
 258
“bartered”) carves the robust figure of a traditional African woman on whom life hinges.  
The instances above bear out the fact that in keeping with his African humanist 
acknowledgement of the centrality of women in family and community life, Mphahlele’s 
narrative writings portray black women as stronger than men.   
 
It is with a similar impact that Mphahlele contrasts male and female characters in The 
Wanderers.  When Timi goes to investigate the story of Rampa in Sekoting, the patience 
of the hostess he consults brings about memories of Rampo’s wife Karabo and his own 
wife Felang as strong black women: “Woman has such a capacity for waiting, for 
suffering, that makes us males look like rats” (93).  The ebullience exuding from the 
passage quoted below extols to the maximum the sustained image of African women as 
enduring pillars on which spiritual survival of a whole people depends, even as their 
carnal beings perish with the passage of time: 
 There was Ma Letsatsi – Mother-of-the-sun – who waited for the sun and for 
 whatever other cheer life could give.  There was Karabo’s mother, who had 
 waited nine months while her husband was looking for a fortune in the diamond 
 diggings of Kimberlery …The widow was still waiting; this time, for only  death, 
 since the government had hounded all blacks from free-hold property and  turned 
 them all into municipal tenants.  My own mother had suffered phyical violence 
 from my father and waited seven years before she could divorce him, waited until 
 the youngest of her three children was twenty-two and then died. (The Wanderers 
 94) 
Mphahlele’s centralisation of family women alongside his interweaving of private, 
personal life history with historical milestones in the evolution of an entire people 
epitomises the tenacious survival of African humanist identity by means of the metaphor 
of the traditional African woman.  Historical milestones that are depicted as inextricably 
entangled with the resilient evolution of African humanist consciousness are those like 
the forerunner instances of migrant labour, that were triggered by blacks being stripped of 
arable land by the exploring Voortrekkers – a process which scattered breadwinners to 
hunt livelihood as far afield from the then Northern Transvaal as the Kimberley diamond 
mines in the Northern Cape, as well as involving forced removals from free-hold non-
racial residential areas during the history of South Africa such as happened to 
Sophiatown (after the forced urbanisation of Africans).  Such a strong sense of history is 
confirmed in dialogue like Naledi’s words in response to Karabo’s remark on her strength 
in the face of adversity, when she is about to leave and report back to her parents about 
Timi’s and her macabre findings on Goshen farm.  She credits her strength to the 
historical fact that “[she] was widowed before [she] became a widow” (112-113).   By 
this remark Naledi means that all black women under the historical circumstances they 
find themselves in are widows even if their husbands are still alive (such as when a 
husband separates from his family for long spells to go and work in the white-owned 
mines).  As it is African humanist reasoning that equips Naledi to see her own suffering 
in such a broad way, Mphahlele through depicting the character of Naledi teaches the 
reader that his concept of African humanism is tied to sensitivity to historical events in 
order to redefine and reconstitute itself as circumstances change.  As confirmation of the 
historicity of his concept of African humanism, Mphahlele in personal comments 
constantly tells the story of his life and those of other people around him in a way that 
 259
contextualises them in historical events that have impacted on them, as in the following 
extract: 
 By the end of the eighteenth century, several wars of conquest and  resistance had 
 been fought in South Africa.  They had started earlier on the eastern Cape 
 frontiers and by the end of the last century the white settlers had reached the 
 hinterland of the Transvaal.  In the eastern and northern parts of the Transvaal 
 several African peoples such as the Pedi, the Venda and the Shangaan had 
 established viable communities with various chiefdoms.  After conquest and the 
 landgrabbing which followed, the forms of worship, systems of land tenure and 
 the culture of the indigenous peoples were systematically subverted.  The 
 beginning of South Africa’s own industrial revolution that followed the discovery 
 of diamonds and gold as well as the establishment of towns and cities added to 
 the burden of military and cultural conquest upon our people as migration into the 
 cities started to take its toll. (quoted Manganyi, Exiles and Homecomings 30) 
Against the historical background he sketches above, lives of characters in Mphahlele’s 
narrative writings are depicted in a culturally defined environment.  This grounding of art 
in real historical events also confirms the African humanist view of art as a cultural act 
that cannot be seen as a luxurious, hermetic activity. 
 
Interesting also is Steve Cartwright’s remark in The Wanderers about Naledi’s refusal 
formally to marry him, that he “wouldn’t have thought Naledi had it in her [to be] so free 
of the shackles of tradition” (195).  Ironically, it is the very “shackles of tradition” which 
make it difficult for Naledi to marry another man.  Unlike in western Christian cultures, 
the traditional notion of marital commitment is such that Africans are not united ‘till 
death does them part’.  To use a proverb as reference point (as Mphahlele has been 
shown in this study to do) in order to suggest her awareness of African humanist tenets, 
one proverb instructs that lehu ga le hlalwe, meaning literally “death may not be 
divorced”.  Traditionally, a widowed woman after observing the period of mourning joins 
with another male only by means of respectful love in order for children to be sired if 
need be; the children bear the surname of the deceased husband and the private lover can 
lay no claim to their identity.  Neither can the widow associate in any ceremonious 
manner with the family of the secret lover, for she is married until her own death to the 
extended family of the late husband – meaning she plays the role of a makoti or bride 
fully with the extended family of the late husband, as she and all her children will for 
ever belong to and be identified by the surname of the deceased husband.  That the secret 
lover this time is the European Cartwright and not a black African attests to the aspect of 
Mphahlele’s African humanism that regards a person as being African due to such a 
person’s consciousness and behaviour and not because of the colour of the skin.  That 
Naledi and Cartwright enter into a relationship according to Naledi’s customs (and not 
the other way round) could also be interpreted as further evidence of African women 
being stronger than men.  Naledi’s immersion in traditional customs (demonstrated by the 
agency of her self-assertion in defining her relationship with Cartwright) as well as her 
possession of hybrid consciousness demonstrated by her “mixture of vernacular proverbs 
and modern colloquial images” in her dialogue cannot be indicative merely of her 
earthiness as the writer Ursula Barnett seems to suggest (A Vision of Order 145).   On the 
contrary, hybrid images that combine an African humanist world-view with colonial 
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experiences reveal her strength in transcending the onslaught of apartheid and exile, 
which is consistent with Mphahlele’s notion of black women as stronger than men. 
 
The novel Chirundu stresses the importance of an historical perspective right from the 
time when Chimba makes seductive advances to the schoolgirl Tirenje:  “Here we are 
learning about the American Revolution and our children do not know where our people 
came from, how great they were once” (15).  Moyo also keeps the memory of his 
ancestors green to acknowledge their heroism, a personal perspective (or spiritual 
commitment) that is intertwined with the historical perspective from which, according to 
African humanist orientation, Africans must interpret their own present as well as shape 
their own future.  This is achieved when Moyo laments the fall of the Chirundu house 
and harnesses the memory to serve as an inspiration to act heroically among the Africans 
of his own lifespan, as he ponders: “Grandfather Mutiso was born in the dark times of 
chifwamba – the Arab and Yao slave raids in Nyasaland” (123).  The thought of his 
ancestors as one of several conquered peoples [during the difficult epoch (circa 1884) in 
the history of his own state] who yet survived the period of historical oppression to see 
the day their sacrifices were rewarded by the dawn of political freedom in a unified 
modern state, spurs Moyo on to continue the heroic struggle in which he is immersed as 
an organiser of workers.  On the importance of reconstituting Christianity, Mphahlele 
through the mouth of Moyo tells the epic tale of the hero Joni Chilembwe who during the 
chifwamba “was Christian and said his church was going to save the people from the rule 
of the white man” (123).  Reference to this abrogation of western Christianity and its use 
as a reconstituted religion in the fight for liberation re-affirms Mphahlele’s homage to the 
role of religious nationalism in bringing about creative hybridity in the practices of post-
independence Africans (as he does with Zionist sects in other texts analysed in this 
study). 
 
Mphahlele is not the only Drum writer who finds it imperative to highlight the historical 
context within which Africans have behaved in determinate ways.  Todd Matshikiza’s 
Chocolates for My Wife describes how, when a housekeeper welcomes him to Mr 
Rutherford’s house near Kensington Palace, his memories of the 1929 visit to South 
Africa by the Prince of Wales are revived (45).  More importantly, Matshikiza devotes 
time and space to describing the meaning of the Prince’s visit to his fellow Africans back 
home, in the following potent words: 
 My father and his fellow advisory committee of important black men did not have 
 the Royal opportunity of meeting and shaking hands with the Prince of Wales but 
 they were placed in an honorary box from where they could bow in the direction 
 of His Royal Highness in full view of the general public.  They were allowed also 
 to take charge of the ceremonial slaughter where several beasts were sacrificed 
 and thousands of the location residents partook of the traditional royal roast.  
 (Chocolates for My Wife 45) 
Although Todd’s educated father may have comprehended the purpose and importance of 
the Prince’s visit to South Africa (as one of the British Commonwealth member states), 
the white rulers do not allow him and his peers a prominence in the ceremony and 
closeness to the Prince equal to theirs.  In the way writers like Ashcroft et al. (1998) have 
defined ambivalence as fear by the “centre” that the hybridity of the subaltern or others 
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may lead to the dangerous situation where the subaltern may outdo members of the 
“centre” in enacting the very lifestyles the colonizer imposed on them, the white South 
African government of the time can be said to have feared the erudition and eloquence of 
Africans like Matshikiza’s father.  Hence the refusal to allow them a chance to prove how 
cultivated they are in European manners as well as African courtesies and dignity.  As for 
the black rank and file attending the ceremony, their ritual concentration on the 
sacrificing of several cattle to their ancestors should be seen as appropriation of this 
western-style ceremony and its re-direction towards serving African spiritual needs in 
order to communicate whatever petitions they might have had to their ancestors.  In 
Mphahlele’s definition, the Africans attending the ceremony to whom (in terms of the 
Eurocentric vision) it might have been inscrutable, display a survival of their African 
humanism despite the condition of colonisation. In other words, the Africans have turned 
the otherwise ‘othering’ gesture of the white government into a self-constituting one in 
which they sacrifice beasts for liberation and in demonstration of their own dignity as 
much as the Prince’s. 
 
Not only are political history and religious nationalism employed in Mphahlele’s two 
novels to convey African humanist resonances and perspective.  Other constituents of 
resonance like myth contribute to the creation of perspective in The Wanderers and 
Chirundu.   That is why, in the ditty sung by the wife of Papa Joas’s neighbour (who is 
irritated by Papa Joas’s slothful pastime of always drinking and playing music from a 
tattered gramophone), the lines “Somewhere is an old man/ who sent his teeth/to fetch a 
rabbit/they never came back” create a mythical atmosphere of the kind that usually 
accompanies traditional oral storytelling (The Wanderers 13).  It is in folktales that 
parables like the one conjured up by the ditty are told by means of song and narrative.  
Mphahlele makes a similar allusion when he depicts how Chimba retorts when Hacket 
confronts him after receiving a letter from the missionaries, to whose souls Tirenje’s 
father had surrendered – accusing him of having sinfully impregnated the schoolgirl 
Tirenje:  “So the conference of birds must have said when they hauled up the owl to 
accuse him of going about at night and sleeping in day-time” (Chirundu 18).  The 
mythical images of the congregating birds and the owl in the above examples from The 
Wanderers and Chirundu respectively create localised variants of a unique, African 
humanist perspective for Mphahlele’s narrative writings.  After the mythical image of 
nsato the python has been implemented in earlier incidents that reveal its mythical power 
(as already demonstrated earlier in this study), Tirenje sustains the image, pointing to the 
immortality of nsato and the qualities the mythical creature embodies when she 
begrudgingly bids farewell to Chimba in the following way:  “One last wish Chimba – 
when I die – wherever it may be – do not come to my funeral … nsato will watch over 
the grave” (94).  More importantly, she legitimately appropriates the mythical image and 
(just as she is divorcing herself from Chirundu) ‘divorces’ the image of nsato from 
Chirundu so much that the mythical creature turns into some kind of Frankenstein 
monster for him.  In this way, nsato as an allegorical representation of Chimba’s greed 
for unbridled power boomerangs to consume its own master, most like the endings of 
folktales in which misdeeds are usually turned dramatically against the hero.  Mphahlele 
consistently employs this invocation of myth and orature in the two novels (as he has 
done in other genres scrutinised earlier on in this study) to indicate that resonance as an 
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artistic device implemented within African cultures constantly includes such allegorical 
items as myths, fables and folktales.  In this way the ‘unbroken song’ that manifests itself 
in repeated humanist patterns in the social practices of Africans continues ad infinitum.  
 
Reference to nsato as constituting mythical resonance in Chirundu need not detract from 
an alternative interpretation by the critic Gagiano when she states:  “The central symbol 
of nsato, the python, is Mphahlele’s expression of the combination of sexual, social and 
political forces which dominate this society” (39).  I agree that the sustained image of 
“nsato gone mad” is a precise description by Mphahlele of Chimba’ s failure as well as 
failure of those behaving like him to redefine the traditional “sexual, social and political 
forces” within society, as their traditional definition is compelled by post-independence 
realities to transform . 
 
The two novels exemplify human behaviour that may be interpreted as representing 
African humanist consciousness such as conceptions of the relationship between life and 
death evident in African cultures, invocation of ancestral intervention in activities of 
carnal life, mystical attachment to places seen as home, as well as counterhegemonic 
appropriation of religious practice.  Mphahlele’s style uses Sotho proverbs and idiomatic 
expressions that are translated literally into English, even in the dialogue of a character 
like Tirenje whose indigenous language is not Sotho.  This is an indication that the same 
expressions are assumed to have their equivalents in the local languages, so that what 
matters is not the surface structure of an expression but its underlying formulation, which 
transcends linguistic barriers.  This attitude makes clear that cultural groups that are 
described as African bear a common identity only in terms of underlying attitudes which 
are African humanist and spawned by common geo-political environmental factors, and 
not in terms of observable cultural behaviour which is localised.  In his quest to 
demonstrate this and other aspects of African humamism, Mphahlele has had to 
appropriate English in such a manner that his imagery and dialogue bear a purposeful, 
functional quality characterised by his unique translation of Sotho idiom into English.   
 
He does so differently from the other black South African writers of the 1950s whose 
attempts to appropriate English have been demonstrated in this study to have fitted more 
the model of critics like Chapman who see these writers’ “wrestling [English] into new 
forms” as “saturat[ing it] with the imagery and rhythm of tsotsitaal and everyday speech 
which provided a vivid articulation of street culture … [and] could carry the weight of the 
new African urban experience in a way that vernacular languages and ‘pure’ English 
could not” (“Sophiatown Writers of the Fifties” 145).  Clearly the intention of the 1950s 
writers matching Chapman’s description was not common with Mphahlele’s – which was 
reinforcement of the value of thought originally expressed in indigenous languages.  For 
the former group of writers Chapman’s observation remains true – to them as to him – 
that “the new African urban experience” could not be captured by “vernacular languages” 
(“Sophiatown Writers of the Fifties” 145).   On the contrary, part of Mphahlele’s mission 
in his writing career has been to illustrate that vernacular languages as carriers of the 
African humanist outlook can and should be harnessed to express Africans’ experience in 
any new situation, including the urban milieu of the fifties.  As this study attempts to 
show, one device Mphahlele employs is imagery that revives African ways of thinking 
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and living together with dialogue that effectively captures colloquial speech forms and 
communal utterances and verdicts.  One achievement of imagery and dialogue devised in 
this way is more complete communication of African humanist sensibility, in keeping 
with Mphahlele’s commitment mentioned above.  For a reader who prefers conventional 
English in order to carry and transmit the social culture of western English speakers, or to 
stop at transmitting the superficial culture of blacks borne of transient environmental 
factors (such as urbanisation under apartheid conditions), this could lead to a perception 
of  unpalatability and intractability – as seems to be the case with a critic like Lewis 
Nkosi, when he resents Mphahlele’s “language [that is] at once dry, brittle and sterile, 
with dialogue that is uniformly heavy and awkward in syntax, whoever happens to be 
talking” (Tasks and Masks 97).  It is the sustained inherence of African humanist thought 
and expression whose constancy in Mphahlele’s narrative writings comes across to critics 
like Lewis Nkosi as “uniformly heavy and awkward in syntax, whoever happens to be 
talking”, however fascinating and effective this style may prove to be – as this study is 
attempting to demonstrate (97). 
 
Understanding of African humanism as Mphahlele defines it is deepened by illustration 
through characterisation that one need not belong to a certain race to be African, or to 
respect African humanist conduct among people to whose group identity one does not 
belong, as such characters as Bongo editor Steve Cartwright (The Wanderers) and the 
Irish teacher Corkery (Chirundu) respectively demonstrate.  African humanism as an 
intellectual, spiritual and social reality is also clarified in The Wanderers and Chirundu as 
characterised by a non-homogenising way of looking at life, as evinced by white 
characters who interact sensitively with Africans despite the existence of other whites 
who fail to do so due to whatever non-African consciousness may be responsible for their 
behaviour.  In this way, African humanism is posited as a distinctive identity of a cluster 
of peoples with symptomatically varying forms of cultural behaviour neither more nor 
less important than other groups exhibiting their own distinctive identities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 264
4.6 CLOSING REMARKS 
 
Mbembe (2002) has rightly observed that African modes of writing the self are 
inseparably tied to the problematics of self-constitution and the modern philosophy of the 
subject (240).  Mbembe’s remark holds for Mphahlele in that the concept of African 
humanism (as he proposes it) is an attempt at self-writing.  It is a mode of self-writing 
because it contributes to the Africans’ self-constitution (as has been illustrated in this 
study through textual scrutiny of his narrative writings).  It is “tied to the modern 
philosophy of the subject”, too, because (as some parts of this study show) his concept of 
African humanism counterdiscursively negates the “centre’s” definition of Africans as 
objects, asserting their subjective self-definition and their capacity to interpret reality 
according to indigenous norms. The authorial voice and textual messages in The 
Wanderers and Chirundu show that Mbembe’s observation is as true of Mphahlele as it is 
of the other Afrocentric writers cited in this study. 
 
Mbembe laments the fact that some Afrocentric thinkers in an attempt at self-writing 
have failed to free themselves of the “victim complex” (242) in the following statement:  
“These three fundamental elements of slavery, colonization, and apartheid are said to 
serve as a unifying center of Africans’ desire to know themselves, to recapture their 
destiny (sovereignty), and to belong to themselves in the world (autonomy)” (“African 
Modes of Self-Writing” 242). The above statement by Mbembe foregrounds the 
weakness of the “victim complex” as an extraneously based exclusivism, which he terms 
a mistaken form of the Africans’ desire “to belong to themselves” (242).  According to 
him, the undeniable facts of history (which are slavery, colonisation and apartheid) 
should not narrowly unify Africans in order for them to wallow in paralysing self-pity, 
because in this way their unity will be based on an obsession with their victim status.  
When Africans unite “to recapture their destiny” it should not be because they define 
themselves in object terms as victims, but they should do this as subjective agents whose 
definition disregards the victimising actions of any other group.  In the same way that 
characters in Chirundu (for example) struggle with reconstitution in subjective responses 
to the new historical reality of post-independence, Africans’ self-definition should be 
premised on the new historical realities which challenge groups of whatever identity not 
to freeze in the past but to adapt to new realities. 
 
While the two novels considered in this chapter feed on the experiences of “slavery, 
colonization, and apartheid” (“African Modes” 262) for their subject matter, Mphahlele’s 
postulation of African humanism as an attitude that shifts attention away from 
preoccupation with colonisation or apartheid towards a strengthening of Africans 
themselves spiritually, so that they may live their lives fully as a self-defining distinctive 
group, should be properly understood to be aimed at ridding Africans of what Mbembe 
calls  the “victim complex”.  Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism similarly finds 
expression (although in different terminology) also in the writings of some other African 
writers.  This can be witnessed in Mphahlele’s call to Africans to move away from 
defining their existence in relation to actions and attitudes of the coloniser, to achieve 
interdependence among themselves as well as across the colour bar.  He proposes as a 
solution for this engagement in what some African writers have called “positive action” 
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(such as Nkrumah, Nyerere and Kenyatta in the late 50s and early 60s).  It has already 
been shown in this study, for example, that during Zambia’s struggle for liberation 
leaders like Kaunda campaigned for self-initiated nation-building projects by Zambians 
(rather than reacting to colonisers’ conduct). 
 
This should illustrate that Mbembe’s  caution to some Africans failing to rid themselves 
of the “victim complex” identifies a problem formerly detected and tackled by Mphahlele 
(and some African writers such as those just  mentioned).  Mphahlele writes, for example 
in his 1990 essay “From Dependence to Interdependence: Towards Nation Building” that 
concentration by some African leaders on conditions of apartheid rather than on a spirit 
of non-exlusive self-sufficiency has led in the late 1980s to De Klerk pulling “the carpet 
from under [their] feet” as all their “energies have been totally obsessed with surviving 
the barbarism of the white man’s rule” (“From Dependence” 199).  African humanism as 
exemplified in The Wanderers and Chirundu teaches Africans to initiate constructive 
nation-building activities rather than focusing on idealisation or demonisation of the 
enemy as their focus.  That is why, for example, Tirenje (in Chirundu) acts in the entire 
novel not against any action of the coloniser, but against the behaviour of her African 
husband.  That Chimba acts within the context of post-independence is a mere 
background of his personal failure to reconstitute his African humanist consciousness to 
accord with a new historical reality. Postcolonialism is a mere background to the native 
characters’ actions in Chirundu, in the same way as apartheid and exile are the 
background in the case of South African characters in both The Wanderers and Chirundu, 
with failure or success measured in the attempt to reshape African humanist 
consciousness to cope with apartheid or exile circumstances – which rightly takes the 
forefront.   An African humanist consciousness thus takes precedence in Mphahlele’s 
writings over obsession with victimisation by either apartheid or exile. 
 
As illustrated by his creation of characters whose African humanism transcends race and 
skin colour (in The Wanderers and Chirundu), Mphahlele should be exonerated also from 
Mbembe’s charge of Africans carrying out self-writing in a manner that unfortunately 
replicates the Hegelian ethnographic practice of striving for an exclusivist, absolutely 
essentialist self-constitution (244).  The awareness of complexity demonstrated in the 
behaviour of characters like Corkery (Chirundu) and Cartwright (The Wanderers), 
together with the hybridity of characters like Chimba Chirundu, should prove that 
Mphahlele does not define his African humanism in absolute or essentialist terms that 
either exclude or include people on the basis of biological origin. 
 
What a writer like Mbembe observes as flaws in self-writing attempts by some African 
writers are also the concerns of writers like Mphahlele.  As antecedent parts of this study 
attempt to illustrate, many characters in Mphahlele’s autobiographies and novels are 
epitomes of exemplary conduct by Africans, portraying them as acting without unhealthy 
preoccupation with apartheid and exile and demonstrating their capacity to survive as 
members of a social group with binding, distinctively African behavioural features. 
 
By exonerating himself (through the representations of African humanism in his narrative 
writings) from the theoretical frailties generally dogging Afrocentric writers as pointed 
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out by writers like Mbembe (cited above), Mphahlele ipso facto responds to the concerns 
explored by Ndebele’s theory.  Ndebele censures the predicating of Africans’ self-
definition on the egregious effects of life under apartheid, in the following words: 
 One other way by which the South African writer can move effectively into the 
 post-protest era is by working towards a radical displacement of the white 
 oppressor as an active, dominant player in the imagination of the oppressed.  This 
 tactical absence will mean that the writer can consolidate the sense of a viable, 
 psychologically self-sufficient community among the oppressed.   (“Redefining” 
 71) 
 
It should now be opportune to turn to Father Come Home and examine whether 
Mphahlele still in this final novel uses language and setting to communicate his concept 
of African humanism. 
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5. BACK  TO  MAUPANENG 
 
5.1 OPENING  REMARKS 
 
In a 1998  interview with Samin, Mphahlele professes that in writing Father Come Home 
he specifically wanted to give the novel a rural setting and tried to “create a pace here 
that corresponds to the pace of rural life, its contemplative aura” (“Interview” 194).  This 
is interesting because in “Redefining Relevance” (published in 1991), the theorist 
Ndebele regrets “the lack” in black South African writing since the era of protest 
literature “of compelling imaginative recreations of rural life in our literature” 
(“Redefining” 71).  He stresses the need for “rural culture as a serious fictional theme … 
to be revisited” (“Redefining” 71).   
Of the importance of the consciousness of the rural populace in theorising about the 
liberation struggle, Fanon has remarked that: 
 The embryonic proletariat of the towns is in a comparatively privileged 
 position … So we understand that the followers of the nationalist political parties 
 are above all town-dwellers … The overwhelming majority of nationalist parties 
 show a deep distrust towards the people of the rural areas … The country people 
 are suspicious of the townsman …What is more, the colonialists make use of this 
 antagonism in their struggle against the nationalist parties.  (“Spontaneity” 86, 
 89) 
 
Such positions by Ndebele and Fanon as quoted above should be considered side by side 
with Mphahlele’s declared objective (as a postcolonial writer) in setting out to compose 
Father Come Home (“Interview” 194). For Mphahlele to see the need to write a novel in 
which to “create a pace” that corresponds to the “contemplative aura” of rural life is to 
reaffirm his own belief in interpreting the lot of his people in such an inclusive manner 
that   “literature … can step outside the rough-and-tumble of human concerns and activity 
and monitor, record and refine them” (“Interview” 194; “Versus the Political Morality” 
361-62, emphases added).  According to the broader theoretical context represented by 
Ndebele, not only is redefinition of relevant literature to focus on “rural culture as a 
serious fictional theme” (“Redefining” 71), but the proposed shift of literary approach 
and focus is important for the development of African literature produced in (post-) 
apartheid South Africa due to the “compelling imaginative” effect or social result it may 
have (“Redefining” 71).  Ndebele advocates that such a rural-focused literature should 
employ techniques that stimulate intellectual growth and should be shorn of depicting 
simplistic reactions to existential challenges that accompanied life under apartheid – as 
the phrase “compelling imaginative” implies.  According to this theory, it can only be a 
credit to Mphahlele to have reversed the neglect of rural people by “actors” within the 
environment of struggle for liberation.  Ndebele discourages a literary and theoretical 
atmosphere in which “to know has been to know how badly one has been treated [and] 
every other thing is irrelevant unless it is perceived as contributing to the extension of 
this knowledge” (“Redefining” 59). 
 
True to Mphahlele’s declared approach and in harmony with Ndebele’s theoretical 
stance, Father Come Home is Mphahlele’s only narrative set in a fully rural milieu (apart 
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from some of the short stories dealt with earlier).   Its symbolically potent rural imagery 
is conducive to the depiction of more overt and frequently observable forms of African 
humanism, which are nevertheless no simplistic representation of Africans’ way of 
thinking and living.  The novel’s echoes of Down Second Avenue make its analysis last in 
this study a satisfactory rounding off, after the study opened with considerations of the 
longer narratives, in discussing Down Second Avenue. 
 
The surface simplicity of language in Father Come Home (as in Down Second Avenue)  
(belying its underlying vitality and turbulence) should be seen to support Mphahlele’s 
literary intention which is, as Reingard Nethersole has observed, “to fill the gap of 
African self-knowledge for a young reading public” (“Places of” 503).  The deceitful 
ordinariness of the storyline and its apparent targeting of teenage readership leads Ruth 
Obee to describe it (in her essay “Father Come Home” 202) as “juvenile fiction”.  
Distinctive incarnations of the ordinariness, and artistry not easily accessible to an 
unseasoned reader characterise this text.   Mphahlele’s approach in Father Come Home 
“that seeks to preserve the legacy of the wisdom of his people in an unbroken song”, as 
recognized by Reingard Nethersole (“Places of” 503), is akin to what Edward Said has 
seen (in his 2003 essay) as necessary for the preservation of Palestinians as a rounded 
people in the face of Israeli injustices comparable with those suffered by blacks in 
apartheid South Africa –  
 What is amazing to me is the persistence of the Palestinian story, and the many 
 different turns it takes, and the fact that it isn’t an organized story, because we are 
 a stateless and exiled people.  One has to keep telling the story in as many ways as 
 possible, as insistently as possible, and in as compelling a way as possible, to 
 keep attention to it, because there is always a fear that it might just disappear.  
 (“Rendezvous” 187, emphases added) 
In this citation Said recognises (as the parts I have italicised demonstrate) the need for the 
artistic interpretation of a people’s existence to adapt itself to different times in the 
history of the emancipation of such a people, and for it to be done in a manner that 
appeals to profound intellectual engagement with detail rather than employing simplistic 
emotional reaction to the unanalysed, bigger picture. 
 
It is within the light of such declarations in Mphahlele’s expository writings as have been 
cited in the opening remarks of this chapter that the text Father Come Home will be 
looked at.  The analysis of this Mphahlele novel will also be done in cognisance of the 
theoretical framework as articulated by critics such as Edward Said and Njabulo Ndebele.  
Ruth Obee sees the fictive focus on rural affirmation as essential in the re-establishment 
of African cultural confidence in the face of the culturally disorienting effect of apartheid,  
for the reason that “apartheid social engineers went to great trouble to link the blacks’ 
rural roots “with barbarism and backwardness” (“Father Come Home” 204). 
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5.2 RURAL  LIFE  BEYOND  EXILE 
 
If Chirundu is remembered in part (as Ogude, Raditlhalo, Ramakuela, Ramogale and 
Thuynsma have remarked) for its  “fresh variation on a common theme [which is] the 
confrontation between a traditional African sensibility and a Western one” (459), Father 
Come Home will be remembered for depicting African humanist behaviour in a more 
extensively rural context than Down Second Avenue.    The protagonist Maredi’s search 
for balanced parental care takes him from rural Sedibeng through the even more rural 
tracts of bushveld lying between it and Fort Victoria and, in 1975 when nearly eighty 
years of age, back to his own house in rural Chuene district, “near the pass at the foot of 
the tall Mountain of Mogodumo, [which he calls] the Mountain of the Gods” (95). 
 
Mphahlele broadens and deepens Maredi’s search for more adequate parental care to 
make it a search for a more meaningful relationship with the cosmos, as perceived from 
an African humanist angle: 
 For their way of worship, the people of Mashite had no church, because they had 
 no church-day like Sunday.  They believed in the Supreme Being, whose presence 
 they felt where human relations were harmonious, in animal life, in plant life, in 
 the mountains and valleys and the elements: water, air, light – everywhere. They 
 believed that their ancestors – the kinfolk and ancient leaders – were always 
 living and present to guide them into the paths of decency, of goodness, of 
 harmony among people.  They prayed to the Supreme Being through the 
 ancestors, without assembling for the express purpose of praying. (36) 
This is Mphahlele’s description of African humanist existence, as has also earlier been 
shown in this study.  Twelve-year-old Maredi Tulamo, having been born of African 
parents living in Sedibeng (separated thinly from Mashite by its being ‘Christian’ while 
Mashite is ‘heathen’) should on the whole be at peace with himself (36).  Despite boys 
and girls from Sedibeng being made to believe that Mashite people are witches with 
whom it is dangerous to mingle, the cultural divisions between the two villages are more 
imaginary than actual, as signified by the image of the river in the valley dividing the two 
villages having “long dried up” and by the fact of children from both sides of the dead 
river attending circumcision school despite Christian precepts forbidding it (36).  The one 
aspect for which the boy Maredi still needs to claim self-constitution is in the sphere of 
religious belief as revealed by his resolve to attend circumcision school “this winter” 
rather than later (3).  The other aspect, in terms of the passage above, concerns complete 
participation in African humanist religious conduct, “where human relations [are] 
harmonious” (36).  The major reason for disharmony in Maredi’s human relations is 
caused by the situation in which he has to “keep asking Mother when Papa will come 
back”, because his father has left the family before he was born (3).   
 
Such a repetitive, urgent, question by Maredi regarding the crucial family value of a 
manchild growing up under the close tutelage of a father broaches one of the major 
themes of this novel – that of eroded family values.  Far from being a stock theme for 
protest literature, this theme is Mphahlele’s contribution to a “rediscovery of the 
ordinary”.  Ndebele’s theory on the relevance of literature emphasises that:  
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Most paradoxically, for the writer, the immediate problem, just at the point at 
 which he sits down to write his novel, is not the seizure of power.  Far from it.  
 His immediate aim is a radically contemplative state of mind in which the  objects 
 of contemplation are that range of social conditions which are the major 
 ingredients of social consciousness.  Exclusion of any on the grounds that they 
 do not easily lend themselves to dramatic political statement will limit the 
 possibilities of any literary revolution, by severely limiting the social range on 
 which to exercise its imagination.  (“Redefining” 69) 
Mphahlele’s Father Come Home revolves on the social issue of family relations, which 
theme at first impression ignores the burning political issue of the time which (as Ndebele 
indicates) is “the seizure of power” (“Redefining” 69). 
 
Apart from handling the supposedly inane theme of family relations under apartheid 
conditions, the novel has a rural setting.  Ndebele has expressed the desperate need for 
intellectual focus on black rural life under apartheid in the following words:  
 The South African industrial revolution occasioned a massive flow of labour from 
 the rural areas into the towns and cities of the country … [after which] the 
 perception appears to have consolidated within the ranks of  the liberation 
 struggle that the decisive element in determining the course of the coming South 
 African future, is the workers in the cities … But what of the millions of Africans 
 in the rural areas who, at that very decisive moment, might decide the fate of the 
 hinterland?  What of the deliberate peasantisation of urban Africans by the 
 government through the Banstustans?  (“Turkish Tales” 21). 
Ndebele’s words quoted above identify the disregard on the part of creative writers (such 
as a section of the intelligentsia within the “liberation struggle”) of themes that 
microscopically analyse black rural life under apartheid for meaningful links with and 
involvement in the struggle for liberation.  It is for this reason that Mphahlele’s decision 
to write Father Come Home with the “the pace of rural life, its contemplative aura”, is 
significant in terms of further evolving post-protest literature in South Africa 
(“Interview” 194). 
 
The rural nature of the environment into which Maredi is born is attested to by 
Mphahlele’s indication (illustrated above) of Sedibeng and Mashite people commonly 
leading lives imbued within African humanist values.  This common lifestyle is only 
superficially masked by varying degrees of westernisation in one community as the 
‘Christians’ clubbing together in “mass prayers during drought or some other disaster” 
resembles the ‘heathens’ of Mashite coming together to feast and sing and dance “at the 
beginning of the ploughing season, soon after the first rains” and during other beacons of 
day to day life, invariably adjusting to seasonal change (35, 37).  Against such a 
environmentally sedate background, the beating by Eliyase that follows Maredi’s 
inquisitive venture into “the forbidden forest to the north-west of Sedibeng” (where the 
overtly traditional Mashite people reside and perform their rituals) can only be the 
manifestation of the paternal uncle Eliyase’s unpleasant personality and not that of 
clashing cultures between the two adjoining villages (27, 35).  That is why Dineo and 
Hunadi eventually concur that the former is right to refuse Eliyase’s proposal to marry 
her as his second wife, because “he is a terror and he is selfish and he has no heart for 
 271
anybody but himself”.  Hunadi even calls her brother “that louse Eliyase” (48).  That this 
happens when Maredi’s mother Dineo and paternal aunt Hunadi (who also suffers from 
anguish because neither her husband nor son ever returned from Johannesburg, where 
they went to seek jobs) nearly fall out since each takes out her frustrations on the other as 
they contemplate the woes inflicted by urbanisation on their extended family, is the 
author’s way of highlighting that Eliyase (though technically at home) is actually absent 
in the sense of his failure to practise African humanist values  (just like the other three 
male members of the extended family who have vanished away in Johannesburg).   The 
metaphor of “louse” reveals Eliyase’s disgusting disposition as parasite on the woman 
suffering because of the dark machinations of apartheid, exploiting the family and 
community to indulge his indolence and selfishness. 
 
Eliyase’s personality flaws include failure to accommodate other people’s views (made 
more crassly evident when he defies communal opinion about the responsibility of a 
family man to work hard in the fields and fulfil other social roles).  Hence he capitalises 
on the major cause of disharmony in Maredi’s family relationships – that of the boy’s 
father Lemeko’s disappearance.  Lemeko’s disappearance is caused by white-ruled 
apartheid conditions which prove too powerful to allow his balanced absorption into 
urban existence.  The actual event symptomatic of Lemeko’s difficulty in adjusting to the 
harshness of the life of blacks under apartheid remains unknown to both Maredi and other 
family members until the re-union at the Sukumakara railway station, after which the 
family settles together in Rhodesia’s Fort Victoria.   As a freshly-wed man working in 
Pretoria, Lemeko one day experiences the trampling to death of a friend (the same man 
who is also a close neighbour back home in Sedibeng) by one of the horses ridden by the 
police who chase behind the malaeta men as they return from their usual Sunday 
afternoon boxing sport (88). 
 
What is significant about the tragic event during one of the malaeta routines is 
Mphahlele’s description, which leads the reader to blame Lemeko’s traumatised reaction 
to it not on Lemeko himself, but on the apartheid system behind it, in the following 
words: 
These young men, some of them mere boys, work in the kitchens in white homes 
… They love the game – they shake heads and arms full of bangles – hear them 
shout “Whoooooo!  My blood is boiling.  I’m the boy from Machaka, Polokwane 
– Peeteesburg!” They are not killers – they want to feel their manhood – test it – 
prove it – that they’re men not women just because they do woman’s work in the 
kitchens.  Where are the manly things to do today – where are the heroes made 
like in the olden days?  Police come after them on horses – drive them from 
behind – they believed malaeta kill everybody in the way … Now then the horses 
– strong horses – the rider pokes it and it charges and the groups of [malaeta] 
break up and the men go mad and think this is another test of their manhood – 
they must run and outrun the horses … [while] the riders are laughing … A friend 
of mine who was in the ring – I see him clearly – he trips and falls in front of the 
horse standing on two legs.  The hoofs come down on him – gi-gi – one, two, 
three, his head is smashed – the second time the hoofs nail him to the road – 
Boom Street – that was it. (87-88)  
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In addition to the image of the malaeta creating cultural perspective for the reader in the 
style that permeates all of Mphahlele’s narrative writings considered in this study, with 
similar effect), the subsequent image of mounted, powerful white men laughing as the 
vulnerable victims are trampled under the hooves of the horses (for fun!) evokes horror 
and pathos that highlight the cruelty of apartheid – symbolised by these mounted police.  
The intensity of Lemeko’s shock at this incident will be best understood once his African 
humanist consciousness is properly seen as sharpening the horrifying effect of the 
unAfrican group attitudes represented by these policemen.   This is because African 
humanism, as Mphahlele defines it, is “originally a religious state of mind producing 
moral action; attachment to the soil, social relationships, the art of healing, the sense of 
community and its welfare …” (“The Fabric” 154).  Lemeko’s desertion of his family is 
understood to have been propelled by this shocking, spiritually disruptive experience. 
 
The structure of the novel foregrounds rural African life as conducive to the thriving of 
successful adaptations of the African humanist mentality.  Action throughout the novel 
unfolds in this rural setting, oscillating between Sedibeng and places like Sukumakara, 
Phalaborwa and Messina.  The incidents reach a point when there is a danger of breaking 
the sustained imagery of rural exuberance and abandon through the return of Lemeko to 
urban Fort Victoria with the family.   Mphahlele counterbalances this by obscuring the 
predominance of urban setting during his schooling in urban areas and his forays into 
married life and in the job world.  This is achieved because the chapter immediately 
following the arrival of the Tulamos in semi-urban Fort Victoria is the Epilogue in which 
emphasis returns to memories of rural nurture and nourishment by means of 72-year-old 
Maredi’s conversation with Mashabela’s daughter Batseba (at a wedding in rural 
Seshego) (92). 
 
The novel is a tribute to the capacity of rural Africa to contain and preserve social 
patterns and consciousnesses that constitute African humanism.  This becomes clearer in 
the light of Thuynsma’s observation that “personal experience, whether fictionalised or 
not, forms [Mphahlele’s] creative impulse” (221).  It is thus important to read Father 
Come Home in terms of the knowledge that it was written after Mphahlele’s return from 
exile and after he had settled with much satisfaction in rural Lebowakgomo.   Mphahlele 
enjoyed settling among fellow Africans in an environment he is familiar with and in 
which he can function meaningfully by contributing towards the welfare of the 
community, no longer hampered by the debilitating impotence of exile.  Exile can never 
be fulfilling because one of its aspects, according to Mphahlele, is “the attitude of the 
exile to the circumstances prevailing in his homeland that are bound to influence him 
psychologically” (“Africa in Exile” 117).  In Mphahlele’s view, what one does after 
returning to South Africa from exile is as fulfilling as opting to remain home under 
apartheid, “because … that very act would [have given one] a purpose – that thing for 
which one lives when one wants to create beauty out of chaos and make sense of it” 
(“Africa in Exile” 123).  This source of Mphahlele’s gratification, stemming from his 
African humanist outlook, is summed up by his friend Sonia Sanchez in a tribute to 
Mphahlele that she wrote upon the parting of their ways as Mphahlele returned 
permanently to South Africa:  “heard you say, sonia. i must be buried in my country in 
my own homeland, my bones must replenish the black earth from whence they came, our 
 273
bones must fertilize the ground on which we walk or we shall never walk as men and 
women in the 21st century” (“A Letter to Ezekiel Mphahlele” 29).  Clearly, in this quote 
Mphahlele ties the success of the liberation struggle in South Africa with his physical 
presence and involvement there (as opposed to exile). That when he returned he chose to 
live in rural Lebowakgomo has to do with his significant conviction regarding the 
preservation of African humanist values. The novel Father Come Home expresses 
Mphahlele’s satisfaction with the rural setting, which according to him remains the place 
where African humanism survives more meaningfully and profoundly than in the cities, 
as his portrayal of characters like Moyo (in Chirundu) demonstrates. 
 
Indeed, it is not far-fetched to interpret Maredi’s satisfaction with finding a stable home 
in a rural setting as a symbol of the satisfaction Mphahlele himself derives from having 
settled (after traversing the globe) in rural Lebowakgomo.  There is a curious parallel in 
the way Maredi and Mphahlele both content themselves with settling in a rural 
environment close to that of their childhood upbringing without actually returning to their 
place of birth.  We know that Maredi was born in Sedibeng, but now has “[retired] to a 
house in Chuene’s district, near the pass at the foot of the tall Mountain of Mogodumo” 
(95).  Mphahlele, too, settled in rural Lebowakgomo instead of Maupaneng when he 
returned from exile. The critic Reingard Nethersole is sharply conscious of this 
parallelism between the lives of Maredi and Mphahlele, as revealed by her remark that 
“The epilogue refers to a chance meeting … [at which] the two old women provide the 
reader with an overview of Maredi’s adult later life of unsettled wanderings” (“Places of” 
502).  It is common knowledge that “unsettled wanderings” are a fitting description of 
Mphahlele’s adult life before returning from exile and settling in Lebowakgomo.  As 
such, Maredi’s search for his father and the ultimate reunion between the two could be 
understood to symbolise Mphahlele’s search for ancestral wisdom for which he searched 
as a youth without much success until he was reunited with his rural place of birth, his 
“father”. 
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5.3 DIMENSIONS  OF  GROWTH 
 
5.3.1 WOMEN AS PILLARS OF FAMILY AND NATION 
 
It has already been shown in this study that women’s personal tribulations in Mphahlele’s 
fiction assume epic dimensions.  This is illustrated, for example, when the widow Naledi 
says (in The Wanderers) that she is not devastated by the news of Rampa’s death 
“because [she] was widowed before [she] became a widow” (113).   The same use of 
dialogue to affirm the position of women as more powerful than men presents itself in 
Father Come Home when Maredi’s mother Dineo and her sister-in-law Hunadi console 
each other in pondering the dispossession they face as two husbands and a son from the 
extended family disappear in response to the demand of labour in the white-owned mines, 
factories and kitchens of the big cities (47).  Painfully, Hunadi asks the rhetorical 
question why Dineo and she “were chosen for this kind of waiting” (47). 
 
Mphahlele uses the now familiar technique of historical perspective to contextualise this 
private deprivation within the Tulamo family, by detailing that the discovery of minerals 
in South Africa after the First World War spiralled into economic developments that 
created (for white colonisers) the need for cheap black labour (15).  Legislation then 
followed (since 1913) that drove people from the land on which they depended for their 
own farming, which led to individuals such as Maredi’s father Lemeko, Namedi, the 
malaeta member who is later crushed to death and others going and looking for work in 
Pretoria, Johannesburg and other cities (16).  The dehumanisation that the landless blacks 
face in the mine compounds and urban townships debauches some of them to the lowest 
levels of immorality.  It leads, for instance, to Hunadi’s son turning into an urban ghetto 
creature called a hole-digger, described as follows: 
 Hunadi was really alarmed when it was reported that her son had become a 
 bum, a drunk, that he had become a hole-digger.  This meant that he was being 
 kept by a beer-brewing queen who gave him food and sleeping room in return for 
 digging holes in the yard to conceal tins of beer against police raids.  A hole-
 digger was considered to have sunk to the lowest level of self-hate – beyond all 
 hope.  Once a hole-digger, only bodily decay and death await you, and there is 
 never a return to the decent life.  (18) 
Mphahlele’s disapproving tone refuses to strip Africans of the responsibility to be as 
resourceful as their tradition of self-pride demands – a tradition that requires self-praise 
and the praise of fellow Africans for achievement (in the spirit of letšema or working in 
groups rather than as individuals) even under such highly adverse conditions.  This is the 
same self-pride with which Mphahlele invests the unfortunate malaeta, which is the 
impulse behind the exlamation “Whoooooo!  My blood is boiling.  I’m the boy from 
Machaka, Polokwane – Peeteesburg!”.  This cry simultaneously casts glory also on 
fellow Africans facing the same situation of urban brutalisation (87). 
 
It can thus be seen that for Hunadi’s son to allow himself to sink to the level of a “hole-
digger” amounts to mismanagement of an African humanist orientation.  Mphahlele’s 
message, like that of other African writers such as Todd Matshikiza (quoted above), is 
that Africans should retain their characteristic self-pride even under the harshest 
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conditions possible that threaten their very survival as a distinctive people. This is the 
effect Mphahlele wants to produce in Afrika My Music, for example, when he shows 
himself coping with the intimidating influence of exile by, inter alia, praising fellow 
exiles, even as they are crushed to death by their circumstances: “Like Selby Mvusi, 
whose remains were shipped from Kenya to his home province, Eastern Cape” (119); 
“Inscrutable Mvusi … He had created some impressive art in black and white when he 
was still in South Africa … Like Archibald Jordan, doctor of philosophy in African 
languages” (120); “Novelists …. Like Todd Matshikiza” (120 - 121); “His mound stands 
in a Lusaka graveyard…A coil of barbed wire beneath the cultured, jovial, even-tempered 
exterior … Remember how you wept when you told us Art Tatum was dead?” (122); 
“And Can Themba…You pulled the strands together in Drum, Can” (123).  The common 
denominator conjoining the heroes immortalised in the passage above is that they 
maintained their African posture and excelled despite adversity. 
 
In Father Come Home the group of Africans who crumble in the face of apartheid’s 
existential challenges contrast with Tintina’s dignified Africanist “fierce self-pride” and 
the bravery of the individual typified in panegyric in the oral tradition, which impels him 
to steadfastly pursue his intended marriage to the daughter of haughty Matime, because 
he is “Maleka the grandson of a warrior with a character worth more than a hundred head 
of cattle” (30).   Such a disposition, which Mphahlele consolidates as the impulse 
responsible for explicit cultural practice and describes as a consciousness that 
interconnects people of African-historical heritage that he calls African humanism, 
portrays Tintina as a hero even though currently he is mentally deranged following a 
mining accident and is dismissed in social gatherings as a numbskull.  The description of 
his fortitude prior to the mining accident, and of his maltreatment at the hands of his 
father-in-law Matime and the wife (who deserts him as soon as the compensation money 
from the mines has been finished), evoke sympathy among fellow African humanists who 
are equipped with the required consciousness to sense the cruel selfishness and greed of 
the people owning the mines.  Matime is portrayed as an example of those individuals 
who fail to manage a proper fusion of tradition and modernity, a predicament which 
results in mimicry gaining the upper hand (as the description “haughty aristocrat” 
implies) (29).  His illusions about being wealthy and denying Tintina the opportunity to 
marry his daughter – on the vain assumption that the prospective son-in-law’s pauper 
status renders him materially uncongenial – adequately portray him as a hybrid 
materialist whose false values cannot be reconciled with the African view that the dignity 
of humans should be put above worldly possessions. 
 
 Such traditional individualism as Tintina, on the other hand, exhibits is what another 
African writer, Ngugi, refers to as “the African tradition of poetic self-praise or praise of 
others” (Decolonising 78).  It is this African humanist orientation which leads the other 
Drum writer Nat Nakasa to laud fellow black achievers (while in a hotel called The 
Theresa in Harlem) for defying marginalisation by the centre, in the following words: 
 The Theresa was built in 1895, strictly for whites.  As Harlem went black, 
 however, it was taken over by Negro celebrities.  Joe Louis, Ella Fitzgerald and 
 other personages have lived there.  More recently, its guests included Fidel 
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 Castro and Cassius Clay.  The world champion gave instructions that all walls and 
 furniture in his suite be painted pink. (The World of Nat Nakasa 117) 
The African Americans Nakasa pays homage to in African self-praising manner in this 
citation are achievers respectively in international boxing, jazz, political liberation and 
(again) international boxing. 
 
The historical perspective which Mphahlele weaves around the private musings of 
Hunadi and Dineo about apartheid-induced destabilisation of their extended family 
should be properly understood to be a way of protesting against apartheid without 
directly assuming the function of political activism.  It should be remembered that in a 
state of siege such as black Africans lived under in apartheid South Africa, “Anything 
that resembles an archive that gives material existence to a history is thought of as 
something to be destroyed [and] that is the folly of every imperial conqueror” (Said, 
“Rendezvous” 160).  Because such historical perspective is of public as opposed to 
private significance, it elevates the dialogue of Hunadi and Dineo into communal, epic 
clamour against the alienation of apartheid.  For Mphahlele this is affirmation that “the 
sounds” of apartheid “begin again” as one returns home after almost two decades of 
exile.  But Mphahlele the humanist being a great believer in man’s victorious reshaping 
of the environment into self-fulfilling meaningfulness, the “unbroken song” or myth of 
survival is achieved through the use of imagery that puts women in control while men are 
flung around by alienating time and place.  That is why, on the day Eliyase flogs the boy 
Maredi for entering the mystic forest, Dineo faces his wrath squarely and dissolves his 
skin deep male courage by a mere mention of the name of yet another woman of 
authority in the extended family: “Let him go, you are going to hurt him, let his aunt talk 
to him, you do not kill a person for making mistakes” (27).  
 
This time, unlike in some of Mphahlele’s works analysed earlier in this study, the 
unquestioned wisdom of African proverbs is not wielded to appeal mainly to people who 
(by their own self-definition) are non-African to readjust their group consciousness.  It is 
directed to Africans whose lowly social and educational status (unlike that of Chimba in 
Chirundu, for example, who is a cabinet minister) and characterisation within an 
inescapably rural setting do not make them vulnerable to neocolonialist manipulation.   In 
the central action of Father Come Home, African humanism is not pitted against 
manifestations of a conflicting group identity such as apartheid racism (or arguably 
neocolonialism in the case of high-class black characters).  It is used against antagonists 
seemingly sharing a common African humanist consciousness with the protagonists.  To 
compensate for the lack of conflicting group consciousnesses and to indicate the 
differences between characters in Father Come Home as resulting from individuality, the 
English syntactic texture into which African proverbs and idiomatic expressions are 
embedded has lost conspicuity.  That is why the proverb molato ga o bolaelwe motho (or 
“you do not kill a person for making mistakes”) fits so smoothly into the sentence uttered 
by Dineo that it appears more harmoniously as continuation of plain English language 
than similar expressions in earlier narratives.  This is as fused an intertextuality between 
languages representing two distinctly contrasting cultural clusters as the one introduced, 
for example, by means of an utterance like “What can it be eating the boy?” in The 
Wanderers, where the African-language idiom jewa ke eng, literally translated, “eating 
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the boy” – meaning troubling/bothering the boy – conforms grammatically to both 
English and Sotho (225, emphasis added).  While such a levelling up of idioms is 
introduced sparingly in works that appeared around the middle of Mphahlele’s career as a 
writer, its intensified frequency cannot escape notice in the much later work, Father 
Come Home. 
 
Significantly (in Father Come Home), as Dineo grapples with the fuming Eliyase, Hunadi 
goes “to her millstone in the house to grind the corn” (27).  The resonance of a woman 
grinding on a millstone in front of a burning fire as one aspect of “the unbroken [African] 
song” recaptures Mphahlele’s view of the economic and social centrality of women in the 
family and the nation as an important aspect of his concept of African humanism.   The 
myth of such a role of the African person in preserving African humanist consciousness 
is evidenced more vividly in the following words: 
Her mind was too crowded to accommodate Eliyase’s ravings and whatever 
might have brought about the scene out there in the dark.  The fire in the house 
and the corn she was grinding seemed to be her only comfort at this moment.  The 
only real things, things that would always be there to occupy a  woman; 
woman the source of nourishment, the giver, the eternal guardian of life’s 
beginnings.  Whatever human stupidities raged around her, whatever storms, 
whatever turmoil brewed in the mind, however lonely life could be without a man 
and a son, the fire and the millstone would still be there to return to: woman’s 
unbroken song … (27) 
The opening line of the passage above is in the private voice of the narrator relating the 
individual saga Hunadi is faced with in the form (this time) of the unreliable Eliyase 
hurting Maredi.  To signify the gloomy future prospects this action suggests, because of 
its evocation of the absence of the male members of the family, Hunadi refers to the 
beating as “the scene out there in the dark” (27).  The narrator assumes a public, 
prophetic voice as Hunadi starts to expand her thoughts from survival in the Tulamo 
family to that of the entire nation, referring to “the fire in the house and the corn” as the 
only “real things that would always be there to occupy a woman” (27).  In other words, 
when the individual Eliyases will be gone from this physical existence and the women 
Hunadi and Dineo will be dead too, the mythical woman will always be there with her 
fire and corn and grinding stone to ensure survival of the distictively African humanist 
peoples through timeless existence. 
 
The handling of plot and characterisation reveals a quality of abstracting the ambience of 
apartheid further from the centre of the narrative than in the texts discussed earlier in this 
study.  The slow, hesitant pace of Father Come Home, perhaps representative of the 
patience and slipperiness of timeframes regarding the return of the awaited men in the 
extended Tulamo family, centralises the lives of the African characters while apartheid 
and the few white characters playing a part in the drama are portrayed as being on the 
periphery of the novel’s action.  
 
However, the placing of white characters and the consciousness they represent on the 
fringes as a persistent (though peripheral) constituent of the atmosphere of Father Come 
Home is significant in yet another way than just extending the hesitant pace of the story 
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and its foregrounding of the subjectivity of the Africans. It should be seen also as 
Mphahlele’s way of pointing to the inevitability of the African characters’ ambivalence 
that has resulted from their historically having encountered Europe through imperialism 
and colonisation.  It should be borne in mind that Mphahlele himself constantly reminds 
his readers that (like the other blacks who have gone through colonisation and exile), his 
soul is “a dialogue of two selves”.  As the critic Woeber has ably demonstrated, one other 
factor in Mphahlele’s personal life which reinforced in him the constantly dialectical co-
existence of European and African consciousnesses is that “However Eurocentric, and 
however disruptive, his education [at St Peter’s Secondary School in Rosettenville] set 
him on the path to negotiation of the  Western and African experience, so that all his 
subsequent work, teaching, writing, artistic development would be an attempt to integrate 
the two” (“The Influence of Western Education” 65).  One reason for Mphahlele not to 
expunge white characters from the drama of Father Come Home — especially because of 
its obvious intention of illuminating the capacity of Africans to live independently of 
white domination or trusteeship — is consciously to remind the reader of the inevitable 
presence in the consciousnesses of the African characters of aspects of European thinking 
and ways of living, as well as some individual whites. 
 
This is not to discount what is achieved by the deliberately languid tempo of the 
protagonist’s action in Father Come Home. The hesitancy that leads to such a tempo in 
the novel is exemplified when Maredi runs away during the school holidays and joins 
four other boys on a droning truck owned by white hunters, only to return home from 
“about fifty kilometres east of Sedibeng” (12). When he runs away the second time a 
messenger from Sedibeng takes him back home from Du Plessis’s dairy farm after he has 
gone only as far as between Sukumakara and Messina (72).  Mphahlele avoids spoiling 
the intentional marginalisation of the existence of whites in the plot and the way of life 
imposed on blacks by apartheid with which the whites are associated as a group, by 
keeping in suspense the major event of malaeta and cavalier cruelty of the police until 
almost at the end of the tale, when Lemeko and the son Maredi slowly begin to work at 
thawing the hard feelings between them.  The sense of waiting lasts in keeping with this 
intentionally slack pace of incidents in the novel, even after Dineo has physically reunited 
with Lemeko, to allow the deeper trauma of Maredi to heal slowly first, thus reinforcing 
the generally slow and meditative pace of the novel.   This thought-provoking, relaxed 
pace is achieved also by means of the lengthiness and repetitiveness of the dialogue 
between Dineo and Hunadi, between Hunadi and Eliyase or Dineo and Eliyase, between 
Maredi and his mother or aunt and his inner self, repeating itself in monologue but also in 
the form of dreams and the contemplative, long epic recitals by the sage Mashabela.  
These narrative devices spill over into the extended action of the novel comprised mainly 
of Maredi’s wanderings on foot and occasional rides on a waggon to Sukumakara and 
other places further north towards the Limpopo in pursuit of his father.  This journey lasts 
a full two months, only for an emissary from Sedibeng to catch up with Maredi and take 
him back home, thus delaying the forward movement of the novel’s action.  The mode of 
transport used (further) also slows down the pace of the narrative, unlike in The 
Wanderers and Chirundu where fast automobiles and even aeroplanes are used to dart 
from one scene to the next.  Significantly, the plot reaffirms the place of the African 
woman as the hub of all economic and social activity.  It is Hunadi and Dineo Maredi 
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runs away from, and it is to them he comes back.  It is from Hunadi and Dineo husbands 
run away.  It is against the consciences of Hunadi and Dineo that Eliyase’s unmanly 
conduct grates.   
 
As such, the repetitive patterns of action in Father Come Home revolve around women, 
in the same way as the intrigues leading to fathers being successfully reclaimed from or 
lost to the hostile environment uncoil from around the women in the novel. 
 
5.3.2 MYTHMAKING 
 
The novel opens with a nightmare in which indistinct, hazy faces demand of Maredi to 
identify himself in full by his father’s surname.  In the background of the blurred faces is 
a chorus of elderly women who sing about the village of Sedibeng where a baby was born 
talking, asking the family the whereabouts of his father, upon which the people point to 
the grave (2).  The composite parts of the “popular village ballad” are mythical from an 
African humanist perspective (signified by phrases such as “baby was born talking” – an 
expression associated with the folktales and fables which Mphahlele uses to create a 
resonance of African traditions) and epic in their loftiness (a quality conjured up by the 
communal voice in the description of the song as belonging not to individual 
composition, but to the entire “village”).  This device, occurring right at the beginning of 
the novel, shows the boy Maredi’s apparently private agony confined to a single 
household for the general problem it is, an issue harming almost all Africans of the 
apartheid era within which the story unfolds.  This Mphahlele achieves by means of his 
(now familiar) mythmaking technique, as demonstrated above.   
 
Mphahlele defines myth as “a fictitious idea we believe in collectively for the power it 
inspires in us [which] we do not have to prove” as long as “it lends a passionate purpose 
to life” (“Social Work” 243).  To the writer mythmaking is crucial because “[it] and 
context lend resonance to [the writer’s] creations” (“Educating” 33).  Considering that 
myth inspires hope (“Social Work” 243) about the meaningfulness of the Africans’ 
existence as a collective, mythmaking is indispensable to the creations of every African 
writer, especially as myth is what Mphahlele describes elsewhere in the following words:  
 The myth is that never-ending story of life: children are still being born, women 
 still wait and endure, men still betray one another, we still dream both idle and 
 meaningful dreams … and we must keep trying to negotiate the meeting point 
 between art and history: an effort that is itself the enduring purpose of life. 
 (“Educating” 33)   
While the above description of myth could be seen as universal to the existence of all 
categories of mankind, Mphahlele’s description of the artist’s function vis-à-vis 
mythmaking as that of  “[trying] to negotiate the meeting point between art and history” 
reaffirms his definition of African humanism to be non-essentialist in that it does not 
define African cultural clusters in absolute terms by which the groups would be regarded 
as held together by indelibly innate attributes.  Art – which inevitably includes 
mythmaking – must be dialectically combined with the history of a specific people or 
cluster of peoples in order to tint the art with the history (as this quotation declares 
regarding Mphahlele himself).  It also has to be in dialectical relationship with immediate 
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reality within which Africans exist, as Mphahlele’s sense of history, tradition or culture is 
proven in the the analysis of his writings not to be an ossified one.   From the angle of 
Said’s theory of beginnings, Mphahlele’s writings and his theory, as beginning, fit into 
the description that “a beginning intends meaning, but the continuities and methods 
developing from it are generally orders of dispersion, of adjacency, and of 
complementarity ... giving rise to the sort of multileveled coherence of dispersion we find 
in … the texts of modern writers” (“Conclusion: Vico” 373).   This means that 
Mphahlele’s instancing of aspects of his concept of African humanism in his works 
allows itself to be affected by other theories and lifestyles, co-habits harmoniously with 
those lifestyles it cannot mix with, and performs the function of taking advantage of the 
accomplishments of other theories with which it differs (as the words from the above 
quotation dispersion, adjacency and complementarity imply, respectively).   
 
It is significant, in terms of Said’s theory of beginnings, that Mphahlele asserts 
mythmaking as the function of  “[negotiating] the meeting point between art and history” 
(“Educating” 33, emphasis added).  Of history within his own theory of beginnings, Said 
has remarked that:  “History [is] the mind considered as synchronous structure (an ideal 
persistent architecture), as the inner form of man’s activity, and as diachronous modality, 
or temporal modifications, or sequential continuity: above all, it is necessary to 
understand that history is neither one nor the other exclusively” (“Conclusion: Vico” 
361).  According to Said (as he explains here), history as once-off memory of the 
“beginning” or “discontinuous” past of a specific cluster of peoples has a unique structure 
of its own which, however, survives through time as flexible double-existence-in-past-
and-present, or as a new version that has absorbed the demands of the present, or been 
modified because different from synchronous form due to its difference in sequential 
order of stages through which original historical memory continues to live – and history 
is all these traits simultaneously.  An examination of Mphahlele’s handling of the idea of 
history as a facet of his broader concept of African humanism (in his writings) reveals 
that his view of history sees it as both eccentrically African and generically belonging to 
and modified at every stage of its continued life by histories of other social groups 
different from the cluster of African peoples who are embodiments of the consciousness 
he calls African humanism. 
 
If milestone historical events such as the holocaust, colonisation and racial bigotry have 
impacted differently on different peoples of the world (using criteria such as whether one 
is European, Asian or African), it follows that the different peoples’ creative negotiation 
of the impact of such events will vary.  It is in this sense that Africans distinctively react 
in a manner Mphahlele defines as African humanist, which leads us to see African 
humanism not as an absolute or essentialist concept, but as a brand of existential/strategic 
essentialism that refers to objective behaviour emanating originally in its subjective form 
from a specific environment/history.  As a result of the different kinds of historical 
impact on the various clusters of peoples European, Asian and African, myths (as the 
meeting point between art and history) will differ, and it is African myths derived in this 
distinctive manner which Mphahlele views as an aspect of African humanism. 
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The mythic fibre of the story emerges more clearly when the prolific village poet walks 
like a godsend into Sedibeng when Maredi is only about four years old, bringing with 
him from Mashona his tiny family and a wealth of orature, thus affecting for ever the 
environment in which the boy Maredi grows up (19).  In fact, Mashabela is a greater 
incarnation of the village elder, profoundly imbued with African humanist qualities, for 
Mphahlele describes him as “a musician, poet and doctor, of Karanga stock” (19).  The 
combination of music, poetry and healing in the practice of a single individual points to 
the African humanist orientation which looks at reality as an organic unity rather than as 
compartmentalised existence.  Mashabela’s description as a musician adumbrates the 
prophetic nature of his performances throughout the novel. This is so because Mphahlele 
describes the prophet as one who “sings, and in what he sings he repeats a number of 
things ... [meaning that he repeats] a number of notes … [and] one note echoes what you 
said before … [and because he is] speaking on behalf of a people … [he] speaks in a tone 
of certitude: he is sure he is right” (“African Literature” 271).  This quotation from 
Mphahlele divulges the reliance of prophetic performance on repetition.  More 
importantly, the way Mphahlele conceives of the nature and role of repetition is similar to 
Said’s views on repetition.  In the essay “On Repetition”, Said subscribes to the thinking 
of theorists who see repetitions as “intelligent patterns that preserve the human race [in 
which] uses of repetitions conserve the field of activity [as well as] give it its shape and 
identity [which] renders repetitions … filiative and genealogical”  (“On Repetition” 111, 
114).  Said’s observation in this quotation stresses the centrality of patterns, self-
preservation, conservation of cultural practices and identity and perpetuation of one’s 
self-asserted consciousness and way of life, as the words “patterns”, “preserve”, 
“conserve” and “filiative” respectively signify.  The very same ingredients are 
demonstrated by Mphahlele throughout his writings as pillars of his concept of African 
humanism as a consciousness and way of life. 
 
This makes clear that the public recitations that Mashabela sings are prophetic 
exhortations to the people of Sedibeng and surrounding villages to follow what he is 
certain is the right path – to follow his myth of never-ending African humanism and its 
attribute to survive existential problems.  His role as a poet invests him with special gifts 
that qualify him to prophesy because, according to Mphahlele, “poetry is a way of 
perceiving, a way of seeking to touch the Highest Reality beneath the surface of things” 
(“Notes Towards” 139).  The “Highest Reality” the character Mashabela preaches is his 
view of African humanism as the true consciousness to be followed, which 
consciousness, according to Mphahlele, lies “beneath the surface of things” — that is: 
African humanism is a deep-lying consciousness that manifests itself in social behaviour. 
 
Such a mythmaking explication of Mashabela’s poetic recitals as prophetic suddenly 
opens our eyes to the reality that the song of the women in Maredi’s dream, like 
Mashabela’s recitals, is prophetic and that its clear message is that Maredi should go and 
look for his father, hence the women’s insistence that he should identify himself by his 
father’s family name, which he fails to do in the dream (2).  I agree with the critic 
Reingard Nethersole that through devices such as the portrayal of the character 
Mashabela and the song of the women in Maredi’s dream (which partly constitute the 
narrator in the novel), “Mphahlele’s narrator assumes the position of teacher and sage … 
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[so that] the artificially created memorial universe in Father Come Home bears … traces 
of an oral tradition characterised by ‘voice’” (“Places of” 504).  That is why in the 
preceding paragraph of this study Mashabela is elucidated in Mphahlele’s African 
humanist terms (“African Literature” 271) as a prophet “[who] sings, … speaking on 
behalf of a people” – which terms refer to mythmaking elements of the oral tradition.   
Mashabela’s description by Mphahlele in these terms befits the stature accorded him by 
the writer Ruth Obee as “the African humanist voice” (“Father Come Home” 208).  The 
oral tradition as an aspect of African cultures or Mphahlele’s concept of African 
humanism is thus sustained in the fabric of the novel through Mashabela’s intermittent 
oral performances.  It is for the same snowballing effect to sustain an atmosphere of 
orature that Maredi responds to the prophetic voice of the women by resolving that  “one 
of these days [he] must run away [to] go find [his] father” (11) in the monologue he 
habitually enters into each time he has acted to spite his selfish uncle Eliyase.  As such  
acquisition of an acoustic existence  by the narrator (in the many forms he manifests 
himself in in this narrative) is an item  of the oral tradition, which assertion of the oral 
tradition as one aspect of Mphahlele’s African humanism proves to be one of the central 
themes of the novel. Testimony to the primacy of the oral tradition as a central theme of 
the novel is the point that the message it conveys by means of the women’s song in a 
dream (cited above) leads to the action that is central to the plot of the novel – that of 
Maredi setting out to search for his father.  In keeping with the tenet of Mphahlele’s 
African humanism that it inspires hope, when Dineo or Hunadi capitulate to the odds that 
seem stacked against Maredi’s venture and advise him to obey Eliyase’s minatory 
disposition without resistance, the response to the prophetic voice of the women in the 
dream instills confidence in him not to be daunted.  Maredi’s metaphorical search for his 
father or literally his search for “cultural memory” should be seen as self-affirmation 
wrought in symbolism, as Nethersole rightly observes about the cultural content of the 
character Mashabela’s poetic chants in Father Come Home that “cultural memory for 
Mphahlele does not merely function as guarantor of endurance in suffering … [but] is 
regarded [also] as clarion call for self-affirmation” (“Places of” 509). 
 
The indefinite time frame that the phrase “one of these days” (11) denotes is Mphahlele’s 
tool to maintain tension in the reader’s mind that should maintain interest in the entire 
fabric of the novel, to counteract the lax pace of the storyline – in this case effected by 
the repetitiveness of reprimands by the mother and Maredi’s monologues about the 
resolve to run away.  That the quarrels are repetitive and cyclic is revealed by 
Mphahlele’s use of phrases such as “idea would not give him any peace” and “Hunadi 
would always say” (11, emphases added). 
 
Despite Mashabela’s special gift of prophecy that is esteemed within the African 
community of Sedibeng, Mphahlele portrays him as an ordinary resident of the village in 
the following words: 
 Mashabela was tall, stringy, and walked with a slight limp.  In many ways he, and 
 his pregnant wife and five-year-old daughter a few strides behind him, seemed 
 ordinary … But his arrival in Sedibeng ten years before had not been an ordinary 
 event … [as] He played the mbira, seeming to project its notes through his sinewy 
 hands, so that  they seemed an extension of the instrument.   
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                                                                                                 (Father Come Home  19) 
That the sage and orature artist Mashabela  is “ordinary” save for his artistry is a 
confirmation of Mphahlele’s view that “Apart from the fact that the artist is the sensitive 
point of a society … we must stop talking about artists as if they were a bunch of bearded 
barefoot messiahs who have drunk the milk of paradise” (“The African Critic”).  In other 
words, the writer or orature artist according to Mphahlele’s African humanism is an equal 
participant in the life of the community he or she writes or performs for.  Such a humble 
opinion of the writer within the community is shared by postcolonial writers like Edward 
Said, when he says of his autobiography in an interview that he has “resisted the use of” 
the word autobiography and calls it “a memoir, because, … [he is] not really a public 
figure … the way a politician would” call his own memoir an autobiography (“Edward 
Said Talks” 15). 
 
Mythmaking continues when Maredi visits the people of Mashite (44).  The humane 
hospitality with which the ‘heathen’ people of Mashite welcome Maredi with “nice beans 
and porridge”  ironically contrasts with the ‘Christian’ hostility wreaked on Maredi by 
the obtrusive presence in his home of ‘Christian’ Eliyase (42).  The image of nurture and 
nourishment elicited by “nice beans and porridge” symbolises the spiritual nourishment 
and nurture Maredi is about to receive from Nature in the bush.  Mphahlele describes 
Maredi’s experience in the bush in first person narration: 
 I saw trees that seemed – it was like they were alive – as if the lianas were going 
 to loosen their hold on the trees and on one another … I touched the lianas to feel 
 –  to feel if they were alive like an animal – my fingers trembled … I was woken 
 up by a very loud shout from underneath the trees, and the lianas were moving, 
 pulling their long, long bodies out of the tangle around the tree trunks, but I could 
 not see where they were moving to … And I could hear the trees breathing a deep 
 heavy sigh, as if they were now free … and now it sounds like – it is like the 
voice  of Mashabela and the voice of Tintina together.  (44 – 45) 
The blurring of different life forms between fauna and flora in which both quiver with 
life points both to the Vital Force with which all nature is imbued and the organic unity 
of all things that constitute the universe.  This is a feature of African humanism as 
Mphahlele defines it.  A remark more relevant to make at this point is that the fauna and 
flora acquire folktale-like life in which stones and animals and plants can speak like 
humans.  The creation of images that recall mythological and folktale creatures and tales 
is Mphahlele’s way of giving African humanist resonance to his narrative writings 
because (according to him) the atmosphere of orature is rich with African humanist 
education for nourishment of one’s inner resources.  Of course the aura of Nature 
depicted in the passage above is intensified by the teenage boy’s exhaustion that makes 
him fall asleep. It is during this sleep that he dreams his father is calling him and (upon 
waking up) runs back home among jeers by some villagers, who suspect that he might be 
off his head.  The jeers abound with colloquialisms that are used more profoundly than in 
the dialogue of other narrative writings than Father Come Home, for such colloquialisms 
now not only give dramatic effect and naturalness to dialogue but  proceed to convey 
decisive, epic pronouncements – expressions like “What is this child trying to do, hao – 
he is a bad omen for us, jo-oh!” (45).  The colloquial expressions “hao” and “jo-oh” in 
this instance externalise shock, the impact of which affects the whole nation due to the 
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mythical stature of Maredi which is predetermined by the prophetic voices of Mashabela 
and Tintina.  Hunadi’s mythical song upon learning of Maredi’s disappearance while 
grinding corn on the stone also suggests that Maredi’s fate should be left to Nature, as she 
makes use of fiction-like speech by creatures like rabbit, tortoise, hedgehog, zebra and 
“wife of porcupine”, and waxes prophetic in the phrases “I asked -- ” and “Go and ask --” 
(55).  This is the last time Hunadi is heard expressing herself before she dies an untimely 
death, which fact also gives an aura to her utterances here.  It is significant that when 
Maredi fully recovers from sleep he recalls the sounds he heard during the reverie as 
those of Mashabela and Tintina.  These two are both poets, with Tintina’s career as a poet 
and prophet truncated by the mine accident. 
 
It is the musical instruments mbira and concertina played respectively by Mashabela and 
Tintina that join both as poets.  Before the accident in the mines Tintina forms a trio with 
some of his friends and together they entertain mine workers with “ethnic songs from the 
northern Transvaal”, with Tintina playing the concertina and the two friends playing a 
mouth organ and a flute (32).  These should be understood to signify their traditional 
wisdom commensurate with Mphahlele’s African humanism.  The Rhodesian mine 
worker who becomes irritated and stabs Tintina’s concertina with a knife during one of 
the mine performances should be seen as a dehumanised victim of industrial life whose 
spirituality is not powerful enough to survive the ravages of migrant labour (33).  His 
irritation with the traditional brand of music played is actually an irritation with vestiges 
of his own traditional self which ‘divorces itself’ in the face of urbanisation.  On the night 
of Maredi’s return from Sukumakara, Tintina dashes the ailing concertina on a rock and 
for the first time plays the new instrument of lepatata or kudu horn (75).  This is in front 
of the villagers, who dance traditional rhythms and feast on the slaughtered ox that has 
been offered by Tintina’s sister Diketso (74).  The hero’s welcome Maredi receives this 
night is a re-birth not only for him but for the whole village – symbolised by wholesale 
feasting and the metamorphosis of Tintina’s poetic instrument.  As this feast takes place 
very close to Maredi and Dineo’s reunion with Lemeko, it should be understood to be an 
epic celebration of national victory in which sons find their fathers and wives find their 
husbands. 
 
The vast territories Maredi plods in his search for Lemeko serve to dress his actions more 
densely in mythical robes.  He travels through bushes full of “marauding lions and 
jackals, and even mean buffalo” (62).  At one time he walks within talking distance of a 
lion which he at first mistakes for a donkey and “at the very instant of his awareness, it 
was on its legs and making for the open veld in a clumsy fashion” (65).  Congruous with 
the slow pace of the novel, these comings and goings through Sotoma and other bushes 
that throb, fable-like, with primeval predators, should be seen as an extended initiation 
for Maredi, since his earlier declaration to the late Hunadi that he “wants to go this 
winter” (3).  The precariousness with which Maredi clings to manhood through these 
perilous territories graduates him into manhood, apart from forging him into a legendary 
figure of mythical dimensions. 
 
When Mashabela’s poetic recitals are described, Mphahlele reveals their cyclic 
recurrence by means of the words “Mashabela would sing the epic of warriors … to an 
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audience that had come into his large homestead” (20, emphasis added).  These are not 
once-off performances.  The common building blocks in Mashabela’s singing and that of 
the women in Maredi’s dream are the traditional components of orature such as myth and 
folktale.  That is why the myth of the women’s song, above, of an inquisitive and 
adventurous child born speaking and wanting to know its father’s whereabouts, is able to 
repeat itself in Mashabela’s lines of epic poetry, “for the newborn infant tonight/ will 
have become the/ stones and earth to build/ a grave for it” (22).  The “it” denotes the 
status quo within African communities depicted in earlier lines as that in which “Our 
women have been left/ alone to scratch the earth for food/ like chickens” (22).  By the 
time Mashabela enters the life of the Sedibeng people the equivalent of the mythical 
child, Maredi Tulamo, has already been born, speaking about tracing his lost father.  
What Mashabela’s poetic lines now achieve is rationalisation – why sons must look for 
fathers, which is the situation in which women are left alone by husbands responding to 
urbanisation, leaving wives to try and scratch a living from diminishing, tired land.  
Typical of the hopefulness which Mphahlele regards as the spiritual resource that allows 
African traditions to survive, Mashabela’s open-air performance invariably closes with 
lines such as “be that as it may, we know/ you ancestors are living” (23).  
 
Just before Maredi, the boy’s uncle Namedi and Dineo leave Sedibeng for good to join 
Lemeko, the sage Mashabela sings in words that perfect the epic stature of the 
protagonist and the drama of Father Come Home: “People of the nation!/ here is our son 
come back,/ sons shall seek their fathers,/ fathers shall seek their sons./Fathers shall go 
and return,/ sons shall do likewise./ I can say I feel the power of/ the waiting years – / 
when fathers will have found their sons/ and sons will have found their fathers/ and 
mothers will have found them all” (76, 77).  The action described in the poetic lines 
corresponds with Maredi’s, thereby merging public action with private action. 
 
While resonances of traditional African cultures have been represented in Mphahlele’s 
short stories, autobiographies and other novels to act as constituents of African humanist 
consciousness, the directness in linking fictional characters with the myth contained in 
the prophetic voice of the ideal African poet witnessed in Father Come Home is 
unprecedented.  The mythical son of the women’s and Mashabela’s songs finds direct 
concretisation in the boy Maredi.  This may be due to the capacity of the rural setting to 
sustain the plausibility of the actions of the prophetic poet.  Such a prophetic poet might 
appear lunatic and out of place as soon as the story of Down Second Avenue moves from 
Maupaneng to Marabastad, or that of Afrika My Music to Denver, Colorado.  The 
presence of white characters playing important roles in the drama of The Wanderers 
(such as the editor of Bongo magazine) might organically co-exist with such a prophetic 
African poet only for as long as it remained submerged or subdued.  Otherwise such a 
characterisation might stand out as inorganic to the atmosphere of the novel as it (the 
characterisation) is mostly urban and metropolitan.  As for Chirundu, the predominantly 
western conduct of characters like Chimba and Monde would not allow such an earthy, 
rural character as Mashabela to walk the metropolitan paths.  At most, the urban setting 
of the novel can accommodate a character like Mashabela only as a caricatured yet 
sustained reminder of the characters’ African humanist heritage, similarly to the way 
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aged characters like Mutiso are made use of.  Predictably, Mutiso (in Chirundu) is less 
endowed with mythical resonance than Mashabela in the much later novel. 
 
5.3.3 UNIQUENESS  OF  DIALOGUE 
 
When Hunadi and she resolve a petty quarrel one day, Dineo responds to Hunadi’s 
apologies by appealing for harmony that  will “let the ancestors sleep in peace and not be 
disturbed by words that stab like a spear” (48).  Mphahlele has indicated the African 
humanist practice of talking over differences until they are resolved.  Disturbance of one 
segment of the order leads to disruption of harmony and this includes disturbing the 
peace of the ancestors.  This could lead to punishment by the gods.  It is for this reason 
that, while pondering over Eliyase’s mean temperament soon after Maredi’s beating, 
Dineo and Hunadi reassure each other that Eliyase’s wife does not bear children because 
“it is punishment” of Eliyase by “the ancestors” for his failing to bring together the 
Tulamo family as the only man remaining (11).  
 
A similar regard for ancestors is sustained as the storyline develops.  Following Maredi’s 
exploration of the forbidden bush, as Dineo and Hunadi exchange greetings the following 
morning, Hunadi complains of insomnia and an indistinct malaise caused by ancestors 
who “travel in the night and visit [her] dreams and [do] not speak so that [she] can hear”.  
She concludes by exclaiming in Sesotho sa Leboa, “Ao, what wonders!” (46)  In this 
nightmare that forebodes her own death, Hunadi exhibits the African humanist view that 
ancestors communicate with the living on any important matter in order for wrongs to be 
atoned where possible.  When Hunadi dies, Dineo explains to Maredi that “life without 
[one’s] man is very heavy” and that the heartsore longing must have killed her (74).  The 
indistinct message of her dreams referred to above is unravelled as having been a 
message too difficult to understand and unnecessary to understand, as her impending 
death is depicted as inevitable through the way Dineo rationalises it.  Hunadi herself must 
be sensing the content of the ancestors’ message when she exlaims by means of the Sotho 
colloquialism “Ao”, which signifies bafflement.  Unlike the way African-language 
colloquialisms have been used by characters in both rural and urban settings to express 
personal feelings of excitement, sorrow, wonderment and so forth (in Mphahlele’s other 
works scrutinised in this study), in Father Come Home colloquialisms such as this 
convey prophetic messages that are pointers for the entire tribe or nation.  That is why in 
the quotation above, Hunadi’s dialogue at the point when it reaches the Sotho colloquial 
exclamation, acquires a plane beyond that of focusing on the dream and foretells her 
death by words that suggest its inscrutability: “what wonders!”.  It is because she has 
reached a point beyond which the human mind can fathom, because this is the meeting 
point of her own prophetic voice with that of Mashabela when he proclaims that “The 
land is gone,/ and all that has been left for us/ is grey sand and rock/ We walk with death 
in our legs,/ with famine and with locusts” (21) .  Here the individual rises into the 
communal and epic, soaring too high for an individual mind to tame. 
 
When Mashabela’s aged daughter meets the 72-year-old Maredi at a wedding in Seshego 
and the two discuss the rumoured forced removal of Sedibeng and nearby villages to the 
west, uppermost in Maredi’s mind is concern over what will happen to the graves of their 
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ancestors, especially those of  Mashabela, Tintina and Hunadi (96).  The old man Maredi 
Tulamo laments forced removals in the following emotive words:  “I have seen enough 
sorrow in my life to blind the sun, when old people have to keep moving, leaving their 
land – land they have known and loved – moving to strange places, dragging behind them 
their souls, looking baffled and lost, leaving the burial grounds of their loved ones” (97). 
The enumeration of people who have been intimate with Batseba and Maredi in this 
dialogue precedes the mention of the people’s graves in general.  Attachment to home 
soil is suggested by means of such an intimate familiarisation of the graves Sedibeng 
people are about to be forcibly separated with. The anguish experienced by Africans is 
immense, due to their valuing of ancestral connection for which graves are the medium, 
whenever forced removals separate them from these shrines.  This anguish is expressed 
powerfully by means of the phrase “dragging behind them their souls”, which explains 
the strong, unbreakable bond between Africans and their ancestral land.  Closure of the 
novel with this disturbing image of a people ever on the move is Mphahlele’s way of 
highlighting that even as he returns home in his old age and is gratified by the way the 
rural, African-cultural milieu facilitates self-fulfilment in being useful to one’s people, 
the horror of apartheid is still part of his people’s “unbroken song”. 
 
Connectedness with relatives who have died as demonstrated in the lives of the characters 
portrayed above, is Mphahlele’s way of representing a consciousness he calls African 
humanism.   Ancestral connections are one of the many religious aspects of Mphahlele’s 
concept.  Witchcraft is another, although usually perceived as negative and mentioned by 
African writers as one item of the African heritage that must be abandoned.  To create 
resonances of this shameful and thus clandestine tradition, Mphahlele assembles a 
medley of gossip regarding the Mashite bush (nicknamed Sotoma after the Biblical 
Sodom and Gomorrah parable) in the following words:  “We have always been told those 
people kill a man or child and take out parts of the body to give to the ancestors … 
Madira the grandmother of Tintina, as the people tell us, told the village that she saw a 
woman on a baboon come out of the woods one night” (39).  So reminiscent of 
communal tap gossip in Down Second Avenue, the quotation above reinforces the 
already-explained “positive face” or “politeness” wants within African cultures which 
determine the desirability of expressed messages aligning with communally-agreed 
standpoints (in the way writers like Fraser and Matsumoto have defined the ideas of 
“face” or “politeness” wants as differing according to specific cultures).  Mphahlele’s 
deliberate removal of the identity of the speakers in this passage is an indication that 
these messages are not attributable to single individuals, but are a communal verdict.  
This is why not one character in all of Mphahlele’s writing considered in this study has 
been quoted as challenging the opinion that witchcraft is evil. 
 
When the sage Mashabela rebukes his neighbours in Sedibeng for denigrating the 
sacredness of the Mashite bush, it is not witchcraft he is defending.  Being an African, 
there is no way Mashabela can oppose the community in traditionally agreed-upon 
opinion about some practices.  What he is standing up against is the unwise, licentious 
heaping of all conceivable insults on the bush by ‘Christian’ Africans for the mere reason 
that the bush is holy ground for ‘heathen’ Africans.  Mashabela publicly declares what he 
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is sure to be right in the following words (that echo the wisdom of Old Segone in Down 
Second Avenue on a similar division of the two sections of Maupaneng):  
 Hear me, listen to me, you people … we must not play about with things that our 
 small brains cannot understand simply because you  think God is only on your 
 side and against the others.  That place you call Sotoma is holy ground for the 
 people of Mashite, and all of us are children on the small finger of God whom our 
 ancestors knew well, to whom they speak for us.  (40) 
While the message echoes that of the sage character in Down Second Avenue, also on the 
‘Christian’ side of the village, for the first time Mphahlele lets a character speak in an 
overtly prophetic tone as the words “hear me, listen to me, you people” indicate. 
 
With the concept African humanism allowed to materialise in the carnal form of 
Mashabela, it is not surprising that western Christianity acquires a human voice through 
the mouth of the lay preacher in Sedibeng, who routinely bellows antidotes to 
Mashabela’s “darkness” in the following words: 
 Listen not to creatures of darkness who pull you away to their heathen gods … 
 The new Christ is come among us and I hear His words tell us to turn away from 
 our ancestral ways, to touch the scars of the Crucifixion and be healed, be 
 cleansed of our sins.  Those poor souls of Mashite over there – I pity them, and let 
 us pray that Sotoma, like the city of its name in the Bible, shall be razed to ashes 
 even as Gomorrha was … The white man brought the light and we can read and 
 write for ourselves and that knowledge and light mean power and the road to 
 salvation.  (40  - 41) 
Comparably to the way in which African humanism is sung openly by the character 
Mashabela in a “compelling voice” (20), the lay preacher is also reciting “with his 
stentorian voice” to the Africans – but here it is a gospel that preaches everything which 
African humanism is not (40).  It is not surprising, within the deeply rural and traditional 
environment of Sedibeng, for the lay preacher to speak almost like a ventriloquist with a 
voice that the soul cannot quite identify with because (being black) he is either hollow as 
far as self-knowledge is concerned or he is a mere marionette of the champions of a 
consciousness opposed to African humanism.  This lay preacher is a far cry from the 
Zionist self-constituting worshipper to whom Mphahlele’s earlier works (analysed in this 
study) have introduced us. 
 
The lay preacher’s words above are akin to the way Eliyase “who [is] so loud about being 
a Christian” writes off the boy Maredi:  “He was always carrying on about Maredi’s 
heathen habits: shouting in the streets, singing nonsense lyrics in the homestead and 
blowing a whistle at intervals”  and: “He always spoke about Maredi as if the boy would 
one day, soon, release devastating thunder and hail and lightning that would flatten 
Sedibeng and the vast territory around” (41, 42).  The intimations of damnation in hell 
created by images in the passage above conflict with African humanism in the way 
Mphahlele describes it, as composed of  “beliefs [that] do not entertain punishment or 
reward in the after-life” (“The Fabric”  154). 
 
Dialogue in this novel conjures up an African humanist atmosphere by means of 
traditional resonances accomplished through orature.  This stylistic aspect weaving 
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through all of Mphahlele’s narrative writings is deepened to the level of mythmaking that 
merges the private conflict and self-actualising action of the protagonist Maredi with the 
epic odyssey of a mythical son whose heroism rids the nation of the shackles of 
urbanisation, apartheid and colonisation.  Sotho proverbs and idiomatic expressions slip 
readily into the texture of the dialogue to signify the harmony of protagonists and 
antagonists who are tied together at the underlying level by African humanist 
consciousness and differ only in some facets of their surface behaviour.  The 
colloquialisms Mphahlele has been constantly employing in his works perform in this 
novel a more profound function than expression of private feelings and the adding of 
dramatic naturalness to dialogue.  In Father Come Home colloquial expressions mark 
decisive transitions in the action of the central character, which coincides with similarly 
momentous forward movements in the emancipation of a whole people. 
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5.4 CLOSING  REMARKS 
 
Mphahlele’s publicised intention to write Father Come Home as a truly rural novel in a 
slow pace commensurate with the contemplative aura of the milieu seems to have been 
achieved.  The cyclic pace of Maredi Tulamo’s repetitive acts of running away in search 
of his father only to come back is intensified by the repetitive movement of prophetic 
songs by Mashabela, Tintina, Hunadi and others.  The routine quarrels with the obdurate 
Eliyase and the many strengthening conversations between Dineo and Hunadi add to the 
slow tempo at which the events of the novel progress. 
 
The novel is a rich depository of instances of African religious practice as the general 
ethos of the people of Mashite in particular illustrates.  Tied to this are the feasting 
behaviour and manners that exemplify surviving African humanist consciousness even 
among the ‘Christians’ who veil such consciousness beneath a thin veneer of western 
Christianity. Ways of making African philosophy (as invested in proverbs and idiomatic 
expressions) the criterion for one’s dialogue to be accessible to fellow Africans pervade 
the work.  Above all, concentration on self-constitution rather than pre-occupation with 
apartheid’s oppression and its attempts at cultural annihilation lead to the actions of the 
characters (heightened by the natural phenomena displaying the immanence of the 
Supreme Being) exemplifying a distinctive African humanist identity and atmosphere 
that binds Africans of differing cultures together at the underlying level. 
 
The prophetic voice kept alive by Mashabela threads throught the action of the novel to 
give the mundane characters’ actions epic resonance.  Mphahlele’s works that were 
considered earlier in this study do not take the use of orature devices to prophetic/mythic 
heights, as they go only as far as reinforcing the African cultural context of incidents 
taking place within the literary texts.  The use of orature by Mashabela and characters 
like Tintina and Hunadi typically sustains African humanist resonances in Father Come 
Home, but when their dialogues turn poetic through the repetitiveness and musical 
rhythm of the songs they sing, poetic/mythical sublimity is achieved. For the first time in 
Mphahlele’s narrative writings, the poetic voice takes the foreground, in keeping with the 
cultural homogeneity unfolding at the centre of the novel.   
 
The might of the poetic voice through which African humanist social practices are 
represented together with African interpretations of the impact of history results in 
western Christianity sometimes being cast in a satirical mould.  The comic presentation is 
embodied in the actions of weak characters like Eleyase and the lay preacher of 
Sedibeng.  Through Eleyase and the lay preacher’s dispositions, for the first time in 
Mphahlele’s works western Christianity is depicted not as a competing social force but as 
a crushed consciousness replaced by the more exuberantly vigorous traditional tapestry of 
religious practices as asserted by characters such as Mashabela, Tintina, Hunadi and 
Dineo.  The likes of Eleyase, unlike ‘Christian’ African characters in earlier works like 
Down Second Avenue and “Mrs Plum”, do not represent any self-constituting 
appropriation of western Christianity.  Instead, what they represent is some kind of 
spiritual hollowness which portrays them either as puppets of western Christianity or as 
generally incompetent in their inability to adapt their African humanist consciousnesses 
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to the effects of colonialism.  Because western Christian leaders and followers such as the 
lay preacher and Eleyase do not represent any sound variant of western Christianity, 
Mphahlele does not bother to contrast their actions with those of any charlatan religious 
leaders, as is the case in earlier works.  In concurrence with the epic and racially 
homogeneous nature of the novel, what Mphahlele satirises in this text is the quack chief 
(38).  As we learn from the dialogue of a Sedibeng elder which (as we now know) is a 
communal voice masquerading as individual opinion, this impersonating chief (Batsumi) 
has successfully lied to the Commissioner that “his ancestors were kings” after boredom 
with work in the kitchens of Pretoria (where he has even  been a member of the fist-
flying malaeta) (38).  Mphahlele reveals that the quack chief Batsumi is an emasculated 
parody of the real traditional ruler by stating that “Apart from collecting taxes and trying 
cases of stock theft, wife-beating or family feuding, he had no real powers” (30).  In fact, 
whether the Commissioner believes the lie or not (told by Batsumi about his being of 
royal blood and in line of succession) is of little consequence, for the latter’s truth about 
filiation could not have been the concern of the Commissioner – who is only interested in 
Batsumi’s affiliation with colonial political ideals.  What would matter to the 
Commissioner (who symbolises colonisation) is a mere ascertainment whether Batsumi 
aligns himself with the operations of colonialism by which, as Stewart Crehan rightly 
states, “Ideological domination was filtered through the indigenous servants of colonial 
power” (“Master-Servant Narratives” 37).  As an insinuation of Batsumi’s affiliation with 
western values, one of the ‘historical achievements’ this chief will be remembered for is 
the occasion when he fawningly sends “dancers to Pretoria to entertain the Prince of 
Wales when he visited in 1925” (38). 
 
In Father Come Home, another dimension has been added also to the use of 
colloquialism which in earlier works goes no further than bringing about African-
language style dramatic naturalness in the characters’ dialogue.  This time, colloquial 
utterances reveal epic, decisive moments in the development of the mythical son’s action, 
or resolution of the national dilemma of destruction by apartheid’s urbanisation policies.  
An example is the occasion when an elder’s dialogue starts colloquially with the word 
Waaaiii as it begins to express the contempt with which chief Batsumi is regarded by the 
community for stealing the position of traditional king – as well as desecration of this 
role by misusing it to prostrate in deference to the apartheid government of the time (38).  
 
By means of the further dimensions mentioned above added in this text to Mphahlele’s 
typical style, Father Come Home proves to be no mere repetition of Mphahlele’s 
effective stylistic devices in exemplifying African humanist sensibility.  The novel proves 
to be a stronger assertion and more intense representation of the concept, now in 
Mphahlele’s fiction, too. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1     OPENING  REMARKS 
 
It is necessary to clarify the point that Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism is 
represented in his poetry, short stories, autobiographies and novels by means of stylistic 
tools that he typically employs to signify the Africans’ distinctive paradigm of human 
existence.  That is to say, Mphahlele uses style in his own unique way in order to lead the 
reader into perceiving the existence of Africans as a distinctive section of mankind that 
sets itself apart from other sections of mankind by means of original, creative, African 
ways of thinking and behaving.  Apart from the African writers outside South Africa who 
have been forerunners in advocating such an assertion of the distinctiveness of African 
thinking, it is important to note that on the South African scene forerunners like Sol 
Plaatje appeared as far back as 1916,  when he published Setswana proverbs “with literal 
translations and their European equivalents”, followed soon by a collection of Setswana 
folktales whose value he felt was fast being eroded by “the spread of European ideas” (A 
Vision of Order 10). Mphahlele’s African humanist perception on the role of the writer as 
that of aligning the individual voice with the communal has precedence (as Ursula 
Barnett writes, for example) as early as circa 1939, when the writer Herbert Dhlomo 
stated that “an artist must come out of himself and enter into the general emotion, thought 
and opinion of the people” (A Vision of Order 13).  Of course Mphahlele, like his 
predecessors and contemporaries, sets Africans apart from other sections of mankind 
without denying that there are fundamental human traits Africans share in common with 
all mankind by virtue of belonging to the human species. 
 
Such original implementation of fictional tools harnessed effectively by Mphahlele are 
wielded in such a way that they confirm his view that creative writing is the enterprise of 
playing with images and symbols.   The distinctive stylistic features that are  Mphahlele’s 
medium for cumulatively defining in full what it is to be African humanist in 
consciousness (and in behaviour emanating from such consciousness) have been 
identified and demonstrated throughout this study.  It is proper at this stage to recapitulate 
them so that they are put side by side and synergised by a single stroke into African 
humanist aesthetic criteria as projected by Mphahlele, alongside his view of art as a 
“compulsive cultural act”. 
 
Equally, it is important to remark, based on the investigations of this study, that African 
humanism as a sociological construct has grown and adapted itself to trends of human 
thought spanning, on the one hand, the period when it was first expressed directly in 
Mphahlele’s expository pieces – such as the 1949 UNISA journal article he wrote while 
still a B A student ( “The Unfinished Story”), as well as indirectly in his 1946 collection 
of short stories Man Must Live and Other Stories – and, on the other hand, the present 
period. The concept of African humanism has developed because it has had to interrogate 
topical issues from time to time. It comes as no surprise that Mphahlele’s concept of 
African humanism has adapted itself to the theoretical context within which it has 
thrived, for as early as the publication dates of the examples cited above Mphahlele 
expresses himself either polemically or in fiction in relation to current thought.  That is 
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why in his formative years as a thinker and literary artist he laments (in his polemical 
essays) the inadequate portrayal of African characters in the South African literature of 
the time.  Such a defective handling of black characters in South African literature was 
one of the many indices of the prevailing philosophical attitudes of the time.  As a writer 
of short stories, Mphahlele during the 1940s consciously counteracts the unsatisfactory 
portrayal of black characters in the fiction of other writers by infusing his African 
characters with the distinctive mode of thinking and existence he has called African 
humanism.   
 
In Mphahlele’s view on the intellectual context of the late 1940s, which continues to be 
the focus of his entire corpus of expository and narrative writings ever since, African 
characters had been portrayed as though they were baseless, floating, carnal beings whose 
existence had no roots in any distinctive world-view that (without being backward or 
‘heathen’) differed from that of the whites who (after colonisation) had been the sole 
deciders of norms.  The 1950s Africanist theoretical context that radically sought to 
ascribe milestone achievements of mankind on the globe to Africans is reflected in the 
celebration of self-determined national consciousness Africans are capable of – as in his 
1960 essay “Nigeria on the Eve of Independence”.   
 
Mphahlele’s definition of African humanism by means of denying the applicability of the 
conception of Africans as either ‘backward’ or ‘heathen’ is developed in the seventies by 
his describing in detail what characterised and stimulated crystallisation of the peculiar 
existential outlook of Africans.  That is why his 1978 essay “African Identity – 
Nationalism – The African Personality – Negritude”, Mphahlele lauds the negritudinists’ 
“quest for African identity … [that] was to give birth to both political and cultural 
nationalism” (44).   This makes clear that the search for African identity took the form of 
movements such as negritude and was motivated by the desire to achieve political and 
cultural nationalism.  The broad term “African identity” Mphahlele has been considering 
since his earliest essay thus  started in the 1960s to assume the more specific dimension 
of “nationalism” and developed in the 1970s to be described in terms of its constituent 
dimensions of “political” and “cultural” nationalism.  The idea of a strong, well-defined 
nationalism as the starting point towards a world-wide definition of Africans is thus 
developed from its beginnings within Mphahlele’s theory in the 1960s as the previously 
cited 1960 essay demonstrates, by means of the improved articulation I have just 
demonstrated.    
 
Equally developed in the 1970s is the articulation of Mphahlele’s association of African 
humanist consciousness with the Afrocentric attitude African theorists adopted since the 
late 19th century when Pan Africanism started taking shape.  Testimony to this is his 1978 
remark that the negritudinists’ definition of a unique African identity would not have 
been possible “without a deliberate return to the source to harness and give expression to 
Africa’s cultural resources that had been distorted and denigrated, or at best repressed” 
(“African Identity” 44, emphasis added).   The theoretical attitude Mphahlele affirms in 
this quotation is the central feature of Afrocentrism, as I have already shown earlier in 
this study.    Mphahlele’s original intention to illustrate African humanist social existence 
as equal to any other group identity of whatever distinctive cultural grouping gains from a 
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denser texture in the 1970s enriched by the addition of more of its defining characteristics 
by which it is known today.  An example is Mphahlele’s description in 1971 of African 
humanism as originating from being a religious “state of mind producing moral action” 
(“The Fabric” 154).  According to Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism as 
expressed in this 1971 essay, all aspects of African humanist thinking and behaviour are 
“religion at work” (“The Fabric” 154).   According to his later 1987 essay, justification 
for describing African humanism thus is the fact that “religion in traditional Africa 
permeates all life” (“Social Work” 242).  In this way, some of the features of 
Mphahlele’s African humanism mentioned in his earlier essays are reinforced in new 
contexts within which his essays of the eighties are written.  This is in addition to the 
eighties essays being involved in global African theoretical debates of the era including 
stances on essentialism. 
 
The 1990s is a period during which Mphahlele made his theory of African humanism 
more circumscribed by mentioning its cosmology, sometimes in a direct didactic method 
as in his 1992 essay entitled “Notes Towards an Introduction to African Humanism: A 
Personal Enquiry” (137).    At times he explicated his concept of African humanism in a 
discursively integrative way while giving his analysis of the way it interacts with modern 
day institutions such as globalised economics and higher education, as in the 1997 essay 
“Knowledge, Its Nature and Role in the Process of Change” (167).  This trend is 
continued in his essays spanning 2000 and 2004, but with a less frequent overt use of the 
term “African humanism” and by asserting the potency and relevance of African 
humanism in resolving day to day challenges in subtler characterisations of the 
philosophy – as demonstrated in Chapter 1 of this dissertation.  Throughout these critical 
environments, issues that Mphahlele and fellow theorists considered are reflected in the 
themes of the former’s narrative writings within each epoch. 
 
Such an anchoring of an author’s personal philosophical stance and literary practice 
within the ambient intellectual debate warrants a selective survey of the way African 
humanism tackles topical issues from the 1940s to the present time.  This study has been 
scrutinising Mphahlele’s representations of African humanism in response (implicitly or 
explicitly) to those aspects of intellectual debate within which it has been conceived and 
refined, such as negritude, Black Consciousness, Afrocentrism, racism and essentialism.   
As I mention in the Introduction of this dissertation, in delineating his concept of African 
humanism Mphahlele never sought to pass off an eclectic combination of existing 
theories as an original concept. 
 
In keeping with his endorsement of African humanism as a consiousness and way of life 
that respects diversity, he interrogated the views of negritudist, Pan African, Black 
Consciousness and postcolonial theorists without attempting to obscure their distinctness.  
What he did was to look critically at these theories, reject some of their aspects and 
reconstitute those aspects he partially embraced to align with his own distinct concept of 
African humanism.  The result was always that no unmediated re-surfacing of an aspect 
of the theory he reacted to would occur in his constantly adapting concept of African 
humanism, as this would undermine the validity and distinctness of such tenets distilled 
from other writers’ theories.  From existing theories he used some aspects to create new 
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views of his own, after which his concept continued to co-exist respectfully with other 
people’s theories.  Evidence of this today is that some of the theories Mphahlele 
developed side by side with those of Black Consciousness and Pan Africanism still exist 
in their updated, modified ways in as much as his concept of African humanism still fills 
the gap it has historically been bridging while growing in graceful neighbourhood with 
these related perspectives.  The lacuna that Mphahlele’s philosophy of African humanism 
fills and always has filled is the absence before his theoretical intervention of an 
Afrocentrism that does not deny the distinctive nature of  non-Africans as members of 
differing cultural clusters – while at the same time rectifying misperceptions about 
Africanness that some non-Africans may harbour, as Afrocentrists in general set out to 
do.  The Pan Africanist aspect of his concept of African humanism is used by Mphahlele 
to castigate fellow Africans who act contrary to the values that would be upheld 
according to the African humanist ethos.  Some Pan Africanists associated with 
Africanist tributaries of thought other than Mphahlele’s African humanism fall into the 
trap of theorising narrowly about Africanism.  Such a weakness often leads them to 
attribute their own failure (emanating from incapacity in balancing western lifestyles with 
Africanist ones) to sometimes anachronistically cited attitudes generally known to have 
been those of imperialist non-Africans.  While today as in the past some conservative 
Black Consciousness exponents have degenerated or are degenerating into racist attitudes 
expressed in slogans like “drive the white man to the sea” or “Africa for the Africans” – 
that result from failure to describe Africanism in rigorously thought-out ways rather than 
emotionally superficial ones – Mphahlele’s African humanism still satisfies the need to 
describe Africanness in scrupulous, methodologically exacting and unsentimental ways.    
Even supposedly progressive adherents to Pan Africanism and Black Consciousness 
today still speak about botho/ubuntu and characterise an “African” in poorly defined 
ways that metamorphose from situation to situation because they serve selfish interests, 
while Mphahlele distinguishes African humanism from such facile definitions of 
Africanness.  The intellectualism that often characterises the speeches and writings of 
some African leaders today in attempting to circumscribe ideas such as the “African 
Union”, “African Renaissance”, “African peer review mechanism” and “reconstruction 
and development” could acquire a more pragmatic sobriety by learning from Mphahlele’s 
philosophically solid yet complex and flexible philosophy of African humanism.   Even 
today it can serve as a moral touchstone. 
 
African humanism as elaborated by Mphahlele should be used to help steer sociopolitical 
debates that necessarily occur as well as grapple with the existential challenges both 
Africans and non-Africans are facing today – as it used to throughout its passage in 
history. 
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6.2      LITERARY  REPRESENTATIONS  OF  AFRICAN  HUMANISM 
 
A close look at Mphahlele’s poetry reveals that when writing in this genre he also looks 
at life from the perspective of what he calls African humanism.  In “Dedication to Voices 
in the Whirlwind” (The Unbroken Song), the alienation of exile is expressed in ways that 
assert Mphahlele’s African humanist outlook, as when he pays tribute to the Africans’ 
resilience by writing in order to intimate his empathy with poets like Dennis Brutus and 
Keorapetse Kgositsile.  What Mphahlele does in this poem is to celebrate the survival of 
African humanist outlook, exemplified by his enduring view of the African writer as 
incapable of writing in isolation from the community of other writers and (especially) of 
fellow Africans.  This poem draws strength from Mphahlele’s notion of the resilience of 
African humanist consciousness displayed by fellow exiles joining him in the agony of 
exile from a wide spectrum of varying host countries. The poems “Vignettes” and 
“Death” from the same collection respectively transform American pastoral beauty into 
the inspiring myth of the unbroken song of African existence that is driven by agency and 
an inclination towards self-definition.  “Death”, for instance, departs from the private 
sorrow emanating from lamenting the untimely deaths of a mother and a brother, to 
sneering at murderous apartheid’s own suicidal aspects.  The author achieves this by 
using the image of the dead former South African leader H.F. Verwoerd who is one of the 
architects of apartheid and dies at the hands of Tsafendas and (probably) other white 
conspirators.  Rather than stagnantly overworking the exposure of apartheid’s brutality, 
the author’s tone urges fellow Africans suffering under the system to learn lessons from it 
and prepare their postcolonial temperament in advance for an outlook that will avoid the 
suicidal pitfalls of apartheid and respect the sacredness of human life – thereby 
preserving mankind (themselves subsumed) rather than engaging in internecine conflict.  
The poetry thus postulates introspection as one of the means to reach a sound self-
definition that transcends the blinkers of transient apartheid. 
 
A zeal for life visible in short story characters like Khalima Zungu in “Man Must Live” 
permeates the short stories and other genres as Mphahlele’s way of exemplifying the 
aspect of African humanism that he sees as the Africans’ general poise and ability to 
celebrate life or live life to its fullest, such as siring children when called upon to do so 
by the position of head of family.  While such a celebration of life in the earlier stories 
exposes a ludicrous mimicry in characters such as the policeman Zungu, in portrayal of 
characters of the later stories it testifies to what Mphahlele sees as the African humanist 
propensity towards a self-defining counterdiscourse to the oppressor’s, such as Karabo’s 
refusal to live life in keeping with the assumptions of Mrs Plum and other liberals, 
revealed stylistically, as a critic like Crehan observes, by devices such as Karabo’s 
adherence “to a naturalistic register … suggesting the servant’s growing awareness or 
movement towards self-emancipation” (“Master-Servant Narratives” 39).  That what is 
regarded as normal by Mrs Plum and Kate is seen to be abnormal by Karabo and the 
other servants is observed by this and other critics, exemplified in his (Crehan’s) 
indicating affiliative markers by their absence in terms like “Dick’s rage at the way Mrs 
Plum pampers and talks to her two dogs”, “Treating animals like people is disgusting” 
and treating the two dogs like people “demeans Dick and Karabo as human beings” (50).  
Similarly, the policeman Tefo in “Down the Quiet Street” defies the stereotype of a 
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caricatured black policeman and relates humanely to the residents of Newclare township 
as a rounded man living life to the full – exemplified by his romantic liaison and eventual 
marriage with one of the Newclare widows.  
 
Black women are portrayed in Mphahlele’s writings as stronger than men and central to 
the economic and social survival of the family and the nation.  That is why Naledi 
“[decides] she can have [Steve Cartwright] as a husband” without entering into formal 
marriage with him, in keeping with her own African customs around widowhood rather 
than acquiring Steve’s cultural practices (The Wanderers 194).  It is (in this way) not a 
surprise when she later describes her married life to Timi in such a way that the life of the 
Cartwright family seems to revolve around her own vantage point, as follows:  “They’re 
fine.  Felix doesn’t do much … [because] the stroke wore him out … My  mother-in- 
law’s still full of beans … I couldn’t have wished for a better father-in-law.  I think my 
mother-in-law is good to me only because she’d lose the battle against those she loves 
and who love me” (223).  Yet Naledi does not stand up against males in the near-militant 
way some feminists would advocate.  As an agent of change, Naledi does not herald 
change in husband-wife relations along the lines of an anti-sexist or anti-paternalistic 
struggle.  Her stand is in terms of political and cultural, national consciousness that 
promotes change in seeing people entering marriage in non-racial terms, acknowledging 
without conflict each other’s distinctive sociocultural consciousness.  The “private affairs 
are a public matter” in terms of “national allegory”, in Crehan’s terms (50) because the 
marriage is antithetical to that in which the white husband would represent the colonial 
domination of Europe, whereas the black wife would enact obliteration of Africanness.  
Like Tirenje in Chirundu (though there with a shift of the “national allegory” towards 
relations of the alienated emerging black middle class, who fail to merge with the 
persistently African humanist ethos of the post-independence masses), she relates with 
calm dignity to her husband and ensures that she remains in her position that is central to 
the life of the husband and his family by asserting the African humanist view of a woman 
as central and not peripheral in the life of her husband, of the family and of the nation.  
Tirenje’s resort in Chirundu to statutory law inherited from colonialism after Chimba has 
married Monde in traditional Bemba law is her way of demonstrating that the African 
humanism within her is adaptable to postcolonial change and does not fall in the trap of 
rigidly rejecting everything that has to do with western cultures.  African humanism, 
being based in traditional African cultures that regard the social position of a woman as 
sacred, does not need the antidote of ideological feminism to accord women the 
respectable position that belongs to them in society.  It is for this reason that the critics 
Ogude, Raditlhalo, Ramakuela, Ramogale and Thuynsma remark that Mphahlele’s work 
“shows a keen awareness of the strength of black women, yet he certainly does not 
develop his women characters as feminist scholars would prefer” (Eskia 454).  In the 
same way that Mphahlele frowns upon the weakness of ideological variants of African 
humanism such as Black Consciousness in its extremely political formulations, it is not 
strange that he does not detract from the more complete and powerful definition of the 
place of a woman in African humanist terms by narrowing it down to the sometimes 
ideological extremism of some variants of feminist thinking. 
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Mphahlele regards resonances (which include momentous historical events) as crucial to 
literature in the sense of its being an aspect of African humanist aesthetics.  It is with the 
intention of illustrating this point that the imagery within the dialogue of Mphahlele’s 
characters recreates orature.  For this reason, when Uncle in the short story “Grieg on a 
Stolen Piano” (In Corner B) flees from his home to the town of Pietersburg and later 
from Pietersburg to Pretoria, the terrain he traverses contains exuberant nature imbued 
with predators and other animals which (as is the case with the protagonists in folktales) 
do not hurt him.  With the same effect of fabricating specifically African resonances, the 
main character Maredi Tulamo in Father Come Home saunters in the confused search for 
his father, through bushes in the company of the iguana, buffalo, zebras, tigers, lions and 
other animals, a setting in which a gigantic lion one day scampers off the middle of the 
road so that he may pass. It is in order to achieve the same effect that historical 
resonances such as the Africans’ survival tactics – to counteract the alienation of exile, 
overall racial bias, the subtle dubiousness of liberalism with regard to the liberation of 
Africans and apartheid’s conquering mechanisms such as segregated urbanisation and 
migrant labour – are painted by means of symbols and metaphors in all of Mphahlele’s 
writing in order to create a uniquely African historical perspective.  Interspersing 
colloquial African language forms in the characters’ dialogue is tied (with regard to 
effect) to historical resonances in works like Father Come Home, in that it marks pointers 
to watershed actions of central characters.  Mphahlele increases the intensity of 
resonances in his narrative writings by means of African language proverbs and idiomatic 
expressions which in themselves can be seen as encoded accounts of Africans’ ways of 
coping with existential challenges in the past, methods of survival whose use in present 
times maintains the “unbroken song” of African existence.  
 
Mphahlele’s use of oral traditions to effect resonances accomplishes what the theorist 
Phaswane Mpe singles out as the proper occupation of literary commentators, in the 
following words: 
 Instead of seeing oral forms in written texts as an unproblematic mirroring of 
 extant oral traditions, we need to ask how writers solve the manifest problems that 
 come with this project.  How, for example, does one deal with representing oral 
 forms of one language in another?  What are the aesthetic, ideological and 
 political possibilities that are opened up by such representations of orality? (77) 
For Mphahlele, the use of orature explores the politico-aesthetic possibility of tempering 
latent hegemonic predeterminations, to which his writing in the medium of English 
would otherwise expose itself, with inherently African cultural modes of thought and 
expression.  In the ideological sphere, the device comprehensively abrogates English 
from propagating imperialist consciousness towards embodying and asserting African 
humanism as a consciousness and a way of life.  Mpe’s observation that Plaatje’s 
“perception of orality tends to be ambiguous” (88) is justified by his equally accurate 
discernment of the feature of Plaatje’s works of using “Shakespeare and the Bible … [as] 
major imaginative templates through which he recast Setswana oral forms in English” 
(78).  Unlike the seemingly derogatory way Mpe views Plaatje’s ambiguity -- in the sense 
of his being inconsistent in his avowed mission of reversing the imperialist process 
whereby “Sechuana folk-tales, … with the spread of European ideas, are fast being 
forgotten” (75) -- I see it as an enriching ambiguity symptomatic of the author’s 
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accession to the existence of a hybrid culture that is a corollary of the experience of 
colonisation.  In this respect Plaatje shows a similarity of technique with Mphahlele, 
although the former did not concern himself as the latter does with defining and 
articulating such a legacy of altered consciousness within Africans in the wake of the 
Natives’ Land Act of 1913 and other apartheid pieces of legislation.  Mpe further remarks 
that Plaatje’s “perception of orality tends … at times [to be] even self-contradictory”, for 
the reason that “[he] offered, at times, an evolutionist model, which suggests a gradual 
decimation of orality” (88).  What should be added is perhaps the possibility that as “an 
allegorical indictment of the Natives’ Land Act of 1913” (75), Mhudi’s intimation of 
literacy (as a symbol of the aggressive expansionism of imperial subjection) devouring 
orality (which symbolises the enduring distinctive cultural identity of Africans) is a 
warning about whites poised at this time in history to wipe out black culture.  In the same 
vein, the “dialectic of cross-referencing and complementarity” should not be seen as a 
pointing to unmediated acculturation of the Batswana in the face of conquest by whites.  
It should be understood to hint at Plaatje’s assertion of a stand equivalent to the 
“integrated vision” or counterpointing of the consciousness of the oppressor with that of 
the oppressed (in Said’s terms) – the point a theorist like Fanon proposes in remarking 
that “It is at the heart of national consciousness that international consciousness lives and 
grows” (“On National Culture” 199).  In other words, it is proper for orality (as an 
ingredient of the “national consciousness” of the Batswana in Mhudi) to co-exist in a 
dialectic relationship with some ingredients of international consciousness (assuming the 
form of the culture of the whites in the novel who are out to dispossess the Barolong of 
land).  The openness of Plaatje’s motives (in his use of orality) to a myriad of 
interpretations is understandable, considering that he did not follow such a style with 
theoretical explanation as Mphahlele has done.  In the case of Mphahlele, oral literary 
devices are used in keeping with his concept of African humanism, as indicated above, to 
evoke resonances that collectively consolidate an African humanist “perspective”. 
 
Resonances arrived at in ways enumerated above are at times employed by Mphahlele in 
combination with poetic devices such as rhythm and refrain to increase their impact from 
merely enhancing an African perspective to the forging of myth.  Myth is tied to the 
orientation of African humanism to inspire hope for the future and to reinforce the 
attitude that life (according to the concept of African humanism) continues to survive 
beyond physical death of individuals and peoples.  An individual whose expression 
reaches mythic heights speaks ipso facto with a prophetic voice.  Prophecy is the ability 
to speak to one’s people with resolute conviction and to direct their lives towards what 
one single-mindedly believes to be the right destiny.  Harmoniously with the way 
Mphahlele has described the irony of African existence as “a dialogue of two selves” (i.e. 
simultaneous psychological occupation with both the present and the past or the 
contiguous and the distant), the community poet succeeds in achieving mythmaking by 
means of alternating emphases on the present and the past or the contiguous and the 
distant.  One example is the character Mashabela’s ability (in Father Come Home) to slip 
into and out of the present and past by juxtaposing the mythical plot of the village boy 
who was born speaking and wanting to know the whereabouts of his father with the 
unfolding  plot of Maredi Tulamo’s search for his father Lemeko.  In this way the 
juxtaposition of a past event (signified by the word was) with a present one (which the 
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word unfolding points to) removes the distance between past and present, distant and 
contiguous. 
 
Mythmaking invests action with the aura of religion in that (like religion) it fixates on a 
visionary object or being whose existence cannot be tested empirically.  Perhaps this 
explains why in Father Come Home the prophetic lines of the sage Mashabela 
championing a return to modes of piety such as ancestral reverence and recognition of the 
holiness of oracles and shrines are pitted in import against the preachings of a Christian 
lay preacher who declares traditional practices to be heathen conduct deserving of a 
grilling in hell in the after-life.  Significantly, Mashabela, Dineo, Hunadi and other 
‘Christian’ characters of the novel reside in the ‘Christian’ side of the villages.  Their 
African humanist way of relating to God, different as it appears to the practices of 
western Christianity, is a hybrid kind of traditional religion into which the effects of 
colonial Christianity have been absorbed.  Their Christianity is so tamed by the rural, 
traditional environment that, should it occupy any prominence above marginality in the 
mainstream, it would be as outlandish as the cacophonous image of Mphahlele’s real-life 
maternal grandfather who “would herd cattle with a Bible in his hand” as early as the 
close of the nineteenth century (Exiles and Homecomings 31). In fact, the hybrid 
Christianity of Mashabela and other Africans living in Sedibeng should be understood as 
being a perfected form of attempts in Mphahlele’s earlier works (like Down Second 
Avenue and “Mrs Plum”) by Zionist or messianic preachers to abrogate Christianity by 
re-defining it as an African humanist variety of humane religious practice. 
 
The aspects of African humanism mentioned in this part have been demonstrated 
throughout this study as having been represented in the characterisation, theme and style 
of the scrutinised texts.  In writing these narrative texts in the ways demonstrated above, 
Mphahlele qualifies himself as an African writer in the sense of writing in a manner 
which relates to the existential status and challenges of being African.  He is an 
Afrocentric writer in that the stylistic features cited above are consonant with and portray 
a view of reality from the African perspective that challenges norms imposed by the non-
African “centre”.  His position as an Afrocentric writer ipso facto groups him globally 
with postcolonial writers whose project it is to appropriate formerly colonised reality and 
consciously undertake the task of self-constitution.  Above all he has proved himself an 
African humanist who embodies all the attributes enumerated above as well as earning 
the description of a Pan Africanist or Black Consciousness thinker in that his spiritual 
position and his praxis inevitably pre-suppose, without degenerating into extremist 
ideology, pride in being African – shared across the continent and in the diaspora.  Such a 
position adopted by Mphahlele naturally subsumes the negritude consciousness and 
disposition, barring the initial narrowness of its scope. 
 
Mphahlele’s divergences from other writers of the fifties and African writers in general 
are evident in two more ways. He handles setting and themes commonly shared by 
African writers (such as master-servant relations) differently from his compatriots.  While 
for writers like Themba and Motsisi “Sophiatown in Johannesburg [is] a juxtaposition of 
dream and myth with reality [and] has inspired … [them] to use [it] as a symbolic 
reference point” (Gready, “Sophiatown Writers of the Fifties” 140), and for black writers 
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of that period generally “Sophiatown had gathered almost mythological import in the 
literature as a romantic, bohemian world … of its petty-bourgeois professional classes” 
(Chapman, “Identity and the Apartheid State” 238), Mphahlele stands out as one writer 
the setting of whose narratives will not be remembered for immortalising the township of 
Sophiatown.  Considering that in social stature he was not different from, and actually 
was counted among the “ ‘new African’ teachers, nurses, lawyers, musicians and 
journalists, who were usually also creative writers, [who] rubbed shoulders in 
[Sophiatown] shebeens with the other products of rapid urbanisation” (Chapman, 
“Identity and the Apartheid State” 238), his deviation from the stock exploitation of 
Sophiatown as fictional milieu should be seen as revolutionary.  From among the 
townships constituting “Western Areas” and including Sophiatown (Gready 157) in 
Johannesburg, Mphahlele uses Newclare, which is much less favoured by his 
contemporaries as narrative milieu; his other famous setting of Marabastad in Pretoria is 
mentioned even less frequently in collective works of the other writers of the Drum 
generation. Due to the high concentration of the black socialites in Sophiatown 
mentioned above, it is clear that townships like Newclare and Marabastad were 
associated with the lowly and poor among blacks, and looked down upon.  For this 
reason, Mphahlele’s single-minded vivid immortalisation of these two townships in a 
way that is infused with intimate love is a sign not only of his dissociation from elitist 
attitudes, but is testimony also of his intention to empower the downtrodden even within 
black social stratifications.  This is in keeping with African writers’ tendency towards 
championing the cause of the oppressed, which in the case of other writers mentioned 
above ironically proves to be a racial undertaking, in that they appreciate the significance 
of such a stance only when whites come into the picture.  This further counts in his 
favour as an innovator or a “beginner” (in terms of Said’s theory), because it defines the 
sameness simultaneously with the difference of his repetition of what is affiliatively the 
common concern of his contemporaries.   
 
Consistently with his genuinely non-racial position (demonstrated above), Mphahlele 
utilises his concept of African humanism to resolve the contradictory position regarding 
the morality of the fiction produced by some African writers in which, according to 
Crehan, “emancipation … looks less like a new dispensation than the Law of the 
indigenous Father returning to take the place of the usurping Law of the colonial Father; 
less like freedom than a more homely form of state repression” (39).  Crehan perceptively 
observes that for the writings of the latter, “The desire generated through contact with the 
racial and cultural other … must be disavowed in favour of a return to African culture 
and traditions” (39).   As shown in the analysis of Mphahlele’s narrative writings (in this 
study), Mphahlele’s projection of African humanism as the appropriate consciousness 
with which Africans should counteract the pernicious effects of cultural colonisation is  
not contingent upon a wholesale rejection of European ways of life.  Rather, it is 
dependent for its survival upon a judicious appropriation of some aspects of European 
mores which results untimately in neither a purely African nor a purely European 
sensibility characterising the behaviour of the postcolonial African humanist citizen. 
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6.3     AFRICAN  HUMANISM  AND  CURRENT  CHALLENGES 
 
In positing African humanism as the distinctive identity of one cluster out of many other 
internally cohering groups of peoples within the broad ambit of humankind, Mphahlele 
has had to respond to several challenges by detractors of his theory.  As he writes in his 
1971 essay “The Fabric of African Culture and Religious Beliefs”, he recognises that “it 
is often argued that African belief used to be shared by the white man when he was 
largely pastoral, i.e. before the 18th century” (“The Fabric” 154). 
 
Implications of the view expressed above include the notion that “what the African 
believes in and practices is not uniquely his” as he “is merely a pre-industrial person” 
(“The Fabric” 154).  What might lend credence to the above challenge to Mphahlele’s 
concept of African humanism is the historical fact that prior to the Renaissance juncture 
in history – when the Western humanists drew a line between the intellect and God – the 
earliest  Western humanists “were devout Christians” though “their interest in the classics 
was not religiously inspired” (“The Fabric” 155).   
 
Western humanism and African humanism (in the way Mphahlele explains above) were 
closer together in the past by virtue of their base in religious belief, yet not indentical, as 
even at that stage Western interest in art was not religiously inspired – whereas to this 
day artistic impulses and concretisations within African humanism are an organic 
extension of religious behaviour.  This means that the spirituality of Western humanists 
became gradually marginalised while it was intellect that was allowed detached growth 
and indulgence, ever since the initial theorisation of its separation from religious 
existence by interest in the classics.   Mphahlele sees the Western humanists’ draining of 
spirituality as having been so radical as being today in the position of “only making 
allowances for man’s emotions”, which contrasts with the nature of African humanism, 
as it “still has a religious base” today (“The Fabric” 155).  This would be the reason for 
‘Christian’ characters who fail to abrogate western Christianity (such as Eleyase and the 
lay preacher of Sedibeng in a work like Father Come Home) showing all emotion and no 
moral sense.  If morality, according to Mphahlele, is a product of religious consciousness 
(as revealed by his statement that “African humanism was originally a religious state of 
mind producing moral action” – “The Fabric” 154), then a person whose African 
humanist religious consciousness is feeble will prove wanting in moral sense. 
 
The important point to note from Mphahlele’s comparison of Western and African 
humanisms is that original separation of intellect from religion has marked Western 
humanism as differing from African humanism, which up to now still retains religion as 
the matrix of all human behaviour.  His conception of all activities by Africans unfolding 
against the backdrop of religion is affirmed by the way he sees even African arts and 
crafts as concretisation of a religious impulse.  In his 1995 “Address at the Opening of 
Community Arts Come Together Exhibition”, he traces the evolution of present day 
African art to the days when Africans “had greater appeal as artists when [their] creations 
were ritualistic, inspired by the gods and ancestral spirits as intercessors between [them] 
and the Supreme Being” (269).    In an earlier address delivered in 1985, he sketches how 
such a religious basis for art survives in African literature and craftsmanship today, in 
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which African artists “have braved the world of new concepts, new social political 
statements, while they try at the same time to recapture the essence of Africanness as a 
distinctive experience” (“Images of Africa” 69).  In order for this social feature to be 
democratically enlisted, Mphahlele looks forward to “a climate of political freedom, 
when there will be freedom of association” in which “the African can hold his cultural 
destiny in his own hands” on the South African scene — a climate in which “the proper 
meeting point between [Western humanism] and African humanism” (“The Fabric” 155) 
will take place. It is important to understand that according to Mphahlele the 
crystallisation and recognition of the existence and distinctiveness of a cluster of peoples 
whose thinking and broadly-defined collective lifestyle is African humanist is a pre-
condition for “the proper meeting point” between Africans, Europeans and peoples of 
other identities, hence his careful qualification that not only should the meeting point 
happen, but it should be a “proper meeting point” (“The Fabric” 155, emphasis added).  
This means that the way Africans make sense of western norms and values should not be 
in the way prescribed by the coloniser but should be in the way the African himself or 
herself abrogates or adopts the western norms and values from his or her own African 
humanist perspective.  This would be the reason for Mphahlele to create characters like 
Chimba and Tirenje (in Chirundu), for example, in order to contrast the successful way in 
which Tirenje’s African humanist subjectivity empowers her to reclaim her centrality in 
Chimba’s life despite the husband’s illusion that he himself is in control, with the dismal 
way in which the husband Chimba fails to manage the “meeting point” between his 
African humanist consciousness and colonial consciousness. 
 
The explanation above of African humanism as a tool with which the African must meet 
other peoples or clusters of peoples without his or her integrity compromised, clarifies 
that Mphahlele expects African humanism to adapt and re-adapt itself indefinitely as it 
moves through time.  The most crucial mission at this time, however, is to define African 
humanism and to have Africans and people of other identities acknowledge its 
substantive existence as a distinctive identity among other such distinctive identities of 
other groups in the world.  There is no doubt that African humanism retains its core while 
changing from time to time as far as it has to accommodate world-views differing from it.  
As for the possibility of Africans one day losing their distinctive identity to be identical 
with Western humanists, this seems unlikely when one considers that the core of African 
humanism has survived to this day.  Also, the pre-Renaissance differences between these 
two humanisms (as Mphahlele has explained) make us aware that here we are not dealing 
with a single phenomenon which has bifurcated along the way.  If this were the case it 
would make sense to forsee a re-merging after the factors leading to the bifurcation, such 
as movement through differing environments, would have ceased to exist. The dynamic 
propensity of African humanism in adapting itself as the environment changes also 
discounts the possibility of its ever fossilising into a relic of the past, unlike what would 
be the case if it were a static, rigid concept that ignores the present to fixate in the past.  
Mphahlele does not dimiss the possibility of Western and African humanisms one day 
imploding into a single consciousness once Africans have completely recovered from 
their pre-industrial imprisonment, nor does he agree that it will necessarily happen.  
Understandably, Mpahlele is concerned with that which obtains now, which he senses is 
not fully appreciated nor given due recognition.  This explains why he makes statements 
 304
such as the following: “Whether or not the African will change is not important, even 
though it is possible” (“The Fabric” 154). 
 
African humanism would render itself vulnerable to extinction only if it were not 
dynamic.  It would seem that this concept’s non-essentialist nature is among the qualities 
that favour it in this regard. Writers like Conversi have indicated that absolute 
“essentialism is often identifiable by the sustained and totalising description of entire 
groups in a hypostatising manner as cohesive entities that appear to be trapped in their 
historical legacy” (“Resisting Primordialism” 271).  African humanism in the way 
Mphahlele defines it is not guilty of this accusation by Conversi, as it makes use of the 
concept of African cultures with the concession that they differ at the behavioural level 
and are tied together by African humanist consciousness only at an underlying level. This 
is one of the reasons why Mphahlele’s work always highlights historical perspective, to 
emphasise that Africans or Europeans are described as and behave as they are shaped by 
historical events.  This serves to distinguish individual features of people belonging to 
any group from the objective cultural traits belonging to the entire distinctive cluster of 
peoples that have been brought about by historical events.   
 
The problem of essentialism does not end with homogenisation of designated and 
described groups.  That is why Conversi goes on to link essentialism with historical and 
cultural determinism (272-273).  To him, the problem with cultural essentialism arises 
when the distinction between objective ethnicity and subjective culture is blurred, which 
could lead to unfortunate essentialising of the (imaginary) enemy and could end in 
blanket condemnation of individual misdeeds and their attribution to entire groups (274).  
Mphahlele’s (now famous) definition of African humanism as welcoming whites and 
people of other races even during apartheid provided that the consciousness of whites can 
voluntarily adapt to coincide with that of African humanists reveals that his concept does 
not totalise peoples who apparently or by definition fall outside its fold.  In other words, 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism is not racist.  Such a nonracist aspect comes 
as no surprise when one remembers that the concept of African humanism aligns itself 
with postcolonial or modern modes of thought which include nonracialsm.  Said, as one 
of the foremost postcolonial writers, has demonstrated his non-racist stance in remarks 
such as the following:  “To reintegrate himself with worldly actuality, the critic of texts 
ought to be investigating the system of discourse by which the “world” is divided, 
administered, plundered, by which humanity is thrust into pigeonholes, by which  “we” 
are “human” and “they” are not, and so forth” (“Beginnings” 26).  Said’s implicit concern 
in this quotation with proper relations between peoples who are classifiable as Europeans 
and those regarded as non-European is similar to that displayed by Mphahlele in the texts 
discussed presently.  Mphahlele being an Afrocentric writer from whose consciousness 
the implications of the encounter between Europe and Africa is bound not likely to fade, 
it is not surprising that he shows a concern for proper relations between Europeans and 
Africans like other Afrocentric writers, as shown by Fanon expressing regret at racist 
interrelations by exhorting :  “Superiority?  Inferiority?  Why not the quite simple attempt 
to touch the other, to feel the other, to explain the other to myself?”  (Black Skin, White 
Masks 231).   Fanon’s valuing of the need for the Africans to “explain the other to 
[themselves]” should be understood properly to mean that Africans should accommodate 
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non-Africanness in their negotiation of multiracial co-existence.  Fanon associates racism 
with failure on the part of the oppressed elite and the masses who follow them, to educate 
themselves about each detail of the intellectual context within which the struggle for 
liberation takes place, in the following words: 
 The settler is not simply the man that must be killed.  Many members of the mass 
 of colonialists reveal themselves to be much, much nearer to the national struggle 
 than certain sons of the nation.  The barriers of blood and race-prejudice are 
 broken down on both sides.  In the same way, not every Negro or Moslem is 
 issued automatically with a hall-mark of genuineness; and the gun or the knife is 
 not inevitably reached for when a settler makes his appearance.   
                                                                                             (“Spontaneity” 116 - 7) 
 
In Mphahlele’s literary texts a representation of the non-racial aspect of African 
humanism is exemplified, inter alia, by the marriage (already hinted at elsewhere) 
between the editor of Bongo magazine, Steve Cartwright, with the black widow Naledi 
(in The Wanderers). This confirms what Mphahlele has affirmed in expository writing:  
“Africans believe in marriage based on compatibility.  There must be good marriages 
between white and white and good marriages between white and black as well. The 
colour doesn’t matter.  It depends on circumstances” (Exiles and  Homecomings 19).  
This is a significant development after most white characters in Mphahlele’s earlier 
works have been depicted almost as avators of complete prejudice associated collectively 
with whites under apartheid.  With the portrayal of the white character Steve Cartwright 
as someone marrying with Naledi purely on the basis of their compatibility as persons, 
Mphahlele is perfecting his superannuation of protest literature and its weaknesses that 
include attitudes which could be said to border on racism. Mphahlele here is 
demonstrating an effort to plunge through racial stereotyping, in order to study and 
understand whites as people.  Such an orientation clinches Mphahlele as a genuine 
postcolonial writer.  From the example of work by postcolonial theorists such as Edward 
Said (as analysed by Khalidi), a postcolonial writer like Mphahlele has of neccesity to 
make a conscious effort  to understand all members of humanity thoroughly, including 
those that could be regarded as the enemy.  Khalidi has described such an attitude in the 
postcolonial theorist Edward Said in the remark that “There are other reasons for Said’s 
influence on Palestinian politics, namely his ability to bring to Palestinian political 
deliberations a profound understanding of American society and culture, and an acute 
awareness of how to speak to the American public” (“Said and American Public Sphere” 
160). 
 
Failure by any postcolonial critic to remember the point Khalidi makes of Edward Said 
(in the quotation above) will defeat the very end of the mission to liberate oneself from 
the past weaknesses resulting from colonialism.  It is for this reason that Ndebele once 
remarked that one major weakness of post-protest literature in South Africa was that:  
“Although the new writing has begun to make a move away from that pre-occupation 
with the ‘other’, it is still rooted in the emotional and intellectual polarities of South 
African oppression …”  (“Redefining” 64).  It is in order for postcolonial orientation as 
exemplified above by means of Said’s lifework and as encouraged in the quotation of 
Ndebele (above) to be promoted that the depicted marriage of Cartwright and Naledi is a 
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great contribution by Mphahlele, further developing South Afican literature by Africans. 
This is because the portrayal of such a crosscultural marriage is shown to be based on 
human affection and attraction free from racial stereotyping and polarisation.  What 
further marks Mphahlele’s development as a writer and theorist apart from the non-
racialism he displays in the writing of such works as The Wanderers is that in later works 
(including Father Come Home) he seems to maintain this stance with even greater 
intensity. 
 
An example of such a more noticeable move away from racial stereotyping is an incident 
in which the central character Maredi (in Father Come Home) finds on the farm of the 
Afrikaner farmer Du Plessis “a white labourer who … lived in a mud shack no better than 
those for the black labourers … [and] all of them, the [black and white workers] and [the 
boss] Du Plessis, were human towards him” (Father Come Home 68).  This part of the 
novel depicts how blacks and whites, probably in the envisaged new South Africa beyond 
apartheid, for the first time could forget about the colour of one’s skin and relate as 
humans according to who is boss and who is servant, as well as according to who 
deserves hospitable kindness due to being a strange saunterer, and who should extend 
welcoming hands to protect the emotional vulnerability of the newcomer. By writing like 
this about Maredi, Du Plessis and other workers on the farm (Father Come Home 68), 
according to Ndebele’s theory  Mphahlele can be seen as consolidating a literary trend 
that moves away from the flaw described (by Ndebele) in the following words:   
What we have … is protest literature that merely changed emphasis: from the 
 moral evil of apartheid, to the existential and moral worth of blackness … [to the 
 point of turning] into a pathology: when objective conditions no longer justify or 
 support an entirely emotional or moral attitude. (“Redefining”64)    
Postcolonial resistance to racial polarisation as exemplified by Ndebele’s view in the 
quotation above is shared by other writers like Edward Said.  Expressing his revulsion 
against polarising partisanship which Palestinian thinkers may be trapped (considering 
the scale of oppression of Palestinians by Israel), Said has remarked that “If there’s a 
report about Israeli torture in the prisons, legal torture, and the Palestinians do torture, 
why are we excused? We shouldn’t be.  Torture is bad, whoever does it” (“Edward Said 
Talks” 29). 
 
However, moving away from racial pigeonholing is not the only challenge Mphahlele 
and other Afrocentric writers face.  Apart from a cultural determinism that may move to 
the extreme of totalising racist weaknesses, according to Conversi, historical determinism 
also leads perniciously  to  absolute essentialism, due to its  view that “the past has got a 
hold on the present, and that we cannot escape its grasp” (275).   Mphahlele as the 
proponent of African humanism differs from African schools of thought such as the 
negritudinists in their initial, radical stages, precisely because negritude romanticised 
traditional Africa and as such paralysed Africans, prevented them from freely shaping the 
present and the future with the fear that this would efface Africanism.  It is this kind of 
imprisonment in the African past that Fanon detests, as in his expression that he is “not 
the slave of the Slavery that dehumanised [his] ancestors” (Black Skin, White Masks 230).   
The cultural heterogeneity of peoples described as African humanists as well as the 
accommodative nature of African humanism take care of genuine concerns of writers like 
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Mbembe when he remarks that at worst essentialism may lead to a canonising of 
difference and elimination of the plurality and ambivalence of custom (“African Modes 
of Self-Writing” 247).  
 
African humanist accommodation of what Mbembe has called “plurality and ambivalence 
of custom” also finds incarnation in characters like the Irish teacher Corkery in Chirundu, 
who is accepted and loved immensely by Tirenje and other learners although he makes 
clear that he neither comprehends fully what it is to be an African nor is he an African 
humanist – Tirenje describes him as “one of that rare breed of Europeans … who was 
ready to listen to his students, to learn from them” (Chirundu 29). Tirenje and other 
students’ love for Corkery signify their African humanist embracement of plurality.  
Moreover, the lauded ambivalence of African humanist and colonial religious conduct as 
evinced in characters such as Hunadi, Dineo and Mashabela in Father Come Home is 
Mphahlele’s way of making clear that African humanism counts in the “ambivalence of 
custom” as a constituent of the atmosphere within which it will assert its own existence.  
In is the environment in which pluralism is not welcome which Mphahlele writes against, 
as follows:  “So much has been written on the Bantu, but I have always felt something 
seriously wanting in such literature.  I told myself there must surely be much more to be 
said than the mere recounting of incident: about the loves and hates of my people; their 
desires; their poverty and affluence; their achievements and failures …” (“Unfinished 
Story” 31).  To write about Africans as if their lives are not full and multidimensional is 
to deny their distinctive existence which would enrich the pluralistic fabric of human 
society.  What Mphahlele demands in the citation above is recognition that Africans do 
not exist as splintered individuals lacking depth but as rounded individuals of profound 
behaviour who represent the depth of their identity as distinctive cultural groups.  To 
deny the African such an identity is to wallow in the self-conceit that Africans can be 
altered into creatures that fit within the objectives of the coloniser.  The African writer 
Chinua Achebe highlights the subjectivity of Africans that Mphahlele reclaims in the 
citation above when he states that “for a society to function smoothly and effectively its 
members must share certain basic tenets of belief and norms of behaviour” (Hopes 100).   
What is also of importance is the converse of Mphahlele’s demand for a 
multidimensional depiction of African lives in fiction.  African humanism by 
Mphahlele’s own definition being based among other consideration on non-racialism, the 
implication of such a demand on Africans extends to the concession that in his own 
writings Mphahlele will ensure that non-African characters are depicted as 
multidimensional, too. 
 
It follows from the above explication of African humanism that the concept’s proneness 
to appropriation makes it amenable to future-directed theories like the Multiculturalism 
suggested by Mazrui (2004).  Mazrui describes Multiculturalism as “pluralistic, seeking 
to represent diverse cultures: latino, … Asian, African, native American and women (sic), 
so multiculturalism is pluralistic…” (“Global Africa” 17). A thorough understanding of 
Mphahlele’s concept of African humanism makes one understand that it is ready to 
participate in any multicultural situation as long as it plays a role as a distinctive 
participant in that complex of multiple participants.  In itself, African humanism is a 
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multicultural concept in that it does not seek to homogenise the diversity of African 
cultures. 
 
One distinction African humanism takes along if it has to join any multicontinental or 
multiracial forum is its notion of dialogue within African cultures – whether adapted to 
modern times to a great degree or not – as simultaneously individual and communal.  A 
speaker within African humanist contexts may be expressing his or her own views, but 
always these views are expressed after attempts on the part of the speaker to determine 
communal opinion on the matter spoken about as well as efforts made to express oneself 
in such a way that there is concord between what one says and the community’s verdict 
on the issue.   In the discipline of Linguistics Mphahlele would thus align himself with 
writers like Candlin in his remark that the performance of speech acts depends on 
“culturally-specific appropriateness criteria” (see Schmidt & Richards 1980, 141).   To 
speak is to perform speech acts, as writers like Hymes (1972) and Schmidt and Richards 
(1980) have explained.  While Matsumoto demonstrates by the example of Japanese that  
the sociolinguistic appropriateness of speech acts is determined in terms of a specific 
culture, Mphahlele’s insight into the appropriateness or acceptability of dialogue within 
African communities would support Matsumoto’s view by giving examples of speech 
acts among Africans (“Reexamination of the Universality of Face” 403).  This entails (in 
terms of Mphahlele’s exemplification in fiction of African humanist dialogue) that 
dialogue necessarily reveals the societal voice in addition to revealing the individual 
voice.  Dialogue by different characters will have this quality of combining the private 
and public voices, but the exact manner of combining the two will still differ from 
character to character – as exemplified in Father Come Home, for instance, by the 
varying poetic qualities of Hunadi’s and Mashabela’s speeches. 
 
It would seem that Mphahlele has achieved what he avows in stating that there is a “need 
to evolve another kind of narrative by way of domesticating the novel … in its present 
form” in an atmosphere where “autobiography should be encouraged [while] epic forms 
should be revived (“The African Critic” 386).  His extension of representations of 
African humanist consciousness and existence in the texture of his poetry and prose (as 
this study illustrates), spills over to the form of the genres in which the poem, 
autobiography, short story and novel invariably centralise the epic author-protagonist – 
either through direct characterisation or by means of a cryptic, continually surfacing 
character employed to sustain awareness of an underlying African humanist 
consciousness.  Mphahlele’s success in this regard is found in the assessments of those 
critics who hold normative views of the forms of literary genres, as when Ursula Barnett 
castigates the “loosely woven and somewhat rambling” plot of The Wanderers (A Vision 
of Order 143).  Because of the same perspective that contrasts with an African humanist 
one (as Mphahlele defines it), Barnett goes on to lament that “Chirundu as a person is not 
sufficiently clearly defined [to] provide a sufficiently strong vehicle for the theme” (149).  
This critic probably falls short of detecting the autobiographical element whereby 
reminders of Chirundu’s youthful African humanist personality (which survives only in a 
mangled state) is sustained throughout the novel in order to sensitise the reader to his 
later degeneration as measured by this standard.  Where some of Mphahlele’s short 
stories appear to counterpoise the protagonist with African humanism as some kind of 
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hidden allegorical character, they are evidently loose in structure and lax in their 
portrayal of the main character, precisely because of the same submerged positioning of 
anonymous African humanist consciousness as the concealed protagonist, consonant with 
Mphahlele’s position that African humanism is at the heart of all activity within African 
societies.  It is the foregrounding of the enduring, adaptive vitality of African cultural 
existence in its broadest totality that Mphahlele begins to adopt as a literary approach in 
the writing of Man Must Live and Other Stories, and continues to sustain in later poetry 
and prose writings, a practice which has solicited praises, as Lewis Nkosi remarks, from 
right-wing journals such as Trek for “not giving … economic or political theories about 
human beings, but real people giving and taking” (in Tasks and Masks 93).  The 
subterfuge of “economic and political theories about human beings” used by Trek 
actually refers to a foregrounding of apartheid which they are happy not to see in 
Mphahlele’s early stories.   What evades the commentators is that what they regard as 
writing on “real people giving and taking” is the beginning of Mphahlele’s (even 
worthier) consolidation of the concept of African humanism which he bases on lives of 
ordinary men and women.  It is interesting, too, how such praise by Trek commentators 
gets outdated when “economic or political theories about [Africans]” start appearing 
more intensely as Mphahlele foregrounds apartheid in his other writings following Man 
Must Live and Other Stories, alongside his representation of African humanism.  It is 
probably disappointment at the marginalisation of the theme of spectacular apartheid 
which leads the “left-wing Guardian” to complain, as Lewis Nkosi goes on to observe, 
“that the author … has had the gods of his fathers exorcised by misionaries” (93).  If this 
were true, however, Mphahlele would diminish the theme of apartheid without setting out 
to assert the worthiness of a distinctly African consciousness and way of life. 
 
A more enlightened assessment would present reviewers such as those in the Guardian 
with evidence of African humanist thinking in Mphahlele’s texts, as in the case of village 
men who concur in “The Leaves were Falling” that the village needs a preacher like 
Katsane “who can preach, instead of howling against [their] sinfulness” (14).  The 
African humanist inclination to appropriate western Christianity to suit the villagers’ 
traditional religious beliefs and practices is displayed in this dialogue, albeit in an 
inchoate, feeble form consistent with the early chronological position of Man Must Live 
in Mphahlele’s career as a writer. 
 
This and other examples cited above should suffice to demonstrate that Mphahlele has 
instanced African humanism not only in the content of his narrative writings, but in the 
wrenching of the normative forms of literary genres from the spell of the assumptions of 
the “centre”. 
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6.4 CLOSING REMARKS 
 
It is hoped that this study has highlighted the difficulties Mphahlele has had to face in 
defining the concept of African humanism, such as having to refine and define his own 
ascription of meanings of words like “African” and “humanism”, and to the expression 
that combines them. Mphahlele’s critics and would-be advisors should strive for a better 
understanding of the true nature and scope of his achievement, because its coherence and 
variousness should succeed in allaying unfounded fears.  Clarification of Mphahlele’s 
concept of African humanism, and the dissemination of this idea through local 
communities and in the minds of individuals, should result at the social level in more 
harmony between people of different races and religions in the South African context in 
particular. 
 
For those who may have been facing a barrier preventing them from plumbing the 
richness of meaning hidden beneath the surface of some expressions in Mphahlele’s 
narrative writings, a re-reading of such works in conjunction with the present study 
should enable them to read hitherto apparently jejune parts of the texts more fruitfully 
and with greater comprehension.  The major approach this study proposes is that readers 
of African literature written (like Mphahlele’s texts) in English need to acquaint 
themselves with the African cultural varieties represented in the works, the starting point 
of which should be a study of the mother tongue/home language or native culture of the 
author, which invariably informs the syntactic structure and content of crucial 
expressions in the works.  In Mphahlele’s case, it would benefit any of his readers 
immensely if they were to make conscious efforts to study his mother tongue of 
Sepedi/Northern Sotho/Sesotho sa Leboa.  The reason is that, although his narrative texts 
are written in English, they are throughout imbued with the cultural vision embedded 
primarily in the author’s mother tongue.  The Northern Sotho language, complete with its 
sociolinguistic appropriateness criteria, is the vehicle by means of which Mphahlele 
exemplifies the philosophy of African humanism.  As this study shows, the existence of 
African humanist consciousness across African cultural clusters does not deny the fact 
that different African peoples do and will always display local(ised) identities.  That is 
why it will be helpful to immerse oneself for example in the sociolinguistic praxis of the 
relatively small cultural group of the Northern Sotho-speaking communities, as a gateway 
to developing a fuller understanding of the African humanist outlook in all its intricate 
complexity. Mphahlele’s use of Northern Sotho linguistic bedrock in his English 
narrative texts is especially concentrated in dialogue, oral literary devices and imagery.  
 
Within the limited demarcations of the scope of this study it has been exemplified that the 
reading of African writers such as Mphahlele will be more rewarding if accompanied 
with a grasp of what African humanism (as a consciousness and a way of life) entails.   
This is mentioned as a polite way of projecting that any study of African literature at an 
advanced level should be accompanied by the learning of the concept of African 
humanism. Of course this puts demands on those faculties and departments in Higher 
Education institutions dealing with philosophy to dedicate more efforts towards satisfying 
the potential demand for learning support materials not just on African philosophy but 
also on African humanism in particular.  It is hoped that, generally and in addition to the 
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specific benefits mentioned above, the didactic sphere can be transformed in an enriching 
manner if the methodological approaches exemplified in this study are accepted as some 
of the many alternatives that should be applied in conjunction, in order for the learner’s 
creative approach to learning to be enhanced. 
 
In short, a multilingual, multicultural approach to the study of Mphahlele’s narrative 
writings and to the study of literature in general is recommended.  More importantly, 
African readers of texts written to signify cultures other than those of the Africans, and 
vice versa, should do such reading with the accompanying, conscious effort to learn 
about the represented cultures beyond the reading of the works of art, in order to deepen 
mutual understanding of various peoples and to move towards the ideal state of mutually-
respecting pluralistic co-existence.  Following this, wounds should also be healed for 
those who have been bearing grudges after mistaking group attitudes for individual traits, 
or the obverse. 
 
Serious questions also arise from the demonstrations of this study regarding linguistic-
cultural accessibility of narrative writings, translation and choice of the language in 
which a work should originally be written.  It is worth considering whether it is best or 
not for a writer setting out to create a work (within a multilingual environment like that of 
South Africa, where cultural interaction should be encouraged), to write originally in an 
African language and then translate forward into English, or write in English first and 
then translate backward into the mother tongue/home language.  Is it worthwhile to avoid 
having to make the above choices by writing in a kind of English which is readily 
accessible to speakers of indigenous languages through employing cultural mediators like 
the devices Mphahlele uses?  In this way native speakers of the medium language will 
also fully access the texts when accompanied by the extra effort of expanding their 
cultural awareness, as this study proposes.  Is anything lost by not writing straight away 
in an indigenous language, following with a translated version of the work?  To us, any 
translation will come back to the kind of English one finds in Mphahlele’s narratives if 
culture-specific meaning is not to be lost.  The route proposed by this study is to 
encourage both original works in indigenous languages and in English, for the native 
speakers of the languages, to be produced.   The works written by mother tongue 
speakers of English should then immediately be available for reading, accompanied by 
the approach of excavating the sociolinguistic cultural context, as suggested above.  For 
non-native speakers writing originally in indigenous languages and then translating into 
English, a good translation such as is used implicitly by Mphahlele in his works should 
follow.  As for non-native speakers writing originally in English, cultural mediation 
should imbue the writing in their texts from the outset, as in Mphahlele’s oeuvre.  The 
reading of such a simultaneous or subsequent translation should also be approached as 
the study proposes in order for access to be complete.  The assumption underlying all 
these recommendations is that for an effective non-native speaker, the use of a second 
language in writing literary texts will always remain at the interlanguage level despite the 
polished surface appearance of the texture of such works.  This is congruous with the 
general postcolonial drift towards the appropriation of English and other languages of 
powerful countries as well as with the self-constituting attitude prevalent among less 
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powerful nations of the world. For this reason, sociolinguistic appropriateness will 
always be premised on the indigenous consciousness which the work embodies.   
 
Recognition of this truth is a resource for multicultural, mutual understanding rather than 
a hindrance, and Mphahlele’s writings are exemplary in demonstrating the practicability, 
as well as the profound social importance, of this technique.  It also facilitates cross-
linguistic understanding in the multilingual society that South Africa is, in which mastery 
of the mother tongue or culture should be seen as a gateway to respecting and learning as 
many as possible of the languages spoken by our compatriots.  Needless to say, such 
learning of our neighbours’ mother tongues or home languages entails learning about 
their cultures as well, whether at the day to day verbally communicative level, or in 
engaging with the literatures that have emerged from and are being created from within 
these various linguistic cultures. 
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